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1ABSTRACT
It is suggested that the lack of progress made towards understanding and
preventing, or even in many cases even alleviating, psychological suffering has been
due, in large part, to the way in which such suffering is conceptualised – as ‘disorder’,
‘illness’ or ‘disease’ which is located, and is thus potentially locatable, within the
individual.   This conceptualisation of psychological suffering is referred to in this thesis
as the ‘Dysfunctional Mind Account’ (DMA). The DMA, it is argued, underlies all
accepted models/theories of psychological suffering and is the dominant way of
conceptualising such suffering for both professionals and lay-people in Western
cultures. It is further argued that the main reason the DMA is unable to assist in
understanding and alleviating psychological suffering is because it is underpinned by
assumptions about human beings and their suffering which are inherently flawed.
The account presented in this thesis places at its centre an analysis of persons and
their experience that attempts to overthrow these assumptions. The resulting
reconceptualisation presents a view of psychological suffering as emergent from our
continual personal and embodied enmeshment within our social world, rather than as
arising primarily out of the various processes occurring ‘within’ us (whether that be our
neurochemistry or our ‘mental mechanisms’ or an ‘interaction’ between them).  It is
essentially suggested that psychological suffering emerges from the same source as all
other aspects of our personal being; from the constant coactions between the various
aspects of our being in the world – personal, organismic and molecular – with the
environment within which we are enmeshed.
This means that the feelings/thoughts/behaviours conceptualised as ‘mental
disorder’ are as much part of our personal being as any other aspect of us; they are not
‘other’, they are not ‘disease’, ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’. Such feelings/thoughts/
behaviours, it is argued, almost always, perhaps inevitably, represent a very adaptive
response, at every level of our being, to environmental contingencies. Thus, when
understood in its full context, the suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’ can be
seen as the very understandable responses of the embodied person to what is happening
to them, rather than ‘un-understandable’ dysfunctions, aberrations and pathological
processes of the ‘mind’ (or brain).
2INTRODUCTION
TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING
I spent day after day crying, huddled up in bed where I felt safe and could do no harm to
myself.  I could not concentrate to read or even watch television, and I did nothing for
hours on end. My appetite disappeared, and I was constantly exhausted.
Kathryn (McNeil, 1993)
Voices, like the roar of a crowd came. I felt like Jesus; I was being crucified. It was dark. I
just continued to huddle under the blanket, feeling weak, laid bare and defenceless in a
cruel world I could no longer understand.
Stuart (Myers, 2001)
The mornings themselves were becoming bad now as I wandered about lethargic . . . but
afternoons were still the worst, when I’d feel the horror, like some poisonous fogbank,
roll in upon my mind, forcing me into bed. There I would lie for as long as six hours,
stuporous and virtually paralyzed, gazing at the ceiling and waiting for that moment of
evening when, mysteriously, the crucifixion would ease up just enough to allow me to
force down some food and then, like an automaton, seek an hour or two of sleep again.
William (Styron, 1990)
That’s when I first started hearing voices and having strange feelings. I got more and
more stressed out. I was about twenty-four years old by then. It was quite bad, but I
thought it was kind of special as well. I felt good when I was hearing those voices
because I used to imagine that it was the boss at work talking to me. As if I was her child
and she was telling me what to do.
Rosemary (Traynor, 1997)
I tried to tell him that I wasn’t coping and I didn’t enjoy my baby. That I was feeling
alternately tearful and angry and thought I was going crazy. I had developed illogical
behaviour and was obsessed by dirt. I was washing everything that fitted into the
washing machine or sink . . . I eventually explained that I was sleeping three hours a
night or less and I hated being a mum.
Fiona (Jeeves, 2004)
I cannot stand being awake. The pain is too much. I have had thoughts of suicide. I get
depressed that I am old. Something has happened to me – this vital spark has stopped
burning – I go to a dinner table now and I don’t say a word, just sit there like a dodo.
Spike (Milligan & Clare, 1994)
3The excerpts quoted above are all descriptions of what is commonly referred to
as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’. It is generally acknowledged that the kinds of
experience referred to by such terms are widespread (Eckersley, 2004; Horwitz, 2002a;
Rothblum, Solomon, & Albee, 1986){Oakley-Browne, 2006 #785} and research also
suggests that the incidence rates for such experiences are rising (Eckersley, 2004;
Seligman, 1990).  Indeed, Seligman (1990) concludes that in 1990 depression (one of the
most common ‘mental disorders’) was ten times more common than it was fifty years
before.
This rise in the levels of misery and distress is also reflected in rising suicide
rates in Western societies (Eckersley, 2004; Public Health Group, 1996; Schumaker, 2001)
with Schumaker (2001) pointing out that between 1960 and 1973 suicide rates doubled in
the 15-24 age group in the United States and tripled for young black people.
Epidemiological and anthropological research strongly suggests that these ‘mental
disorders’ are less prevalent in ‘developing’ countries and that their incidence rises as
societies become more ‘’Westernised’ (see, for e.g., Schumaker, 2001; Warner, 1985).
Indeed, some anthropological reports suggest that ‘insanity’ is rare or non-existent
amongst peoples who have been completely unaffected by Western culture (Schieffelin,
1985; Torrey, 1973; Warner, 1985).
As Rothblum et. al. (Rothblum et al., 1986, p. 171) note, “according to most
informed estimates some 15% of the population of the United States exhibits . . .  serious
emotional disturbances”.  Rothblum et. al. (1986, p. 171) further point out that this
’hard core group’ does not include millions of persons with psychosomatic physical
conditions . . . nor the very large number of other persons who experience acute
emotional upsets as a consequence of life crises.
The reasons for such suffering, and for its apparent prevalence, remain the
subject of much debate amongst mental health professionals and researchers and the
search for a ‘cure’ for the many ‘mental disorders’ which have been identified remains
ongoing.  Indeed, it seems that the relief of ‘symptoms’ has been the primary
achievement thus far, though, as has been pointed out by a number of authors, many of
the ‘symptoms’ of most ‘mental disorders’ nevertheless remain entirely unrelieved (see,
for e.g., Carson, 1996).  This lack of progress is often openly acknowledged, particularly
in reviews of the literature about mental disorders (Walker, Kestler, Bollini, & Hochman,
2004) wherein it is common to find such comments as:
4The progress in the area of affective disorders in the last two decades is impressive, but
despite the availability of a myriad of antidepressants and psychotherapies that have
been shown to possess unequivocal efficacy1 in the treatment of depression, a large
number of depressed patients remain ill. Clearly, advances in the management of
depression would be welcome.
(Nemeroff, 2001)
We do not know the exact cause of bipolar affective disorder. Current theories see it as a
diverse condition, possibly reflecting a number of separate underlying diseases. Different
causes may operate in different people.
(Mental Health Foundation, 1999b)
Despite remarkable advances in the pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy of depression
in the past two decades, the phenomenon remains an intriguing challenge to researchers.
A definitive etiology is still unavailable, and diagnoses are frequently conflicting and
inaccurate.
    (Carr & Vitaliano, 1985, p. 244)
Even though a lot of research into ADHD has gone on around the world, its exact cause
is still unknown. It is likely that there are not one, but several causes, which, when they
occur together, become ADHD. 
               (Mental Health Foundation, 1999a)
All we really know is how to treat depression in the first six weeks. After that there’s
very limited understanding of what you do when the first treatment fails, how long
people should be on medication – it’s pretty much clinical folklore rather than real data.
(Professor Roger Mulder, cited in Philp, 2001)
It is suggested that this lack of progress has been due, in large part, to the way in
which such suffering is conceptualised in the first instance – as ‘disorder’, ‘illness’ or
‘disease’ which is located, and thus potentially locatable, ‘inside’ the individual.   It will
be argued that this conceptualisation, referred to in this thesis as the Dysfunctional Mind
Account2, underlies most generally accepted models or theories of psychological
suffering and is the dominant way of conceptualising such suffering for both
professionals and lay-people in Western3 cultures.
It will be argued in Chapter Two of this thesis that this conceptualisation is
inherently flawed at a theoretical level, and has very little empirical support.  It will be
                                                 
1 This is a highly contested statement (see Breggin, 1991; Ross, 1995a; Whitfield, 2004; Kirsch et al., 2008).
2 The reasons for this will be discussed in some detail in Chapter One.
3 Note that this approach is at its most undiluted in America and that while it is still ‘mainstream’ in Britain
and in Europe it is more contested in these countries (see Gaines, 1982; Sanua, 1993) due to different socio-
cultural forces.
5further suggested that at a practical level such a conceptualisation leads to the search for
both causes and ‘cure’ being focused primarily ‘inside the skin’ of the individual; a
partial approach which leads to only partial and often misleading results. This critique
will lay the groundwork, and provide the rationale for, the attempt in the remaining
chapters of this thesis to reach an understanding of psychological suffering that does not
locate it solely within the individual, but which does not deny the personal ‘embodied’
nature of such suffering.
Before proceeding any further, however, it should be noted that when referring
to the kinds of experiences usually called ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’ I will, in
most instances, use the phrase ‘psychological suffering’. 4  The word ‘suffer’ derives from
the Latin suffero, to suffer – sub, under and fero, to bear.  To suffer is “to feel or bear with
painful, disagreeable, or distressing effects; to undergo (to suffer pain)” (Thatcher &
McQueen, 1952, p. 838).   Because suffering is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of
the vast majority of those behaviours and experiences commonly called ‘mental
disorders’5 to refer to such experiences as ‘suffering’ is relatively unproblematic, if
unspecific.  Importantly it implies no judgements or assumptions about the ‘location’ or
the etiology of these experiences.
To call such suffering ‘psychological’ is also relatively unproblematic, as long as
the word psychological is used to refer simply to a person’s activities in the world6 rather
than to some kind of Cartesian mental space7 entirely separate from the physical or
somatic.  If the word ‘psychological’ is used in this way then the phrase ‘psychological
suffering’ also implies no assumptions about the location or the etiology of the
experiences it refers to.
Of course ‘psychological suffering’ is a very general term, encompassing not only
‘mental disorders’ but so-called ‘normal’ reactions to life’s vicissitudes (e.g., grief, shock,
sadness, frustration, guilt, jealousy8, etc.).  In general, the phrase ‘psychological
suffering’, in the context of this thesis, will refer to those experiences usually called
‘mental disorder’, although, as will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Two, the
boundary line between what is ‘disordered’ and what is ‘normal’ is blurred and
                                                 
4 Unless I am quoting directly or indirectly from other sources.
5 There are, of course, a handful of ‘mental disorders’ listed in the DSM-IV which, it could be argued, do not
seem to involve overt suffering, at least on the part of the ‘disordered’ person, for e.g., antisocial personality
disorder and conduct disorder. Such disorders are, however, far outnumbered by those ‘disorders’ to which
suffering is central.
6 Meaning both those activities referred to by psychologists as ‘mental’ (thinking, believing, dreaming,
remembering, etc.) and as ‘behavioural’  (talking, crying, sleeping, screaming, etc.).  In lived experience the
‘mental’ and the ‘behavioural’ are probably impossible to separate.
7 Indeed, as will become clear, this thesis is fundamentally opposed to such a position.
6constantly moving (posing a constant problem for those who believe in the reality of
‘mental disorders’).  Indeed, this thesis will suggest that the psychological suffering
identified as ‘mental disorder’ is not of a fundamentally different kind from the
psychological suffering seen as ‘normal’ or nondisordered; rather, it is a matter of
increased intensity or duration.  This point is essentially acknowledged by the DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), given that many disorders begin, or are
identified, when ‘normal’ suffering goes on past a certain length of time, or exceeds a
certain level of intensity.
Chapter Outline
Chapter One
It will be argued that the Dysfunctional Mind Account underlies all accepted
models or theories of psychological suffering and is the dominant way of
conceptualising such suffering for both professionals and lay-people in Western
cultures.
Chapter Two
It will be argued that the Dysfunctional Mind Account is inherently flawed at a
theoretical level and has very little empirical support. It will be further argued that this
due to the Account being underpinned with assumptions about human beings and their
suffering which are also inherently flawed.
Chapter Three
An approach to understanding human experience, which could be characterised
as ‘social constructionist’ in its orientation, will be presented which overturns these
assumptions and in so doing overturns the notion of the “atomistic, bounded, coherent,
rational psychological subject endorsed at least implicitly, by most mainstream
approaches” (Cromby, 2004a, p. 797).  I will draw primarily upon the theorising of Rom
Harre, John Shotter and John Cromby whose work is particularly useful within the
context of this thesis because of their focus on the social construction of our experience
of being persons in the world, our ‘personal being’ as Harré (1984a) refers to it.
                                                                                                                                                  
8 Though all of these can easily spill over into becoming ‘disorders’ or at least symptoms of ‘disorders’ if
they go on ‘too long’ or are ‘too extreme’.
7Chapter Four
In this chapter it was acknowledged that the emergence of persons and their
suffering cannot be understood only by looking at sociocultural and discursive factors
because persons are both socioculturally and biologically co-constituted. In order to
facilitate a clearer articulation of the ways in which this co-constitutional process occurs
a brief outline of the developmental approach to biology taken by Steven Rose (1997)
will be provided before discussing some recent research from the biological sciences
illustrating Rose’s (1997) central contention – that the lifeline of an organism is
constructed via its enmeshment in its environment, and thus cannot be understood
without taking that environment into account – an insight which mirrors the social
constructionist position that a person cannot be understood separately from the social
world within which s/he is enmeshed.
Chapter Five
An account will be sketched out which will describe how the feelings/
thoughts/actions which are conceptualised as ‘symptomatic’ of the various ‘mental
disorders’ are emergent from our continual personal and embodied enmeshment within
our social world, rather than arising from processes occurring within us (whether those
processes be neurochemical or ‘mental’).
Chapter Six
In this chapter more detailed analyses will be presented of how, given the
vagaries of each person’s particular life trajectory, two particular ‘clusters of suffering’ –
conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ – may emerge.
8CHAPTER ONE
THE DYSFUNCTIONAL MIND ACCOUNT
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Many within the mental health field suggest that there is no one dominant way
of explaining or understanding psychological suffering (e.g., Clare, 1976; Myers, 2001;
Shorter, 1997; Wing, 1978).  Those who take this position claim that mental health
professionals are essentially eclectic in their approach to such suffering, selecting
amongst a wide variety of ‘models’ and methods and tailoring both their aetiological
assumptions and their therapeutic efforts to the needs of each individual client.
It is further claimed that the multiple ways currently available for
conceptualising and explaining psychological suffering are almost all, to varying
degrees, useful, both practically and theoretically, particularly if some sort of synthesis
can be achieved between them.  This new drive for synthesis is reflected in the current
enthusiasm for the “interdisciplinary bio-psycho-social perspective” (Myers, 2001, p.
534), sometimes referred to as the ‘multi-causal model’ (Gleitman, Fridlund & Reisberg,
2004).   This approach will be discussed in more detail below.
As will be shown in Section 1.3, however, underlying all the ‘mainstream1’
approaches to psychological suffering, including the biopsychosocial model, is the
assumption that certain manifestations of such suffering2 are objectively verifiable
‘mental disorders’, ‘mental illnesses or ‘mental diseases3, and that these problems exist
                                                 
1 By ‘mainstream’ I mean those approaches which have the backing of the major institutions set up within
our society to deal with such suffering; the professional disciplines of psychiatry and clinical psychology,
the research carried out by those involved or associated with these disciplines and the organisations to
which members of these professions belong (e.g., The American Psychiatric Association, The National
Institute of Mental Health, The New Zealand Psychological Society, The Royal Australian and New Zealand
College of Psychiatrists).
2 Usually those that are particularly intense, long lasting or disruptive to the person’s life and/or to the
wider community within which they live.
3 There are a number of referents to such suffering which are essentially variations on the internal
dysfunction / pathology theme; for e.g., ‘psychiatric disorder’, ‘psychiatric illness’, ‘psychiatric disease’, and
‘psychopathology’.
9inside the skin of each individual sufferer. Such ‘disorders’ can be researched, discussed,
debated about, managed, treated and sometimes even cured in more or less the same
way as physical illnesses can.
Essentially this way of conceptualising psychological suffering is grounded in
what is known as the ‘medical-model’ (sometimes also referred to as the ‘disease
model’).  Busfield (1986, p. 16) notes that the terms ‘medical model’ and ‘disease model’
are commonly used to refer to a view of psychological suffering that “locates its
significant causes and treatments exclusively within the realm of the body”.  Svensson
(1995, p. 5), a critic of this orientation, notes that the medical model contains two central
assumptions
1. that the phenomena called mental illnesses are sufficiently like the phenomena
called ‘ordinary’, or bodily, illnesses for the two categories to be subsumed under
a common head-category, and
2. that the two types of phenomena are sufficiently dissimilar to motivate the
separation of them into two distinguishable sub-categories
Svensson (1995, p. 5) further notes that the
espousing of the medical model . . . most often is tied to the notion that ‘mental illnesses
are like any other illnesses’; they are entities or processes located within the ill person,
causing suffering and incapacitation; and just like any other illnesses they could, and
should, be diagnosed and treated by medical expertise.
As Blashfield (1984, p. 26, all italics in original, cited in Follette & Houts, 1996)
points out, the medical model carries with it implicit notions about the ‘management’
and treatment of those who suffer psychologically due to its conceptualisation of such
suffering as ‘disease’. Thus
the persons afflicted with these diseases are called patients; they need treatment from
doctors; diagnosis is an essential first step if one is to prescribe the best therapy and to
predict the natural course of a patient’s disorder. Severely disturbed patients need
medication and perhaps hospitalization; their care should be paid for by health insurance
policies.
Svensson (1995, p. 64) suggests that ‘the medical model’ is probably “the most
frequently used expression in the polemics concerning ‘mental illness’”.  It is the
application of this model to the problems and experiences called ‘mental illness’ that has
been, and continues to be, the target of most critiques, and it is this model that the
defenders of the concept of ‘mental illness’ defend.
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The term ‘medical model’, however, as Busfield (1986, p. 16) points out . . . “has
become a shorthand for a set of ideas about mental illness and psychiatry whose content
is rarely specified. As a result it’s meaning has become extremely vague and imprecise”.
Svensson (1995) notes that there are at least two main understandings of the medical
model as applied to psychological suffering; one that explains psychological suffering as
the result of biological abnormalities and disturbances, and one that characterises
psychological suffering as if it were illness or disease.
Svensson (1995) distinguishes between these two understandings by referring to
the first as the somaticist version of the model, and the second as the metaphorical
version. Indeed, many critics of the ‘medical model’ are actually criticising the narrow
biological version of the model , but are still happy to accept the as if or  ‘metaphorical’
medical model explanation of psychological suffering (e.g., Clare, 1976, Engel, 1980,
cited in Pilgrim, 2002).
Svensson (1995, p. 66) notes that the medical model (in both its guises) tends to
focus on “the cause side of the health-disease complex” and arguments offered by the
proponents of this version “come close to what might be described as sophisticated
versions of . . . “the faulty machine model” of disease4.  While there have been attempts
to break away from the medical model altogether and offer models which focus more on
the effects or consequences side (see Svensson, 1995, p. 66-67) it is the medical model in
both its somaticist and metaphorical guises which dominates psychiatry, and the wider
mental health field today (as will be illustrated in Section 1.2 below, and discussed
further in Chapter Two).
It should be noted here that the new  ‘biopsychosocial’ or multi-causal approach
advocated by many of those who have criticised the somaticist medical model of
psychological suffering is still a traditional medical model account; the only difference
being that it embraces both a somaticist and a metaphorist approach rather than opting
for one or the other. Because of the lack of conclusive evidence that any ‘mental illness’
is caused by malfunctioning biology, however, proponents of the biopsychosocial model
are often forced back into a more metaphorist position to justify the labelling of a wide
range of problems as ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’ (See Chapter Two).
The biopsychosocial position is articulated most clearly by its founder, George
Engel (1980).  Engel argued that mental disorders (like other medical disorders) emerge
within individuals, but that those individuals are also part of a larger system.  This
                                                 
4 Indeed, many influential proponents of this approach to psychological suffering are quite open about such
suffering being due to ‘dysfunctions’ occurring within the person as will be discussed further in Chapter
Two.
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larger system has physical elements that are both sub-personal (biological) and supra-
personal (social and physical environment). This system is conceptualised hierarchically;
the lower levels are necessary for the existence of the higher levels, but they are not
sufficient to describe or explain them.
Pilgrim (2002, p. 586) notes that the biopsychosocial model “was established as a
form of psychiatric orthodoxy” by the 1970s and that it has been particularly useful as a
means of deflecting the criticisms of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’.  As Pilgrim (2002, p. 586)
points out,
Virtually all of the disquiet created by psychiatry since the Second World War has
emanated from a constellation of factors within a reductionist biomedical orthodoxy . . .
The psychiatric professional agenda has constituted a wide target to hit by critics and the
BPS model provides the means to significantly reduce its size.
While some critics claim that the biopsychosocial model “has been relegated to
political lip service in our managed care era” (Gabbard & Kay, 2001), and that many of
its psychiatrist followers have “relapsed into a crude bio-determinism in their clinical
work” (Pilgrim, 2002, p. 586), the model is nevertheless still widely touted as being the
way forward for the mental health field (Clare, 1999; Gabbard & Kay, 2001; Myers, 2001).
Non-psychiatric mental health professionals such as clinical psychologists, social
workers and counsellors of various persuasions particularly favour the biopsychosocial
approach.  It is also still popular amongst psychiatrists who are not determinedly
bioreductionist; allowing them to continue to conceptualise certain problems as ‘mental
illness’, despite the absence of any indication that these problems have biological causes
(e.g., Clare, 1976, 1999).
Gaines (1982, p. 171) makes an important point about the biopsychosocial
approach in his study of the relation of psychiatrists’ definitions of ‘mental illness’, seen
as folk theories, to professional behaviour.  He notes of one of his subjects;
Dr Lauren, however, felt that mental disorders could be caused by biogenic, macro- or
micro-sociogenic or psychogenic factors. This view is not a kind of holistic view as that
held by Dr Sohm in my first study. Rather, Dr Lauren was asserting that any and/or all
of these sorts of factors could be causal agents. Basically, he was asserting an open
position, rather than a holistic view.
This seems to accurately encapsulate the ‘biopsychosocial’ approach as practised
by mental health professionals currently.  For those who espouse this approach the
causal factors of ‘mental illness’ may be biological, or psychological, or social.
Alternatively, such ‘illnesses’ may be caused by an ‘interaction’ between these factors.
Such an approach still divides the biological, the psychological and the social into
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categories that may ‘interact’ with each other but are nevertheless separate, and
separable by science.
Indeed, the biopsychosocial approach seems to share the underlying assumption
of what Ingold (2000) refers to as the ‘complementarity thesis’; an account of the human
being as “a creature of three components, of genotype, mind and culture”. As Ingold
(2000, p. 231) points out, the approaches to these three components, drawn from biology,
cognitive psychology and anthropology, share one fundamental premise “that the
bodily forms, intellectual capacities and behavioural dispositions of humans are
specified independently and in advance of their involvement in practical contexts of
environmental activity”.
The biopsychosocial approach often results in mental health professionals
‘sliding’ between different discourses about psychological suffering (biological,
psychological and social/ environmental) depending on the situation at hand. Barrett
(1996) suggests that this is particularly so for psychiatrists who, while claiming specialist
expertise about the ‘mind’, now have considerable competition from other professionals
for this ‘work-site’ and so tend to “fall back on [their] medical stronghold, the body”.
Barrett (1996, p. 48) further notes that it is
largely a matter of psychiatric discretion to determine the relative mix of body and mind
for each case and to adjudicate . . . on whether a stressful emotional state triggered a
biological illness or that illness caused the emotional state in the first instance.
Despite the apparent openness of the biopsychosocial model to the possibility of
‘mental disorders’ having multiple causal pathways it still tends to function primarily as
a biological model for many of its supporters (Pilgrim, 2002). The biological is seen as
the point of ‘first cause’ and the psychological and the social are seen as ‘triggers’ of that
underlying ‘predisposition’.
As Nicolson (1991/1992) and Rose (1986) point out, even more socially oriented
theories which claim to reject the medical model (in all its forms, including the
biopsychosocial) often continue to pathologise psychological suffering.  Nicolson
(1991/1992, p. 78), discussing depression in women following childbirth, notes that both
the social science account and the clinical/medical account of such suffering employ the
view that ‘post-natal depression’
can (a) be made available to an ‘objective identification’, and (b) is distinct in its quality
from other forms of depression that might be experienced by men or women at times
other than following childbirth.
Pilgrim and Bentall (1999) draw attention to the work of George Brown and
colleagues (Brown & Harris, 1978, p. 20) on the social origins of depression as being a
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good example of this retention of medical model assumptions within a socially based
theory.  Indeed, Brown has made it clear that he believes there is a biological base to
‘depression’ the illness that is different from everyday misery.  Ingleby (1980) likewise
notes that Brown’s work is a version of “weak positivism” because of its uncritical
retention of the diagnostic category of depression.
Kleinman (1988; 1997; 1985), a psychiatrist and anthropologist whose theorising
about ‘mental disease’ is also strongly social in its orientation, also argues that many of
the more serious ‘mental disorders’ may be caused by disordered biology, with
social/environmental factors triggering their onset and either exacerbating or alleviating
their course (see, for e.g., Kleinman, 1988).  Indeed, as Busfield (1986, p. 15) points out
Much of the conflict about the causes of mental illness . . . and about preferable
treatments occurs within this [medical model] framework and does not question its basic
parameters.
It is important to note that this thesis is challenging both versions of the medical
model as articulated by Svensson (1995); the somaticist and the metaphorical.  It is also
challenging the ‘biopsychosocial’ accounts which attempt to combine the two into a
more integrated model of mental health and illness and those social science accounts
which continue to pathologise or implicitly medicalise psychological suffering.
Rather than referring to the ‘medical model account’, the ‘disease model account’
or the ‘clinical/medical account’, however, this thesis will refer to such
conceptualisations of psychological suffering as the ‘Dysfunctional Mind Account’
(DMA).  This avoids the implication that it is only the medical or biological approach to
such suffering that is at issue here.  It also highlights the assumption – underlying all
ascriptions of ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’ – that people’s suffering is the result
of something going wrong with the natural or ‘normal’ functioning of their ‘minds’
(often conflated with the brain in biological accounts).  It is this assumption that will be
the primary focus of criticism in this thesis.
Indeed, as Wakefield (1992b, p. 381), a prolific and widely cited defender of the
concept ‘mental disorder’ notes, there is a “virtually universal tendency to fall back on
dysfunction to explain disorder”.  Wakefield (1992b) further points out that the notion of
‘dysfunction’ occurs “with remarkable consistency in the remarks of many authors who
otherwise differ in their views” including Spitzer and Endicott (1978, cited in Wakefield,
1992b), two of the leading architects of the American Psychiatric Association’s
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual5 (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000).
According to Wakefield, 1992, p. 381) Spitzer and Endicott “noted the seeming necessity
and virtual universality of using dysfunction to make sense of disorder”.  Wakefield
himself has argued in an influential and widely cited series of papers (Wakefield, 1992a,
1992b, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 2002) that a problem cannot be a ‘mental
disorder’ unless it can be established that it is due to the dysfunction of some underlying
‘mental mechanism’.
Klein (1987, cited in Follette & Houts, 1996) has also argued for the importance of
dysfunction as the basis for the concept of disease as applied to ‘mental disorders’.  As
Klein (1987, cited in Follette & Houts, 1996, p. 70) points out
[m]odern science has developed the concept of objective underlying disease processes,
demonstrating that the inference that something has gone wrong is not simply arbitrary.
Disease is defined here as covert, objective, suboptimal part dysfunction.
This notion of the dysfunctioning mind underlies not only all biomedical
accounts of psychological suffering (despite the use of the word ‘brain’ in place of ‘mind’
in these accounts), but also all psychological and most psycho-social accounts (including
the ‘biopsychosocial’ accounts).  The only exception to this is psychoanalytic6 approach
wherein ‘psyche’ is social and formed through interactions with others.
1.2. THE DOMINANCE OF THE
DYSFUNCTIONAL MIND ACCOUNT
This thesis contends that the approach to psychological suffering referred to in
this thesis as the Dysfunctional Mind Account (DMA) – that is the idea that certain
forms of intense or long-lasting psychological suffering are the result of a
dysfunctioning mind (or brain) – dominates the way in which psychological suffering is
conceptualised in Anglo-American7 cultures.  Before going on to discuss the limitations
                                                 
5 A widely used diagnostic system developed by the American Psychiatric Association (see Chapter Two,
Section 2.2.1)
6 I am referring here to the post-Freudian approaches such as the Lacanian, and some Kleinian versions of
psychoanalysis, not to the ‘psychoanalysis’ that was imported into American psychiatry and radically
revised in the process.
7 According to Gaines (1982, p. 178) there are “two distinct major cultural traditions in the West” – the
Mediterranean-Latin tradition and the Northern Europe-Protestant tradition. The Northern-European
tradition “is home to the world-view Weber (1964, cited in Gaines, 1982, p. 179) referred to as
‘disenchanted’” and takes a “practical, empiricist, non-magical approach to the world” (Gaines, 1982, p.
179). It is in the latter that underlies the world-view that dominates Anglo-American societies (including
15
of the DMA, however, it is important to demonstrate the veracity of the claim that the
approach to psychological suffering I am calling the DMA8, far from being the ‘straw
man’ that many defenders of the account suggest (e.g., Clare, 1976; Shorter, 1997; Wing,
1978), exists in, and indeed underpins, all ‘mainstream’ responses to psychological
suffering.
1.2.1. The DMA in professional discourse about ‘mental health’
The primary disseminator of the Dysfunctional Mind Account is the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, first published by the American Psychiatric
Association in 1952 (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1952) and now in its
fourth edition – revised (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The
DSM9 is now one of the most widely used, and certainly the most influential, psychiatric
diagnostic systems in the world (Bentall, 2004; Caplan, 1995; Follette, 1996; Follette &
Houts, 1996; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1997).  As Caplan (1995, p. xviii) notes
Today, in most settings where new generations of psychiatrists and other physicians,
social workers, psychologists, and psychiatric nurses are trained the DSM is the key
volume about mental illness that all trainees must learn from cover to cover. It is also
used as the key volume for a great deal of the research on mental health and mental
illness funded by government agencies and private foundations.
While its dominance is most complete in the United States the DSM system is
also widely used in other countries around the world (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Pilgrim &
Rogers, 1999).  A commonly used alternative to the DSM system in some countries is the
World Health Organisation’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (known by the acronym ICD). The problems listed in the ‘Mental
Disorder’ section of the latest version of the ICD (ICD-10) (World Health Organization,
1990) are very similar, however, to those listed in the DSM-IV.  Indeed, a lot of effort was
expended during the preparation of the ICD-10 to make sure that the diagnostic
categories listed within lined up with those in the DSM-IV. This has considerably
widened the influence of the DSM system and the Dysfunctional Mind Account of
psychological suffering it promulgates.
                                                                                                                                                  
Australia, NZ, Canada, etc.) and it is out of this world-view that psychiatry emerged in the nineteenth
century.
8 Which other critics have variously referred to as the ‘medical model’, the ‘disease model’, the psychiatric
model, or ‘diagnostic psychiatry’.
9 I could have called the approach to psychological suffering at issue in this thesis the DSM account but
decided not to because a significant number of researchers and professionals are clearly in support of the
main tenets of the  Dysfunctional Mind Account (see p. 2, this chapter) but are very critical of the DSM (e.g.
Wakefield, and others)
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As will be further discussed in Chapter Two, all editions of the Manual since
DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) note that to qualify as a ‘mental
disorder’ a person’s suffering
must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the person and society are mental
disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the person.
The DSM then lists a large number of ‘mental disorders’ and provides outlines of the
symptoms that signal the presence of these disorders. As will be discussed further in
Chapter Two, although these ‘disorders’ have surprisingly little theoretical or empirical
support as scientific concepts they are taken as ‘a given’ by the vast majority of
researchers and practitioners in the mental health field simply because they are listed in
the DSM (Follette, 1996).
It should be noted at this point that the first two editions of the Manual were
strongly psychoanalytic in their approach and terminology and there was no set
dividing line between normal and abnormal.  The DSM-III (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980) marked a radical shift towards the more biomedical paradigm that
had been dominant in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Busfield, 1986). As
Bentall (2004, p. 58) points out, by the end of the 1960s
many American psychiatrists had become disenchanted with psychoanalysis, partly
because it had failed to deliver effective treatments but also because it threatened to sever
forever the ties between psychiatry and medicine.
This was primarily due to major problems with the reliability and validity of the
‘disorders’ described in the DSM-I and II; a problem so profound it was threatening to
undermine the legitimacy of psychiatry as a medical discipline (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992;
Bentall, 2004). In order to put an end to this slide into professional oblivion a group of
psychiatrists, headed by Robert Spitzer joined forces to cleanse the DSM system of
psychoanalytic jargon and to return psychiatry to its medical roots.
Gerald Klerman (1978, cited in Bentall, 2004), a high-ranking psychiatrist in the
Federal Government and ardent supporter of the DSM-III, coined the term neo-
Kraepelinian to describe the new attitude to psychological suffering advocated by this
movement.  The term neo-Kraepelinian refers to a return to the approach advocated by
one of psychiatry’s founding fathers, Emil Kraepelin who, as Bentall (2004, p. 42) notes,
“established a paradigm or a set of assumptions” which stated that
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psychiatric disorders fall into a finite number of types of categories (dementia praecox,
manic depression, paranoia, etc.), each with a different pathophysiology and aetiology.
Klerman (1978, cited in Bentall, 2004) outlined the nine propositions that he
believed united this new movement.  These nine propositions, particularly propositions
4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, reflect the Dysfunctional Mind Account in action and are fundamental to
the approach taken to psychological suffering by the DSM.  They are:
1) Psychiatry is a branch of medicine.
2) Psychiatry should use modern scientific methodologies and base its practice on
scientific knowledge
3) Psychiatry treats people who are sick and who require treatment for mental
illness.
4) There is a boundary between the normal and the sick.
5) There are discrete mental illnesses. Mental illnesses are not myths. There is not
one, but many mental illnesses. It is the task of scientific psychiatry, as of other
medical specialities, to investigate the causes, diagnosis and treatment of mental
illnesses.
6) The focus of psychiatric physicians should be particularly on the biological
aspects of mental illness.
7) There should be an explicit and intentional concern with diagnosis and
classification.
8) Diagnostic criteria should be codified, and a legitimate and valued area of
research should be to validate such criteria by various techniques. Further,
departments of psychiatry in medical schools should teach these criteria and not
depreciate them, as has been the case for many years.
9) In research efforts directed at improving the reliability and validity of diagnosis
and classification, statistical techniques should be utilized.
For Klerman (1984, p. 539, cited in Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, p. 6) the DSM-III
represented a “significant reaffirmation on the part of American psychiatry to its
medical identity and its commitment to scientific medicine”. He concluded his speech at
a national convention between proponents and critics of the new manual in 1982 by
suggesting that
The judgment is in; DSM-III has already been declared a victory. There is not a
textbook of psychology or psychiatry that does not use DSM-III as the organizing
principle for its table of contents and for classification of psychopathology. The debate is
already an anachronism. The victory of DSM-III has been acknowledged by our
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colleagues and adversaries in psychopathology, in the other mental health professions
and in other countries.
Klerman (1984, p. 542, cited in Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, p. 6)
Not surprisingly, given the influence of the Manual, the approach to
psychological suffering advocated by the architects of the DSM is strongly evident in
almost all mainstream professional discourse about psychological suffering. A glance
through top mainstream journals of psychiatry10 and clinical psychology11 certainly
confirms this.
In almost every article it is taken as a given that the suffering being discussed is
the manifestation of one particular (or sometimes more than one) ‘mental disorder’
(Proposition 5).  It is also largely taken as a given that there is a clear dividing line
between the ‘mentally ill’ and the ‘mentally well’ (Proposition 4). Also evident in
mainstream journals is an abiding interest in issues surrounding diagnosis and
classification (Proposition 7). Of particular interest is the effort to determine the validity
and reliability of the diagnostic criteria for the various disorders contained within the
DSM (Proposition 8) and various complicated statistical techniques are utilised to this
end (Proposition 9).
The Dysfunctional Mind Account, as promulgated by the DSM, is also reflected
in books written primarily for the use of practising mental health professionals also
reflect the Dysfunctional Mind Account of psychological suffering.  A representative
example is The Hatherleigh guide to Psychiatric Disorders (Hatherleigh Press, 1996), which
describes itself as surveying “a fascinating array of emotional and behavioural disorders
encountered in contemporary American culture”. The Hatherleigh guide uses the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as its framework for discussing each of the
‘disorders’ it canvasses.
Textbooks written for those studying to become psychiatrists and psychologists
are also indicative of the all-encompassing nature of the DMA in the mental health field
(suggesting that the second point in Proposition 8 has been taken to heart).  The
following quotes are taken from textbooks, introductory and advanced, of general
psychology, abnormal psychology and psychiatry.
                                                 
10 American Journal of Psychiatry, Archives of General Psychiatry, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,
British Journal of Psychiatry, Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Psychiatry
11 British Journal of Clinical Psychology, British Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, Journal of Clinical Psychology, Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology
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Scientific research continues to increase our understanding of the human mind. Recent
findings have shed new light on the development of the mind, on its complex
relationship with the body, and on the diagnosis and treatment of its disorders.
The Harvard Guide to Psychiatry (Nicholi, 1999, p. 1)
Abnormal psychology is devoted to the study of mental, emotional, and behavioural
aberrations. It is the branch of psychology, concerned with research into classification,
causation, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of psychological disorders or
psychopathology. Its purview covers a broad spectrum of afflictions and includes
neuroses, psychoses, personality disorders, psychophysiological disorders, organic
mental syndromes, and mental retardation.
Abnormal Psychology (Lazarus & Colman, 1995, p. ix)
A prominent concern in abnormal psychology has been the presence of ‘psychological
deficit’, which can be defined as a decrement in psychological functioning, usually as
assessed by intellectual or laboratory tasks, as a result of a particular clinical disorder.
Investigating Abnormal Behaviour (E. Miller & Morley, 1986, p. 55)
There is a need for instruments that will identify a disorder like depression and which
will measure the degree to which subjects possess this attribute.
Investigating Abnormal Behaviour (E. Miller & Morley, 1986, p. 55)
We turn now to a different sort of variation, one that is a departure from normal
functioning and that carries us into the realm of mental illness. The study of such
conditions is the province of psychopathology, or, as it is sometimes called, abnormal
psychology.
Psychology (Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg, 2004, p. 642)
The medical model’s assumption that psychological disorders are mental illnesses
displaced earlier views that demons and evil spirits were to blame. However, critics
question the medical model’s labelling of psychological disorders as sicknesses. Most
mental health workers today adopt a bio-psycho-social perspective. They assume that
disorders are influenced by genetic predisposition, physiological state, psychological
dynamics and social circumstances.
Psychology (Myers, 2001, p. 537)
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The first quote, from The Harvard Guide to Psychiatry, encapsulates the
Dysfunctional Mind Account12 approach to psychological suffering.  It identifies the
‘mind’ as the thing that is ‘disordered’ and thus the entity that should be the focus of
treatment and enquiry. It also suggests that this ‘mind’ can be understood by application
of the scientific approach.
Indeed, as Busfield (1986, p. 17) notes, the application of science to
understanding the ‘mind’, is
viewed as the lynchpin of psychiatric practice; it is science that permits the boundary to
be drawn between the normal and the pathological; it is science that creates the
possibility of accurate identification of the mentally ill; it is science that provides sound
knowledge of the causes of mental illness; and it is science that provides effective
methods of cure.  Consequently, it is science that determines the essential content and
form of psychiatric practice, what help is offered, where it is offered, and who receives it.
It is important to note here that the word ‘scientific’ is used by psychiatry for
rhetorical purposes; the approach taken to psychological suffering by psychiatry is
anything but scientific in the real sense of the word (Bentall, 2004; M. Boyle, 2002).  The
application of a truly scientific approach would not ‘permit the boundary to be drawn
between the normal and the pathological’, nor help us to accurately identify the
mentally ill as these are value judgements not matters of scientific fact (Boyle, 2000;
Bentall, 2004).
As will be discussed Chapter Two, there is very little research of a ‘scientific’
nature being applied to the causes and cures of those types of psychological suffering
seen as ‘mental illness’.  As will also be discussed in Chapter Two it is not ‘science’ that
determines “the essential content and form of psychiatric practice, what help is offered,
where it is offered, and who receives it”.
The general assumption of the ‘disordered’ or ‘dysfunctional’ mind best
understood and treated by the ‘scientific’ approach is implicit in all of the general
psychology (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bem, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996; Gazzaniga &
Heatherton, 2003; Gleitman et al., 2004; Myers, 2001; Weiten, 2004), abnormal
psychology (Barlow & Durand, 2002; Coles, 1982; Davison, Neale, & King, 2004; Hersen
& van Hasselt, 2001; Lazarus & Colman, 1995) and psychiatry texts (Guthrie & Lewis,
2002; Nicholi, 1999; Tasman, Kay, & Lieberman, 2003) surveyed, although the medical or
disease model variant of it was subjected to a more critical appraisal in psychology texts
than it is in psychiatry texts, as the quote from Myers (2001), above, illustrates.  Even
when criticising the approach characterised as the ‘medical model’ (usually meaning the
                                                 
12 Note that this quote could be interpreted as being in favour of the both versions of the medical model as
outlined by Svensson (1995, see Section 2.1)
21
biological version of the model), however, all these texts continue to refer to
psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’ or ‘psychological disorder’ and to primarily
characterise such suffering as a dysfunction internal to the sufferer.
Pilgrim and Bentall (1999, p. 264) note that “psychologists are more prone to
assume the continuous distribution of personality features and psychological
functioning, including depressive experience (e.g., Eysenck, 1986), whereas psychiatrists
are more likely to argue that illness is a category or discontinuous state (e.g., Kendell,
1975)”.  Nevertheless, most clinical psychology texts almost invariably characterise
psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’.  Many such texts are divided into chapters
devoted to the aetiology, course and treatment (medical terminology) of each individual
‘mental disorder’ (as listed in the DSM).  These disorders are usually taken at face value
and treated as scientifically proven entities rather than as the contested concepts they
actually are (Bentall, 1990; Boyle, 1994, 2002).
Pilgrim and Treacher (1992) suggest that the tendency to work within the
medical paradigm is primarily due to the pre-existing dominance of medicine over
psychological suffering; a fact which had a significant shaping influence on the new
discipline of clinical psychology. Pilgrim (1990) also points out that systematic
psychological theorising about ‘mental illness’ is often biologically orientated “evading
sociological and anthropological modes of deviance”.
Clinical psychology, like psychiatry, is also primarily focused on the individual
(Handy, 1987; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1997).  As Handy (1987, pp. 165-166) notes,
[b]oth the formal models of the discipline and the majority of published clinical research
utilize a scientist practitioner model which concentrates on explaining and treating
individual or family dysfunctions without locating these issues within a broader analysis
of organizational or societal contexts.
Handy (1987, p. 166) further points out that this traditional perspective thus conveys
three implicit messages.
Firstly, that the organizational or social levels of analysis and intervention are somehow
peripheral to the real work of clinical psychologists which concerns the direct treatment
of the personal problems of disturbed individuals. Secondly, that psychological skills are
a form of technological expertise which can be acquired through training in the theory
and techniques of applied psychology. Thirdly, that the application of these skills is
positively valenced and does not involve issues of power, conflict, morality or faith.
It seems, then, that the vast bulk of the literature written primarily for mental
health professionals (journal articles, handbooks, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is in line with
the central tenets of the DMA; that the aetiology and the course of psychological
suffering is located within the psychology and/or the biology of each individual sufferer
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and that such suffering can be categorised into discrete disorders which can be
diagnosed, and hopefully cured, by mental health professionals.   Indeed, as Read and
Harré (2001, p. 224) point out
[s]o strong is the faith in this approach [among mental health professionals] that one
study (Rahav, 1987, cited in Read & Harré, 2001, p. 224) defined agreement with ‘Mental
illness is an illness like any other’ as an example of a ‘liberal, knowledgeable, benevolent,
supportive orientation toward the mentally ill’.
Read and Harré (2001) also note that the belief that psychological suffering is
‘mental illness’ and that ‘mental illness’ is akin to physical illness has been central to
campaigns designed to raise the public’s awareness of such suffering and to reduce the
stigma associated with it.  As the US Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health
pointed out in 1967 (cited in Read & Harré, 2001)
The principle of sameness as applied to the mentally sick versus the physically sick . . .
has become a cardinal tenet of mental health education.
There are numerous examples of this in material released by governmental and
professional organisations on ‘mental health’ topics in New Zealand and overseas. Such
information is vigorously disseminated to the public by both governmental and
professional organisations in an attempt to encourage people to conceptualise more and
more varieties of suffering as ‘mental disorder’.
For example, in ‘Learning about mental illness’ (Ministry of Health, 1993), a
pamphlet distributed by the New Zealand Ministry of Health to educate people about
‘mental illness’, it was noted that
[m]ental illness covers the different types and degrees of disorder which affect the mind
and lead to changes in emotional moods, behaviour, communication, thinking . . . Like
physical illness, mental illness is nothing to be ashamed of and is not someone’s fault.
Another New Zealand Ministry of Health pamphlet entitled ‘Everyday people
and mental illness’ (part of an ongoing campaign to destigmatise ‘mental illness’) states
that
[m]ental illness’ is a term that refers to a group of illnesses that affect a person’s mind –
much the same as ‘heart disease’ refers to a group of illnesses that affect a person’s heart.
[The mentally ill] need the same understanding, support and acceptance as people who
are physically ill. Mental illness is no different.
(Ministry of Health, 1997)
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A pamphlet distributed to the public by the Schizophrenia Fellowship NZ states
that “[m]ental illness is a biologically-based medical problem, like any other illness”.
They go on to note that
The causes of schizophrenia are not fully understood. Biochemical and genetic factors
play a part, and like other complex biological illnesses, there may be environmental
factors.
The Schizophrenia Fellowship NZ also notes, in a booklet entitled About
Schizophrenia (Schizophrenia Fellowship (N.Z.) Inc., 1996, p. 10), that
In the 1960s and 1970s there were many social theories which claimed that patterns of
family interaction were the cause of schizophrenia. There is no evidence to support any
of these theories and no one with any knowledge of the subject would refer to them. 13
The influential National Institute of Mental Health in the United States makes
similar statements on its website.  For example:
Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, autism, and other mental disorders are
serious, often life-threatening illnesses for which we need reliable diagnostic tests, new
treatments, and effective strategies for prevention.
Thomas R. Insell, Director, NIMH (Insell, 2004)
The NIMH mission is to reduce the burden of mental illness and behavioral disorders
through research on mind, brain, and behavior. This public health mandate demands
that we harness powerful scientific tools to achieve better understanding, treatment, and
eventually, prevention of these disabling conditions that affect millions of Americans.
Facts about NIMH, posted 9/4/2004,
(National Institute of Mental Health, 2004a)
Revolutionary scientific advances in neuroscience, molecular biology, genetics, and brain
imaging have provided some of the greatest insights into the complex organ that is the
seat of thought, memory, and emotion. Thanks to these new tools, the scientific evidence
that mental illnesses are brain disorders now exists.
About NIMH, 12 July 2003
(National Institute of Mental Health, 2003, my italics)
                                                 
13 The surety with which the Fellowship assures its readers that schizophrenia is a biological illness (despite
there being little evidence that biological factors play a major causal role in schizophrenia (Bentall, 2004;
Breggin, 1991; Valenstein, 1998; Whitfield, 2004), together with the surety with which they dismiss the
significance of social factors in the aetiology of schizophrenia (despite a large volume of research suggesting
childhood trauma may play a causal role in the problems commonly subsumed under the label
‘schizophrenia’) (Read, 1997; Whitfield, 2004), betrays an ideological rather than a scientific approach to the
suffering with which they are concerned. As Whitfield (2004, p. 173, author’s italics) points out over the last
forty years “for every one study that addressed the trauma-schizophrenia link there have been forty-six on
genetics and thirty on the biochemistry of schizophrenia . . . a remarkable discrepancy that biases all results
in favor of the biogenetic theory by a ratio of 74 to 1”.
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The DMA is also dominant in material aimed at those suffering from specific
‘mental disorders’. For example, in its campaign to raise awareness of depression in
men, Real Men, Real Depression it is declared:
Depression is a serious but treatable medical condition - a brain disease - that can strike
anyone, including men.
Real men, real depression public awareness campaign
(National Institute of Mental Health, 2004b)
The American Psychiatric Association, one of the most powerful organisations in
the mental health field similarly states on the Public Information section of its webpage
that
Mental illness is an illness that affects or is manifested in a person's brain. It may impact
on the way a person thinks, behaves, and interacts with other people. The term "mental
illness" actually encompasses numerous psychiatric disorders, and just like illnesses that
affect other parts of the body, they can vary in severity. Many people suffering from
mental illness may not look as though they are ill or that something is wrong, while
others may appear to be confused, agitated, or withdrawn.
It is a myth that mental illness is a weakness or defect in character and that sufferers can
get better simply by "pulling themselves up by their bootstraps." Mental illnesses are real
illnesses--as real as heart disease and cancer--and they require and respond well to
treatment.
(American Psychiatric Association, 2004,my italics)
NAMI (National Alliance for the Mentally Ill), an organization which offers
support and advocacy for ‘consumers’, families and friends of people with ‘severe
mental illnesses’, also enthusiastically endorses the DMA account of psychological
suffering, particularly its biological version.  For example, in describing depression,
NAMI (National Alliance on Mental Illness, 2006, author’s italics) notes
Major depression is a serious medical illness affecting 9.9 million American adults, or
approximately 5 percent of the adult population in a given year. Unlike normal
emotional experiences of sadness, loss, or passing mood states, major depression is
persistent and can significantly interfere with an individual’s thoughts, behavior, mood,
activity, and physical health. Among all medical illnesses, major depression is the leading
cause of disability in the U.S. and many other developed countries.
There is no single cause of major depression. Psychological, biological, and
environmental factors may all contribute to its development. Whatever the specific
causes of depression, scientific research has firmly established that major depression is a
biological brain disorder.
The Surgeon General of the United States also endorses an ‘illness/disease’
understanding of psychological suffering.
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Mental illness is a term rooted in history that refers collectively to all of the diagnosable
mental disorders. Mental disorders are characterized by abnormalities in cognition,
emotion or mood, or the highest integrative aspects of behavior, such as social
interactions or planning of future activities. These mental functions are all mediated by
the brain. It is, in fact, a core tenet of modern science that behavior and our subjective
mental lives reflect the overall workings of the brain. Thus, symptoms related to behavior
or our mental lives clearly reflect variations or abnormalities in brain function.
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999)
The above discussion strongly suggests that the conceptualisation of
psychological suffering as being due to some kind of individual disorder or dysfunction
of the mind (or brain) is central to the majority of mainstream professional discourse
about such suffering.  Indeed, it seems there are no mainstream mental health
organisations or advocacy groups that do not take this position.
It seems then that the neo-Kraepelinians have been very successful in their
campaign to establish that ‘mental illnesses are not myths’.   The notion that mental
health professionals are dealing with real entities (i.e., that ‘depression’ and
‘schizophrenia’ and ‘obsessive-compulsive disorder’ are valid scientific constructs)
which can be easily identified in the ‘real world’, now seems essentially unquestioned in
the vast majority of mainstream professional discourse.
While many of the quotes I have cited above could be interpreted as embracing
both versions of the DMA (the biological/somaticist and or the psychological/
metaphorical) many of them clearly favour the biological version.  It has been pointed
out by a number of authors (Barrett, 1996; Kemker & Khadivi, 1995; Lipowski, 1989;
Luhrman, 2000; Pam, 1995b; Pilgrim, 2002; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Sanua, 1993;
Whitfield, 2004; Breggin, 1991; Valenstein, 1998) that the biological version of the DMA
is becoming increasingly dominant within psychiatry.
Interestingly, despite the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual
the DSM claiming ‘theoretical neutrality’ (i.e., that it makes no aetiological claims) the
Association recently issued a press release (American Psychiatric Association, 2003) that
suggested that the organisation did in fact support a more biologically oriented position
on ‘mental illness’.  This statement was in response to “those who would deny that
serious mental disorders are real medical conditions that can be diagnosed accurately
and treated effectively” (American Psychiatric Association, 2003, p. 3) and noted that
Research has shown that serious neurobiological disorders such as schizophrenia reveal
reproducible abnormalities of brain structure (such as ventricular enlargement) and
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function. Compelling evidence exists that disorders including schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and autism to name but a few have a strong genetic component14.
It is perhaps not surprising that the APA is becoming more explicit in its
endorsement of a more biological approach to mental illness considering that the
architects of the DSM-III were strong advocates of such an approach (Bentall, 2004; Kirk
& Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997).  Indeed, one of the main aims of Robert
Spitzer and his fellow neo-Kraepelinians15 was to place psychiatry firmly back into the
fold of general medicine and, towards that end, to focus psychiatry primarily on the
biological aspects of mental illness.
This biological slant is also reflected in psychiatric training (Breggin, 1991;
Kemker & Khadivi, 1995; Luhrman, 2000; Reiser, 1988). As American psychiatrist Susan
Kemker (Kemker & Khadavi, 1995, p. 242) notes
throughout most of my residency, I took for granted the medical model of
psychopathology. I did not always grasp the fine points of biological research, but I
certainly respected it. As far as I knew, biology was the ‘science’ of psychiatry.
Kemker (Kemker & Khadavi, 1995, p. 246) further notes that
As a psychiatric resident . . .  I would explain that mental illness is caused by a chemical
imbalance in the brain. Mental illness resembles diabetes, which involves a chemical
imbalance in the body, I would explain. The patient’s psychiatric disorder is chronic, I
would say, and requires medication every day for the rest of the person’s life. I would
then assure the patient that if he took the medication, he would probably live a normal
life.
Because psychiatry holds a dominant position amongst ‘mental health providers’
it is perhaps not surprising that there has been an increasing tendency for many other
mental health professionals, academics, mental health advocacy groups and
governmental agencies to also align themselves with the biological version of the
approach (Whitfield, 2004), as is clear from many of the quotes cited above.
This enthusiastic endorsement of the biological version of the DMA occurs
despite a startling lack of evidence that psychological suffering is caused by faulty
biochemistry, anatomy or genes (Boyle, 2002; Breggin, 1991; Joseph, 2003; Ross, 1995a,
1995b; Valenstein, 1998; Whitfield, 2004).
                                                 
14 Again, as Chapter Two will illustrate, this evidence is highly contested.
15 Neo-Kraepelinian is a term coined by Gerald Klerman to refer to the return to conceptualising
psychological suffering as a biologically based illness.
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1.2.2. The DMA in the mass media
While the DMA is spread to the public via the publications of governmental and
professional organisations it is the mass media (newspapers, magazines, internet,
television, radio) that are the main disseminators of this approach (particularly its
biological version) to the general public (Busfield, 1986; Horwitz, 2002a; Shorter, 1997).
As Horwitz (2002a, p. 117) points out,
In the contemporary world, the media often work in tandem with medical authorities
and pharmaceutical companies to promote the latest fads and fashions in psychiatric
diagnosis. Clients often use the knowledge they obtain from the media and from their
informal social networks to preselect those professionals they know will be sympathetic
to their self-diagnoses.  Professionals and sufferers participate in a common culture of
illness display disseminated through the mass media.
A perusal of a selection of articles run recently on ‘mental health’ in Time, a
popular American magazine aimed at the more ‘serious’ end of the market, is indicative
of the media’s approach to psychological suffering.  For example, a recent edition of the
magazine (November 3, 2003) ran an article purporting to take a critical look at the
increasing use of psychiatric drugs on children and young adults.  Despite its critical
premise, this article took it as a given that the varieties of suffering it described were
‘mental disorders’, and also that these ‘mental disorders’ were essentially biochemically
based.   As the journalist confidently asserted about one young woman:
[t]he problem, though neither Andrea nor her teacher knew it, was that her adolescent
brain was being tossed by the neurochemical storms of generalized anxiety disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) – a decidedly lousy trifecta.
(Kluger, 2003. pp. 42-43)
The majority of articles featuring in a special edition of Time (January 20, 2003),
focusing on the relationship between mental and physical health, were equally confident
that the various ‘mental disorders’ identified by psychiatry were valid concepts with
mainly physiological causation.  For example:
Schizophrenia is the most personally destructive and least understood of all the major
mental illnesses . . . The cause is undeniably physical – perhaps the unhappy
combination of a genetic predisposition and an infection suffered in the womb.
 (Gorman & Cole, 2003, p. 66)
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Scientists have made great strides in sorting out the underlying causes of depression: it is almost
certainly a defect of some combination of key genes, plus the right triggering
environment . . . But while the disease-depression connection is becoming more and
more clear, how to uncouple them is an uncharted process.
(Lemonick, 2003, p. 46)
Even those articles in this feature which were less ‘disorder-oriented’ such as ‘Is
there a formula for joy?’ (Corliss, 2003) or those which were more critical of the
psychiatric approach like ‘How we get labelled’ (Cloud, 2003) basically accepted the
existence of ‘mental disorders’.  The only article in which the ‘mental disorder’ approach
was openly questioned was a one-page tongue-in-cheek look at the multitude of mental
disorders the author could potentially be suffering from (Kirn, 2003).   This article was
sandwiched between “One family’s burden” (Gorman & Cole, 2003) a serious look at the
‘major mental illness’ schizophrenia and ‘Postcards from the brain’ (Park, 2003) which
declared confidently that with the information provided by new brain scanning
technologies “doctors are beginning to understand – at the level of the neuron – how
mental illnesses occur” (Park, 2003, p. 70).
This uncritical acceptance of the notion of ‘mental disorders’ seems to be equally
common in the New Zealand media.  In an article called ‘The Unfriendly Isles’, about the
difficulties faced by non-European migrants to New Zealand, the journalist noted that
Many refugees have mental health problems. Overseas research estimates the number at
more than 50 percent, “ranging from chronic mental disorders to trauma, distress and a
great deal of suffering”.
(O'Hare, 2004, p. 18)
The same article also quotes Auckland psychiatrist, Dr Sai Wong, who suggests that
Caught up in the daily struggle to build a new life . . . refugees often put their mental
anguish down to the difficulties of finding a job or separation from family . . . They think
pathological depression is just a common variety of unhappiness.
(O'Hare, 2004, p. 18)
Implicit in this quote is the assumption that the kind of suffering we call ‘mental
disorder’ is not ‘just suffering’, it is pathology. Another example of this assumption
occurred on National Radio’s Nine to Noon show (10 February, 2003) when the host,
Linda Clarke, asked the lawyer of a Sri Lankan girl facing deportation by the New
Zealand Government
Is the child not eating or drinking as some kind of protest or is this the symptom of
mental illness?
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This question again accepts the idea that the kind of suffering called ‘mental
illness’ is quite different from any other.  The young woman could be refusing food and
drink as ‘a kind of protest’, in which case she is in charge of her behaviour and that
behaviour can be understood within the ‘normal’ frame and rendered ‘meaningful’.  If
she is refusing food and drink because she is ‘mentally ill’, however, her behaviour can
no longer be understood within the normal frame and becomes, essentially,
meaningless.  The ‘mental illness’ becomes the explanation for the behaviour.  The
notion that it is the ‘mental illness’ that causes many kinds of psychological suffering is
fundamental to the Dysfunctional Mind Account.  As the Schizophrenia Fellowship NZ
points out to its readers in a pamphlet entitled Understanding Mental Illness16,
Mental illness can cause people to behave in unusual ways or to think or feel very
differently from other people.
Implicit in such statements is the notion that a behaviour is either ‘normal’ and
thus self-driven and essentially ‘rational’  (i.e., that the girl could have been refusing
food and drink as a protest) or it is ‘symptomatic’ of a mental illness, and thus beyond
the person’s control and ‘irrational’ (in which case the girl could have been refusing food
and drink because she was driven to do so by her ‘mental illness’). The people
responsible for deciding whether behaviours are ‘normal’, or not, are primarily
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 
It has been suggested by a number of authors that the continual claims by both
the media and professional organisations and advocacy groups that more and more
forms of psychological suffering are ‘illnesses’ is leading to what is often referred to as
the ‘medicalisation’, or perhaps more accurately ‘psychiatrisation’ of more and more
aspects of human life (Conrad, 1980, 1992; Conrad & Potter, 2000; Fox, 1994; Horwitz,
2002a; P. Miller, 1986).
Indeed, this is a matter of concern for many of those who embrace the DMA, but
who see their position as being compromised by the increasing number of ‘normal
distresses’ which are being drawn into the realm of ‘mental disorder (Horwitz, 2002a,
2002b; Shorter, 1997).  Many such critics blame psychiatric ‘empire building’ and drug
companies attempting to create bigger markets for their products, and the media’s buy-
in to these trends.  As Shorter points out (1997, p. 290),
The boundaries of what constitutes depression have been expanded relentlessly outward.
Depression as a major psychiatric illness involving bleakness of mood, self-loathing, an
inability to experience pleasure, and suicidal thoughts has been familiar for many
centuries. The illness has a heavy biological component. Depression in the vocabulary of
                                                 
16 This pamphlet was sponsored by Eli Lilly & Company (NZ) Limited. Such alliances between patient
advocacy groups and drug companies are very common.
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post-1960s American psychiatry has become tantamount to dysphoria, meaning
unhappiness, in combination with loss of appetite and difficulty sleeping. Thus it comes
as no surprise that the incidence of depression so defined has been rising and occurring
at ever younger ages.
Such critics suggest that this ‘psychiatrisation’ or ‘psychologisation’ of normal
distress is drawing attention and resources away from ‘real mental disorders’, which, as
Shorter (1997, p. 323) points out, cause “terrible pain and disablement”. They are also
concerned that it is undermining the disorder-based approach to psychological
suffering; if people begin to doubt the credibility of some of these newer ‘non-disorders’
then they may begin to doubt the credibility of the entire approach.
1.2.3. The DMA in the discourse of the ‘mentally ill’
A medical diagnosis of PND [post-natal depression] took the pressure off me.
(Jeeves, 2004, p. 118)
Depression has darkened my life for a long time now, and despite my best efforts there
has been no escaping it. It has hounded me wherever I’ve gone, following me halfway
around the world and back, like a dark and ominous cloud.  I liken it to an eclipse of the
sun, taking the light and colour away, and leaving only a world of grey.  My treatment
and rehabilitation began four years ago at Sunnyside Hospital, where I have been treated
as an outpatient, but I have been ill for a lot longer than that.
(McNeil, 1993, p. 13)
I was diagnosed with bipolar disorder 18 months ago.  I kind of always wondered what
was different about me. I’d always been quite a hyped up, racy, kind of full-on person,
always rushing somewhere or doing something.  It wasn’t until I looked back recently at
some of the comments people have made to me over the past four years in particular that
I had any idea that I was different to other people.  It was when I was doing two PR
papers at Massey, working fulltime, a secretary for two voluntary committees, a wife and
a mother that things started to fall apart.  Eighteen months ago three police officers and
an emergency psychiatric nurse came to my house. I asked them to take their shoes off
and they wouldn’t and I got mad. I actually assaulted them and was taken kicking and
screaming handcuffed by the hands and feet – carried out like a roll of carpet to a police
car and taken to the secure psychiatric unit at Wellington Hospital.
(Simmons-Donaldson, 2003, p. 6)
I’ve had ADHD for 10 years now. I was diagnosed with it in kindergarten. Truthfully, I
don’t remember every detail of my life before ADHD, but there are some things I can’t
help remembering. For example, in kindergarten I was sent to the “time-out chair” about
two or three times daily. The reason? I would say things that would hurt the other kids.
Why did I say these mean things? Because I’d never think about what I was going to say
or the consequences. Another thing I’ll never forget is how antsy and talkative I was.
Every day after lunch, there was a competition to see whose table was the quietest. Of
course, I could never stop talking or moving, so my table was always last.
Andrea (Castro, 2003, p. 50)
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When I was really bad I heard other voices. They were people from my work. It was
getting out of control so that’s when I had to leave and saw the psychiatrist. She told me
then that I had schizophrenia. That was really quite awful, because she had to try to
explain it to my father as well.
(Traynor, 1997, p. 172)
I knew nothing about mental illness. I had long periods of depression, not knowing I was
sick. I just blamed myself for being lazy . . . I did some stupid things, I drank my own
urine, stripped in public, tried to kill myself. I ran away from home and did crazy things.
(O'Hare, 2004, p. 18)
During this time my husband began to have affairs with other women. My depression
got worse. I began to isolate myself. I was afraid to see people . . . I didn’t realise I was
suffering from a mental illness. When it became too hard to bear I overdosed on drugs.
(O'Hare, 2004, p. 13)
The quotes cited above are all from first-person accounts of psychological
suffering (obtained from media sources and books) in which the suffering is
acknowledged by the sufferer to be a ‘mental disorder’ of some kind.   This acceptance
of psychological suffering as ‘illness’ or ‘disorder’ is actively encouraged by many
mental health professionals (Kemker & Khadivi, 1995; Read & Harré, 2001).
The author of the first excerpt cited above was diagnosed with postnatal
depression17, a diagnosis which she claimed “took the pressure off me” (Jeeves, 2004, p.
118) noted that at the time of her ‘illness’ she was reluctant to take medication but “in
hindsight this should not have been my choice as I was too sick to make the right
decision” (Jeeves, 2004, p. 118).
The second excerpt is by a journalist who, given the opportunity to write an
article about ‘depression18’, decides to “admit to herself and others” that she has a
mental illness.  She discusses her ‘illness’ in primarily medical terms; noting that there
are
two types of depression, reactive and endogenous19. Reactive depression is caused by an
external force such as grief – the loss of a loved one, redundancy, divorce, surgery, or
moving house. Endogenous depression is brought about by a chemical imbalance in the
                                                 
17 Post Natal Depression is not designated as a separate ‘disorder’ in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000).  If a woman becomes depressed within 4 weeks of giving birth she is diagnosed as
suffering from a mood disorder (there a number of these and her diagnosis would depend on her
‘symptoms’).  The specifier ‘With Postpartum Onset’ is then added to the original ‘disorder’.  So, for e.g., the
woman could be diagnosed as suffering from ‘Mixed Episode of Major Depressive Disorder with
Postpartum Onset’.
18 See Chapter Six for a description of ‘major depressive disorder’.
19 This distinction is not made by the DSM-IV firstly because the endogenous/exogenous distinction is
highly contentious even amongst those who support the DMA (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992) and also because
the distinctions carry implications about etiology, which the DSM eschews in its attempts to be
‘atheoretical’.
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brain. To the sufferer there is no apparent reason for it. My depression is thought to be
endogenous.
(McNeil, 1993, p. 13)
She acknowledges that being told her depression is ‘endogenous’ makes it
“harder to deal with, and more difficult to accept”.  Nevertheless she does accept her
diagnosis and the “life sentence of swallowing pills” that it entails (McNeil, 1993, p. 13).
The author of the third excerpt, diagnosed with bipolar disorder20, was also quite
accepting of her diagnosis, noting that it explained why she had always been different
from other people.  She also points out that she suffered “a minor brush with depression
not long after my father died” and “suffered from postnatal psychosis” after the birth of
her two daughters. She suggests her mental illness may have something to do with her
“designer genes”.
The author of the fourth excerpt is an American teenager who has “had ADHD21
for 10 years now.  I was diagnosed with it in kindergarten” (Castro, 2003, p. 50).   After
trying Ritalin “which was not very good for me” (Castro, 2003, p. 50) she now takes
Adderall.  She states that her medicine “lets me perform to my full ability” (Castro, 2003,
p. 50). Nevertheless she notes that her personality has changed because of it and she has
“lost a whole bunch of friends”, which gets her “depressed at times” (Castro, 2003, p.
50).  She also notes that her relationship with her family has changed.
When I am off my medication, I am hysterically funny with my parents and a lot more
imaginative in playing with my younger sister and brother. But I also have a shorter
temper, which leads to conflicts with my sister. We make each other cry. So my condition
and treatment have definitely affected my family, for good and bad.
The person cited in the fifth excerpt migrated to Australia when she was five and
felt ostracised and different in her new country.  Her mother, with whom she still lives,
hit her and was “really bad with her nerves” and she was frightened of her father who
was bad tempered and distant.  She started hearing voices at nineteen and a psychiatrist
put her on Trofrinil (antidepressant) and then, after learning that she was hearing voices,
put her onto Largactil (anti-psychotic).   This woman notes that while “perhaps you can
never completely recover [from schizophrenia22] . . . if you can accept your illness, you’re
on your way to recovery” (Traynor, 1997, p. 179).
                                                 
20 ‘Bipolar disorder’ is a ‘mood disorder’ characterised by episodes of ‘mania’ (extremely elevated mood)
alternating with episodes of ‘major depression’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
21 ‘Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder’, the essential feature of which is a “persistent pattern of
inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and severe than is typically observed in
individuals at a comparable level of development” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
22 See Chapter Six for a description ‘schizophrenia’.
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The author of the sixth extract migrated to New Zealand from Asia with her
husband and daughter.  Her and her husband attempted to start two businesses, both of
which failed causing her to “crack” with the stress.  She, like all the others quoted above,
was accepting of her diagnosis (of bipolar disorder) and after recovery she now helps
run Bo Ai She, a self-support group for other Asian women recovering from mental
illness.
The author of the sixth extract is also a migrant to New Zealand. She still misses
her family and her homeland and “unable to speak English well or engage with the New
Zealand way of life, she found her life beginning to unravel” (O'Hare, 2004, p. 13). She
has tried to kill herself eight times. She now realises she is “suffering from a mental
illness” (depression).  There is no indication in the article of what treatment she received
or whether she is recovering.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the dissemination of the DMA to the public via
the media, either directly (through interviews with mental health professionals/experts)
or indirectly (through journalists’ assumptions that the MDA is scientific fact), accounts
such as these are becoming increasingly common in public discourse about such
suffering (Horwitz, 2002a). Of course these accounts in turn, because of their public
nature, also play a part in the further dissemination of the DMA.
Such accounts suggest a general acceptance, indeed even a willingness, on the
part of those who are experiencing certain kinds of distress to attribute that distress to
some sort of disorder or dysfunction inside themselves.  As the above authors were all
concerned to point out, their suffering had been officially diagnosed as ‘mental
disorder’.  They were not mad, or malingering, neurotic, or imagining things; they were
ill.  It is important to note, of course, that the prevalence of such accounts in the media
does not necessarily reflect a general acceptance of a diagnosis of ‘mental illness’
amongst all those who suffer psychologically; rather, it may be that those who do not
accept that they are ‘mentally ill’ are less likely candidates for media interest. If this is so,
of course, it suggests a bias towards an illness or disorder based conceptualisation of
psychological suffering on the part of the media.
1.2.4. The DMA in lay-people’s conceptualisations of psychological
suffering
As Whittle (1996, p. 259) points out, by the early 1970s
it had been concluded that the lay ability to recognise mental disorder had increased at
least as far as serious mental disorder was concerned and that mental illness was
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increasingly regarded as an illness like any other illness which was the message behind
much of the psychiatric educational efforts in the ‘50s and ‘60s.
Whittle (1996) goes on to note that there had been a continuing trend to construe
mental disorder in this way ever since.  This is supported by the Surgeon General’s
Report (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999) in which it was noted
By 1996, a modern survey revealed that Americans had achieved greater scientific
understanding of mental illness . . . The public learned to define mental illness and to
distinguish it from ordinary worry and unhappiness. It expanded its definition of mental
illness to encompass anxiety, depression, and other mental disorders. The public
attributed mental illness to a mix of biological abnormalities and vulnerabilities to social
and psychological stress.
Interestingly, however, a number of studies suggest that despite the public’s
willingness to accept the idea that certain forms of psychological suffering are ‘illness’, it
seems that they considerably less willing to accept what Svensson (1995) would refer to
as the Somaticist Medical Model account (where psychological suffering is seen as a
biological illness).  Research has suggested that the predominant lay view seems to
reflect a more Metaphorical Medical Model account (where the notion of ‘illness’ is used
metaphorically, allowing for causal theories beyond the biological) (Angermeyer,
Matschinger, & Holzinger, 1998; Furnham & Bower, 1992; Furnham & Kuyken, 1991;
Furnham & Rees, 1988; Jorm et al., 1997; Kemker & Khadivi, 1995; Kuyken, Brewin,
Power, & Furnham, 1992)
There are some exceptions to this general support for more psychosocial theories,
however.  For example, Angermeyer, Matschinger and Hozinger (1998) found that
relatives of schizophrenics held more ‘biological/constitutional’ beliefs than other lay
people.   The authors suggested that this was because of “greater exposure to the
knowledge of psychiatric experts and their having to deal with their own feelings of
guilt”. Kuyken, Brewin, Power & Furnham (1992) also found that depressed patients
tended to endorse biological explanations more than clinical psychologists did, perhaps
for similar reasons. Indeed, as Drew (1996) found in her analysis of the discourse of
depressed patients one of their major aims was to deflect blame for their problems away
from themselves and towards other sources, with the ‘illness discourse’ (i.e., biologically
based) being one effective means of achieving this.
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1.3. CONCLUSION
In this chapter it has been suggested that the Dysfunctional Mind Account is
central to most public discourse (professional and lay) about certain kinds of
psychological suffering, particularly that which is long-lasting and/or intense.  Such
suffering is widely accepted to be the manifestation of some kind of  ‘mental illness’ or
‘mental disorder’ and is generally located within the mind (or brain) of the sufferer.  The
individual person is also seen as the main target of treatment and intervention23, with
the individual’s biology often being the primary target (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Sanua,
1993; Whitfield, 2004). This conceptualisation makes it considerably less likely that such
suffering will be seen as understandable response to life and increasingly likely that it
will be viewed, by professionals, sufferers and laypeople alike, as ‘ununderstandable24’.
As Horwitz (2000, p. 4) points out
A huge cultural transformation in the construction of mental illness has occurred in a
relatively short time. The broad array of mental illnesses at the beginning of the twenty-
first century has little resemblance to older stereotypes of madness that persisted
throughout most of human history   . . . The extensive use of disease categories for a wide
variety of human behaviours is unique in human history; most of the many mental
illnesses that are now taken for granted as objective natural entities are recent creations.
Such widespread acceptance of the DMA, however, does not necessarily mean
that conceptualising psychological suffering as ‘disorder’ or ‘dysfunction’ is well
founded theoretically, and nor does it mean that it is effective in a practical sense.  In the
following chapter it will be argued that the conceptualisation of psychological suffering
referred to in this thesis as the Dysfunctional Mind Account is not adequate to the task
of explaining, alleviating (in the long-term), or preventing psychological suffering.
                                                 
23 This is not to deny that many ‘treatments’, particularly those of a ‘psychological’ kind, attempt to
intervene at a relationship or family group level.  Such approaches, however, are less common, particularly
for the so-called ‘major mental disorders’, than more individually based treatments (Pilgrim & Rogers,
1999).
24 In General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1913, 1963, cited in Sass, 2002) examines the relationship between
understanding and disorder, noting that understanding sometimes reaches the point where despite every
effort to empathise with a person, their experiences or behaviour are ‘ununderstandable’ – ‘one psychic
event follows another quite incomprehensibly; it seems to follow arbitrarily rather than emerge’ (Jaspers,
cited in Szmukler, 2004). At this point, argued Jaspers (1913, 1963, cited in Sass, 2002), we encounter signs of
a ‘mental illness’, and some sort of ‘dysfunction’ of ‘mind’ or brain must be occurring.
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CHAPTER TWO
PROBLEMS WITH THE DYSFUNCTIONAL
MIND ACCOUNT
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the general acceptance of the DMA amongst most mainstream mental
health professionals and many lay-people this approach to psychological suffering has
long been the subject of intense criticism, not only from academic disciplines such as
psychology, sociology, philosophy and anthropology but also from non-medical mental
health professionals, disaffected ‘consumers’ of mental health services and even from
within psychiatry itself.   Such criticisms began in earnest during the 1960’s and 1970’s
and, as Svensson (1995, p. 2) notes, were part of a “broad and multi-faceted critique of
many established ideas, institutional practices and taken-for-granted ways of thinking
about and dealing with human affairs”.
Many of these early critics are grouped together as the ‘anti-psychiatrists’,
though as Svensson (1995, p. 12) points out “they were actually a very heterogeneous
group, differing widely as to ideological platform and motivation”.  Thomas Szasz (e.g.,
Szasz, 1960, 1970, 1974, 1993) and R.D. Laing  (e.g., Laing, 1967) are perhaps the best
known of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’.  Szasz focused directly on questioning the validity of
the concept of ‘mental illness’ to make his point that psychiatry was an instrument of
social control rather than a genuine medical speciality dealing with genuine medical
illnesses.  R.D. Laing claimed that those problems called ‘mental disorders’, and in
particular schizophrenia, were actually a normal or expected reaction to pathological
situations.
Other early critics, sometimes also characterised as ‘anti-psychiatrists’1, such as
Thomas Scheff (e.g., Scheff, 1986, 1999) and Erving Goffman (e.g., Goffman, 1962)
argued that psychiatry functioned as a politically repressive force, and that ‘mental
disorders’, rather than being ‘real-world’ entities, were primarily instruments of social
                                                 
1 See, for example, psychiatrist-historian Shorter’s discussion of the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’ that
includes Foucault, Goffman and Scheff (1997, pp. 274-276).
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and ideological control. This theme has also been explored in a number of
‘historiographies’ of psychiatry by authors such as Michel Foucault (1965), Robert
Castel, Francois Castel & Anne Lovell (1982), Klaus Doerner (1981) and Andrew Scull
(1979; 1993).
This criticism sparked a spirited response from the psychiatric profession, who
provided counter-attacks in books such as Psychiatry in dissent by Anthony Clare (1976),
Reasoning about Madness by John Wing (1978) and The Reality of Mental Illness by Martin
Roth and Jerome Kroll (1986). Indeed, as has been noted in Chapter One, the
development of the ‘biopsychosocial’ approach to ‘mental illness’ was a direct result of
criticism that psychiatry was overly biological and reductionist in its approach to
psychological suffering.
The critiques directed against psychiatry and the DMA were also, at least in part,
responsible for the change of direction taken by the Third Edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III).  As already discussed in Chapter One
this version of the Manual abandoned the psychodynamically inspired approach which
informed the first two manuals and focused on delivering a nosological system which
was more “empirically based and scientifically rigorous” (Millon, 1986).
The sustained criticism of the conceptualisation of psychological suffering as
‘mental illness’ (referred to in the DSM as ‘mental disorder’) also stimulated a number of
publications attempting to defend the validity and usefulness of the concept (see for
example Boorse, 1981, Macklin, 1981, Margolis, 1980, all cited in Svensson, 1995;
Wakefield, 1992a, 1992b).  The necessity of defending the concept against critics also
played a role in the decision of the Task Force who oversaw the development of the
DSM-III to provide a definition of ‘mental disorder’ in the Introduction to the Manual
(Millon, 1986).  This definition, and the difficulties encountered in defending it, will be
discussed below.
Despite psychiatry’s claims that the debate is now over (Klerman, 1984, cited in
Kirk & Kutchins, 1992); that “mental illness does indeed exist” (O'Connell, 1988, p. 1025),
and that psychiatry is a legitimate and necessary enterprise (Clare, 1976; Shorter, 1997)
the criticism has continued.  Much of this more recent criticism has been aimed at the
political-ideological place of psychiatry in modern Western societies.  Some examples of
such critiques include those of Andy Treacher and Geoff Baruch (Treacher & Baruch,
1980), Joel Kovel (1980), Peter Miller (1986), Nikolas Rose (1986), Joan Busfield (1986),
and Stuart Kirk and Herb Kutchins (1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997).  There have also been
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several feminist critiques of psychiatry, for example Elaine Showalter (1987), Phyllis
Chessler (1989) and Jane Ussher (1991).
Some recent critics have also focused their attention specifically on the biological
version of the DMA, for example Alvin Pam (1995), Colin Ross (1995a; 1995b), Ellen
Borges (1995), Elliot Valenstein (1998), Peter Breggin (1991) and Charles Whitfield (2004).
Other critics have taken issue with the DMA from within a cross-cultural or
anthropological perspective, for example John Carr and Peter Vitaliano (1985), Gananath
Obeyesekere (1985), Leo Kirmayer (1994a; Kirmayer, 1994b), Charles Keyes (1985), and
Rob Barrett (1996).
While many of the more recent critiques have been directed at the entire
enterprise of psychiatry; its theoretical foundations, its institutions, its treatment
technologies, and its ideological-political position in Western societies there has,
nevertheless, been a continuing focus on questioning the validity of the concept ‘mental
illness’.  Indeed, Svensson (1995, p. 7) suggests that the concept of mental illness is “the
pivot around which the entire debate [about the validity and usefulness of the
psychiatric approach] rotates”.
Some examples of recent critiques directed specifically at the concept of ‘mental
illness’ include Tommy Svensson (1995), David Ingleby2 (1980), Edwin Wallace, Jennifer
Radden and John Sadler (1997), Allan Horwitz3  (2002).  Many of these more
conceptually based critiques have focused their attention specifically on the validity of
certain ‘disorders’, examples being Richard Bentall (1990) and Mary Boyle (Boyle, 1990;
1994; 1996; 2002)(schizophrenia4), and David Pilgrim and Richard Bentall (1999)
(depression), an exercise which inevitably raises questions about the validity of the
wider concept of ‘mental illness’.
It is this conceptualisation of psychological suffering as illness, disorder or
disease, and its consequent placement within a medico-scientific framework, that will be
the focus of critical discussion in Section 2.2 of this chapter5.  If this conceptualisation
                                                 
2 Ingleby’s (1980) critique also highlights the political and values implications of the ‘positivist science
paradigm’ within which the concept of ‘mental illness’ is justified and within which psychiatry works.
Indeed, most of the critics I cite above touch on both theoretical and political-ideological aspects of
psychiatry, I have listed them according to their main focus.
3 Horwitz (2000), while criticising what he calls ‘diagnostic psychiatry’s’ over-zealous attempts to label every
human problem ‘mental disorder’ does believe that there are ‘real’ mental disorders.  This does not,
however, negate the importance of his critique, which focuses on exposing the culturally constructed nature
of most ‘mental disorders’.
4 Schizophrenia has been singled out for particularly intensive criticism for its “weak diagnostic accuracy,
uncertain aetiology and dustbin-like character” (Miller, 1980, p. 23), starting with the work of R.D. Laing in
the 1960s.
5 It should be noted that underlying and informing all of the problems with the DMA discussed in this
chapter is a more fundamental problem relating to how the concept of ‘mind’ is understood.  The
conceptualisation of psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’ is only possible because of the reification of
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cannot be defended then serious doubts are raised concerning the validity and
usefulness of the entire Dysfunctional Mind Account of psychological suffering.
It will be argued by supporters of the DMA, however, that what really matters,
conceptual difficulties notwithstanding, is the practical utility of the DMA.  Thus it is to
the DMA’s effectiveness at generating strategies for the alleviation and prevention of
psychological suffering to which attention will be turned in Section 2.4.
2.2. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING AS ‘MENTAL
DISORDER’: DEFENDING THE
INDEFENSIBLE
Insanity is, after all, only a disease like other diseases . . . a mind deranged can be
ministered to no less effectively than a body deranged . . . The problem of insanity is
essentially a public health problem to be dealt with on modern public health lines.
(Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, 1926, cited in N. Rose, 1986)
Underlying the arguments put forward by all but the most determined
somaticists to justify conceptualising psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’ is the
notion that certain kinds of psychological suffering can be usefully conceptualised as
analogous to physical disorder. If belief in this analogy did not exist it would make no
sense to call certain types of psychological suffering ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’,
nor would there be a mandate to deal with such suffering within a medico-scientific
framework.  Thus, it is of particular importance for psychiatry and allied mental health
professionals to defend the conceptualisation of psychological suffering as ‘illness’ or
‘disorder’.
In this section I will discuss some of the efforts to define and defend the general
concept of ‘mental disorder’, an exercise which highlights the considerable difficulties
involved in this enterprise and brings into sharp focus the major problems involved in
conceptualising psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’.
While debates about the meaning of ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ do take place in the
area of general medicine they tend to be of primarily academic interest; few medical
professionals (researchers or practitioners) expend much concern over whether the
                                                                                                                                                  
those aspects of human experience seen as ‘psychological’ or ‘mental’ (e.g., thoughts, feelings, perceptions,
dreams, etc.) into an entity we call ‘mind’. Once this entity is created it is possible to talk about things going
wrong with this ‘mind’.  The issues raised by this reification will be discussed in Section II of this thesis.
40
problems they are dealing with are ‘real diseases’.  Nor do they question the
appropriateness of dealing with these problems within a medical framework6.  For
mental health practitioners and researchers, however, defining and defending the
concept of ‘mental disorder’, and justifying its inclusion within a medico-scientific
framework, is considerably more challenging, particularly for those who are not
determinedly somaticist.
As Fulford (2001, p. 80) points out
It is with mental disorder, not physical disorder, that the most acute conceptual
difficulties in clinical work and research in medicine arise.
This, in and of itself, suggests that conceptualising psychological suffering as
‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’ is quite different, and considerably more
problematic, than conceptualising physical suffering as ‘disease’ or ‘illness’.
Nevertheless, efforts to do so, and to justify doing so, have been particularly strenuous
in the last four decades.
The criticisms of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’ during the 1960s and 1970s stimulated
the first wave of attempts to ‘nail down’ what ‘mental illness’ really was (e.g., Clare,
1976; Kendell, 1975).  This led to an attempt to provide a definition of this highly
contested concept in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), which
stimulated, according to Sadler (1996, p. 220), a “renewed if ambivalent, interest in the
definition of mental disorder”.
Attempts to define ‘mental disorder’/‘mental illness’ tend to cluster around
several major themes, with many theorists straddling more than one of these.  These
themes include:
1) Mental disorder is statistical deviation from the norm (e.g., Kendell, 1975; Taylor,
1971; Scadding, 1967, cited in Wakefield, 1992b)
2) Mental disorder is essentially a value judgement reflecting a deviation from
some alternative experiences/behaviours which are considered to be more
desirable (e.g., Sedgwick, 1982, cited in Wakefield, 1992b)
3) Mental disorder is biologically disadvantageous (e.g., Boorse, 1976; Kendell,
1975)
4) Mental disorder is what mental health professionals treat (e.g., Taylor, 1976)
                                                 
6 This is not to say, however, that there is no debate about the traditional medical approach to physical
problems (see, for a discussion of this, Busfield, 1986).
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The various attempts at defining mental disorder outlined above have been
criticised by a number of authors, including the above-mentioned authors critiquing
each others work7.  Wakefield (1992b, p. 374) provides a useful summary of the various
problems inherent in each of these attempts to define ‘mental disorder’ and concludes
that
Despite a vast literature spanning philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and medicine
devoted to the concept of mental disorder, there currently exists no widely accepted
analysis that adequately explains even generally agreed upon, uncontroversial
judgements about which conditions are disorders.
I will now look at two major attempts to remedy this situation; the definition
provided by the DSM-III (and repeated in subsequent versions of the Manual) and the
‘harmful dysfunction analysis’ of disorder presented by Jerome Wakefield (Wakefield,
1992a, 1992b, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 2002).
2.2.1 DSM-III definition of ‘mental disorder’
The attempt to formally define ‘mental disorder’ within the DSM-III has been
particularly contentious because of the influence wielded by the Manual on research and
practice in the mental health field (see Caplan, 1995; Follette & Houts, 1996; Wakefield,
1992a). Any definition of ‘mental disorder’ endorsed by the DSM could not fail to exert a
major influence on how psychological suffering was subsequently conceptualised, and
dealt with, by mental health researchers and practitioners, as was outlined in Chapter
One.
The first attempt at defining ‘mental disorder’ for the purposes of the DSM was
as follows
A medical disorder is a relatively distinct condition resulting from an organismic
dysfunction which in its fully developed or extreme form is directly and intrinsically
associated with distress, disability, or certain other types of disadvantage. The
disadvantage may be of a physical, perceptual, sexual, or interpersonal nature. Implicitly
there is a call for action on the part of the person who has the condition, the medical or its
allied professions, and society. A mental disorder is a medical disorder whose
manifestations are primarily signs or symptoms of a psychological (behavioural nature),
or if physical, can be understood only by using psychological concepts
(Spitzer & Endicott, 1978)
This definition is metaphorist (see Chapter One for a discussion of metaphorist
and somaticist versions of the DMA) in that it requires acceptance of the notion that a
‘mental disorder’ is the same as physical disorder, except that in the case of the mental
                                                 
7 Wakefield criticises all of them, Kendell criticises Taylor, and vice versa.
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disorder the signs and symptoms (and quite possibly the causes) are of a psychological
rather than a physical nature. As Follette and Houts (Follette & Houts, 1996, p. 1124)
point out, however, despite its metaphorist leanings this definition “raised the hackles of
psychologists” because of its open declaration that ‘mental disorders’ were medical
problems; the implication being that they were primarily the responsibility of medically
trained professionals. Eventually, after considerable debate and mooted legal action, the
American Psychiatric Association agreed to drop any references to mental disorders
being medical disorders from the final draft of the DSM-III.
The definition that finally appeared in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980) is as follows:
In DSM-III, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant
behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is
associated with present distress (e.g., painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in
one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. In addition, this
syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned
response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its
original cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral,
psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g.,
political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the person and
society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction
in the person.
This definition has remained essentially the same through subsequent editions
and revisions of the Manual (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, 1994, 2000),
despite the criticism directed at it from a wide variety of sources since it was first
suggested. The only change is the substitution of the word ‘person’ in the earlier DSMs
with the word ‘individual’ in the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR definitions.
As Follette and Houts (1996, p. 1122) note, while there was now no explicit
statement that the medical model was the organizing principle for the DSM, the
“underlying ontologies of a weakly stated medical model are easily deducible from [the
content of the Manuals]”.  The ‘medical model’ implicit in the DSM is primarily
metaphorist in character, although it allows for the possibility that “biological entities”
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) may play some part in the etiology of certain
‘mental disorders’8.
The DSM definition of ‘mental disorder’ has been criticised by a number of authors
(e.g., Boyle, 2002; Caplan, 1991, 1995; Follette & Houts, 1996; Pantony & Caplan, 1991;
                                                 
8 Though not overtly specified in the DSM-III the intention of those who developed this Manual was to re-
medicalise psychiatry (see, in support of this point, the discussion of the ‘Kraepelinian Manifesto’ Chapter
One, Section 1.2.1).
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Sadler & Agich, 1996; Wakefield, 1992a; Wallace et al., 1997) on numerous counts,
including:
1. The vague use of value-laden terms such as ‘clinically significant’,  ‘present
distress’, ‘important’, ‘impairment’, ‘freedom’, and ‘expectable’ (Caplan, 1995;
Wallace et al., 1997). As Caplan (1995, p. 55) points out, the use of such terms
without defining them more precisely leaves “enormous scope for subjectivity
and bias”.
2. The failure to distinguish between ‘behavioural’ and ‘psychological’ or to clearly
define what either term actually means within the context of the definition
(Wallace et. al., 1997).
3. The failure to define the term ‘dysfunction’ (Wakefield, 1992a; Wallace et al.,
1997). As Wakefield (1992a, p. 235) points out “there is a serious problem with
defining disorder directly in terms of dysfunction, if no analysis of dysfunction
in simpler terms is provided”.  Wakefield (1992a, p. 235) goes on to note that “the
two concepts are so close in meaning that such a definition does not substantially
advance understanding”.
4. The failure to clarify the ontological relationship between “a person (‘the
disordered’) and his or her ‘disorder’” and the meaning of saying that a
‘disorder’ occurs ‘in’ a person (Wallace et al., 1997, p. 70).
In relation to this last point, Wallace et al. (1997, p. 70) note that
it would seem that the only way we could localize ‘mental disorders’ (i.e., patterns of
experience and behavior) in persons is to reconceive persons purely organismically and
neurobiologically (i.e., nonphenomenologically and nonsymbolically, with psychosocial
and interpersonal perspectives and etiological models discarded altogether).  Otherwise .
. . we are faced with the products of complex (biopyschosocial) originating and sustaining
multicausality; and ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ become at best metaphors for ‘private’, subjective
and ‘public,’ objective or intersubjective . . . ‘In the individual’ would then refer to
personal tendencies or dispositions manifested in specifiable situations, circumstances, or
environments – i.e., in relational configurations.
It should be noted that this point applies not only to the DSM definition of
‘mental disorder’ but to all attempts to define the concept, and indeed to all approaches
to psychological suffering which seek to define such suffering as illness or disorder. In
raising this point Wallace et al. (1997) are highlighting fundamental questions about the
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nature of ‘mind’ and its relationship to the body, questions which are rarely addressed
in mainstream psychiatric or clinical psychology literature9.
2.2.2. Wakefield’s ‘harmful dysfunction’ analysis
One of the most prolific, influential and widely cited critics of the DSMs
definition of ‘mental disorder’ is Jerome Wakefield (1992a; 1992b; 1997a; 1997b; 2002).
Wakefield’s attempt to redefine ‘mental disorder’ as ‘harmful dysfunction’ has been
utilised by several authors to determine the validity of a number of ‘mental disorders’
(see for e.g., Richters & Cichetti, 1993).
Wakefield’s account is particularly useful in the context of a discussion of the
limitations of the Dysfunctional Mind Account because his criticisms of the DSM
definition of ‘mental disorder’ (and of the whole DSM classification system) are of a very
fundamental nature.  Indeed, Wakefield (1997a) suggests that in the case of many
diagnostic categories the DSM is incapable of distinguishing between ‘disorder’ and
‘non-disorder’.
Such criticisms raise serious questions about not just the DSM, but also about its
conceptual underpinnings; the notion that certain forms of psychological suffering are
‘mental disorders’.  Wakefield’s critique is all the more compelling because he is not a
radical; he is essentially in support of the DMA, and he is in support of a categorical
taxonomy like that presented in the DSM for listing the disorders he firmly contends
exist.
Wakefield is fully aware of the implications of the difficulties faced by the DSM
and sets out to provide a ‘treatment’ for its ‘disorder’ in the form of his own ‘harmful
dysfunction analysis’; one of the most concerted (he has written numerous articles on
the subject over more than a decade) and rigorous attempts to place ‘mental disorder’ on
a firm conceptual footing attempted to date.  As such it provides a vivid illustration of
just how difficult it is to define and defend the concept, particularly within a primarily
metaphorist framework.  It is also representative, in many respects, of the assumptions
underlying all Dysfunctional Mind Accounts of ‘mental disorder’; so the problems
associated with Wakefield’s account are similarly associated with most such accounts.
                                                 
9 Indeed, in subsequent chapters it will be argued that it is to these questions which attention needs to be
urgently turned if we are to reach any clearer understanding of the kinds of psychological suffering
currently conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’.
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Wakefield does not disagree with the DSM definition’s basic premise that
“mental disorders . . . are distresses or disabilities (or other harms) resulting from
internal dysfunctions” (Wakefield, 1997, p. 635).  Indeed, Wakefield’s stated goal is not
to overthrow the DSMs definition, but to refine it so that it is capable of allowing “a
coherent and valid distinction to be drawn between clear cases of mental disorder and
nondisorder that is consistent with the use of disorder in the broader medical sciences”
(Wakefield, 1997a, p. 635).
As Lilienfeld and Marino (1995, p. 411) point out
Whereas most attempts to define disorder are predicated on either value or scientific
criteria, Wakefield proposed that the proper analysis of disorder incorporates both value
and scientific criteria. Specifically he argued that disorder is best conceptualized as
‘harmful dysfunction’ whereby ‘harm’ is a societal judgment regarding the undesirability
of a condition (i.e., the value component), and ‘dysfunction’ is a ‘failure of a mechanism
in the person to perform a natural function . . . (i.e., the scientific component).
Wakefield suggests that this dysfunction requirement is in line with the “basic
intuition underlying judgements of disorder . . . that something has gone wrong with
some part of the organism” 10 (Wakefield, 2002).
Neither requirement, for the presence of ‘harm’, or the presence of ‘dysfunction’,
differs markedly from DSM’s definition of ‘mental disorder’, which also incorporates a
harm requirement and a dysfunction requirement. Where Wakefield differs from the
DSM is that he makes an effort to provide an analysis of what the internal dysfunction
aspect of a ‘mental disorder’ would actually comprise and how it would be recognised.
Wakefield’s ultimate aim is to provide a rigorous enough analysis of the dysfunction
aspect of ‘mental disorders’, to allow a dysfunction requirement to be incorporated into
the diagnostic criteria in some way (see, for e.g., Wakefield, 1997a).
Wakefield (1992b) begins his analysis of  ‘dysfunction’ by noting that the ‘failures
of function’ implied by the term ‘dysfunction’ are failures of what he refers to as ‘natural
functions’.  He illustrates what ‘natural functions’ are by showing how one would go
about distinguishing the natural functions of bodily organs (e.g., hearts, lungs, etc) from
their other ‘effects’, giving as his example the heart, which “has the effects of pumping
the blood and making a sound in the chest, but only pumping blood is the natural
function” (Wakefield, 1992b, p. 382).
                                                 
10 It is this notion, that psychological suffering represents a dysfunction in the individual, which this thesis
seeks to challenge. This notion not only profoundly affects how such suffering is viewed, treated and
experienced, it also means that it is the individual, and what is going on ‘inside’ them, either metaphorically
or literally, who becomes the focus of enquiry in seeking to understand such suffering.
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Wakefield (1992) goes on to note that functional explanations can be “plausible
and very useful even when little is known about the actual nature of a mechanism” (p.
382) and suggests that
with natural mechanisms, as with artifacts, the benefits that they provide are so
remarkable and depend on such intricate and harmonious interactions that it is often
reasonable to infer that the benefit is not accidental.  In such cases, if no alternative
explanations exist, it is reasonable to infer that the artifact exists because it has these
effects. For example, it cannot be merely a happy accident that the eyes enable us to see,
the legs enable us to walk . . . The eyes therefore must exist in part because they enable us
to see, that is, the fact that the eyes provide sight must somehow enter into the
explanation of why we have eyes.
(Wakefield, 1992b, pp. 382-383)
The usefulness of functional explanations, even applied to mechanisms about
which little is known, leads Wakefield (1992b, p. 383) to the main point of his argument;
that such an analysis “applies equally well to the natural functions of mental
mechanisms11 and thus forms a common basis for the attribution of physical and mental
disorder”.  Wakefield (1992b, p. 383) suggests that
[l]ike artifacts and organs, mental mechanisms such as cognitive, linguistic, perceptual,
affective, and motivational mechanisms, have such strikingly beneficial effects and
depend on such complex and harmonious interactions that the effects cannot be entirely
accidental.
The application of such functional explanations to ‘mental’ phenomena yield,
according to Wakefield (1992b, p. 383), “ascriptions of dysfunctions when respective
mechanisms fail to perform their functions”.
Wakefield (1992b) then provides his analysis of ‘dysfunction’ with what he refers
to as “some theoretical substance” (1992b, p. 383) by linking it to evolutionary biology.
As Wakefield (1992b, p. 383) explains:
Today evolutionary theory provides a better explanation [than other competing
explanations] of how a mechanism’s effects can explain the mechanism’s presence and
structure.  In brief, those mechanisms that happened to have effects on past organisms
that contributed to the organisms’ reproductive success over enough generations
increased in frequency and hence were ‘naturally selected’ and exist in today’s organisms
. . . Because natural selection is the only known means by which an effect can explain a
naturally occurring mechanism that provides it, evolutionary explanations presumably
underlie all correct ascriptions of natural functions.  Consequently, an evolutionary
approach to personality and mental functioning is central to an understanding of
psychopathology.
For Wakefield (1992b, p. 383) this linking of the concept of ‘dysfunction’ with
evolutionary biology means that “[d]ysfunction is thus a purely factual scientific
concept”, although he does concede that “discovering what in fact is natural or
                                                 
11 Wakefield seems to take the existence of these ‘mental mechanisms’ as a given and makes no real attempts
to define what they are or defend their existence (see Boyle, 2002; Sadler & Agich, 1996).
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dysfunctional (and thus what is disordered) may be extraordinarily difficult”
(Wakefield, 1992b).  While Wakefield seems unconcerned about the implications of this,
placing his faith in future scientific progress to clarify matters, such ‘difficulties’ point to
fundamental problems with his definition of ‘mental disorder’, and with the entire
enterprise of attempting to conceptualise psychological suffering as such.
As Wakefield (1997a, p. 647) points out, assumptions and
presuppositions, however inchoate, about underlying mechanisms and their functional
programming underlie every disorder attribution, and one benefit of the harmful
dysfunction analysis is that it encourages us to start being more explicit in formulating,
evaluating and improving these assumptions.
One of the most striking aspects of Wakefield’s analysis is that it does make so
explicit one of the fundamental assumptions underpinning the concept of ‘mental
disorder’, the assumption of the existence of an ‘internal dysfunction’12.  Wakefield’s
efforts to define, ‘operationalise’ and provide ‘scientific’ justification for the existence of
such ‘dysfunctions’ expose difficulties not just with his own analysis but with the entire
enterprise of attempting to validate the concept of ‘mental disorder’ and attempting to
apply that concept to psychological suffering.
Critics of Wakefield’s attempt to define ‘mental disorder’ have highlighted a
number of problems with his analysis.   Because Wakefield’s ‘harmful dysfunction
analysis’ is really no more than a sophisticated attempt to justify present mainstream
notions of what a ‘mental disorder’ is, it is useful to look at some of the key criticisms
which have been directed at it because they apply to most mainstream accounts of
psychological suffering, including the DSM’s.  These criticisms highlight some of the
fundamental problems faced by those attempting to justify the conceptualisation of
psychological suffering as ‘mental disorder’.
2.2.3.  Criticisms of Wakefield’s ‘harmful dysfunction’ analysis
2.2.3.1 Assuming prior validity of ‘mental disorders’
Boyle (2002, p. 96) notes that though “one of the fundamental tenets of scientific
practice [is that] concepts must be tied to observable events . . . psychiatric concepts [are]
not tied to observables in this way; that is, there [are] no clear rules for inferring them”.
                                                 
12 The DSM assumes such dysfunctions, but no attempt is made to provide any analysis of how one would
go about establishing the existence of these dysfunctions in order to utilise them as a means of determining
the presence of ‘mental disorder’.  It is this that Wakefield aims to achieve with his ‘harmful dysfunction
analysis’.
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Boyle (2002) notes that when this was pointed out by Hempel (a philosopher of science)
the response of psychiatry was not to question whether the original concepts (i.e., the
various ‘mental disorders’) were ‘real’ but to try to come up with ‘operational
definitions’ for them. As Boyle (2002, p. 96) points out, this was not the correct way to
proceed because
in scientific activity, the observations or ‘operations’ come first and the concepts second
as a consequence of them. Concepts developed this way come, as it were, ready equipped
with correspondence rules; to suggest that it is reasonable to try to find these for existing
concepts is nonsensical, a back-to-front view of research.
As Boyle (2002, p. 229) notes, Wakefield, like most others who attempt to define
‘mental disorder’, acts in this same ‘back-to-front’ manner by starting with an existing
concept and “searching for a ‘correct’ set of correspondence rules13 for inferring it”.
Wakefield (1999b) justifies his ‘back-to-front’ approach by arguing that he, along
with Spitzer and Endicott (Spitzer & Endicott, 1978) and Klein (1978, cited in Wakefield,
1999b), was simply “formulating theories to explain a distinction we already make”.  He
goes on to suggest that
such an analysis is successful if it meets the scientific objective of providing an adequate
explanation of existing judgements about disorder and nondisorder. Such analyses do
not stipulate how we should use ‘mental disorder’ but rather attempt to capture how we
do use it.
(Wakefield, 1999b, p. 1011, emphasis in the original)
Boyle (1990) notes that it is perfectly reasonable to study how people use terms
like ‘mental disorder’ but points out that Wakefield seems to be trying to do a lot more
than this. His suggestion that ‘disorder’ is a purely scientific concept, in that it exists
“over and above value judgements” (Wakefield, 1999b, p. 1011) and his use of phrases
like ‘genuine disorders’ or ‘truly disordered’ is part of a concerted effort to stipulate
exactly how the concept ‘mental disorder’ should be understood rather than trying to
‘capture how we do use it’.
Wakefield, in spite of his claims to the contrary, and in common with most
defenders of the Dysfunctional Mind Account, does not question the validity of the
concept ‘mental disorder’, despite the difficulties surrounding it.  Rather he sees his task
as offering a more rigorous or more ‘exact’ definition of it. Boyle (2002, p. 229) suggests
that this is like trying to come up with a more rigorous or more exact definition of sin
                                                 
13 In the natural sciences correspondence rules specify what has to be observed before a concept can be
inferred and “may specify quantitatively the relationship between variation in what is observed and
variation in the inferred construct. The correspondence rules for the concept of intelligence, for example,
specify the relationship between observable responses to items on a standardised test and ‘amounts’ of the
unobservable concept, intelligence” (Boyle, 2002, p. 4).  The ‘correspondence rules’ for ‘mental disorders’ are
essentially the agreed-upon diagnostic criteria (as outlined in the DSM for example).
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and then trying to provide a scientific basis for “common-sense distinctions between sin
and other forms of wrong-doing”.  Boyle (2002, p. 229) further notes that
[i]f this analogy seems strange it is only because in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries mental disorder has assumed a reality in Western culture almost as
unquestioned as the reality of sin in earlier times; it is this assumed reality which makes
it look as if the task of finding a scientifically based definition of mental disorder is
reasonable.
2.2.3.2 What is a ‘natural function’ and how do we know it’s
dysfunctioning?
Wakefield (1992a; 1992b) suggests that in order to identify a dysfunction we first
have to establish a mechanism’s ‘natural function’ in order to know that it is failing to
perform this function.  For Wakefield, identifying a mechanism’s ‘natural function’ is a
purely scientific exercise involving no value judgements at all.  Indeed, it is imperative
for Wakefield’s argument, that it be so or otherwise deciding whether a ‘natural
function’ is dysfunctioning would have no scientific basis; rather it would be a value
judgement.
A number of authors, however, challenge the notion that a ‘natural function’ can
actually be defined value free (Fulford, 2001; Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995; Sadler & Agich,
1996; Wallace et al., 1997).  As Sadler and Agich (Sadler & Agich, 1996, p. 224) point out,
Wakefield’s discussion of ‘dysfunction’ (in Wakefield, 1992a, p. 236) “reveals several
value terms – beneficial, benefit, and failure – which are central to his analysis, yet resist
restatement in descriptive terms”.  They go on to note that
this is not surprising because functionalist definitions of disease (or disorder) naturally
employ value terms in elaborating the concept of function. This unavoidable use of value
terms partly explains why these accounts fail.
(Sadler & Agich, 1996, p. 236)
Sadler & Agich (1996) also note that Wakefield’s appeal to evolutionary biology
to provide a value-free purely scientific basis for the concept of dysfunction is
misguided. They suggest that Wakefield seems unaware that his interpretation of
evolutionary theory, in particular his implication that organs or ‘mental mechanisms’ are
‘intended’ to or ‘designed’ to function in a particular way, is “itself contested by
evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology” (Sadler & Agich, 1996, p. 224).14
                                                 
14 A number of theorists (e.g., Gould, 1991, Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989, Williams, 1996, cited in Lilienfeld &
Marino, 1995) have pointed out that many important physical systems were not actually designed by
evolution to perform a particular function. Rather they were by-products of adaptations that have since
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Wakefield also seems unaware that for evolutionary theory to do the job [he] expects, it,
too, must be value-free.  As Sadler and Agich (1996) argue, notions of ‘design’ or
‘intention’ (even if used ‘metaphorically’) cannot be ‘value-free’. There are also
fundamental questions over whether we can ever know the ‘natural functions’ of
mental, or even physical, mechanisms, given our “incomplete and perhaps intrinsically
limited knowledge regarding the natural origins of mental and physical systems”
(Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995, p. 412).
Even if the notion of ‘natural functions’ was unproblematic, Wakefield fails to
provide any means for directly establishing a means of distinguishing between natural
functions and dysfunctions, as Boyle (2002) and Follette and Houts (1996) point out.
Indeed, Wakefield acknowledges that “discovering what is in fact natural or
dysfunctional may be extraordinarily difficult” (Wakefield, 1992a, p. 236).
Instead, Wakefield invokes the clinical experience of each individual mental
health professional in order to decide whether a dysfunction is present or not.  He
suggests that in order to do this, clinicians would have to determine,
1. whether the response (symptoms) is so extreme “that nothing but the breakdown
of internal mechanisms could be expected to cause them” (Wakefield, 1992a, p.
243) [in which case a mental dysfunction is present], or
2. whether the ‘symptoms’ are “a natural response that is initiated and maintained
directly by the ongoing stress”  (Wakefield, 1992a, p. 238) [in which case no
mental dysfunction is present], or
3. whether the symptoms are a “normal, proportionate reaction to an unusual
environmental stressor” (Wakefield, 1994, p. 646) [no mental dysfunction is
present], or
4. whether the symptoms are caused by “the right kind of triggering stimuli”
(Wakefield, 1994, p. 646) [mental dysfunction is present].
Such criteria, it seems, require omnipotence beyond the ken of even the best
mental health professional.  It presupposes the ability to look into every aspect of
people’s lives, from birth to the present, in all of the environments they live in (work,
home, school, church, clubs, friendships, etc.), all the roles they play (father, lover,
doctor, counsellor, friend, enemy, son), etc., etc.  How else could one decide that a
reaction was so ‘extreme’ it could only be caused by an ‘internal dysfunction’? How else
                                                                                                                                                  
taken on functions different from their initial functions. For example, it has been argued that birds’ feathers
originally evolved to assist in heat insulation and only subsequently became helpful as a means of enabling
flight (see Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995, p. 412).
51
could someone decide whether the symptoms were a ‘natural response’ to ongoing
stress? How else could someone decide if something is a ‘normal response to ongoing
problems in living’, or a ‘normal, proportionate reaction to an unusual environmental
stressor’?
Indeed, Wakefield’s suggestion that clinicians could determine whether mental
dysfunction is present or not by deciding whether something is a ‘normal response’ or
an ‘extreme’ response is at odds with his own rejection of statistical deviance as a means
of deciding whether a disorder exists or not (Wakefield, 1992b).  If one cannot rely on
statistics to alert one as to whether something is ‘normal’ or not then one is forced back
on value judgements, which is precisely what Wakefield is trying to avoid with his use
of the ‘scientific’ concept of dysfunction as the determiner of ‘mental disorder’.
This has important implications for all metaphorist accounts of ‘mental disorder’
because to rest decisions about whether a ‘natural function’ is not functioning ‘correctly’
(i.e., whether someone has a ‘mental disorder’ or not) solely on value judgements is to
place at risk psychiatry’s scientific mandate to diagnose and treat these ‘dysfunctions’.
This is the main reason why Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis has been
seized upon by psychiatry, and some clinical psychology practitioners, with such
enthusiasm; because it offers the possibility of ‘scientific’ proof that the problems that
psychiatry and clinical psychology lay professional claim to are legitimate ‘medical
disorders’.  If Wakefield’s analysis (which is widely considered to be one of the most
rigorous and ‘scientific’) does not, as is argued above, achieve this end, this raises
questions not just about the conceptual validity of ‘mental disorder’, but the legitimacy
of the entire Dysfunctional Mind Account approach to psychological suffering.
2.2.3.3 Difficulties with the ‘harm’ requirement
While Wakefield’s (1992b, 383-384) harm requirement is considerably less
problematic than his dysfunction requirement, not the least because it openly
acknowledges that value judgements are involved, there are two important difficulties
with it.
First, Wakefield does not clarify what he means by ‘harm’, which opens the way
for systematic bias in these judgements.  This is also a problem with other definitions of
‘mental disorder’ that include the criteria of ‘harm’, such as that provided by DSM-III
(1980) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) through IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000).  As Boyle (2002) points out, socially dominant groups may be less
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likely to see their own behaviour as harmful and thus less likely to evaluate it
negatively, particularly if it is behaviour they enjoy or which is important in maintaining
existing power relationships
Pantony and Caplan’s (1991) attempts to get a new disorder, Delusional
Dominating Personality Disorder, included in the DSM-III-R suggest that such
definitional variation may indeed occur.  The symptoms of this proposed disorder
include
1. Inability to establish and maintain meaningful interpersonal relationships.
2. Inability to identify and express a range of feelings in oneself
3. Inability to respond appropriately and empathically to the feelings and needs of
close associates and intimates
4. Tendency to use power, silence, withdrawal, and/or avoidance rather than
negotiation in the face of interpersonal conflict or difficulty
5. Adoption of gender-specific locus-of-control (belief that women are responsible
for the bad things that happen to one and the good things are due to one’s own
abilities and efforts).
(Adapted from Pantony & Caplan, 1991, p121)
The disorder can also include a number of delusions including “the delusion of
personal entitlement to the services of a woman with whom one is personally
associated” and the delusion that “women like to suffer and to be ordered around”.  As
Pantony and Caplan (1991, p. 121) point out the symptoms of this disorder are
stereotypically ‘masculine’ but are by no means exclusively applicable to males (nor do
they characterize all males of course). The criteria clearly constitute a serious
psychological problem.
It could be argued, using Wakefield’s criteria, that this disorder constitutes a
dysfunction of a ‘natural mental mechanism’, or several mental mechanisms (e.g.,
aggression inhibiting mechanisms, exploitation inhibiting mechanisms, impulse control
mechanisms, socialisation mechanisms, mechanisms associated with learning, action,
belief, thought, drive, and moral development15, to name but a few).  This disorder could
also be argued to cause harm, both to those who suffer the disorder, and to those come
into contact with the sufferer.  Indeed, Pantony and Caplan’s (1991, p. 129) primary
point is that the kind of behaviours manifested by ‘sufferers’ of DDPD are “harmful to
health”.
                                                 
15 These ‘mechanisms’ have all been mooted by Wakefield in his various articles on the ‘harmful dysfunction
analysis’ of mental disorder (see Section 2.2.3.5 for some examples).
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The framers of the DSM-III-R, however, rejected this proposed disorder on the
basis that there was not enough empirical support that it actually was a disorder, noting
that “it is folly to open the floodgates to new and unsupported diagnoses” (Frances,
1989, p. 1, cited in Pantony & Caplan, 1991).  Interestingly, the DSM-III-R retained two
highly contested (and empirically unsupported) ‘disorders’, Self-defeating Personality
Disorder and Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder, in an Appendix of categories
needing further study. Both of these ‘disorders’ mislabel and pathologise female
behaviours and feminine characteristics16.
As Pantony and Caplan (1991, p. 120) point out “both categories were given
official numbers and have, in fact, been treated in many ways as though they were full-
fledged categories”, despite the lack of evidence that they are ‘disorders’ and despite the
objection of more than six million Americans and Canadians.  It seems then, that certain
harmful clusters of typically ‘masculine’ behaviours are perhaps less likely to be
considered to be indicative of disorder than are other clusters, arguably less ‘harmful’
behaviours more typically ‘feminine’.  This example raises serious questions about the
usefulness of Wakefield’s ‘harm’ requirement as a means of deciding whether a disorder
is present or not.
Another problem with the harm component of Wakefield’s analysis, pointed out
by Boyle (2002) is that having argued for its importance, Wakefield then proceeds to
devalue it.  For example, he implies that the concept of ‘disorder’ is a purely scientific
one, in that it exists “over and above value judgements” (Wakefield, 1999b, p. 1011). This
is despite the fact that Wakefield himself has argued that harm (which does require a
value judgement) and dysfunction are equally necessary for a judgement of mental
disorder.  If this is the case then dysfunction (the supposedly value-free component)
cannot be given precedence over harm.  Indeed, Boyle (2002) accuses Wakefield of
seeming to forget that he has made ‘harm’ a necessary part of his definition of mental
disorder by essentially leaving it out of his analysis altogether.
2.2.3.4 Acceptance of ‘mental disorders’ as medical disorders
Wakefield defines ‘mental disorders’ as medical disorders in his analysis (e.g.,
Wakefield, 1999b). This claim, which is implicit in all versions of the Dysfunctional Mind
Account (metaphorist, somaticist and biopsychosocial), is made explicit by Wakefield.
                                                 
16 Late-luteal phase dysphoric disorder has been re-named Pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder and is still in
Appendix B (Criteria Sets and Axes for Further Study) of the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Self-defeating personality disorder seems to have been removed from DSM-IV-TR.
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For Wakefield, as for Clare (1976) and many other metaphorists, it is not necessary for
‘mental disorders’ to be shown to be biologically based for them to be legitimately
included as medical disorders.  Wakefield’s (1999b, p. 1004-05) answer to those who
question the conceptualisation of certain types of psychological suffering as ‘medical
disorders’ is that
[b]ecause the psychological systems with which the DSM and the mental health
professions are concerned are biologically designed, DSM defined mental disorders are
by definition a species of the general category of ‘medical disorder’ (which encompasses
diseases, traumatic injuries and all other failures of normal functioning), analogous to
digestive disorders and circulatory disorders.
Wakefield (1999b, p. 1007-08) goes on to suggest that because disorders are
“failures of biologically designed functioning”
[t]he judgement that ‘something has gone wrong’ with psychological functioning must be
made relative to some baseline of things ‘going right’ and . . . evolution appears to be the
only viable way to define the relevant baseline for how our minds are supposed to
function. Evolution is part of biology, so disorders are biological.
As Boyle (2002) points out, however, this argument contains a number of
assumptions that Wakefield makes no attempt to justify or support.  These assumptions
include:
1. that we have ‘psychological systems’ that have been ‘biologically designed’ by
evolution to function in certain ways
2. that if our minds (psychological systems?) fail to function in the way they were
‘designed’ to that this would necessarily result in a ‘mental disorder’. (Failure to
function as designed could be adaptive in present circumstances, for example)
3. that because our psychological systems were ‘biologically designed’,
dysfunctions of this system are inevitably going to be ‘medical disorders’
analogous to digestive and circulatory disorders.
Wakefield (1999b, p. 1004) does not explain what the “psychological system with
which the DSM and the mental health professionals are concerned with” actually
comprises. Nor does he provide any support (in any of his articles on this matter) for
why we should believe that this ‘psychological system’ was ‘designed’ by evolution.
The notion that our ‘psychological systems’ (and this, in itself, is a problematic
notion) are ‘designed by evolution’ is a highly contested claim (see for e.g., Panksepp &
Panksepp, 2000; H. Rose & Rose, 2000) and one cannot simply treat it as a given.  Indeed,
given that Wakefield’s entire analysis rests on the acceptance of this claim (it is, after all,
55
how one can ‘scientifically’ determine whether or not a dysfunction, and hence a
‘disorder’, is present) his failure to provide any real arguments to convince us of its
verity is perplexing17.
Finally, Wakefield does not provide any reasons why even if our ‘psychological
systems’ were ‘biologically designed’ by evolution why dysfunctions of this system
should necessarily be medical disorders. As Boyle (2000, p. 229) points out “we cannot
assume in advance that when these [psychological systems] ‘fail to perform as designed’
the result will be conceptually identical to a ‘failure’ in a bodily mechanism”.  Wakefield
seems to expect us to share his assumption that when something goes wrong with our
lungs or our hearts this is conceptually the same as something going wrong with, for
example, our ‘loss-reaction regulating mechanism’ or our ‘moral development
mechanism’.
What is more, Wakefield presents no evidence in support of the existence of these
‘mental mechanisms’ he constantly makes reference to, indeed he seems to invent them
as he needs them.  As has also been discussed above Wakefield fails to provide any
support for his contention that it is possible to tell if mental mechanisms, even if such
mechanisms could be proven to exist, are functioning as they were ‘designed’ to do or
not.
2.2.3.5 Assumptions about the existence of ‘mental mechanisms’
Underlying Wakefield’s analysis, and most other metaphorist accounts of
‘mental disorder’, is the assumption that within every individual exist various ‘mental
mechanisms’ suited to, or ‘designed’ for, the fulfilment of specific tasks or activities.  In
response to criticism of these assumptions, Wakefield (1999b, pp. 1012-13) has suggested
that there are,
in fact no special mentalistic assumptions . . . involved in my position on mental disorder.
Mental disorders are simply psychological disorders; psychological disorders are
disorders of psychological functioning; and, psychological functioning is simply a certain
domain of functions (e.g., cognition, emotion, motivation, perception, intentional action)
that are placed together under the same category of ‘psychological functions’ for complex
reasons that are not relevant here. More or less everyone agrees that there are such
functions and that there are internal mechanisms designed to perform them.
                                                 
17 It should be noted here that Wakefield claims he is basing his analysis on evolutionary biology but he is
actually basing it on evolutionary psychology –an entirely different disciplinary area (allied to psychology
rather than biology); an area whose knowledge claims are considerably more contested than those of
evolutionary biology.
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As Boyle (2002) points out, Wakefield’s (1999, p. 1013) appeal to what ‘more or
less everyone agrees’ is of no use in supporting his argument that “there are such
[psychological] functions and that there are internal mechanisms designed to perform
them”.  Boyle (2002) notes that Wakefield’s assertion ignores the extensive and persistent
controversy over whether such performative mechanisms exist (Karmiloff-Smith, 2000;
S. Rose, 1997, 2000), as well as controversy over the relationship between our ‘mental
life’ and our behaviour (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gergen, 1999; Panksepp & Panksepp,
2000, 2001).
Wakefield, belying his assertion that there are no mentalistic assumptions in his
account, provides a long list of the kind of mental mechanisms which might be
implicated in mental disorder, including socialisation mechanisms, loss-reaction-
regulating mechanisms, sadness-generating mechanisms, moral development
mechanisms, anxiety regulating mechanisms and exploitation inhibiting mechanisms.
As Boyle (2002, p. 226) and Follette and Houts (1998) argue, these mechanisms,
whose failure to function constitutes a ‘mental disorder’, seem to be simply invented as
needed by Wakefield.  For example, he suggests that conduct disorder may be caused by
“a dysfunction of the moral development mechanisms” (Wakefield, 1997a, p. 648), and
that depression is a condition where the symptoms may be caused by “a dysfunction in
loss-reaction-regulating mechanisms, or sadness-generating mechanisms” (Wakefield,
1997a, p. 645).
Houts and Follette (1998, p. 855) ask:
Where is the loss-response mechanism? Is it closer to the gain-response mechanism? And
where are they? Is the sadness-generating mechanism located in the stomach or the
throat? According to Wakefield’s formulation where something must have gone wrong
inside the organism, such hypothetical mechanisms must be invoked or else his
formulation cannot distinguish genuine disorder from normal behavioural variation.
Where biological psychiatry cannot yet supply the physical mechanism, Wakefield seems
content to freely invoke mental mechanisms.
These mental mechanisms are a crucial aspect of Wakefield’s account because
according to his definition of ‘mental disorder’ people’s problems are symptoms of
‘disorder’ only if those problems are caused by a dysfunctioning mechanism within the
organism.  Indeed, they are an important aspect, implicitly or explicitly, of all
Dysfunctional Mind Accounts of ‘mental disorder’ because as pointed out by Wakefield
(Wakefield, 1992b, p. 381) there is a “virtually universal tendency to fall back on
dysfunction to explain disorder”.
Without the existence of these ‘mental mechanisms’ what would it be that was
dysfunctioning?  A person’s behaviour? A person’s emotions? A person’s social skills? A
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person’s ability to make their way in the world?   If this was the case how could such
dysfunctions be objectively determined in an entirely value-free way?  And what would
be the mandate for such dysfunctions to be conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’ and
dealt with within a medically based framework?
Thus it is important, if Wakefield’s account is to fulfil its own aim of providing
an objective, scientific basis for discriminating true mental disorders from other human
problems, that it fulfil three main requirements:
1. to establish that the various inferred mental mechanisms actually exist, and to
establish what their normal functioning is
2. to establish that a particular mechanism (or mechanisms) has actually
dysfunctioned and
3. to establish how this dysfunction has led to the problem with which the person is
presenting.
As has already been noted above, Wakefield fails to fulfil requirement (a)
because he seems content to invent various ‘mental mechanisms’ when and as needed.
As Boyle (2002, p. 226) notes, the existence of these ‘mental mechanisms’ are
inferred in a circular fashion from the behaviour that the mechanism is then used to
explain; there seems to be no independent means of inferring the mechanisms without
reference to the supposed effects used to posit their existence in the first place.
Boyle (2002) notes that Wakefield cannot see the tautology here because he takes
the existence of these mental mechanisms as given.
Because Wakefield cannot establish the existence, or the normal functioning, of
these mental mechanisms he is unable to establish that a particular mechanism (or
mechanisms) has actually dysfunctioned (requirement b), and he is also unable to
establish how this dysfunction has led to the particular problem (e.g., chronic sadness,
suicidal thoughts, obsessions, compulsions, disobedience, hyperactivity, insomnia,
anxiety, etc., etc.) that a person may be suffering from (requirement c).
This failure to definitively establish how a certain ‘dysfunction’ (or
neurochemical / neuroanatomical / genetic / cognitive / behavioural difference)
actually causes the suffering in question is a problem for all Dysfunctional Mind
Accounts of psychological suffering and highlights the importance of seeking
‘understanding’ rather than ‘explanation’.
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Indeed, Wakefield (1997a, p. 647) himself acknowledges that many
presuppositions concerning mental mechanisms are “inchoate” but suggests that this
“encourages us to start being more explicit in formulating, evaluating, and improving
these assumptions”.  Unfortunately, until this is done (assuming it actually can be done,
see Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995), Wakefield’s analysis, based as it is upon the inferred
existence, and inferred dysfunctioning, of such ‘inchoate’ mechanisms, fails as a means
of objectively determining the existence (or not) of ‘mental disorders’.
2.2.4. Conclusions
Despite having made what Sadler and Agich (1996, p. 221, authors’ italics)
describe as “the most sustained and articulate application of disorder and dysfunction
concepts to psychiatric classification in the literature” Wakefield has nevertheless failed in
his attempt to provide a ‘scientific’ and ‘value-free’ analysis of ‘mental disorder’. This
failure indicates just how difficult it is to define and defend the concept, particularly
within a primarily metaphorist framework.
These difficulties essentially arise because words such as ‘disorder‘, ‘illness’ and
‘disease’ are lay or social terms and, as Boyle (2002, p. 222) points out, “they can no more
have a proper or correct definition or tell us how to think about those to whom the terms
are applied, than terms like ‘courage’ or ‘sin’”. Boyle (2002, p. 222, author’s italics) goes
on to note that
trying to identify people who have mental disorders makes no more sense than trying to
identify people who are definitely courageous or sinful. This is not to suggest there is no
agreed or correct usage of these terms, simply that no usage can be thought of as correct
or definitive or tell us which theoretical frameworks to use in trying to understand
whatever behaviours led us to apply the terms in the first place.
In other words, the concept of ‘mental disorder’ is no more than just one among
many ways of talking about psychological suffering.  The fact that this ‘way of talking’ is
led by a particularly powerful group in our society (medical doctors) does not make the
concept any more ‘scientifically’ valid.  As Boyle (2002, p. 231) puts it
[t]he entire enterprise of defining mental disorder is pointless, at least in so far as the goal
is to allow us to recognise ‘genuine’ or ‘true’ disorders. Indeed, attempts to define
‘mental illness/disease/disorder’ can be seen as attempts to prove that we ought to
respond to certain behaviours and experiences as if they were unwanted bodily
phenomena in the absence of evidence that this is a valid and useful way of proceeding.
Before proceeding to the next section it is necessary to note that while I have
discussed in some detail the problems inherent in the general concept of ‘mental
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disorder’ I have not looked in any detail at the problems surrounding the various
discrete diagnostic categories (e.g., schizophrenia, depression, bi-polar disorder, etc.)
contained within the DSM-IV.   Suffice to say, perhaps not surprisingly given the
difficulties surrounding the general concept of ‘mental disorder’, that psychiatric
diagnoses fail the first major test of whether they are defining anything ‘real’ in that, as
Bentall (2004, p. 68) points out,  “for the most part [they] fail to meet adequate standards
of reliability”.  Essentially this means that psychiatrists and psychologists often cannot
agree whether a person is suffering from Disorder A or Disorder B.
Further, reliability alone cannot ensure a diagnostic system is categorising
anything ‘real’. As Bentall (2004) notes, further tests of the system must be done to
ascertain its validity.  We can evaluate the validity of diagnostic categories by asking
whether they help us to reach useful insights about a problem, or if they help us to make
predictions about what course a particular problem might take (Bentall, 2004).
While I will discuss some of these issues, as they relate to the Dysfunctional
Mind Account in general, rather than to specific ‘disorders’ in Section 2.3, it should be
noted, as Bentall (2004, p. 68) points out, that
a diagnostic system cannot be valid without first being reliable. Unless psychiatrists and
psychologists can agree about which patients suffer from which disorders there is no
possibility that the process of diagnosis will fulfil any useful function.
It is suggested that difficulties reaching an agreement about who suffers from
what disorder are inevitable given the problems, outlined in some detail above, inherent
in the general concept of ‘mental disorder’.  I will, however, return to some of the issues
surrounding individual diagnoses in Chapter Six when I attempt to apply the alternative
analysis generated in Chapter Six to understanding the experiences and the behaviours
involved in two specific ‘mental disorders’ – ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’.
2.3. PRACTICAL UTILITY OF THE
DYSFUNCTIONAL MIND ACCOUNT
Clearly the DMA is difficult to justify theoretically, with little support for its
central tenet – that certain types of psychological suffering are ‘mental illnesses’; discrete
disorders which can be distinguished from other types of psychological suffering and
from each other. The DMA has also failed to provide any real understanding of the
causes of the kinds of suffering called ‘mental disorder’.  But what about its practical
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utility? Does the DMA lead to strategies that result in the alleviation of psychological
suffering for those who seek help?  Perhaps even more importantly, does the DMA lead
to strategies for preventing such suffering in the first place?
It should be noted here that the DMA views the individual as the primary locus
of his or her problems. As Hare-Mustin & Marecek (1997, p. 114) point out
The presumption underlying most forms of treatment is that what is wrong lies within
the individual, and external conditions do not need to be addressed or modified.
Traditional treatment approaches take as their task helping people to adjust to their
circumstances rather than transforming those circumstances that contribute to and are
part of the problem.
Smail (1987, p. viii, author’s italics) suggests that the individualistic bias of
mainstream approaches to psychological suffering is exacerbated by
the apparent indubitability of our personal experience – our intimate knowledge of our
feelings – which makes it so difficult for us to conceive of the source of our difficulties as
outside ourselves. We feel it inside, so we think that that is where it must indeed originate,
and we are, therefore, easily persuaded [by mental health professionals and others] that it
is we who are responsible for what ails us.
Because of this individualist bias attempts to alleviate psychological suffering
within the Dysfunctional Mind Account framework tend to focus almost entirely on the
individual.   Such attempts, due to the DMA’s medical model grounding, are usually
referred to as ‘treatments’ and focus on either the body (e.g., pharmaceuticals, Electro-
convulsive therapy, psychosurgery) or on the ‘mind’ (psychotherapy, group therapy).
2.3.1. Does it succeed in alleviating or ‘curing’ suffering?
Physical treatments: Pharmaceuticals
As has been pointed out by a number of writers the percentage of people who
are helped by pharmaceuticals is much lower than is commonly claimed and many
people also experience a number of adverse side effects (Antonuccio, Danton, &
McClanahan, 2003; Breggin, 1991; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Valenstein, 1998; Whitfield,
2004). Whitfield (2004) notes that research has shown one-third to two-thirds of people
who take antidepressant drugs are not helped by these drugs.  Antonuccio, Burns and
Danton (2002, cited in Antonuccio et al., 2003, p. 1029), talking specifically about the new
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, also note that
although [these drugs] are widely thought to be extremely effective and safe, there is
mounting evidence that their benefits have been overemphasized in the scientific
literature.
61
Furthermore, a recent study (Kirsch et al., 2008) indicates that that SSRIs
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) are no more useful than a placebo for the
majority of those taking them. The only exception occurs for the most severely
depressed patients, although according to the authors this is probably because the
placebo stopped working so well rather than the drugs having worked better. As the
Head of the Department of Psychological Medicine at the Christchurch School of
Medicine, Professor Roger Mulder admitted to a journalist writing about ‘depression’,
All we really know is how to treat depression in the first six weeks. After that there's very
limited understanding of what you do when the first treatment fails, how long people
should be on medication - it's pretty much clinical folklore rather than real data. But we
are starting to realise that the outcome is not as good as people hoped.
(Mulder, cited by Philp, 2001, p. 21)
A review by Fisher and Greenberg (cited in Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999) makes the
same point about the major tranquilisers (also called ‘neuroleptics’ and ‘antipsychotics’)
used to treat schizophrenia.  This review suggests that two out of three medicated
patients suffer relapse and that long-term use leads to ‘reduced social functioning’.
Another review (Cohen, 1997, cited in Rogers & Pilgrim, 1999, p. 126) concludes that
“the overall usefulness [of major tranquilisers] in the treatment of schizophrenia . . . is
far from established” and goes on to note that their “near sacred reputation as
‘antipsychotics’ is equalled only by their record as one of the most behaviourally toxic
classes of psychotropic drugs”.
As has been noted by Healy (2001) in a lecture he presented at a Symposium at
the University of Toronto.18
If our drugs really worked, we shouldn’t have 3 times the number of patients detained
now compared with before, 15 times the number of admissions and lengthier service bed
stays for mood and other disorders that we have now. This isn’t what happened in the
case of a treatment that works, such as penicillin for GPI [General Pariesis Insanity]
It should be noted here that one of the major reasons why many people, both
medical practitioners and lay-people, think that drugs are considerably more efficacious
than they are in the alleviation of psychological suffering is that pharmaceutical
companies work very hard to ensure their products are seen in a positive light. As many
commentators have noted, the pharmaceutical industry is very large, and very powerful
                                                 
18 Healy had recently been appointed Clinical Director of the Mood and Anxiety Disorders Program and as a
Full Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Toronto but shortly after this speech was
delivered his job offer was withdrawn.
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– economically and politically (Antonuccio et al., 2003; Healy, 2001; Valenstein, 1998).
Indeed, as Antonuccio et al. (2003) point out
it is the most profitable industry in the United States in terms of return on revenues,
return on assets and return on equity.
The industry spends a considerable amount of money to influence the opinions
and behaviours of doctors (including psychiatrists) and the public and the “the
effectiveness of their marketing strategies cannot be overestimated” (Valenstein, 1998, p.
166).
It should also be noted that the profit motive of these companies works against
the truthful reporting of research outcomes (Breggin, 1991; Healy, 2001; Valenstein, 1998;
Whitfield, 2004).  As Valenstein (1998, p. 189) emphasises, the pharmaceutical industry
invests a considerable amount of money sponsoring biomedical research in universities,
hospitals and medical schools and notes that because such companies do not want to see
their investment wasted
there are clear dangers when they are in a position to influence the way trials are
conducted and the way data are presented
Valenstein (1996) further notes that studies of clinical trials have shown that
those supported by pharmaceutical companies are more likely to report results
favourable to a company’s products. One review of more than one hundred controlled
clinical trials published in five leading medical journals found that those funded by
pharmaceutical companies were much more likely to conclude that the new drug had
advantages over a traditional treatment than were studies funded by government
agencies.
Drug companies almost always exaggerate the efficacy of their own drugs while
minimising any adverse side effects. This is done by citing on the studies that show their
product in the best light, and by “putting their own ‘spin’ on the way data are
presented” (Valenstein, 1996, p. 189).  As Healy (2001, p8) notes
a large number of clinical trials are not reported if the results don’t suit the companies’
sponsoring study. Other trials are multiply reported so that anyone trying to meta-
analyse the findings can have a real problem trying to work out how many trials there
have been. Within the studies that are reported, data such as quality of life scale results
on antidepressants have been almost uniformly suppressed. To call this science is
misleading.
It seems that the ability of pharmaceuticals to alleviate psychological suffering is
considerably more limited than the ‘hype’ which surrounds them would suggest and it
is difficult not to conclude that drug company marketing contributes more to the
increasing use of pharmaceuticals for the treatment of ‘mental disorders’ than the
efficacy of the drugs themselves.
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It must be acknowledged at this point, however, that while undeniably ‘over-
hyped’ psychiatric drugs do provide, in some cases, relief from suffering for those
diagnosed with ‘mental illnesses’.  As Moncrieff (2005) notes, however, this does not
mean that these drugs are correcting ‘chemical imbalances’ in the brain, or acting
directly on any other underlying ‘pathologies’ hypothesised to be ‘causing’ the suffering.
Rather, Moncrieff (2005, p 146) suggests that what psychiatric drugs are doing is
inducing
characteristic physiological and subjective states that may, or may not, be experienced as
useful in certain social and interpersonal situations, including clinical situations
Some of these subjective states may provide relief for certain aspects of the
suffering a person is experiencing. Moncrieff (2005) illustrates her point with the
example of alcohol, a drug that results in certain characteristic physiological and
behavioural effects and subjective experiences. She suggests that because of its
characteristic disinhibiting effects
it may be seen as a possible treatment for ‘social phobia’, not because the substance
corrects an underlying physical abnormality in social phobia, but because one type of
effect produced by alcohol might in itself be useful for people experiencing difficulties in
some interpersonal or social situations
Moncrieff (2005, p 147)
To further support this contention Moncrieff (2005) cites research that describes
“dramatic beneficial effects of ethyl alcohol on patients with schizophrenia” (Sullivan,
1962, Lehman, 1989, cited in Moncrieff, 2005).
Physical treatments: ECT
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) involves the passing of electricity through the
brain to cause a seizure.  This is done due to a belief that the seizure will alleviate the
suffering associated with various ‘mental illnesses’, in particular depression and
schizophrenia. As was noted in the review of ECT carried out by New Zealand’s
Ministry of Health (2004, p. 1)
most studies [assessing the efficacy of ECT] have had poor design features, such as small
samples of patients and inappropriate methods of statistical analysis, which  increase the
likelihood of bias (i.e. error) occurring when assessing associations between ECT and
outcomes . . .   There are few ideal RCTs of ECT.
The review (Ministry of Health, 2004, p. 1) also acknowledges that
there are risks associated with the general anaesthesia administered before ECT.   These
are mainly related to the cardiorespiratory system.  Special care should be  taken when
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administrating ECT to people with existing cardiac disease. ECT should only be
administered by medical practitioners appropriately trained and experienced in the
technique, including use of general anaesthesia.  Headache and minor confusion are
common immediately following ECT.  Older  patients are at a higher risk of falls and
injury when confused.  Many patients experience disturbances in memory following
ECT.  These disturbances usually resolve within a few weeks for most patients.  A
minority of patients experience  long-term effects on memory, which is subjective and
difficult to measure.
Despite its acknowledgement that ECT is a potentially dangerous treatment and
that the scientific evidence on which efficacy claims for ECT are based is scant the
Report recommended that ECT continue to be utilised as a treatment for severe ‘mental
disorders’ in New Zealand.
Psychologist John Read (2004), who presented a submission in opposition to the
continuation of ECT in New Zealand, questions the report’s conclusion that ‘ECT is an
effective treatment’ and notes that the Report itself acknowledges that there are no
studies showing any lasting benefits of ECT beyond a few weeks . Read (2004, p. 1),
points out that his review of the literature and the three other research reviews he
submitted to the Committee
document the serious methodological flaws in the few studies that claim even a short-
term advantage of ECT over simulated-ECT (i.e. general anaesthetic without the
electricity or convulsion - the appropriate placebo control for such studies). The Report
also acknowledges [7.1] that there is only one properly designed efficacy study that has
ever followed up patients for six months and that this study ‘showed a trend in favour of
simulated ECT.’
Read (2004, p. 2) also notes that the Report concluded that “there is no definitive
randomized evidence that ECT prevents suicide” (Ministry of Health, 2004, p 11) and
suggests that
It seems illogical, therefore, that the Report goes on, despite this lack of evidence, to
recommend that ECT should be used when patients are ‘at a high risk of suicide’. [7.1.A].
Read (2004, p. 2) also notes that
this sort of logical inconsistency is evidenced at several other points in the Report. For
example, despite rightly concluding that ‘there is insufficient evidence to draw firm
conclusions about the efficacy of ECT in mania’ [7.3] the Report goes on to recommend its
use for mania anyway.
Breggin (1991, p 206), an American psychiatrist and critic of ECT, also questions
the acceptance of ECT by psychiatrists and health authorities.  Breggin (1991) notes that
[a] thorough review of the shock literature shows that there are no controlled studies
indicating any ‘beneficial’ effect beyond four weeks. Most show little or no improvement
at all.
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Breggin (1991, p 207) goes on to note that this point was proven at a conference
on ECT held by NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) and NIH (National Institute
of Health)
at which psychologist and attorney Edward Opton Jr., presented his [critical] review.
When none of the assembled shock doctors could provide any contradictory evidence,
his conclusions were accepted in the Consensus Conference panel report,
“Electroconvulsive Therapy”, published in the October 18, 1985, Journal of the American
Medical Association.
Breggin (1991) notes, however, that Opton’s report was excluded from
publication in the proceedings of the NIMH Consensus Conference. Breggin (1991) also
cites a study by Crow and Johnstone (1986), published in the 1986 New York Academy
of Science proceedings, which concludes
Whether electrically induced convulsions exert therapeutic effects in certain types of
depression . . . has yet to be clearly established.
 (Crow & Johnstone, 1986, cited in Breggin, 1991, p 207)
As Breggin (1991, p. 206) points out, “this is a most remarkable conclusion from
the heart of the establishment”19.  Breggin (1991) further notes that the conclusions of
Crow and Johnstone were omitted from the American Psychiatric Association’s task
force report The Practice of Electroconvulsive Therapy, which, according to Breggin (1991, p.
206), “carefully paints an unblemished portrait of ECT in order to promote the treatment
and to protect psychiatrists against malpractice suits”.
It is difficult not to conclude that mental health professionals and government
bodies are determined to continue with the practice of ECT despite the fact that there is
very little evidence to suggest that it is efficacious and a considerable amount of
evidence to suggest that it causes ongoing harm to recipients.
Physical treatments: Psychosurgery
According to the Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry (Gelder, Gath, Mayou, &
Cowen, 1996, p. 598) psychosurgery is
the use of neurosurgical procedures to modify the symptoms of psychiatric illness by
operating on either the nuclei of the brain or the white matter.
Psychosurgery began in 1936 with the work of Moniz and continued to be
enthusiastically endorsed, and utilised, by psychiatry until the 1970s.  Psychosurgery fell
out of favour due to growing evidence of adverse ‘side-effects’ including intellectual
                                                 
19 Timothy Crow is an eminent British biological psychiatrist.
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impairment, emotional lability, disinhibition, apathy, incontinence, obesity, and epilepsy
(Gelder et. al., 1996). Advances in pharmacology also contributed to its fall from grace. It
is, however, still used in some countries for “intractable mood disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and anxiety disorder” (Gelder et al., 1996, p. 599).
Less invasive techniques such as deep brain stimulation (implanting electrodes in
a person’s brain, or in a nerve in their neck, and connecting them to a pulse generator
implant placed under the skin of their chest) have arisen as possible alternatives to
psychosurgery.  The research on deep brain stimulation as a treatment for depression is
still in its early stages but the technique is causing the same kind of excitement aroused
by the lobotomy in the 1930s.
There are currently two ways of delivering Deep Brain Stimulation to patients,
the first is to implant electrodes directly in a person’s brain and the second is to implant
electrodes into a patient’s vagus nerve in their neck.  In both methods the electrodes are
controlled by a device placed under the skin of their chest that controls the amount of
‘stimulation’ the brain receives.
The first method was pioneered by neurologist Helen Mayberg and publication
of the first research results (Mayberg et al., 2005) received considerable media attention.
A Google Search for ‘brain pacemaker‘20 (depression) brought up 343,000 articles.  The
majority of those sampled were very positive about the new technique with little or no
acknowledgement of the continuing controversy over whether it actually works.  The
excerpts below are typical of the tone of these articles:
Pacemaker ‘cure for depression: Scientists claim to have developed a "brain pacemaker"
that can cure depression through an electronic stimulus. The discovery raises hopes for
thousands for release from depression by drilling holes into their skull and attaching
electrodes to the brain which can create a brighter mood.
(L. Gray, 2005)
Implanted brain pacemaker treats depression: A "pacemaker" implanted in the brain
appears to help severely depressed patients who don't respond to other treatments. In a
small but potentially landmark study, four out of six formerly treatment-resistant
patients got better after electrodes were implanted in a region of their brains thought to
drive depression.
(S. Boyle, 2005)
Brain pacemaker lifts depression: Fitting patients with a brain pacemaker could switch
off hard-to-treat depression, believe UK experts.
                                                 
20 The term used by many in the media to refer to Deep Brain Stimulation techniques of this sort
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(BBC News, 2005)
This study involved six people, four of whom were reported to have experienced
‘significant improvements’ in their mood. These improvements lasted for the six-month
duration of the study.  Two of the six lapsed back into depression.  Media reports were
upbeat about the two non-responders, however, with many of them noting that
“scientists believe that fine-tuning the implant treatment could eventually cure most
cases of severe depression” (Chittenden, 2005; L. Gray, 2005).
What none of the media reports located in the Google Search noted, however,
was that the two men who didn’t respond to the treatment also
developed local infections related to the connector cable at the chest (patient 2) or scalp
(patient 4). Both were treated with intravenous antibiotics. Because of persistent infection
in the absence of clinical benefit, the devices were explanted at approximately 6 months
with resolution of their infections.
(Mayberg et al., 2005)
The media reports located also failed to note the considerable limitations of this
study – the most important of which was that no sham surgery or systematic placebo
control arm was used. To properly evaluate the effectiveness of a procedure of this type
including a control group who are subjected to the same surgical procedure is vital.  The
effects on the people involved in this experiment of being subjected to such a highly
technical, ‘cutting edge’ procedure carried out by expert neurologists and neuro-
surgeons with the promise of ‘curing’ their depression cannot be underestimated. The
sample size of the study was also extremely small and the duration of the study, six
months, very short, particularly given that depression tends to wax and wane naturally
over time for most people (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992).
The other method of delivering Deep Brain Stimulation involves implanting a
device in the vagus nerve of a person’s neck.  This device, called a vagus nerve
stimulator, was approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in
July 2005 as a treatment for depressed adults who had tried four other treatments and
were still depressed (Boodman, 2006; D. Gray, 2006).
As noted by an article in The Washington Post (Boodman, 2006), however,
the only rigorous clinical trial of the device -- which is approved to treat severe epilepsy -
- failed to demonstrate effectiveness in alleviating depression. That study involved 235
patients, all of whom received the device, which was turned on in only half the group. At
the end of three months, there was no statistically significant difference between the two
groups.
A second study of 174 VNS recipients found that 30 percent showed significant
improvement after one year. Because that study lacked a control group and because
patients received other depression treatments after the device was implanted, there is no
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way to know whether the device was responsible. For years experts have known that
depression -- unlike, say, type 1 diabetes -- can get better without treatment.
As well as not having been proved to be effective in alleviating depression VNS
also causes many patients to lose their voice and to feel persistent constriction in the
back of their throats. Once implanted the electrodes in a patient’s neck must remain
forever due to tissue growing around them. As a result of this VNS recipients often
cannot undergo a full body MRI or a therapeutic ultrasound (Boodman, 2006).
Worsening depression and suicide attempts have also been reported by one-third of
patients in a study funded by Cyberonics (the company selling the VNS device),
according to data presented to the FDA (Boodman, 2006).
Again, as with psychopharmaceuticals, psychosurgical procedures seem to be
considerably less efficacious at alleviating psychological suffering than people have been
led to believe.
Psychological treatments: Individual psychotherapy
The effectiveness of psychotherapy is notoriously difficult to pin down, due to
the massive influence of interpersonal factors. As Pilgrim and Rogers (1999, p. 128) point
out
Good outcome in therapy is not linked to particular models but to these benign,
supportive or inspirational practitioner variables
(Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, p. 128)
Nevertheless a number of studies suggest that psychotherapy is only marginally
effective at best (Bergin & Lambert, 1978, cited in Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999) while others
suggest that not only is it not effective, but it can also have detrimental effects (Masson,
1994; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Smail, 1987)
Pilgrim and Rogers (1999) point out some of these detrimental effects. These
authors note that many clients in psychotherapy experience what is known as the
‘deterioration effect’ where symptoms get worse during the course of therapy. They also
note that personal change can be held back, rather than accelerated, while in therapy
due to the patient role reinforcing passivity and dependency.
Another problem with therapy pointed out by Pilgrim and Rogers (1999, p. 128)
is the possibility of encountering an unethical therapist who exploits “the power
discrepancy existing, under conditions of privacy, to gain emotional or sexual
gratification from their clients.”  A review by Schoener and Lupker (1996, cited in
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Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999) found that in the US over half of the malpractice suits brought
against psychiatrists and clinical psychologists involve sexual abuse by therapists.
Another difficulty with psychotherapy is that it is time-consuming and thus
expensive.  Albee and Ryan-Finn (1994) cite a study by Kiesler and Morton (1987, cited
in Albee & Ryan-Finn, 1994, p. 82) that established
the unbridgeable gap between the small number of professionals available to treat and
the large numbers needing treatment. Those with the most serious mental and emotional
problems (the poor) are not covered by health insurance and cannot afford therapy.
Albee and Ryan-Finn (1994) also point out that those groups with the most
mental health problems are also the least likely to seek help in the form of
psychotherapy.  They further note that even if these groups were able to access therapy
it would do little to alleviate the effects of stressors such as chronic poverty, social
isolation, inadequate education and weak cultural ties.
Indeed, the above discussion suggests that a Dysfunctional Mind Account
approach to psychological suffering is not particularly effective at alleviating or ending
such suffering regardless of what treatment modality is employed.  As Pilgrim and
Rogers (1999, p. 129) note
No form of treatment claims startling improvement rates (let alone ‘cure’) . . . [g]iven this
poor showing in symptom reduction, the iatrogenic effects of treatment become
particularly salient. ‘Side-effects’ might be tolerated if significant therapeutic benefits
were also experienced by patients but with high iatrogenic effect rates and low symptom
reduction rates, treatments become highly problematic.
2.3.2. Does it succeed in preventing suffering?
As has already been pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis, research
suggests that the incidence rates for the experiences referred to as ‘mental illnesses’ are
rising (Eckersley, 2004; Hagnell, Lanke, Rorseman, & Ojesjo, 1982; Schumaker, 2001;
Seligman, 1990). This rise in the incidence of psychological suffering is reflected in rising
suicide rates in Western societies (Eckersley, 2004; Public Health Group, 1996;
Schumaker, 2001), with Schumaker (2001) pointing out that between 1960 and 1973
suicide rates doubled in the 15-24 age group in the United States and tripled for young
black people.
A recent nationwide survey carried out in New Zealand (Oakley-Browne, Wells,
& Scott, 2006) found that 39.5% of New Zealanders had suffered from a ‘mental
disorder’ at some time in their lives and 20.7% had suffered from one in the last twelve
70
months. The research suggested that 46.6% of the population in New Zealand will meet
criteria for a disorder at some time in their lives.  Of the respondents 15.7% had thought
seriously about suicide, 5.5% had made a suicide plan and 4.5% had attempted suicide.
The Global Burden of Disease Study (Murray & Lopez, 1996, cited in National
Institute of Mental Health, 2001) found that ‘mental illness’, including suicide, accounts
for over 15 percent of the burden of disease in established market economies.  This is
more than the disease burden caused by all cancers.  This study found depression to be
the leading cause of disability worldwide among persons aged five years and older.
Oakley-Brown (2006) found anxiety and depression to be the two most
commonly experienced ‘mental disorders’ with 24.9% of people reporting that they had
experienced an anxiety disorder at some time in their lives and 20.2% of people
reporting that they had experienced a mood disorder.  As Schumaker (2001) points out,
the prevalence of these two disorders in the West has become accepted wisdom, so
much so that until recently we were considered to be in the ‘Age of Anxiety’ and now
we are considered to be in the ‘Age of Depression’.
Levine (2001) notes, in relation to the ubiquity of anxiety disorders in the United
States, that in December 1999 the Surgeon General reported that in any given year 16.4%
of Americans between the ages of 18 and 54 will suffer from anxiety disorders (ref, cited
in Levine) while the American Psychiatric Association, in the same year, suggested that
one in eight Americans, in their lifetime, will suffer from social phobia (ref, cited in
Levine).  Levine (2001) also notes that in 1988 the National Institute of Mental Health
reported that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) could be 25 to 60 times as common
as previously supposed and that 6.2% of American adults were taking benzodiazepine
tranquilisers in 1994 (see Levine, 2001).  Two meta-analyses, carried out by Twenge
(Twenge, 2000) found that Americans have become substantially more anxious and
neurotic since the 1950s with the average American child reporting more anxiety in the
1980s than child psychiatric patients in the 1950s.
A considerable body of research also testifies to the high rates of depression in
the industrialised West. Martin Seligman (1990) analysed a number of studies of rates of
depression, including several well-controlled longitudinal studies, and concluded that
depression is approximately ten times as common as it was only fifty years ago.  A
similar conclusion was reached by Hagnell and his colleagues who, after reviewing the
literature on depression (1982, p. 279), concluded “it now appears as if the prevalence of
depression is reaching epidemic proportions”.  In the face of this escalation the DMA, it
seems, is not proving itself to be effective at preventing ‘mental disorder’.
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Cross-cultural and anthropological research further illustrates the DMA’s
inability to make any impact on the rising numbers of people suffering from ‘mental
illness’.  Such research suggests that many, if not all, of the ‘mental disorders’ listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual are considerably less common in non-Western or
‘traditional’ societies than they are the West (where the DMA is the predominant
conceptualisation of psychological suffering).  Schumaker (2001, p. 55) notes, in the case
of depression, that
a broad generalization can be made about so-called clinical depression when it is
examined in a wide cross-cultural context.  In its full form, which entails an extensive
psychological and cognitive component (e.g., sadness, self-doubt, self-denigration, guilt,
personal worthlessness and low self-esteem, social withdrawal, loss of interest in life),
clinical depression appears to be limited to Western culture.  In non-Westernized
cultures, there is little or no evidence for clinical depression as it is described in our
diagnostic manuals.  A great many of them have no words that describe depression as we
know it.
Schumaker (2001) also notes that
[t]here exists extensive cross-cultural variation with regard to the general magnitude of
anxiety, as well as the prevalence of anxiety disorders. Indeed, there have been some
striking observations made on this subject in different cultures. In a study of 2,360
Yoruba Aboriginals of Australia, not a single case of overt anxiety was found. No
indications whatsoever were found of such specific anxiety disorders as phobia or
obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Western researchers, working within a DMA framework have tended to resist
such findings and instead suggest that depression and anxiety are present in all cultures
but that that these ‘disorders’ are expressed in different ways.  In the case of depression,
for example, this has involved the creation of a sub-type that has only the somatic
symptoms such as headaches, and problems with sleep and digestion. Interestingly
these ‘symptoms’ almost always accompany stress and no one is arguing that people of
other cultures do not suffer from stress at one time or another. It is what they ‘do’ with
that stress that is at issue and it appears that ‘depression’, as it is conceptualised in the
West, is not a common response to stress in non-Western cultures.
As Schumaker (2001, 56) points out
[t]he claim that clinical depression is universal or inevitable does not stand up well to
anthropological research that demonstrates that entire societies can be found that do not
suffer from this type of psychopathology. An examination of their cultural structures can
tell us a great deal about the nature of depression, as well as the viability of our current
theoretical formulations.
Almost without exception research suggests that the rates of ‘mental illness’ are
continually increasing in Western industrialised nations. Even if, as suggested by Healey
et al. (2001) mental health researchers over-inflate the numbers of people suffering from
the various disorders in order to generate more income and status for themselves, these
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findings raise considerable questions about the way we are currently dealing with the
kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental illness’.
It seems an inescapable conclusion that the Dysfunctional Mind Account
approach to psychological suffering does not lead to strategies that have resulted in
the prevention of psychological suffering. Instead, the rate of ‘mental disorders’ in
Western populations seems to have risen precipitously over the last fifty years or so, a
rise which shows no sign of abating despite the huge amounts of money poured into
research into discovering the causes of ‘mental illness’, or new treatments (most often
pharmacological) to alleviate or ‘cure’ it.
It is not surprising that the DMA has not had much success at preventing mental
disorders given its profoundly individualistic focus.  Such a focus actively mitigates
against efforts to reduce the incidence of ‘mental illness’ because to be effective such
efforts must be made at a societal level, not just at an individual level.  As Albee and
Ryan-Finn (Albee & Ryan-Finn, 1994, p. 81) point out
[i]t is a well-established public health doctrine, proven repeatedly, that no mass disorder
afflicting humankind has ever been eliminated, or even brought under control, by
attempts at treating affected individuals.
Albee and Ryan-Finn (1994, p. 81) go on to note that
the strategies of primary prevention of mental and emotional disorders are essentially the
same as the strategies of prevention of physical illness and disease. One of the effective
strategies is to discover the noxious agent and take steps to eliminate it or reduce it. A
second strategy is to strengthen the resistance of the host to the noxious agent. In the field of
mental health the noxious agent frequently is excessive stress. Often the stress results
from powerlessness, exploitation, poverty and hopelessness.
Efforts at prevention, if they are made at all, tend to be focused, as Albee & Ryan-
Finn (1994, pp. 81-82) note, almost exclusively on
individual resistance to stressors at the expense of societal reforms, and some programs
would be more aptly viewed as early intervention.
2.4. CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this chapter that the DMA is difficult to justify both
theoretically and practically.  Despite the considerable amount of research devoted to
the various ‘mental disorders’ there is still a disturbing lack of clarity about just what
sort of ‘phenomena’ these ‘disorders’ are, where they come from, how best to help those
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who suffer them and how to prevent them occurring in the first place.   The response
from psychiatry to this criticism tends to be to point out that the research programme
currently being pursued with such vigour (focusing primarily on the individual and, in
particular, their biology) will eventually bear fruit and that “just round the corner lies
some vital new fact which will settle the arguments for once and for all” (Ingleby, 1980,
p. 23).
As Ingleby (1980) points out, however, it is not the sheer volume of research
findings that count, but the “principles which govern the acquisition and interpretation
of the findings”.  As Ingleby (1980, p. 23) notes,
. . . a science whose conceptual foundations have not been properly thought out is
doomed to collapse, no matter what volume of findings is stacked up above them. What
we need, then, are not more findings – we probably have all we need, if only we knew
what to do with them – but a reappraisal of the kind of explanations we should be
looking for, and the kind of data that would be relevant to them. The ‘great debate’ in
psychiatry, which professional and disciplinary lines of demarcation have so far
succeeded in keeping frozen (in the English-speaking world at least), must start with the
prior questions of what kind of creatures people are, and how we should go about
observing and accounting for their behaviour and misbehaviour.
It is suggested that the main reason the DMA is unable to assist us in
understanding and alleviating psychological suffering is because it is underpinned with
assumptions about human beings and their suffering which are inherently faulty.
The first, and perhaps the most essential, assumption underpinning the DMA is
that certain activities and experiences of persons in the West (those referred to as
‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ and which are seen as occurring ‘inside’ the person, e.g.,
thoughts, beliefs, wishes, fears, hopes, etc.) are seen as representing or occurring in
something called the ‘mind’, an entity posited to contain, or comprise, these activities
and experiences.  It is this mind that is considered to encapsulate or represent the
person’s uniqueness, or individuality.  It is seen as private and personal, accessible only
to its owner, and yet it is also seen as being open to the probings of science.  It is
generally accepted that the mind can be divided into various pieces or functions, and
that these can then each be analysed and ‘explained’ separately from the other by an
appropriately trained expert.
This reification of certain activities and experiences into an entity called ‘mind’,
which can then be ‘investigated’ by science, has made it easy to conflate the
metaphorical ‘mind’ with the brain.  This leads to the reductionist position, taken by
most bio-psychiatrists, that ‘mind’ is essentially brain and that by understanding how
the brain works we will also understand how the mind works. This is seen by some
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(refs) as a resolution to the ‘mind-body’ problem in psychology, and also makes possible
the general acceptance of non-intentional explanations for intentional phenomena.
This view of human beings has contributed towards the notion that those forms
of psychological suffering seen as ‘mental illnesses’ are grounded in biological factors.
Genes, neurochemistry and neuroanatomy are often hypothesised to cause ‘mental
illness’ while ‘the environment’ is often relegated to the role of a ‘trigger’ for a pre-
existing genetic or otherwise biologically caused vulnerability to ‘mental illness’.  Due to
this view the medicalisation of many forms of psychological suffering has been
inevitable.
The notion that certain sorts of psychological suffering are indicative of a
‘dysfunctional’ or ‘diseased’ ‘mind’ (or brain) is, not surprisingly, another of the
fundamental assumptions underlying the DMA.  As has been noted earlier in this
chapter, even for those even for those who do not conflate ‘mind’ with brain,
psychological suffering is still conceptualised as representative of a ‘dysfunction’ or
‘disorder’, albeit of the metaphorical mind rather than the literal brain (Svensson, 1995),
and thus seen as best dealt with within a medico-scientific framework.
The third general assumption underlying the DMA is that humans are
autonomous individuals essentially separate from each other, and from ‘society’ and
that society is simply a backdrop to human life.  This can be seen clearly in psychology’s,
and psychiatry’s, focus on the individual, and the search for causal processes ‘inside’
individuals, an approach which means that the environment within which individuals
live out their lives tends to fade into the background.  As Handy (1987, p. 162) notes of
general psychology:
[b]y failing to examine the interplay between social structure and individual subjectivity
and concentrating on the analysis of the individual as a relatively isolated entity the
discipline implicitly accepts and reinforces the cultural norms concerning individualism.
Psychology’s (and psychiatry’s) assumption that society is made up of
autonomous individuals is usually accompanied by the further assumption that these
individuals are operating within a relatively benign social order which provides
adequate opportunities for people to develop their potentialities (Hall, 1983, cited in
Handy, 1987).  Because social structures are not seen as constraining, human behaviour
is explained by internal, personal characteristics rather than by situations or
relationships; thus failure is often seen as due to personal shortcomings or personal
pathology. This leads to a failure to deal with the political and historical contexts of
human behaviour, a charge that has been levelled against psychiatry (Elias, 1969;
Ingleby, 1980; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999), clinical psychology (Cromby, 2006; Pilgrim, 1992;
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Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992; Schumaker, 2001; Smail, 1993; Treacher & Baruch, 1980) and
general psychology (Cromby, 2006; Handy, 1987)21.
The view of human beings as autonomous individuals who are essentially
unaffected by their environment is reflected in the way in which most people in the
West conceptualise themselves as “self contained unitary individuals who carry their
uniqueness deep inside themselves, like pearls hidden in their shells” (Burkitt, 1991, p.
1), with “a distinct boundary that separates [them] from society and from nature”
(Barrett, 1996, p. 180).
As Barrett (1996) points out, the individual in the West while conceptualised as
unitary is also, simultaneously, conceptualised as an ensemble of parts. These parts are
often thought of as divisions or dichotomies; for example body and mind, emotions and
cognitions, rationality and irrationality, actions and thoughts.  Scientific psychology has
broken the human being up even more comprehensively, with the modular mind22
favoured by many evolutionary psychologists representing the apex of this approach
(Karmiloff-Smith, 2000).
As Barrett (1996, p. 181) describes, these divisions are also reflected in scientific
and popular ideas about heredity in which a person is seen as a “composite of nature
and nurture, or a combination of characteristics inherited from maternal and paternal
genes”.  Barrett (1996, p. 182) goes on to note that
[w]hen put together, the individual and the ensemble form a concept of the person as a
tension between whole and parts.  A spatial metaphor is evoked, as if the person could be
represented by a circle or a sphere, with a clearly demarcated external boundary and an
interior that can be divided into sections.
It is suggested that the view of human beings presumed by these underlying
assumptions is not an accurate one, and that because of this the DMA will never be able
to resolve the theoretical and practical difficulties discussed in this chapter.  It is further
suggested that in order to move beyond the conceptual confusion and practical
deficiencies of the DMA and towards an alternative conceptualisation of psychological
suffering it is necessary to challenge these underlying assumptions and to explore
alternative ways of understanding what it is to be a person.
                                                 
21 It should be noted, of course, that this generalisation applies to the disciplines overall rather than to
individual academics and practitioners within these disciplines.
22 This is the claim that evolution has resulted in our brains becoming increasingly ‘prespecified’ into a
number of domains or modules.  Each module is suggested to specialise in a particular function, including
the higher-level cognitive functions such as language acquisition and use, numeracy skills, face recognition
and etc. Steven Pinker’s (1997) How the Mind Works is perhaps the best example of this, its key idea being
that “the mind is a system of organs of computations, designed by natural selection to solve the kinds of
problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life”. According to Pinker (1997) the mind is organised
into modules that are ‘designed’ to be ‘expert’ in one particular area.
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In the following chapter I will outline an approach to the study of human
experience that overturns these assumptions, and in so doing overturns the notion of the
“atomistic, bounded, coherent, rational psychological subject endorsed, at least
implicitly, by most mainstream approaches“(Cromby, 2004, p. 797). In the remaining
chapters of this thesis I will then attempt to sketch out the beginnings of an approach to
understanding psychological suffering based upon this ‘alternative view’ of human
beings – an approach which acknowledges the personal and embodied reality of such
suffering but does not attempt to locate its genesis, or its course, purely within the
individual.
While this alternative approach will, of necessity, acknowledge the realities of the
various levels of our being in this world – the biological, the ‘psychological’ and the
social – in order to reach a better understanding of psychological suffering, it will,
nevertheless be more than just another ‘biopsychosocial’ account. As has been noted
above, the biopsychosocial approach to psychological suffering is really no more than an
attempt to ‘patch together’ the two opposing accounts which have dominated psychiatry
since its beginnings – the somaticist and the metaphorist accounts. The assumptions
about human beings that underlie the newer biopsychosocial accounts, however, remain
exactly the same as those which underlie the accounts they seek to replace and thus they
are unable to offer any radically new understandings of psychological suffering.
Such accounts still see the human being as being essentially a composite of parts
that are separable by science, as outlined above – the ‘mind’ and the body, emotions and
cognitions, rationality and irrationality, actions and thoughts. Such accounts also see the
human being as separable from the social and material environment with the
environment merely ‘impacting upon’ people in various ways, or, in the case of ‘mental
disorders’,  ‘triggering’ vulnerabilities that are internal to the person.
Furthermore, such accounts still view the ‘psychological’ aspect of human beings
as being contained in, or represented by, an entity referred to as the ‘mind’ (which may
or may not be conflated with the brain, depending on the account), and this ‘mind’ (or
brain) generates various ‘mental’ or psychological phenomena such as thoughts, desires,
obsessions, hallucinations and etc. It is this ‘mind’ which ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘causes’ the
person to feel/think/act in ways which are considered to be ‘ununderstandable23’, in
which case they are said to be suffering from a ‘mental disorder’.
                                                 
23 As was noted in Chapter One, this is a term coined by Karl Jaspers (1963, cited in Sass, 2002) a German
phenomenological psychiatrist, to describe the kinds of ‘psychopathology’ that were “closed to
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Such feelings/thoughts/actions are so ‘extreme’, as Wakefield (1992a, p. 243)
notes, in his attempt to pin down the concept of ‘mental disorder’ once and for all, that
“nothing but the breakdown of internal mechanisms could be expected to cause them”.
They are so ‘extreme’ that they could not possibly be a “natural response that is initiated
and maintained by the ongoing stress” (Wakefield, 1992a, p238) and nor could they be a
“normal, proportionate reaction to an unusual environmental stressor” (Wakefield,
1997a, p. 646).
In the analysis to follow it will be suggested that the feelings/thoughts/actions
which are ‘symptomatic’ of the various ‘mental disorders’ listed in the DSM-IV-TR
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) are, in fact, completely understandable if they
are seen as being emergent from our continual enmeshment within our social world,
rather than as arising primarily out of the various processes occurring within us
(whether that be our neurochemistry or our ‘mental mechanisms’ or an ‘interaction’
between them).
As soon as the human being is fully contextualised, and the person and their
person-level experiences, rather than their neurochemistry or their ‘mental mechanisms’,
are placed centre stage, the mist starts to clear and one can start to start to explore the
ways in which such suffering may arise. The insights gained from a clearer
understanding of the genesis of such suffering could then be used to move towards not
only new ways of alleviating or even preventing such suffering, but also towards new
understandings of why the feelings and behaviours considered ‘symptomatic’ of ‘mental
disorder’ or ‘mental illness’ are actually experienced as ‘suffering’, rather than as just
another way of being in the world.
In the final two chapters of this thesis I will sketch out an example of how such a
‘person-based’ exploration of psychological suffering could be carried out.  This
exploration will focus on the foundational nature of people’s relationships with their
first care-giver and attempt to illustrate how the origins of the vulnerabilities for
experiencing the ‘clusters of suffering’ conceptualised as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental
disorder’ can emerge from the same source as all other aspects of our personal being;
from the constant coactions between the various aspects of our being in the world –
personal, organismic and molecular – with the environment within which we are
enmeshed. It is, of course, acknowledged, that this approach represents only one of
                                                                                                                                                  
psychological comprehension” (Sass, 2002, p. 251).  Such suffering, in other words, was so bizarre it could
only be caused by ‘dysfunctions’ or aberrations of the ‘mind’ or brain.
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many ways in which psychological suffering could be usefully explored utilising the
alternative conceptualisation of persons to be offered in Chapter Three.
This means that the feelings/thoughts/behaviours which are conceptualised as
‘mental disorder’ are as much part of our personal being as any other aspect of us, they
are not ‘other’, they are not ‘disease’, ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’. Indeed, as will be
illustrated in the final two chapters, such feelings/thoughts/behaviours almost always
represent a very adaptive response, at every level of our being, to environmental
contingencies. Thus, it is suggested that when understood in its full context, the
suffering conceptualised as ‘mental illness’/‘mental disorder’ can be seen as the very
understandable responses of the human person to what is happening to them, rather
than ‘un-understandable’ dysfunctions, aberrations and pathological processes of the
‘mind’ (or brain).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
PERSONS AND THEIR SELVES
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Children ‘inherit’ their humanity . . . in a process of communication which takes place
after birth . . . What has been overlooked in modern psychology . . . is that man is not
simply a being immersed directly in nature but is a being in a culture in nature.
(Shotter, 1975, cited in Shotter, 1993b, pp. xii-xii, italics in original)
In Chapter Two it was argued that the current dominant account of
psychological suffering in Anglo-American societies, the Dysfunctional Mind Account
(DMA), is not adequate to the task of explaining or understanding such suffering.  It was
suggested that one of the primary reasons for this is because the DMA is underpinned
with assumptions about human beings and their suffering which are inherently faulty. It
is suggested that the view of human beings presumed by these underlying assumptions
is not an accurate one, and that because of this the DMA will never be able to resolve the
theoretical and practical difficulties discussed in Chapter Two.  It is further suggested
that in order to move beyond the conceptual confusion and practical deficiencies of the
DMA and towards an alternative conceptualisation of psychological suffering it is
necessary to challenge these underlying assumptions and to explore alternative ways of
understanding what it is to be a person.
There are a number of theorists within the social sciences who have questioned
these assumptions (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992; Elias, 1982; Gergen, 1984; Harré, 1998;
Shotter, 1984; Shweder, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978). These theorists have essentially
attempted to repair the fundamental split between the individual and his/her
environment that pervades many of the social sciences (including psychology,
psychiatry, sociology and anthropology) by showing that each is essentially constitutive
of the other.
As Armon-Jones (1986, p. 32) notes, the notion that individual experience is
socio-culturally constituted “originated in the critical positivist tradition of post-
80
enlightenment social philosophy”.  George Herbert Mead (see Mead, 1956), an early
exponent of this view, saw the behaviour and experience of individuals as constituted
by, rather than prior to, the social group of which the individual is part.  Mead’s work
was influential in promoting studies of the interdependence between the social world
and the shaping of individual behaviour and experience. This approach to theorising
about human beings is often referred to by the umbrella term ‘social constructionism’1.
As Handy (1987, pp. 163-64) points out, while there are considerable differences
in emphasis between those theorists who are characterised as ‘social constructionist’ one
of the most fundamental propositions of the approach is
that human subjectivity and action are so inextricably interwoven with the social context
which people inhabit that a theoretical separation between the individual and society is
conceptually inadequate . . .  This necessitates developing analyses which acknowledge
firstly, that human subjectivity and actions are constituted within and through social
structures, and, secondly, that people are also the producers of the social structures they
inhabit.
Cromby (2004, p. 797) suggests that perhaps the most substantive commonality
within the “diverse assemblage” of “philosophy, theory and research” which is referred
to by the term of ‘social constructionism’ is “the rejection of the Cartesian subject of
mainstream psychology”. Cromby (2004, p. 797) points out that
[a]longside a focus on language and a view of society as the prime mover, the guarantor
of knowledge and root of experience, constructionist psychology rejects the atomistic,
bounded, coherent, rational psychological subject endorsed, at least implicitly, by most
mainstream approaches. Instead, constructionists observe that notions of the person are
culturally obtained and promulgated . . . and proposed that thought has a discursive,
argumentative or dialogical character that utilizes the ‘common sense’ themes and
dilemmas of a culture.
As has been noted above, the Dysfunctional Mind Account of psychological
suffering presupposes a ‘mind’ which can become, even if only metaphorically, ‘ill’ or
‘disordered’. For social constructionists, however, there is no such entity. For social
constructionists the mind is neither the receptacle for, nor the originator of, our thoughts
or any of our other ‘mental’ states. Indeed, one of the basic premises of a social
constructionist approach to psychology is that those processes commonly
conceptualised as ‘mind’ are primarily public and collective and are located
                                                 
1 The term ‘social constructionism’ is often somewhat ‘over-extended’ and certainly not all of the above-
mentioned theorists would consider themselves to be ‘social constructionists’.  I will use the term here,
however, as the signifier for the general approach outlined above in the absence of any more appropriate
term.
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in the contingent, unbroken responsive flow of language intertwined interaction between
people as they spontaneously cope with each other in different circumstances.
(Shotter, 1997, p. 9)
Indeed, according to Harré (1998, p. 49), mind
is created by people ad hoc in the activities of everyday life, including private acts of
thinking as well as public and collective cognitive performances. Mind is nothing but
meaningful action.
I will now turn specifically to the work of the two social constructionist theorists
just quoted above, John Shotter and Rom Harré2, who offer a way of viewing human
psychology which radically challenges all of the assumptions underlying the DMA.
Both these theorists acknowledge the impossibility of attempting to separate the
individual from their social world (proximal and distal) and argue that human
subjectivity and actions are constituted within and through the immersion of the
individual in that social world.
The work of these theorists is particularly useful within the context of this thesis
because of their focus on understanding the social construction of our subjectivity, our
experience of being persons in the world, what Rom Harré (1984a) refers to as our
‘personal being’. For Harré (1984a) this ‘personal being’ encompasses (a) one’s sense of
oneself as a singular being with a continuous and unique history (b) one’s capacity for
self-reference (‘self’ consciousness), and (c) one’s sense of oneself as an agent – “a being
in possession of an ultimate power of decision and action” (Harré, 1984a, p. 29).  Our
personal being3, in other words, comprises our various ‘senses of self’, as will be
outlined further in section 3.1.3.
As Shotter (1984, p. 49) points out, in order to become a ‘person’ “the provision of
the appropriate initial ecological conditions is vital” and “so is the participation of
another person in the process”.  As Shotter (1984, p. 49) goes on to note
[o]nly by attending closely to another’s spontaneous actions, and selecting socially
relevant aspects of them, can [a human being] construct a socially accountable ideal self,
an image of genuine personal being, which can be held out to the other as a challenge to
                                                 
2 The approaches taken to human psychology by these two theorists are by no means identical but heir
approaches to understanding the process of the social construction of human experience are, however,
broadly consistent and, as Morss (1996, p. 44) points out, “they share many commitments and values, and . .
.  agree on many points of criticism of orthodox psychology”.
3 I will use this term to refer to the psychological experience of being a ‘person’ because it more thoroughly
encompasses the various aspects of our being in the world than more commonly used terms such as
‘personality’, or ‘self’. The sense of experiencing oneself as a ‘self’, however, is, according to Harré (1998) a
central aspect of our personal being, and thus will be central to the alternative account of psychological
suffering developed in this thesis.
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be attained; one person can help another to become more of a person. By instruction4
individuals can become responsible themselves for actions which initially arose in the
context of their interaction with others.
If Harré  and Shotter are correct and what Harré (1984a) refers to as our ‘personal
being’ emerges from our enmeshment with our social world, then it is likely that the
kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental illness’ may also emerge, at least in part,
from that enmeshment.  Thus, if we could understand the processes involved in the
emergence5 of our ‘personal being’ it is possible we may be able to come closer to some
understanding of why the various problems we call ‘mental illness’ occur and begin to
move towards a way of conceptualising such suffering that does not frame such
experiences as ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’ but, rather, sees them as emerging from the
intricate coactions between the person and the social world within which they must live
their lives.
3.1.1. Conversation without end: The social constructionism of
John Shotter and Rom Harré
Harré (1984a, p. 20) suggests that there are “two primary realities in human life:
the array of persons and the network of their symbiotic interactions, the most important
of which is talk”. Harré (1984a) suggests that thought represents the privatization and
personalization of part of that network. For Harré (1984a) these two realities, persons
and their interactions, can not be reduced one to the other, but each is necessary if the
other is to exist.  For Harré (1984a; 1998), and for Shotter (1993a; 1997), the concept of the
‘person’ – “the embodied, publicly identifiable and individuatable and unanalysable
being around which the human form of life revolves” (Harré, 1998, p. 177) –  and the
‘joint actions’ of those persons should form “the ontological basis of all psychology”
(1992, p. 154).
Thus, for Harré (1984a, p. 20), as for Shotter,
                                                 
4 And in most cases this ‘instruction’ is provided ‘naturally’, without conscious intention, within the context
of everyday interactions.
5 The word ‘emergence’ is a dynamic systems term that refers to “spontaneously generated (i.e., emergent)
order in complex, adaptive systems  (Granic & Hollenstein, 2003, p. 644). See Chapter Five for a discussion
of the usefulness of a dynamic systems ‘heuristic’ in attempting to build an understanding of persons and
their suffering which acknowledges all of our various aspects of being in the world – the molecular, the
organismic, and the personal and how they coact with the social world within which we are enmeshed.
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The fundamental human reality is a conversation6, effectively without beginning or end,
to which, from time to time, individuals may make contributions. All that is personal in
our mental and emotional lives is individually appropriated from the conversation going
on around us and perhaps idiosyncratically transformed. The structure of our thinking
and feeling will reflect, in various ways, the form and content of that conversation.
(Harré, 1990, p. 341)
Shotter (1993a, p. 7) suggests that it is within this “contingent flow of continuous
communicative interaction between human beings”, a sphere of activity he refers to as
‘joint action’, that “all the other socially significant dimensions of interpersonal
interaction, with their associated modes of subjective or objective being, originate and
are formed” (Shotter, 1993a, p. 7).
As Harré (1998, p. 50) notes
[s]ocial life is not an ad hoc coming together of individuals, hazardously trading
hypotheses as to what each one is thinking and doing. The minds of individuals are
privatized practices condensing like fog out of the public conversation onto material
nuclei, their bodies.
In line with this insight, Harré (1984b, p. 128) suggests we suspend our “usual
practice of looking inside [ourselves] and other people for the primary places of
thoughts” and notes that “many mental phenomena . . . have their primary place in
public displays”.  For Harré (1984b, p. 128) “emotions are just as much displayed as felt,
while promises, if kept to oneself, mean nothing”. Harré (1984b, p. 128) suggests that our
‘mental’ activities, such as “reasoning, declining, making commitments, and even
feeling” are essentially located within the conversations in which we engage.  This does
not mean, however, that these ‘mental’ activities are not central to our subjective sense of
being in the world, nor does it mean that they are ‘disembodied’. When we reason,
decline, make a commitment and feel an emotion our bodies are engaged in these
activities too, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.
Indeed, Shotter (1993b, p. 107) suggests that rather than being as logical or
systematic as psychologists and philosophers have often assumed, our ‘minds’
reflect in their functioning essentially the same ethical and rhetorical considerations
influencing the transactions between people, out in the world. And furthermore, rather
than being organised at the centre of our being (thus to be given orderly expression or
not as required), they are organized peripherally, in a moment-by-moment process of
‘ethically sensitive negotiations’ at the boundaries of our being, where the negotiations
involved are as varied in their form, say as those between intimate lovers, parent and
                                                 
6 The word ‘conversation’ is used here in the extended sense and includes those ‘extra-discursive’ aspects of
our interactions with each other such as gestures and facial expressions and also includes our
‘conversations’ with ourselves.
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child, those between distant strangers, those between poets and logicians, or those
between different social classes.
Thus, for Shotter and Harré our individual, unique mental lives are essentially
social productions. Indeed, Harré (1984a) characterises them as being the result of the
acquisition of a theory rather than of biological maturation and suggests that most of the
things we take to be “metaphysically ultimate in psychology are referents of theoretical
concepts” (1984a, p. 21).   As Harré (1984a, p. 20) notes,
[a] person is not a natural object, but a cultural artefact. A person is a being who has
learned a theory, in terms of which his or her experience is ordered.
Both Harré (1984a, 1998) and Shotter (1974a; 1974b; 1984; 1997) suggest that this
‘theory learning’ process occurs within the context of an infants’ earliest social
relationships, and in particular their relationship with their mother7.  As Harré (1984a,
pp. 21-22) notes, from the very beginning “infants make demands upon their mothers
and other caretakers that provoke the very talk and action from the mother” that
facilitates the development of personal being – a being with a sense of oneself as a
singular being with a continuous and unique history with a capacity for self-reference
(‘self’ consciousness), and a sense of oneself as an agent – “a being in possession of an
ultimate power of decision and action” (Harré, 1984a, p. 29).
As Harré (1984a, p. 22) points out, and as will be detailed in Section 3.2,
each level of sophistication of public –collective activity in which a developing person
joins is perpared for, not by a maturing natural endowment, but by the previous level of
that interpersonal, public and collective activity.
Thus, what seem to be the child’s ‘natural’ contributions to this process have
already emerged, suggests Harré (1984a, p. 22),  from the “personalization of the social
structure” within which the child’s personhood is being established.
From the viewpoint of the kind of social constructionism espoused by these two
theorists, everything that is taken to a ‘real psychology object’ in the cognitive (realist)
account – things like our intentions, memories, motives, perceptions, emotions, etc. – can
be talked of in a different way: Such psychological phenomena are not already finished
and finalized entities, rather, they are still in the process of construction. This means that
at all times in a person’s life they are both partially constructed and, also, open to further
                                                 
7 It is acknowledged that some children have primary caregivers who are not their biological mothers (for
e.g., grandmothers, aunts, adopted mothers, fathers, etc.).  When the word ‘mother’ is used it is shorthand
for primary caregivers of all kinds.
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construction, or even, re-construction, in different ways and in different circumstances,
according to the person’s sense of how they are placed in relation to both their own
project and to the other people around them (Shotter, 1997).
Indeed, Shotter (1997) claims that it is  “only through the semiotic mediation of
signs, within an inner conversational process, that what we talk of as our 'self', our
'psyche', or our 'mind', comes into existence at all, but that . . .  'minds', 'selves', or
'psyches' exist as such, only within our embodied discursive practices”. In accordance
with this, Harré (1984a, p. 21) suggests that by adopting ‘theories’ in which concepts like
‘mind’ and ‘self’ have a place, “we so structure our experience as to create them:
different theories, different mental organization”. Because of this, while our ‘minds’ and
our ‘selves’ may not be actual entities these ‘theories’ nevertheless exert a very real
influence over our lives and the way we live them.
As Shotter (1993a, p. 22) argues,  when we talk of our ‘minds’ this leads us to talk
as if our ‘minds’ exist as the real things underlying our behaviour. This allows us,
suggests Shotter (1993a, p. 31) to
structure and manage our individualistic forms of life, and to create certain forms of
social institutions, not available to those those lacking such a ‘language of the mind’.
This, indeed, is the nature of our ‘social reality’; we sustain and manage it through such
forms of talk.
Through such talk, Shotter (1993a, p. 31) maintains,
people are not making a reference to the nature of their already existing minds, but are
taking part in a contested (or at least contestable) process, a tradition of argumentation, in
which they are still struggling over the constitution of their own mental make-up. At a
personal level, the whole lexicon of ‘mind’ and ‘mental activity’ terms provides a set of
rhetorical resources or devices for use by them to serve their own personal interests in
that struggle; while at a social level, it is a way of talking that serves to sustain and
perhaps develop further, our own Western form of social life and personhood.
As Shotter (1984) notes, by taking viewing ‘minds’ and all the other ‘mental
entities’ we have created through this lens we can begin to repudiate
the ‘Cartesian starting point’ – localized in the ‘I’ of the individual . . . and replace it
within a more diffuse and flowing process – a process with not only social, cultural and
historical aspects to it, but with biological and ecological ones too; a large-scale
developmental process which is productive of individual, localized subjectivities, but
which itself is, as Popper (1972, cited in Shotter, 1984) puts it, ‘without a knowing
subject’.
Both Harré and Shotter (in common with a number of other social
constructionists, including John Cromby, whose work I will be discussing later in this
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chapter) draw on the work of Russian developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky in
order to explain how ‘natural powers’ are transformed, via social interactions with
significant others, into ‘personal’ or ‘acquired powers’. As Tissaw (2000, p. 847) puts it,
in Vygotsky’s account
[t]he immediate social surroundings of infants and young children constitute the
framework within which innate, prelinguistic individual powers become the
differentiated powers of thought and action recognised by care-givers as psychological
growth and maturity.
As both Harré (1998) and Shotter (1984) point out, it is via the processes
identified by Vygotsky’s research that an infant’s perception of arrays of things in the
world is transformed into an adult perception of person-centred external and internal
environments, action becomes agency, dependency becomes respect and memory
becomes autobiography. Vygotsky’s insights are so central to the social constructionist
account of persons and emergence being outlined in this thesis that before proceeding
any further it is necessary to provide some background on Vygotsky’s “strange and
surprising psychology” (Shotter, 1993b, p. 108).
3.1.2. Vygotsky: A brief introduction
The research of Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934), a developmental psychologist
working in Russian during the early twentieth century, was carried out within a
tradition commonly known as cultural-historical psychology.  According to Cole (Date
Unknown, p. 2) cultural-historical psychology
begins from the assumption that there is an intimate connection between the special
environment that human beings inhabit and the fundamental, distinguishing, qualities of
human psychological processes. The special quality of the human environment is that it
is suffused with the achievements of prior generations in reified (and to this extent
materialized) form.
As Cole (Date Unknown, p. 2) points out, for cultural-historical psychologists like
Vygotsky
the development of the mind is the interweaving of biological development of the human
body and the appropriation of the cultural/ideal/material heritage which exists in the
present to coordinate people with each other and the physical world.
For Vygotsky, our ‘minds’ emerge from our active engagement with our
environment, they are not in existence prior to the commencement of that engagement.
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As Vygotsky notes, “the social dimension of consciousness is primary in time and in
fact. The individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and secondary” (Vygotsky,
1979, p. 30 , cited in Wertsch, 1985, p. 58). 8
As Burkitt (1991, p. 145) points out
Vygotsky’s entire corpus of works aims to show that the relation between the child and
its environment does not unfold spontaneously from the child’s own activity considered
in isolation from others. Rather, the child must always be considered in an
interdependent relation to those around him or her, who instruct the child in its activities
using the materials and knowledge of the day.
For Vygotsky, psychological development occurs within the relations between
the child and its environment, particularly its social environment. Vygotsky’s approach,
as Burkitt (1991, p. 144) points out, is a dialectical and developmental one, and thus the
child’s psychological development is seen as occurring within the relations between the
child and its environment, “not externally to them”. It is not a case of the child being on
one side and the environment being on the other. The child’s ‘personal being’ is
constituted in its active relationship to the world.  It is this relationship that will become
internal  to the child and shape the psychological plane and the structure of the self.
(Burkitt, 1991)
According to Vygotsky (1978) the higher cognitive capacities, such as language
and the ability to think about oneself (fundamental to the notion of possessing a unique
individual ‘self with an ‘inner life’), are developed during the course of our interactions
with others. These formative interactions occur when the infant attempts or seems to
attempt a task, either manipulative or cognitive, and an older, more skilled, person
(usually an adult but sometimes an older child) will supplement its efforts in such a way
as to complete the task.
At this stage the cognitive or motor skill is, as Vygotsky (1962) puts it, ‘in the
zone of proximal development9’. Development has occurred when the child can do for
itself the supplementing action offered by the parent or older child. The child can then
complete the task him or herself. In other words the child must master tasks “practically,
in its interactions with adults, before it masters them intellectually and can use them
autonomously” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 147).
As Vygotsky (1962, pp. 90-91) notes,
                                                 
8 As Wertsch (1985, p. 67) points out, this resonates with Mead’s (1934, cited in Wertsch, 1985, p. 59) claim
that “the social act is a precondition of [consciousness]”.
9 The ‘zone of proximal development’ is essentially the range of potential each person has for learning – with
what the person can do without assistance at one end, and what s/he can do with assistance at the other.
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consciousness and control appear only at a late stage in the development of a function,
after it has been used and practiced unconsciously and spontaneously. In order to subject
a function to intellectual control, we must first possess it.
This is not to say that Vygotsky denied the importance of biology in determining
what skills a developing child can begin to acquire at various points in its life, but he did
not believe that biology leads the process of psychological development. Rather, for
Vygotsky, it is cultural instruction “which determines the level to which people will
develop psychologically”10 (Burkitt, 1991, p. 146) and it is speech which plays the key
role in the transmission of this instruction.
As Burkitt (1991) points out, Vygotsky’s own empirical research suggested that
there were three stages in the development of speech and thought in a child. Firstly
there is ‘social speech’ when the child is “introduced to the speech content of the adult
world” by its parents and other adults and older children.  Then comes ‘egocentric
speech’ in which the child uses words “to guide its own behaviour by talking aloud to
itself as an adult would who was giving the child instructions” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 147).
The third stage of this development is ‘inner speech’. At this stage the child no longer
speaks out loud to itself, but rather speaks ‘silently’ to itself – “having internalized the
social form of communication as a way of autonomously regulating its own actions”
(Burkitt, 1991, p. 147). As Burkitt (1991, p. 147) notes, “at this stage speech ‘centres’ itself
in the personality as a conscious ego – the ‘I’ – which creates the internal plane of self-
consciousness”.
For Vygotsky, then, psychological functions develop on the social level, within
relationships between humans, before they develop at the psychological level. This is
expressed in Vygotsky’s (1966, p. 44, cited in Shotter, 1993b) ‘general genetic law of
development’ that
[a]ny function of the child’s cultural development appears on the stage twice, on two
planes, first on the social plane and then on the psychological, first among people as an
intermental category and then within the child as an intramental category.
As Shotter (1993b, p. 111) notes this essentially means that “within the child, the
same ethical concerns which are held in the social realm are still of importance in the
‘inner’ psychological realm of the individual”. Shotter (1993b, p. 112)  further notes that
when a function appears ‘within’ the child – via a process Vygotsky calls
‘internalization’ –  this does not mean there has been a spatial or geographical
                                                 
10 This ‘rule’ would not apply, however, if a child were brain damaged in any way.
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transformation, but rather a “transformation in our responsibility for things”. Shotter
(Shotter, 1993b, p. 112) stresses that Vygotsky is not talking about a process
whereby what was in the adult’s head gets transferred into the child’s head, he is talking
about a process in which things which at first a child only does spontaneously and
unselfconsciously, under the control of an adult, comes under the control of the child’s
own personal agency.
Thus, as Lock (1981, p. 29) notes, there is in development “a transfer of the
control of action from one individual to another”. Lock (1981) further notes that this
transfer occurs through the development of symbolization, particularly in the form of
language. This results, according to Lock (1981, p. 30) in the child becoming
able to control processes that he previously could not by an ‘internalization’: his
individual construction of the symbolizing other.
As Burkitt (1991) notes, before a child begins to master speech its thinking is tied
to its practical activities and its socio-emotional attachment to its mother.  The child’s
relationship with its mother forms the milieu where “needs can be expressed and met,
and . . . wishes and desires are created” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 147). As Burkitt (1991, p. 147)
goes on to point out
[a]t this stage in development, thinking is totally encapsulated in the child’s activity and
emotional responses, and has not yet developed as self-consciousness which can regulate
and direct actions.
According to Vygotsky (1962, p. 150), this level of mental functioning never
disappears because
[t]hought itself is engendered by motivation, i.e., by our desires and needs, our interests
and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional tendency, which
holds the answer to the last ‘why’ in the analysis of thinking. 11
As Burkitt (1991, p. 148) points out while this ‘pre-verbal’ level of mental
functioning never disappears “what is transformed . . . as children begin to master
language, is the actual thought processes themselves”. While emotion and desire may
                                                 
11 This seems to conflict with the position held by Shotter and Harré (see p. 19 above) that our motives are
the product of our activities rather than our activities being the product of our motives. Upon closer
examination though the “affective-volitional tendency” which is “behind every thought” is still essentially
generated by the child’s activity and emotional responses, as Harré and Shotter would suggest. The
“emotional responses”, however, while themselves heavily influenced by a child’s experiences and activities
in the world are also going to be influenced by the child’s biology, which itself, of course, will itself be
influenced by the child’s activities and emotional responses. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapters
Five and Six, social and biological factors interact in various directions resulting in complex feedback loops
which can precipitate, exacerbate and alleviate psychological suffering.
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remain the motivational forces behind thought, language enables thoughts to “find a
new medium for formulating themselves and a totally new structure” (Burkitt, 1991, p.
148).  This, in turn, leads to transformations, via language, of the original motivational
force – it being strengthened, weakened, or entirely changed by the way in which we tell
stories about it to ourselves and others.
Thus, for Vygotsky (1987, p. 251, cited in Burkitt, 1999, p. 148)
speech does not merely serve as the expression of developed thought. Thought is
restructured as it is transformed into speech. It is not expressed but completed in the
word.
Vygotsky’s empirical work suggested that the development of thought and
speech are separate until the child is about two years old (Burkitt, 1991). At this stage,
according to Vygotsky, thought and speech combined to initiate new forms of thinking
and acting. The child, in discovering the signs which represent objects in the world,
discovers the symbolic function of words and learns to place objects, including itself, “in
a system of social meanings, and . . . thereby [becomes] an object to itself” (Burkitt, 1991,
p. 148).
This insight is supported by research carried out by Bozhovich (1979, 1980, cited
in Burkitt, 1991, p. 150) which has shown how, at about the age of three years, the child
begins to recognize itself as the subject or initiator of its own acts. As Burkitt (1991, p.
148) notes, “it is at this juncture the self begins to emerge in awareness and the inner
conversation is begun with the self [and] . . . self consciousness is being forged out of the
consciousness of experience within communicative interaction”.
As Burkitt (1991, p. 149) goes on to point out, Vygotsky’s work suggests that
“consciousness develops within the personality as a whole – in its bodily,
emotional/volitional aspects”.  With each stage of the development of consciousness
there is a transformation in its structure. To begin with, mental activity remains on the
level of ‘practical consciousness’ (Giddens, 1984, cited in Burkitt, 1991, p. 149), where
there is a non-reflective understanding of how to perform an action. Late, however, as
thought and speech begin to merge, ‘discursive consciousness’ (Giddens, 1984, cited in
Burkitt, 1991, p. 149) appears. At this stage thoughts can be put into words – for other
people and for oneself – and there is self-conscious awareness and control over thought
and action. 12
                                                 
12 As will be discussed in Section 3.3, however, this self-conscious awareness and control over thought and
action is never total.
91
Burkitt (1991, p. 150) suggests that at this point “involuntary motivation no
longer remains the driving force in the personality, as the cognitive and affective
processes are brought into balance by the self-conscious personality – the ‘I’”. The ‘I’ is,
as Harré (1998) makes clear, itself a product of speech, and becomes “the linguistic
reference point that the child uses to identify its new found sense of its own self as a
subject and initiator or action” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 150).  As Tissaw (2000, p. 847), citing
Bruner (1984), points out, “the primary responsibility for this transformation is not the
child’s but depends ‘on society’s capacity to provide the child with the symbolic tools
that the child need[s] in order to grow” (Bruner, 1984, p. 96, cited in Tissaw, 2000).
As has already been noted above, one of the fundamental insights drawn by
social constructionist theorists from Vygotsky’s work is that our ‘inner lives’ (our
‘thoughts’, our ‘personalities’ our ‘mental states’, our very ‘minds’) are ‘appropriated’
from the ‘general conversation’ (in the extended sense) going on around us.  As has also
already been noted above, if this insight is correct, then our psychological suffering, too,
must emerge from the ‘conversation’ within which we are all embedded and engaged.
Thus, it is to this conversation, the social interactions within which the child is
embedded, that we must turn if we wish to move towards a better understanding of
such suffering.
As was pointed out above, Shotter (1984) suggests that children derive their
personal powers from their pre-existing ‘natural’ powers. As has already been noted,
this is not something they can do on their own; such a process requires the help of
someone who already possesses such ‘personal powers’ someone who is, ideally, in a
‘love-relation’ to the child, “someone who cares sufficiently to reflect them back to
themselves in an ideal way, i.e., in a way which indicates to them which of all the things
‘they’ do are the things highly valued in their society” (Shotter, 1984, p. 56, abbreviation
in the original).  This is usually, but not always, the biological mother. Thus, Shotter
(1984, p. 56) suggests that in order to understand how children are “transformed from
almost wholly ‘natural’ agents’ into individual personalities” it is necessary to attempt to
understand “what goes on between and within mothers and their children” during the
early stages of development.
For both Harré (1998) and Shotter the transformational processes which occur
between a mother and her child take place primarily during a period some theorists
have called ‘psychological symbiosis’ (Newson & Shotter, 1974; Spitz, 1965) – a stage
beginning with the first smile and ending when the child’s use of language becomes
sophisticated enough to enable them to engage in private discourse and carry out
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complex cognitive acts for themselves.  Within this symbiotic relationship, according to
Harré (1984a, p. 105), “certain kinds of language games13 are played, engendering talk
with appropriate cognitive properties, for instance self-expression of feelings and
intentions”14, language games essential to the emergence of our sense of being a ‘self’; a
unique individual with agentic powers and a personal life trajectory which we can own
as our own and tell stories about, both to ourselves and to others.
Before going on to outline how our ‘sense of ‘self’ emerges from within this
symbiotic relationship, however, the way in which the ‘self’ is conceptualised in this
thesis needs to be made very clear. As Falmagne (2004, p. 831) points out the notion of
the ‘self’ has been the subject of rigorous poststructuralist critique in recent years. This
critique has “subverted the traditional notion of a unified, bounded, stable, transparent
self who is the origin of his or her actions and of social life”.  While there is much to
criticise in this notion of the ‘self’, however, Falmagne (2004, p. 831) suggests, in line
with social constructionist theorists, that
the impulse that has fuelled the radical rejection of the ‘self’ and the shift toward a non-
substantial, fluid notion of subjectivity in postmodern theorizing has been precipitous in
assuming a necessary link between the notion of a substantial ‘self’ (which, as noted
above, has been also been criticised by social constructionist theorists) and the unified,
bounded, stable Cartesian self.
We can still continue to utilise the concept of the ‘self’, suggests Falmagne (2004),
if the “self whose subjectivity we theorize can be complex, unstable, contradictory and
contingently shifting while remaining substantial”.  Indeed it is just such a
conceptualisation of self that can be found in Harré’s (1998) social constructionist
analysis of the ‘self’ which I will outline below. I will also, in the following discussion
make some links between Harre’s (1998) account of the ‘self’ and the account developed
by Russell Meares’ (2000), as presented in his book Intimacy and alienation: Memory,
trauma and personal being. While Meares (2000) would not identify himself as a ‘social
constructionist’, aspects of his work have strong resonances with the approach taken by
Shotter, Harré and Cromby (whose work will be discussed later in this chapter). Meares’
                                                 
13 Language games (Wittgenstein, 1953) are essentially the enactment of language in the everyday activities
of people, their ‘forms of life’.
14 It should be noted that this early pre-linguistic stage of development was not the focus of Vygotsky’s
research, and indeed in many of his writings he appears to claim that the ‘mental functions’ children are
capable of at that age are automatic and innate within the personality. As Burkitt (1991, p 152) points out,
however, there is “now evidence to suggest that children actively begin to appropriate the social heritage,
and to construct their personality under the influence of their culture, before they have acquired linguistic
competence”. While this early pre-linguistic stage of development was not the focus of Vygotsky’s work the
findings to be discussed below nevertheless “complement his work and extend the spirit of his enquiries to
the pre-linguistic stage of childhood” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 152).
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(2000) insights are particularly useful with respect to understanding how the emergence
of ‘personal being’, and the sense of ‘self’, may be affected by neglect and trauma during
the early years of a person’s life.
3.1.3. The self: One point of view, many aspects
As Sass (2007, p. 399) notes,  along with notions of the ‘individual’ and the
‘person’, the notion of the ‘self’ is “amongst the most foundational and irreducible”.
Indeed, Harré (1984a, p. 26) suggests that the notion of ‘self’ should be the “central
constructing concept of individual human psychology”.  As Harré (1998, p. 2) further
notes, “it is uniqueness, personal singularity, that is the leitmotif of all our forms of
life15” and this uniqueness and singularity is most often expressed and discussed by the
use of the word ‘self’. Further, and most importantly within the context of this thesis, the
sense that this ‘self’ has somehow been disrupted, damaged, devalued, split, lost, or
never formed at all is central to those experiences commonly conceptualised as ‘mental
disorders’ (Cermolacce, Naudin, & Parnas, 2007; Crowley Jack, 1991; Estroff, 1989; Karp,
1996; Stone, 2004).
As Harré (1998, p. 1) points out, however, the notion of the ‘self’ is “not a clear,
univocal or straightforward” one and suggests that a social constructionist / discursive
approach to the concept of the ‘self’ may help to “abstract a modicum of order from . . .
the flood of writing” on this topic.  To this end Harré  (1998) offers an alternative
explanatory framework to that which underlies most ‘mainstream’ psychological
accounts  (including the various permutations of the Dysfunctional Mind Account) for
understanding the self and its emergence.
As Harré (1998, p. 4) points out, in the Cartesian tradition (as exemplified by
mainstream psychology and the Dysfunctional Mind Account) the sense of self has been
interpreted to be “an intimation an entity has of its own existence”.  That entity, notes
Harré (1998, p. 4) “has been variously categorized and located by generations of
philosophers”.  For Harré (1998, p. 2), as for other social constructionists and discursive
theorists, however
                                                 
15 This comment may be more applicable to Western, industrialised societies than to other less
individualistic cultures. Indeed, Harré’s analysis of the concept of ‘self’ applies primarily to our Western
‘sense of self’. Other cultures, as Harré (1998) acknowledges, will be very likely to have other ways of being
in the world.
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the self, as the singularity we each feel ourselves to be, is not an entity. Rather it is a site,
a site from which a person perceives the world and a place from which to act. There are
only persons. Selves are grammatical fictions, necessary characteristics of person-oriented
discourses.
The notion of the self as entity is, suggests Harré (1998) a “useful fiction, but
ultimately seriously misleading”.  Indeed, Harré (1998) suggests that it may be helpful to
move away from the notion of ‘the self’ and talk instead of a “person’s senses of self”.
As Harré (1998, p. 4) notes there are a number of ‘aspects’ to a person’s ‘sense of self’.
Firstly, to have a sense of self is
to have a sense of one’s location as a person, in each of several arrays of other beings,
relevant to personhood. It is to have a sense of one’s point of view . . . a location in space
from which one perceives and acts upon the world, including the part that lies within
one’s own skin.
Secondly the phrase ‘sense of self’ is often used to refer to
The sense one has of oneself as possessing a unique set of attributes which, though they
change nevertheless remain as a whole distinctive of just the one person.
(Harré, 1998, p. 4)
Finally, the notion of the ‘self’ is also often used to refer to the impression that a
person makes upon other people, either purposely or accidentally. Thus, in Harré’s
(1998) analysis we have three ‘aspects’ of the ‘self’, which Harré (1998) refers to as Self 1,
Self 2 and Self 3.
Self 1 is having “a sense of a field of things centred on one’s own embodied self
with which one is in a material relation” (1998, p. 104).  As Harré  (1998, p. 96) points
out, however, the pronoun ‘I’ doesn’t just indicate a person’s spatio-temporal location
but it also indexes what is said with “the personal responsibility of the speaker”. Thus,
Self 1 also has another, and related, aspect; the discursive presentation of the person as
“a responsible and active being – person as agent” (1998, p. 96).
Self 2 includes “the totality of attributes both ephemeral and enduring of the
person I am” (Harré, 1998, p. 148). Included in these attributes are “one’s beliefs about
one’s attributes” (Harré, 1998, p. 4). There are two aspects to Self 2, what one currently is
(self-knowledge or self-concept) and what one has been (autobiography).  Self 2
encompasses the “ephemeral flows of activity, both private and public, in which that
person engages, producing thoughts and actions sometimes but not always displaying
repeated structures and forms” (1998, p. 135).
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Self 3, in Harré’s (1998) analysis, is essentially “the impression of a person’s
personal characteristics that one person makes on another” (Harré, 1998. p. 4). There are
two aspects to Self 3; “the self I intend to project in what I say and do” and “the self that
others read in my speech and action” (Harré, 1998, p. 177).
 Harré’s (1998) schema can be represented as having the following structure:
Person {Self1, Self 2, Self 3}
According to Harré (1998, p. 9) the “person is the robust existent and the three
bracketed concepts refer to aspects of and conditions for the flow of personal action”. As
has already been noted, for Harré (1998) the word person refers to “the embodied,
publicly identifiable and individuatable and unanalysable being around which the
human form of life revolves” (Harré, 1998, p. 177). Persons are “both materially
embodied and enmeshed in networks of symbolic exchanges, which are, at least in part,
constitutive of what they are” (Harré, 1998, p. ix).
In Harré ‘s (1998) analysis the “‘person’ is the genuine substantive, picking out a
category of real entities [but ]. . . the three ‘selves’ discussed above are ontologically
quite different” (Harré, 1998, p. 148). These expressions refer not to entities, as already
noted above, but to
attributes of the flow of personal action, and to the skills, powers and dispositions a
person must have so to act. As entities, Self 1, Self 2 and Self 3 are fictions, though
indispensable fictions.
(Harré, 1998, p. 148)
For Harré (1984a, p. 26), while the concept of self is the “central constructing
concept of individual human psychology”, it is a
theoretical concept whose source analogue is the socially defined and sustained concept
of ‘person’ that is favoured in the society under study and is embodied in the
grammatical forms of public speech appropriate to talk about persons. Our personal
being is created by our coming to believe a theory of self based on our society’s working
conception of a person.
Harré (1998, p. 72) emphasises that it is “persons who are the basic particulars of
the human world. It is as persons that human beings belong in that world, not as
organisms”.  For Harré (1998, p. 5), selves, either as “personal points of view [Self 1] or
as dynamic totalities of personal attributes [Selves 2 and 3]” are aspects of persons that
exist primarily in discourse.  Selves exist in the stories we tell in which our uniqueness is
established and displayed for ourselves  and for others.  As Harré  (1998, p. 19) notes,
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[u]nless we take the greatest care in how we interpret ways of expressing ourselves as
persons we can easily begin a multiplication of sub-personal entities, homunculi of
various sorts, for instance ‘self as mental mover’ or ‘self as mental contents’.
Harre’s suggestion that the ‘self’ is socially constructed throws into disarray the
commonly held belief that “to be a person is [to] possess an inner psychic unity (which
we call our ‘self’)” and the related beliefs “that it is from our self that all our motivations
issue, and that it is within our self that all the reasons for all our actions can be found”
(Shotter, 1993a, p. 95). As Shotter (1993a) points out, such an analysis, shared in general
terms by Shotter (1993a; 1993b) himself and by most other social constructionists,
suggests that rather than our activities being the product of our motives (which issue
from the centre of our being, our ‘self’), our motives are actually the product of our
activities.16
Harré (1998, p. 59) suggests that it is somewhere in the “grammar of the personal
pronouns, particularly the first person and to a lesser degree the second” (Harré, 1998, p.
55) that we should be looking for “an expression of the seemingly elusive sense of self”.
Harré (1998) suggests that first and second person pronouns are used for the expression
of all three aspects of self (Self 1, Self 2 and Self 3). Third person pronouns and proper
names, on the other hand, “are used to pick out persons as publicly identifiable
individuals and refer to none of the discursively constructed pseudo-entities, Self 1, Self
2 or Self 3” (Harré, 1998, p. 65).
In order to support his arguments concerning persons and their selves Harré
(1998, p. 17) depends heavily on a linguistic analysis which is “directed towards
                                                 
16 This social constructionist insight is an interesting one in that it completely reverses the accepted view of
where our motives issue from. Certainly in the case of many motives it would seem to provide a more
accurate account. For example, if we are motivated to go and meet a friend for coffee it may be because we
have had previous pleasurable interactions with this friend, thus ensuring we will seek them out again. Or it
may stem from our friend exerting pressure on us to meet for coffee (“you haven’t had much time for me
lately” or “I need to talk to you about something”). Both of these possible reasons would also interact with
other factors such as our need to socialise regularly or our lack of ability to say no to someone, both of which
are also the product of our past and present activities in the world even though they have now become part
of our ‘self concept’.  But what about those motivations we feel without really understanding where they
come from? Our sudden urge to touch that lamppost as we walk past it. Our strong desire to avoid a
particular street as we are driving about town, even if it would get us to our destination faster. Our need to
eat that fourth cream cake even though we are full to bursting. There seems to be no relation between our
activities in the world and these strange urges. For many, these motivations seem to come from within, from
our deepest core. Indeed, many of the ‘symptoms’ of the so-called ‘mental disorders’ outlined in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual are of just this character.  Strange urges, unexplained fears, baffling
desires and mysterious sadness; feelings which do not seem to have any real link to our actual lived lives.  In
Section 3.3, however, it will be argued that these feelings/motivations can be shown to come from our
activities in the world as surely as do the simpler more ‘explainable’ motivations.  As will be noted at the
end of this chapter, however, in order to more fully understand such experiences, it must be acknowledged
that they are not just ‘socially constructed’, rather they are socially and biologically co-constituted.   It will
be the task of the remaining chapters in this thesis to outline how such ‘co-constitution’ occurs.
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showing that ‘I’. . .  is not a referring expression like a proper name or an unambiguous
description”. According to Harré (1998, p. 17)
the only referring expressions in the language games of self-attribution and description
are proper names and their equivalents and they are used to refer to actually, formerly or
potentially embodied persons.
First and second person pronouns, rather than referring to actual embodied
persons, are used for the expression of all three aspects of the discursively constructed
self.  This is because these words are indexicals and thus carry with them grammatical
properties that locate a person in place and time.  The use of ‘I’, for example, indexes the
content of a report about the world with the point of view of the speaker and, according
to Harré (1998, p. 55) “implies a centring among material things in the environment and
also among the parts of one’s body as territory within the larger territory”.
Harré (1998, p. 56) suggests that the meaning of ‘I’ is
completed on an occasion of use by local knowledge of the location of the body of the
speaker. By virtue of that fact about its usage the situated use of ‘I’ indexes the empirical
content of a descriptive statement with the spatial location of the embodied speaker.
But there is another ‘location’ which the word ‘I’ indexes and that is the speaker’s
location or ‘position’ in the local moral order (Harré, 1998; Harré & Gillett, 1994).  If
someone says “I think the Headmaster is a fool” our assessment of whether the speaker
is reliable or unreliable, fair or unfair, etc., will influence how we respond to what s/he
has said. This aspect of an utterance is called its ‘illocutionary force’. Thus, the pronoun
‘I’
does the work of indexing these aspects of a statement with spatial locations and moral
positions. My sense of self, of my individuality, is in part my sense of experiencing the
world from a unique location in space, the location of my body. It is also, in part, my
sense of acting on the world at that place, but also in relation to other people. My moral
position is also implicated in my sense of my own agency. It is an essential component of
the sense of self, and it is manifested in the role of the pronoun that presents the speaker
as a self.
(Harré and Gillett, 1994)
As Harré and Gillett (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 197) go on to note “[p]ersonal
identity is one’s sense of being located in space and having a position in the moral order
of the little group with which one is conversing”.  They conclude that “selfhood is
discursively produced for others by the use of the first person pronoun, and at the same
98
time is discursively produced for ourselves. It reflects and in part engenders my own
personal identity” (Harré & Gillett, 1994).
Harré’s analysis of the ‘grammatical fictions’ that are our ‘selves’ makes very
clear how the ways in which we use language have essentially ‘tricked’ us into believing
in the existence of a variety of ‘object-like’ entities – the ‘self’, the ‘ego’, the ‘soul’, and
etc.  As Harré (1998, p. 61) notes “’I’ is part of the grammatical machinery by which I
express my point of view, not a device for referring to a subject [e.g., the ‘inner self’ or
the ‘mind’] to which properties and states are being ascribed“. Thus, when someone says
they ‘see’ something, all they are doing is describing “some state of the world, indexed
with the point of view (the location of the speaker’s body) from which it is seen” (Harré,
1998, p. 60).  There are no extra entities (e.g., ‘selves’, ‘egos’) doing the seeing, there is
only the person17.
As Harré (1998, p. 17) notes “the indexical force of the first person is nothing
other than incorporating the locations of speaker and act of speaking in the manifolds
presupposed in perception, action and memory in discourse”. Harré (1998, p. 17) goes
on to argue that
[s]ince there is but one person marking device in the grammar of which a person’s
locations in all three manifolds are expressed, namely ‘I’, it is that device that pins
together the otherwise disparate locations into the one person that each of us is. The
psycholinguistic thesis of the social construction of selfhood is simply that in acquiring
the grammatical capacity to use the first person devices the singularities of self are
brought into coordination as the sense I have of my own personal being as a singularity,
my continuous point of view.
For Meares (2000, p. 11), also, ‘I’
is primarily a noun of ‘position’, a metaphoric ‘eye’ from which attention is directed, so
shaping an individual reality, which is in a state of ceaseless change. The ‘I’ is a constant,
offering a means of unifying personal existence. In this way one’s person is conceived as
a unified diversity. 
According to Harré (1998), and Shotter (1974a, 1974b), it is within the symbiotic
relationship between a child and their mother that the ‘grammatical fictions’ that are our
‘selves’ are established, and it is these senses of ‘self’ which essentially comprise our
‘personal being’. Again, this accords with the work of Meares (2000, p. 14), who notes
                                                 
17 It should perhaps be reiterated here that in Harré’s schema Person{Self 1, Self 2, Self 3} the three ‘selves’
are not entities, rather they are various aspects of our multi-faceted ‘sense of self’. It is not any of these
‘selves’, as articulated by Harré, who are ‘doing the seeing’, it is the embodied person.
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“[w]e are not born with a ‘self’. It is a potentiality, to be realised in the context of a
particular form of relationship with others”.
3.2. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF OUR
SENSES OF ‘SELF’
3.2.3. Psychological symbiosis: Laying the foundations for personal
being
As already noted in Section 3.1.2, for both Harré (1998) and Shotter (1974a;1974b;
1984) the processes which transform a child into a ‘person’ take place primarily during a
period some theorists have called ‘psychological symbiosis’ (Newson & Shotter, 1974;
Spitz, 1965) – a stage beginning with the first smile and ending when the child’s use of
language becomes sophisticated enough to enable them to engage in private discourse
and carry out complex cognitive acts for themselves.  As has also already been noted
above, it is within this symbiotic relationship, according to Harré (1984a, p. 105) that
“certain kinds of language games18 are played, engendering talk with appropriate
cognitive properties, for instance self-expression of feelings and intentions”19, language
games essential to the emergence of our sense of ‘self’ as a unique individual with a
point of view, agentic powers and a personal life trajectory which we can narrate to
ourselves and to others.
Psychological symbiosis, as defined by Harré (1984a, p. 105) is
a permanent interactive relation between two persons20, in the course of which one
supplements the psychological attributes of the other as they are displayed in social
                                                 
18 Language games (Wittgenstein, 1953) are essentially the enactment of language in the everyday activities
of people, their ‘forms of life’.
19 It should be noted that this early pre-linguistic stage of development was not the focus of Vygotsky’s
research, and indeed in many of his writings he appears to claim that the ‘mental functions’ children are
capable of at that age are automatic and innate within the personality. As Burkitt (1991, p. 152) points out,
however, there is “now evidence to suggest that children actively begin to appropriate the social heritage,
and to construct their personality under the influence of their culture, before they have acquired linguistic
competence”. While this early pre-linguistic stage of development was not the focus of Vygotsky’s work the
findings to be discussed below nevertheless “complement his work and extend the spirit of his enquiries to
the pre-linguistic stage of childhood” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 152).
20 While the infant is not, at this stage, a ‘person’ in the Harréan sense it is, nevertheless, in the process of
becoming a ‘person’ and, as will discussed in this chapter, is treated as a ‘person’ by its mother and
significant others in its life. Indeed, Harré (personal communication, cited in Tissaw, 2000) suggests that
without this assumption on the part of the mother that her infant is a ‘person’, personal being could not be
achieved.
100
performances, so that the other appears as a complete and competent social and
psychological being.
Drawing on Spitz’s (1965) descriptions of mother-infant interactions during the
first year Shotter (1984), offers a three-stage account comprising of (1) ‘initial stages’, (2),
‘continuation’, and (3) ‘end’ outlining the changes that take place during the period of
symbiosis. Describing the beginning of the initial stages, Shotter (1984) notes how
human babies are essentially “adapted to a complete dependence upon an adult human
being.” (Shotter, 1984, p. 57).  He also notes that they are born into a ‘love relationship’
(although this is not, of course, always the case) “which is inherently personal” Shotter
(1984, p. 57) suggests that human infants
must be treated as if they are already persons who can intend purposes; they cannot
think for themselves, yet they cannot live without thought, so some way must be found
of having their thinking done for them.
Shotter (1984, p. 57) further argues that
until they have ‘constructed’ their own thought ‘mechanisms’ . . . by their mother’s
courtesy, they use their mother as ‘mechanisms’ to do the thinking required in the
realization of their intentions for them.
While in the initial weeks of life babies have always been seen as completely
helpless research has shown that babies are actually born with a range of orienting,
approach and expressive behaviours that allow them to immediately ‘join the
conversation’ around them.  Some of these behaviours are ‘innate’, while others, as
Polan and Hofer (1999b) have shown, are learned before birth, as will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter Four.
Such behaviours then serve as the building blocks from which the kind of
psychologically symbiotic relationship described above can be constructed. For example,
less than an hour after being born babies will draw back their heads to look into the face
of the person who is holding them and within a few hours will turn their head in the
direction of their mother’s voice (Taylor, 2002). And from the first day of their life
infants will move their body in synchrony with adult speech (Small, 1998, p 36). The
human baby, as Taylor (2002, p. 39) notes, “begins life primed to be social”.
These behaviours and abilities allow for a rapid increase in responsiveness on
the part of the infant towards its mother in the first few weeks (Meares, 2000), thus
enabling the initiation not only of the biologically symbiotic relationship which will be
discussed in some detail in Chapter Four, but also of a ‘psychologically symbiotic’
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relationship. As Shotter (1984) points out, this growing responsiveness results in a
qualitative change in the interactions between the mother and the infant over the first
few weeks of life so long, of course, as the mother is adequately responsive21 towards the
child.  As Shotter (1984) points out, the first stage of the symbiotic relationship between
the mother and her child is a very important one and for things to proceed well a
relationship is required within which each member pays total attention22 to the other
while they are together (Shotter, 1984).
Drawing on Mead (1934, cited in Shotter, 1984), Shotter (1984, p. 58) notes that
“such interlaced but spontaneous activities are a form of communication, even if they
cannot be said to constitute a language – as they are not of the form in which a stimulus
affects the individual who makes it in the same way as the one who receives it”. Shotter
(1984, p. 58) goes on to note that “the sort of perception involved in these exchanges – of
the expression of feeling or affect – is very primitive”, with the participants, he suggests,
acting purely as natural agents or ‘biological individuals’. This very basic physical-
affective relationship becomes ‘psychological’, or ‘personal’, when behaviours such as
smiling and reaching for specific objects “result in attempts on the part of the mother to
interpret and/or complete what appear to be intentional or other actions that may be
described through use of psychological predicates” (Tissaw, 2000, p. 856).
Indeed, as Tissaw (2000) notes, following a suggestion made to him by Harré
(personal communication, February, 1997, cited in Tissaw, 2000, p. 850), the assumption
on the part of care-givers that infants’ behaviour is intentional or moral “is integral to
psychologically symbiotic exchanges and, indeed, to normal23 psychological
development”.  Shotter (1974a) also argues that a child can only act because his/her
mother acts as if she understands him/her, and mothers act in this way because they
credit their children “with human qualities and sensitivities” and react towards them as
                                                 
21 As the research cited in this chapter and in subsequent chapters highlights, there are some basic acts
mothers need to do in relation to their children and if these are not done there are adverse consequences for
the child. The phrase ‘adequately responsive’ essentially means that the mother has fulfilled these basic
requirements.
22 Research suggests that such preoccupation with the infant is very common, for both mothers and fathers
during the very early weeks of parenthood, although mothers are generally much more preoccupied than
fathers. In a study by Leckman, Mayes, Feldman, Evens, King & Cohen (cited in Mayes, Swain, & Leckman,
2005), for example, mothers of normal infants two weeks after delivery reported spending nearly fourteen
hours per day focused exclusively on their infant. Fathers reported spending approximately half that time.
As Mayes et al. (2005, p. 303) note, such parental preoccupations also include “thoughts of reciprocity and
unity with the infant, as well as thoughts about the perfection of the infant”.
23 The difficulties with such a value-laden word as ‘normal’ are acknowledged. While there is no such thing
as ‘normal’ development , however, there are developmental trajectories that lead to less suffering than
others within certain socio-cultural contexts. It is presumed that what Tissaw is meaning here is that
‘normal’ psychological development results in the person living a life that is relatively free from the kinds of
psychological suffering which are the focus of this thesis.
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“potential human beings” (Newson, 1979, p. 210). Thus babies are in a personal
relationship with their mother right from the start and, as McMurray (1961, p. 50, cited
in Shotter, 1984, p. 82) puts it, they live “a common life as one term in a personal
relation”.
In treating her infant in personal terms, according to Shotter (1984) a mother does
two things. First, she attempts to elicit from her child certain kinds of activity. Shotter
(1984, p. 82) suggests that many of the activities the mother attempts to elicit from the
child are already present within the child’s repertoire, either innately or due to prenatal
learning but that without the mother’s “intelligent adjustment of the eliciting
circumstances [much of this behaviour] would undoubtedly remain unexpressed”. By
doing this a mother ‘affords’ or acts to motivate certain types of activity in her baby thus
providing what Schutz (1953, cited in Shotter, 1984) would call a ‘because-motive’ for
the child.  Second, the mother, having motivated some sort of activity in her baby, then
interprets it as having meaning.
The important point here, notes Shotter (1984) is that even though mothers
actively attempt to elicit certain activities from their babies when the babies comply the
mothers still interpret their babies’ activities as something which comes from the baby,
not just something they have succeeded in getting the baby to do. Their babies’
behaviour is “thus treated as activity worthy of being an expression in a dialogue, an
expression requiring a meaningful reply” (Shotter, 1984, p. 83). In so doing, mothers
supply their children with what Schutz (1953, cited in Shotter, 1984) calls an ‘in-order-to’
motive as well. In these situations babies learn what they can cause to happen through
their own actions.
Thus, as Newson and Newson (1975, p. 442, cited in Shotter, 1984, p. 84) point
out, the various action sequences elicited by mothers and performed by infants are
therefore a combination of the infant’s “own activity and an intelligent manipulation of
that activity by the much more sophisticated adult partner”. It is in this sense, argues
Shotter (1984, p. 84)
that children can be competent participants in such interactive exchanges as these (in a
way that, presumably, other organisms could not), that they may properly be counted as
one term in a genuine personal relationship.
These very early ‘language games’, as Harré (1998) refers to them, between
mother and child have the form of a conversation which includes vocalisations, but it
also includes facial expressions, body movements and tone of voice. Trevarthen (1987, p.
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365, cited in Meares, 2000, p. 17) notes that microanalysis of ordinary face-to-face play
between mothers and their babies reveals
precise conversation-like timing in the way they address one another and reply. Babies
stimulate gentle and questioning ‘baby talk’ which has a regular beat and characteristic
expression of mood in its changing intonation, rhythm, and accompaniment of
movements of head, eyebrows, eyes, and so forth. The infant watches the maternal
display intently and then makes a reply, on the beat, with a smile, head and body
movements, cooing, hand movements, and even lip and tongue movements which are
called ‘pre-speech’. Photographic records suggest they are developmental precursors of
actual speech. These attempts at vocal expression are synchronised with hand gestures.
The work of Bateson (1979) gave definitive recognition, and the name “proto-
conversation, to this behaviour, identifying it “as a form of instinctive communication
that lays the ground for learning of language” (Trevarthen, 2001).
As Meares (2000, p. 16) further notes
the movements, gestures, and expressive vocal tonings of the mother-baby dyad are
finely co-ordinated so that the behaviour of one is dependent on the behaviour of the
other. Although the interchange appears simple, it consists of a fluid and complex stream
of behaviours which are interwoven and extremely difficult to code.
  
This links to research within the field of ‘emotion regulation’ the results of which
suggest that during infancy “successful [emotional] regulation largely depends on
caregiver support and flexible responding”. Such regulation “occurs through specific
patterns in which the matching of affective states and reparation of interactive and
affective ‘mismatches’ . . . have fundamental importance” (Reck, Hunt, Fuchs, Weiss,
Noon & Moehler, 2004, p. 273). As Tronick (1998, p. 294) points out, “the typical mother-
infant interaction moves from coordinated (or synchronous) to miscoordinated states
and back again over a wide affective range”.
Tronick (1998) refers to these miscoordinated states as ‘miscommunications’. As
Tronick (1998) points out, however, these ‘miscommunications’ are normal events that
occur when one of the partners fails to accurately appreciate the meaning of the other’s
emotional display and in turn reacts in a way that was not expected. When the mother
and the child interact in such a way as to move from a miscoordinated state to a
coordinated state Tronick (1998) refers to this as ‘interactive repair’.
It is from within these very early, pre-linguistic, symbiotic interactions between
the mother and the child, suggests Harré (1998), that the two aspects of our personal
being which comprise ‘Self 1’ begin to emerge  – the sense of oneself as “the centred
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structure of our own perceptual field” (Harré, 1998, p. 95) and (b) the sense, and
eventual discursive presentation, of oneself as an agent.  As Harré (1998, p. 104) points
out, Vygotsky’s research suggests that the origins of the first sense of ‘Self 1’ “lie in the
manipulative practices with which . . . an infant begins to appreciate its world as
ordered, with respect to its own position as an embodied being among other things and
beings of that or similar sorts”.
Harré (1998) suggests that there is never a Jamesian ‘blooming buzzing
confusion’; we do not begin our lives experiencing the world as an array of elementary
sensations.  Our perceptions of the world are always structured because they are centred
on our bodies and organized around our point of view. “Objects are perceived as
standing in spatial relation to the embodied perceiver” (Harré, 1998, p. 104). As Harré
and Gillett (1994, p. 108) elaborate
[i]f one looks out from one’s eyes and listens with one’s ears and pays attention to the
bodily tactile sensations of which one can become aware at this moment, one finds
oneself at the center of one’s own material body. That, in a first approximation, is a
beginning to an investigation of the structure of consciousness. One can become
conscious of the fact that all that one perceives is structured around a kind of center, as
Husserl (1973) called it, the “I” pole.
For Harré (1998, p. 107) “consciousness, being aware of something, is a relation
between a person and an intentional object” (which may be either outside – i.e.,
perception – or within – i.e., proprioception, the envelope of the skin), it is not the
property of a person alone. The idea of consciousness being relational is in line with
Shotter’s position (1974a, p. 148) that perception seems to be an active process at every
level, building on our basic “intrinsic processes of mental organization”. Shotter (1974)
draws attention to the work of Bohm (1965, p. 203, cited in Shotter, 1974, p. 148) who
argued that we do not perceive a stimulus simply for what it is in itself, what we
perceive contains “structural features which are not even on the retina of the eye at a
given moment, but which are detected with the aid of relationships observed over some
period of time”.
As Bohm (1965, p. 211, cited in Shotter, 1974, p. 148-49) notes
a person must actively meet his environment in such a way that he coordinates his
outgoing nervous impulses with those that are coming in. As a result the structure of his
environment is, as it were, gradually incorporated into his outgoing impulses, so that he
learns how to meet his environment with the right kind of response.
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Thus, as Shotter (1974a, p. 148) points out, what we perceive lies in the way we
“relate our actions and their consequences, and, of course, as infants such relating will
need to be scaffolded by others in our social world. Perceiving is a skill, one based upon
natural powers but augmented over time by our experiences in the world”. Thus, during
the close interactions between mother and child, characterised by Shotter (1984, 1993)
and Harré  (1984a, 1998) as psychological symbiosis, the child begins to gain a sense of
him or herself as something separate from other people, as a ‘self’ that can perceive the
world from a particular vantage point, a being with a ‘point of view’.
The second aspect of Harré’s ‘Self 1’, our sense of ourselves as an agent in the
world, also begins to emerge during this stage from our immersion, and our
participation, in the discourses we are surrounded by (Harré, 1998; Harré & Gillett,
1994). As Harré  (1984a, p. 180) points out, the self as agent is not a mysterious thing
involving all sorts of sub-personal dispositions, rather it is “a belief which endows the
believer with certain powers of action in accordance with the interpersonal models
available in the society”.  Harré  (1984a, p. 193) suggests that our understanding of
ourselves as agents should be seen as “the employment of a theory with the active and
willing self as its prime theoretical concept”.
Harré  (1984a, p. 193) suggests that this theory of ourselves as agent is learnt by
the same Vygotskian processes as are all other aspects of our personal being, thus
by being forced to listen to the exhortations of others, I learnt to exhort myself, and by
watching others push each other into action, I learn to bestir myself. It is my grasp of the
theory that I am a unified being that enables me to understand that I am the recipient
both of exhortations and kicks and shoves, and that I can exhort and shove others, and,
finally, putting all this together, that I can so treat myself.
As Harré  and Gillett (1994) note, it is via our immersion in the various
discourses that comprise our social world that we learn the various ‘rules of
engagement’, and realise which rules are validated within which discourses. According
to this view, right from the beginning our “intentions are structured by and emerge from
the positions taken up in a social context and the discourses that pervade and structure
it” (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 122)
For Harré and Gillett (1994), the validations operating within discursive contexts
together with a person’s ‘self-location’ or ‘positioning’ within these contexts emerge as
the crucial factors influencing the attainment of a sense of control over one’s actions in
real-life situations. ‘Validations’ essentially provide people with options to look at a
situation in one way rather than another and they also recommend commitments to
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certain positionings within a discourse. Thus, there will be certain ‘options’ within the
discourses that surround us that are validated, and others which are not.
It is likely then, that the options that were validated or invalidated during the
discourses that surrounded us in our childhood would exert a particularly potent effect
on our actions throughout our lives.   In many, indeed most, cases people would not be
able to articulate or understand why certain options seem impossible to them, or why
certain other options seem so compelling – even in the face of good ‘rational’ reasons to
do or not do this or that.  This would be particularly the case if they were still being
affected by the validations and invalidations that were part of the discourses of their
formative years.
At the same time as the interactions in the mother-child relationship are
scaffolding our emerging sense of ourselves as agents, and shaping what we feel we can
and cannot do in the world, these interactions are also scaffolding the foundations for
the acquisition of the powers crucial to the emergence of Self 2 (and, also of Self 3, which
is essentially just the public ‘presentation’ of Self 2) – self-expression and self-reference.
As Meares (2000, p. 85) points out, during early infancy the baby does not conceive of
him/herself as a ‘self’, and “cannot view his or her experience in the manner of the
stream of consciousness . . . The mother, however, shows the baby what he or she feels
like”. As research with mother-baby dyads shows, the mother’s “responses to the baby,
although they do not precisely imitate the baby’s facial and vocal expressions, closely
resemble them, adding to them, showing them in a somewhat elaborated form” (Meares,
2000, p. 85).
Thus, Meares (2000, p. 85) suggests that in the beginning “the face and voice of
the mother is where the baby’s existence as the ‘me’ resides”.  In other words, Meares
(2000) is suggesting that within the psychologically symbiotic relationship between the
mother and the child, the mother “enacts a germinal ‘me’ in relation to the baby’s
rudimentary ‘I’ (Self 1) in order to ‘call out’ or ‘scaffold’, in the Vygotskian sense, the
baby’s emerging ‘me’ (Self 2).
Once the child gains even a basic facility with language the location of this ‘me’
shifts from the mother to the child. As was pointed out above, during development there
usually is “a transfer of the control of action from one individual to another” (Lock,
1981, p. 29). This transfer occurs through the development of the ability to use symbols,
particularly, though not solely, ‘linguistic signs’ (Lock, 1981).  As Lock (1981, p. 29)
points out, the child learns to control processes that he “previously could not by an
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‘internalization’: his individual construction of the symbolizing other”.  It is at this point,
then, that the child begins to utilise language not only to communicate with others, but
also to communicate with him/herself.
Harré (1998, p. 27) suggests that at this stage a child is “beginning to develop the
capacity for private discourse”. This enables the child to “perform complex cognitive
acts for itself”, thus facilitating
higher level cognition by making possible retrospective and anticipatory commentary
first upon the overt acts of public life and then on its own discursive practices, modelled
on the commentaries to which its speaking and acting have been subjected by others.
As Meares (2000) points out, such ‘private discourse’ is particularly obvious
during children’s play.  Meares (2000) notes, however, that children are not, during such
play sessions, talking themselves. Rather they are “talking to a part of the external
world, which [they have] imaginatively created . . . an illusory person who is a
condensation of the parent experienced in this way and a double of himself” (Meares,
2000, pp. 22-23). Thus, although children who are engaged in this kind of play seem
oblivious to others Meares (2000) suggests that “the sense of a presence of another, the
caregiver, permeates the whole experience”.
Meares (2000) notes that the chattering that accompanies symbolic play takes a
conversational form, with the child often switching between two or more viewpoints, as
in the following example from Kohlberg et al. (1968, cited in Meares, 2000, p. 149):
The wheels go here, the wheels go here. Oh, we need to start it all over again. We need to
close it up. See, it closes up. We’re starting it all over again. Do you know why we
wanted to do that? Because I needed it to go a different way. Isn’t it going to be pretty
clever, don’t you think? But we have to cover up the motor just like a real car.
This kind of ‘chatter’, as has been noted in Section 3.1.2., is representative of
Vygotsky’s ‘egocentric speech’ stage when the child uses words “to guide its own
behaviour by talking aloud to itself as an adult would who was giving the child
instructions” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 147). Such talk, suggests Meares (2000, p. 24), is
“qualitatively different from that used for communication and for ordinary coping with
the environment”. It often lacks the grammar of ordinary communicative language, and
“moves capriciously according to association and analogies” (Meares, 2000, p. 25).
As Meares (2000, p. 24) notes, while chattering in this way the child “is in a state
which is embryonically ‘inner’.  The child’s experience . . . is equivalent to that of an
adult who is lost in thought”. Such chatter, suggests Meares (2000, p. 25) becomes,
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essentially, “an embryonic narrative of self . . .  representing and so bringing into being,
the sense of self” (Meares, 2000, p. 25).
It is at this stage, according to Harré (1998), that the period of psychological
symbiosis essentially ends. As Newson and Shotter (1974) note, once language has been
introduced this lessens the child’s reliance on the mother and gives them “access to a
more universal, established system of intersubjectively significant gestures”.  At this
point the child becomes amenable to other sources of cultural influence (such as teachers
and peers).
It is suggested that if the child-caretaker communicative system has not
functioned well24 during this period then this compromises the very foundations upon
which personal being and our ‘senses of self’, as outlined by Harré (1998) and Meares
(2000), depend for their emergence. As has already been noted above, a feeling that our
‘self’ has somehow been disrupted, fragmented, split, devalued or lost are central to the
experience of the kinds of psychological suffering outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). If these foundations are compromised then this, as will be
outlined in more detail in Chapter Five, leaves the child vulnerable to suffering in ways
which may result in the ‘clusters of suffering’ referred to as ‘mental disorders.  I will go
on to discuss, in Chapter Six how such vulnerabilities may, depending on the
complexities of a lived life, contribute to two particular ‘clusters of suffering’ those
conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’.
3.1.4. Transforming natural powers into personal powers: The
emergence of personal being and our senses of ‘self’
Once children are able to move around independently and to “actively deny their
mothers the option of influencing them” (Shotter, 1984, p. 64) their mothers, who
previously only had to gratify (or not) their child’s needs, now find themselves having to
curb and prevent some of their child’s initiatives. Thus, according to Shotter (1984), the
period of ‘social games’ begins. As Shotter (1984, p. 65) points out, to be able to play
such games children
must first develop a clear distinction between people and things (animate and
inanimate), and then learn as their first social skill how to open and close the social link
                                                 
24 In the sense of having not prepared the child well for the social world which s/he must live out his/her
life.
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at will. And a part of being able to do that is being able to acknowledge the humanity, the
autonomy and cognitive status of the other by some form of greeting – even if only a
smile. Self-conscious beings recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
Vygotsky (1966a, cited in Shotter, 1984, p. 65), suggests that children’s play at this
stage is essentially  “an expression of the child’s basic needs and desires, structured as a
result of the child’s earlier action exchanges with adults and the world”. Thus, according
to Vygotsky (1966a, cited in Shotter, 1984), when children play they do not understand
what they play, rather they play in accord with this ‘internal structure’. Vygotsky (1962)
calls this an ‘imaginary situation’. Shotter (1984) stresses that they do not play according
to rules. The establishment of rules, rather than being an essential part of this process is
actually the final consequence of it. And any rules there are in child’s play are not
thought out in advance but arise instead in the course of interacting with others in a
coordinated way (Shotter, 1984).
As Shotter (1984) points out, the people and the objects in a young child’s world
usually dictate themselves how they must be used but in play this is no longer the case.
In the imaginary world of play children can regulate their own behaviour not by
reference to how the ‘things’ in their environment would normally be used but
according to the meanings that the children assign to them. Their behaviour, notes
Shotter (1984, p. 66)
has ceased to be wholly context-dependent and begun to be structure-dependent, in
Chomsky’s (1972) sense of the term; that is, its elements have their significance in terms
of the part they play in relation to the field of possibilities inherent in children’s image of
their play-world.
While children of this age are not at the stage of symbolism involving rules yet,
“the affective meanings children assign to ‘things’ dominate and determine their
behaviour towards them” (Shotter, 1984, p. 66).  Of course if ‘things’ can mean virtually
anything within the context of play, meanings and ‘things’ could never become linked in
any determinate fashion without the involvement of other people in the process. It is
because adults and older children within a child’s environment (at this stage most often
the child’s mother25) require the child to “co-ordinate their activity with theirs in relation
to definite criteria which are important to them in some way” that such links begin to be
                                                 
25 Again, the point must be made that the mother may not be as central to this process for children in non-
Western cultures. As Blaffer Hrdy (1999) notes, while mothers are central to their child’s very early lives in
every culture in many cultures they quickly become less central as other members of the tribe/village, such
as grandmothers, aunts and older girls, begin to take on care-taking roles and the children, as they become
ambulatory, begin to move out on their own accord, into the wider social world.
110
forged. Thus while adults and older children, in a play situation, cannot instigate a
child’s activities they can exert “powerful controlling influences” (Shotter, 1984, p. 67).
Mothers, in particular, can do this because they know their children intimately
from their earlier unspoken and emotional relationship and mothers are still the primary
means of their children’s gratification. Thus, suggests Shotter (1984, p. 67), mothers
“make use of this relationship time and again to draw their children into involvements
which, if left to their own devices, they would never otherwise undertake”. Once again,
there are no absolute rules or criteria regulating such exchanges, rather, the participants
“negotiate the rules as required” (Shotter, 1984, p. 68). Thus the interactions between
mothers and their children scaffold the child’s play, allowing the child to function
beyond their actual developmental level, reflecting Vygotsky’s theory of the ‘zone of
proximal development’, as outlined above.
This is illustrated by research which shows increases in the diversity of children’s
play (a measure which research suggests is related to later play sophistication and
intelligence) during play with their mother as compared to solitary play (O’Connell &
Bretherton, 1984, cited in Damast, Tamis-LeMonda, & Bornstein, 1996). O’Connell and
Bretherton (cited in Damast et al., 1996, p. 1753) suggest that it is “not simply a mother’s
presence, but her active participation that accounts for differences in children’s play
across social contexts”. Tamis-LeMonda and Bornstein (1991, cited in Damast et al.,
1996) found that the play behaviour of mothers (i.e., their demonstrations, and their
gestural and verbal solicitations) with their children “relate to their children’s play
behaviors: Mothers who engage in more symbolic play with their 13- and 20-month-olds
have toddlers who engage in more symbolic play at these ages” (Damast et al., 1996, p.
1753).
As Shotter (1984, p. 68) points out, the most important skill children acquire in
the course of their ‘games’ with their mothers, and other significant adults / older
children in their lives is
the skill to make meanings of their otherwise indeterminate actions determinate as
required, by co-ordinating their behaviour with others, and by making implicit or explicit
agreements with them one way or another.
As Shotter (1984, p. 68) further notes,
the relationships that people have to one another, besides having an aspect of mutual
use, also provide a reciprocated access to being – people help one another to be
themselves.
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Once children are capable of participating in the kind of social games and
symbolic play outlined above the transformation of their ‘natural’ powers – made
available to them from their surroundings (social and physical) – into ‘personal’ powers
can begin. If one is going to be a person26, suggests Shotter (1984, p. 75) “an autonomous
individual acting in the knowledge of who and what one is, and what one is trying to do
in relation to all the others with whom one is sharing one’s life”, then you need to do
more than just behave in ways that others can recognise. You need to be able to
recognise what you are doing yourself.
While the child, as a biological organism, may have the capacity to act in a
number of different ways the source of the knowledge about how these otherwise
indeterminate capacities might be used, as has already been noted above, lies within the
social ecology within which the child is embedded.  In other words,
the knowledge which children must acquire if they are to learn how to put their innate
capacities to use, intelligibly and responsibly, to do the ‘done things’ in their society, is
‘out there’, in their society, encoded not as ideas in people’s heads but . . . spread out in
the practical activities of everyday life”.
(Shotter, 1984, p. 75)
Thus, according to Shotter (1984, p. 173), persons are constituted, in a very deep
way, “by the sense-making procedures made available to [them] by the social order (or
orders) into which [they] have been socialized; procedures which have their provenance
in the history of our culture”.  Such procedures enable the members of a social order not
only to account for their actions to themselves and to each other, when they are required
to do so, but also enable them to “act routinely in an accountable manner” because their
actions are informed, as their performance unfolds, by these procedures. Such
procedures also put limits on what people can say or do because people must, to be full
members of a social order, “talk and act only in ways which are intelligible and
legitimate within their society, and which are appropriate to their momentary position
(or status) as the persons they are within it”.
As Shotter (1984, p. 178) points out,  “all ‘I’s’ need ‘you’s’ if they are ever to
appear in the world to themselves as ‘me’s’, and to possess well-defined social
identities”.  They also need ‘you’s’ in order to learn how to be all the ‘persons’ they need
to be in order to be fully functioning members of their society; listeners, speakers,
spectators, thinkers, rememberers, imaginers, storytellers, requesters, insulters, and etc.
                                                 
26 Once again, we are talking here about a Western ‘person’. The general point, as made quite clearly in the
following paragraph, however, that children become fully participating members of their society by being
immersed in the practical activities of everyday life, including the social interactions, within that society
would, it is suggested, hold true for every human society.
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All this necessitates them “learning how to do certain things within themselves, some
‘ontological skills’, not just ‘facts’ about such activities: they have to learn to articulate
their own relation to themselves in a socially appropriate manner”. And children learn
these ‘ontological skills’ within the context of relationships with significant others in
their social world via the kind of Vygotskian processes outlined above.
Three of these ‘ontological skills’ –  the development of the capacity for what
Vygtosky refers to as ‘inner speech’, the ability to construct a coherent narrative about
past events and the self-reflective capacity to locate ourselves within that narrative – to
be able to say ‘this is my story’ – are crucial to the emergence of the sense of ‘self’ Harré
(1998) refers to as Self 2 –  “the totality of attributes both ephemeral and enduring of the
person I am” (Harré, 1998, p. 148) .  It is this sense of self Meares (2000, p. 26) refers to as
the ‘self as stream of consciousness’; the ‘self’ experienced as “a constantly changing
fabric of inner experience, a kind of gossamer or ‘shimmer’ . . . ” (Meares, 2000, p 10).
Central to the development of inner speech, suggests Meares (2000), are the
child’s experiences of symbolic play, which begins during the second year of life (Belsky
& Most, 1981; Bornstein & O’Reilly, 1993; Fein, 1981; Tamis, LeMonda & Bornstein, 1995;
Tamis-LeMonda, Damast & Bornstein, 1994, Ungerer, Zelazo, Kearsley & O’Leary, 1981,
cited in Damast, Tamis-LeMonda, & Bornstein, 1996). As has already been outlined
above, while engaged in such play children frequently talk out loud in a way that is
“qualitatively different from that used for communication and ordinary coping with the
environment” (Meares, 2000, p. 25).
As has also been noted above, Meares (2000) suggests that while chattering in
this way the child “is in a state which is embryonically ‘inner’, similar to an adult who is
lost in thought”. Vygotsky’s (1962) empirical research suggests that as the child grows
older this chatter ‘internalises’ into ‘inner speech’ and becomes, essentially, “the
language of inner life . . .  the language of the self” (Meares, 2000, p. 26).  At this new
stage of development, suggests Meares (2000), the two ways in which a child uses
language, ‘linear’ (directed outwards at the social world) and ‘non-linear’ (directed
‘inwards’), become coordinated and ordinary conversation is made up of a combination
of both of them.
The ‘play-space’, now internalised as the ‘self’, suggests Meares (2000, p. 26)  “is
now very much a metaphoric field arising, as it were, between people. Self is not only
‘inner’ but is found or at least manifest, in this metaphoric space”, an insight which
reflects Harré and Shotter’s position that the ‘self’, and indeed all other ‘psychological’
113
phenomena, exist within the “contingent flow of continuous communicative interaction
between human beings” (Shotter, 1993a, p. 7). ‘Myself’, suggests Meares (2000, p. 26),
“involves not only a sense of inner experience but also the movements of this experience
going on between ‘me’ and other people. ‘Myself’ is ‘in’ and ‘between’”.
Thus, symbolic play does not spontaneously arise from within the child; rather, it
is modelled and scaffolded by the mother and other significant people in the child’s life,
thus illustrating one of Vygotksy’s central points that during development there is  “a
transfer of the control of action from one individual to another” (Lock, 1981, p. 29), with
the location of the ‘me’ now shifting from the mother to the child due to the child’s
increasing ability to use symbols, in particular ‘linguistic signs’ (Lock, 1981) to
communicate with others and with themselves.
This process begins, as has been noted above, with mothers showing their infant
“what he or she feels like” (Meares, 2000, pp. 84-85) by reflecting their actions and facial
expressions back to them during interactive play. Because of this the sense of ‘inner life’
or self as ‘stream of consciousness’ that emerges from symbolic play “includes the sense
of the presence of the other, who is represented not as a single person but as a form of
relatedness” (Meares, 2000, p. 26).
For both Harré (1998) and Meares (2000), the second and third ontological skills
necessary for the emergence of those aspects of our subjectivity conceptualised as ‘Self 2’
are essentially the skills involved in autobiographical memory – the ability to construct a
coherent narrative about past events, and the self-reflective capacity to locate ourselves
within that narrative; to be able to say ‘this is my story’. Indeed Meares (2000, p. 39)
suggests that such storytelling “holds together the sense and feeling of an individual
life”.  For Harré (1998, p. 135) such autobiographical telling is “the story of one’s Self 2, a
set of beliefs, offered to oneself and/or to others, at some moment in one’s life.  As such
it is itself part of one’s Self 2”.
When this ‘autobiography’ is offered to others, however, it is also part of the
production of what Harré (1998) has called Self 3, a “self which can exist in its
recognition by relevant others”.  The expression of Self 2, what kind of person someone
is, occurs in the display of Self 3. Thus the ability to tell stories about one’s life, to oneself
and to others, is central to the sense of ‘self’ as ‘myself’, and to the achievement of what
Harré (1984a) calls personal being – our sense of ourselves as a singular being with a
continuous and unique history, a capacity for self-reference (‘self’ consciousness), and
the power of decision and action over our lives.
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Autobiographic narratives involve more than just recounting facts about the past.
They involve, as William James (James, 1890, Vol II, cited in Meares, 2000) pointed out,
the additional consciousness that the past that is being recounted is my past.  In other
words, notes James (James, 1890, Vol II, pp. 649, cited in Meares, 2000, p. 35)
I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that ‘warmth and
intimacy’ [which characterise] all experiences ‘appropriated’ by the thinker as his own.
Harré (1998, p. 136) suggests that the link that makes all the possible stories one
could tell about one’s life ‘my stories’ is essentially our embodied selves and that the
“grammatical devices for expressing one’s sense of oneself, as one and only one person
[Self 1], define the frame in which the discourses of self make sense” (Harré, 1998, p.
137).
Harré (1998, p. 137) goes on to note that
[a]s human beings are located in time, that is their lives are sequences of events
embedded in other sequences of events, the use of ‘I’ as narrator of a life indexes events
as belonging in that continuous life course. My sense of myself is not as the locus of an
event among events, but as the locus of a trajectory in a larger history.
Meares (2000) makes the same point when he notes that the pronoun ‘I’ shapes
an individual reality despite that reality being in a state of ceaseless change. “The ‘I’ is a
constant” says Meares (2000, p. 11) “offering a means of unifying personal existence”.
As Harré (1998) points out, children learn how to remember and to ‘tell’ their
lives in the same way as they learn to do everything else, through discursive interactions
with other human beings in their social world. Harré (1998, p. 143) suggests that “at
some point in development ‘remembering’ as a cognitive skill would have been in the
‘zone of proximal development’ and he draws attention to the work of Middleton and
Edwards (1990, cited in Harré, 1998) on kinds of interactions between mothers and their
children that result in the development of the ability to ‘remember’.
Middleton and Edwards (cited in Harré, 1998) suggest that it is within certain
conversations that children acquire the skill of establishing their own past as a discursive
competence. It is within these interactions that notions like ‘my memories’ and ‘my past’
are developed. Harré (1998, p. 144) cites a transcript of a brief segment of one such
conversation:
Mother: oh look / there’s where we went to the riding stables wasn’t it?
Paul: yeh / er er
115
Mother: you were trying to reach up and stroke that horse
Paul: Where? [laughs]
Mother: You don’t look very happy though
Paul: Because I thought I was going to fall off
As Middleton & Edwards (1990, p. 39, cited in Harré, 1998, p. 144) point out, such
conversations
are used by parents as opportunities for marking past events as significant, recalling
children’s reactions and relationships, cueing the children to remember them, providing
descriptions in terms of which those rememberings could be couched and providing all
sorts of contextual reminiscences.
As these authors note, such studies suggest “the plausibility of a dialogical basis
for thought . . . for an origin of self-consciousness, metacognitive and rationalized
remembering, from within communicative pragmatics – from within children’s
conversations and arguments” (Middleton & Edwards, 1990, p. 39, cited in Harré, 1998,
p. 144).
This suggestion is given further support by research27 showing that
by the middle of the third year of life, a child has already begun to join caregivers in
mutually constructed tales woven from their real-life events and imagining. The richness
of self-knowledge and autobiographical narratives appears to be mediated by the
interpersonal dialogues in which caregivers co-construct narratives about external events
and the internal subjective experiences of the characters.
(Siegel, 1999, p. 36)
As Siegel (1999) points out, research suggests ‘autonoetic28’ (‘self knowing’)
consciousness, the reflective capacity so central to the sense of oneself as a unified ‘self’
with a past, a present and a future, is also enhanced by communication with parents and
other significant adults. This ability, as Siegel (1999, p. 36) points out, was thought until
recently to be “wholly dependent upon the maturation of the frontal cortical regions of
the brain”.
                                                 
27 See Siegel (1999) for an overview of this research.
28 To have “a sense of recollection of the self at a particular time in the past, awareness of the self in the lived
present, and projections of the self into the imagined future” (Siegel, 1999, p. 35)
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Such research supports “the general principle that interpersonal experiences
appear to have a direct effect on the development of explicit memory29” (Siegel, 1999, p.
45) with conversations between parents and children before, during and/or after an
event organising and integrating their experience and thus facilitating their
remembering of that event. Research also shows that children who have more
experiences of talking about their memories with their parents are able to recall more
details about their lives later on (Bauer & Wewerka, 1995, cited in Siegel, 1999).
This suggests, notes Billig (1999, p. 157), that parents, in talking with their
children about past events, “convey to them what is ‘memorable’ – in other words, what
features are appropriate to recall”. As Billig (1999, p. 157) further notes, parents will
often ask guiding questions to prompt their children to provide appropriate responses,
thus providing “discursive guides for what cognitive psychologists call ‘retrieval cues’”.
Billig (1999, p. 157) suggests that in doing this “adult speakers are demonstrating
to children how to ‘interrogate’ the past”. From those around them, children acquire
kinds of narrative skills they require for remembering. These skills, suggests Billig (1999.
p. 157),
involve not merely the retelling of past events but also the construction of the narratives
themselves. Consequently, children learn to retain memories by formulating them as
narratives. The child practices these skills of remembering in the course of conversations
with adults, with the result that the remembering is frequently not accomplished by the
child alone but jointly with the adult. This practice of remembering in conversation
continues throughout life.
Through this process children learn to apply the kind of questions their parents
use to guide their remembering to their own individual reminiscing and, as Billig (1999,
p. 158) notes, “external dialogical skills, having been internalized as inner speech,
become a means of constructing memories”. As Billig (1999, p. 158) concludes, “the skills
of explicit remembering are bound up with the skills of language and, therefore, they are
learnt skills”.
Thus, via such processes even our innermost sense of our ‘self’, our ‘self’ as
‘stream of consciousness’, is constituted out of the continuous coactions between us and
                                                 
29 Explicit memory is when a person is aware they are remembering something. Implicit memory is when
we are not aware that we have remembered anything. Implicit remembering can occur from birth, as
evidenced in the way infants learn to recognize the faces and voices of loved ones, as well as various other
sights and sounds, patterns of movement, etc. Implicit remembering can also occur in non-human animals
whose behaviour can be changed by experience. In explicit remembering, however, language is typically
involved.
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our social world.  Our sense of ‘self’ emerges from our earliest interactions with
significant adults in our lives as they scaffold and facilitate our play and, later, as they
scaffold and facilitate our ‘rememberings’ and our abilities to claim those rememberings
as our own.
Meares (2000) further suggests that not only our sense of ‘self’ but also the value
we assign to that self, emerges out of these early social interactions. For Meares (2000)
the concept of ‘value’ in this context is essentially the feeling tone that permeates a
person’s experience of life. It is the ‘feeling tone’, suggests Meares (2000, p. 65),
which gives the individual his or her sense of his or her value. A feeling of well-being, of
feeling good, is the source of self-esteem. This feeling, which is a particular kind of
pleasure, is often only a background experience. It arises through a resonance between
one’s core experience, the essence of one’s immediate personal reality, and the responses
of others.
This kind of resonance, suggests Meares (2000), is central to the proto-
conversation, as outlined in Section 3.3.1 above, that occurs between a mother and her
infant and “involves a fine co-ordination between the facial expressions, vocalisations
and body movements of mother and child such that they can be conceived as a single
system made up of two people” (Meares, 2000, p. 68).  “The particular form of pleasure
upon which value depends”, suggests Meares (2000, p. 68), “arises as a consequence of
caregivers’ responses which create a feeling of ‘fit’ with the immediate experience of the
baby”. Pleasure does not just arise from within the baby, rather it is “engendered by the
harmonious connectedness between the baby’s state” and the state of those with whom
s/he is interacting, at this stage usually the mother (Meares, 2000, p. 69).
Meares (2000, p. 69) suggests that “as the child grows older, his or her core
experiences will require more sensitive and imaginative resonance”. This becomes
particularly important when the child begins to develop that aspect of the sense of ‘self’
which is experienced as an ‘inner life’ or ‘stream of consciousness’. Meares (2000, p. 69)
suggests that the responses of a caregiver to a child, “in that they represent in the outer
world the essentials of the child’s experience, are a re-knowing, a re-cognition of the
child’s experience”.
Meares (2000, p 69) goes on to suggest that the pleasure that this recognition
elicits depends “upon a matching process which is essential to our ordinary coping with
the environment”. Changes in the surrounding environment, suggests Meares (2000),
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even very small ones, cause a change in that matching judgement from familiar to non-
familiar. As Meares (2000, p. 69) points out, by way of example
[w]e pick up cups, turn door handles, walk up stairs, taking little notice of what we do. If,
however, the cup seems unusually heavy, the door handle turns too far, or our footfall on
one of the stairs sounds different from the rest, our attention is aroused
 If this feeling of unfamiliarity continues to increase the arousal shifts into anxiety
and a feeling of insecurity. Meares (2000) suggests that the kind of pleasure which
generates feelings of value comes from events in the environment which match the
individual’s expectations, expectations which themselves have been generated by
previous experiences. This matching, Meares (2000, p. 69) suggests,
is of a very particular kind. It involves a resonation with what is known of oneself,
however dim or tenuously formed this knowing may be. Pleasure arises when the
responses of the other show a re-cognition of our personal reality.
This may not necessarily be the ‘reality’ that the person shows to the world
(Harré’s ‘Self 3’). The resonance is with “that complex of feelings, imaginings, memories,
which is seen as the core of individual existence”, the private aspect of Harré’s (1998)
‘Self 2’ that Meares (2000, p. 70) calls ‘myself’.  Meares (2000) suggests that this
recognition of our personal reality on the part of significant others in our social world is
an essential part of our development and if “such recognition is not habitually given, or
when it is, repeatedly, a misrecognition, the child suffers developmental damage”
(Meares, 2000, p. 71).
Thus, Meares (2000) is suggesting that a central aspect of Self 2, our self-concept –
which essentially encompasses all those things we believe about ourselves, in particular
the beliefs we have about the value of our Self 2 – is fundamentally shaped by our very
early social interactions, the most significant of which are those with our primary care-
giver. And because the things we believe about ourselves, and the value we place on
ourselves will inevitably impact on the way in which we present that self, both
purposely and accidentally, to others in our social world these early social interactions
will also shape our Self 3.
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3.3. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ‘SELF’ WHO IS
‘NOT MYSELF’ WITHIN A SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTIONIST FRAMEWORK
I have suggested that a social constructionist approach of how persons and their
selves emerge may provide insights into the discursive origins of our sense of ‘self’
which may, in turn, lead to new understandings of the various kinds of suffering we call
‘mental illness’. One central aspect of our experience is left essentially unaccounted for
by such an analysis, however;  the unconscious30 aspects of human psychology. What of
the ‘self’ who feels ‘driven’ by unexplained urges, desires, aversions and fears?  The
‘self’ who cannot understand its own actions, the self who wants to act one way and yet
acts in another? The self who is ‘not myself’?
Because this sense of not being in control of one’s own self is so central to many
of the experiences conceptualised as ‘mental illnesses’ – as has already been noted
above, it is often the ‘self’ which is characterised as being ‘disrupted’, ‘split’ or ‘lost’
when people suffer from these ‘illnesses’ (Lally, 1989; Karp, 1996; Estroff, 1989) and
people who experience such suffering often note that in the midst of it they were ‘not
myself’ (Estroff, 1989; Lally, 1989) – it is important to discuss how such experiences can
be accounted for within a social constructionist framework.
It is suggested that this aspect of our being in the world can be fully accounted
for within a social constructionist framework, but only when it is acknowledged that
such experiences (a) belong primarily to that “realm of experience primarily constructed
in and expressed through embodiment, rather than through language, and relatively
resistant to translation into it” (Burr, 1999, p. 113) and (b) often have their roots within
the system of social relations in general thus rendering their origins more
psychologically obscure.
 In this section I will bring both of these realities – our biophysical embodiment
and the system of social relations within which we are embedded – to the forefront in an
attempt to account for those aspects of our lives which are popularly conceptualised as
‘unconscious’ within an essentially social constructionist framework.
                                                 
30 In the context of this thesis I am using the word ‘unconscious’ simply as shorthand for those aspects of our
lives that we do not feel to be under our control. I am not referring to the psychoanalytic unconscious.
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3.3.3. The sociocultural constitution of forms and modes of
embodiment
The failure of social constructionist and discursive theorists to fully engage with
the reality of human embodiment has been pointed out by a number of critics (Burr,
1999; Cromby, 2004a; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Martin, 2003; Sampson, 1998) and
indeed Harré (Harré, 1991, 1999) himself.  As noted by Cromby (2004a, p. 798).
The body tends either to be omitted from constructionism, or only to appear as surface of
inscription, metaphor or text – rather than as a fleshy organ bearing both enablements
and constraints.
Critics note that even for those social constructionists who acknowledge the
reality and the importance of embodiment, as do Shotter and Harré, the biophysical
grounding of human beings tends to play a relatively minor part in their theorising
(Cromby, 2005; Martin, 2003). As Cromby and Nightingale (1999, p. 10) point out
bodies are difficult to find in social constructionism, which tends to dismiss the body
whilst simultaneously appearing to address it by providing detailed analysis of the
discourses of bodily matters. Studies of discourse typically proceed as though their raw
material was not already the product of embodied beings, in seeming ignorance of the
fact that talking is not the only form of interaction. In continually either ignoring the
body or treating it as a mere metaphor or text, social constructionism obscures and
downplays the significance of its functional, physiological, hormonal, anatomical and
phenomenological aspects.
Cromby (2004c, p. 2) notes that “the omission of . . .  embodiment creates
particular problems for critical accounts of psychopathology, which must then proceed
as though their focus was simply a discursive form in the DSM, or an iatrogenic
arrangement of administrative-bureaucratic-technical practices aimed at ‘symptoms’
that were somehow immaterial before those very practices created them”.  Cromby
(2004c, p. 2) goes on to note that “this creates a conceptual space where individualised
biomedical explanations can thrive since their explanatory force . . . can appear greater
by contrast with accounts that disregard the embodied character of distress”.
Thus, although the social constructionist perspective removes many
misconceptions about people and their relationship to the social world inherent in
mainstream psychology and psychiatry this approach to understanding human
‘psychology’ can still provide only a partial picture of psychological suffering due to its
failure to fully acknowledge embodiment.
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A person is a socio-culturally and biologically co-constituted organism.  As
Smail (1993, p. 62) points out “a person only comes into being when a body is placed in a
social world which interacts with it”.  Psychological suffering, like all other human
behaviours, capacities and experiences, cannot be understood by attempting to reduce it
to its sociocultural origins, as a lot of social constructionist theorising does.  Nor, of
course, can it be understood by reducing it to its biophysical origins, as bioreductionist
psychiatry does31.
The importance of acknowledging the reality of our embodiment is highlighted
by the findings emanating from recent research in neuroscience.  As Schore (2001a, p. 2)
points out, this research focuses not just on “sensory, motor and cognitive development,
but on the development of the child’s adaptive social and emotional functions” and
emphasises
that the development of the infant’s emotional brain is directly and actively influenced by
his [sic] transactions with the animate social, and not the inanimate physical
environment.
As this research makes clear, not only does our sociocultural enmeshment result
in us becoming ‘persons’ with ‘minds’ it also impacts directly on our physical being. The
very structure of our brains and nervous systems are shaped by our experiences in the
social world32.  The impacts of the social world upon our bodies then, of course, often
effect the ways in which we engage with the social world. Thus, complex feedback loops
are created which can precipitate, protect against, exacerbate or alleviate psychological
suffering.
In an attempt to bring the embodied feeling/experiencing person to the
forefront of this account, I will now turn to the theorising of John Cromby (2005; 2006b).
Cromby regards the body as the origin of experience and draws on the theorising of
Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu and also on the later work of John Shotter to begin
developing an appropriate notion of embodied subjectivity within a social
constructionist framework.
                                                 
31 Neither can it be reduced to the psychological (e.g., unconscious drives or mental mechanisms) as often
occurs in the metaphorical DMA where the causal drivers for many ‘mental illnesses’ are posited to be
‘psychological’.
32 This process can also, of course, flow in the opposite direction, with the structure of our brains and
nervous systems shaping or our experiences in the social world. This is the position of biological
psychiatrists – dysfunctional body/brain --- dysfunctional ‘mind’/person. As will be discussed in Section III
this very simplistic linear-causal position takes no account of the complex coactions that occur between the
embodied organism/person and the social and material world within which they are enmeshed.
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For Cromby (2006b, p. 13) our embodied feelings “are the core stuff of human
experience” and, as such, must be acknowledged within social constructionism if it is to
provide us with the fullest account of what it is to be a person in this world.  As Cromby
notes, citing the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby, 2006b),
in neural terms our embodied sensations or feelings are “the fundamental fabric of
consciousness: deprive the brain of all physical feedback from the body, and
consciousness also disappears”. Thus, as Cromby (2006b, p. 13) notes, “[t]he moment by
moment flow of our experience consists, before it consists of anything else, of a flow of
embodied sensations or feelings”. “To be a person”, suggests Cromby (2006b, p. 13) “is
first and foremost to be a feeling body”.
Cromby (2006b) notes that embodied ‘feelings’ include not just those feelings
we would call ‘emotions’.  ‘Feelings’ encompass a far wider class of experiences such as
being hungry, thirsty, tired, lustful or in pain and also those “half-recognised,
inarticulate feelings, that arise fleetingly in social interaction and which lead us
afterwards to say things like ‘well, it just felt wrong’” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 13).
All these ‘feelings’, while embodied, are, as Cromby (Cromby, 2006b, p. 13)
points out, “nevertheless thoroughly socialised” as research in neuroscience (Damasio,
1994), psychology (Shotter, 1993b) psychiatry (Perry, 1991; Wexler, 2006) and various
social sciences (Shweder, 2004, cited in Bourdieu, 1977; Cromby, 2006b; Elias, 1982)
shows. Cromby (2005) begins the task of theorising embodied subjectivity by looking at
the work of two social theorists whose focus has been the sociocultural constitution of
forms and modes of embodiment; Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu.
As Cromby (2005) notes, Elias (1982) outlines a history which shows that the
civilising process Europe went through as it emerged from the Medieval period was
essentially
a temporary monopolisation of the means of violence in the hands of police and other
agents of the state, a moment within an ongoing competition for power where certain
practices are seen as the rightful perogative of some sectors of society and not others. It is
the dynamic, unstable, and temporary solidification of a somewhat fragile power
relationship, not a permanent consensus of liberal tolerance and consolidation of human
rights.
In his analyses Elias (1982) uses the notion of ‘figuration’  – a concept that
“indicates the way in which humans within a group or a society are bound by mutual
dependence on each other” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 164).  This dependence occurs not just
between allies, but also between opponents. For Elias (1982), as Burkitt (1991, p. 165)
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points out, “our actions are always tied to, and limited by, the actions of all those with
whom we are interdependent”.
Thus, as Burkitt (1991, p. 166) notes,
individuals can never be treated as separate from their societies, because from the
moment we are born we are always in a figuration of interdependencies with other
people. The figuration is therefore the unit of analysis, and it is only within it that the
different perspectives of ‘I’ and ‘we’ – the individual and the group as a whole – develop.
 ‘I’ and ‘we’ are not pre-given entities, for Elias,  “but reference points within a
figuration. They indicate the positions held by people in their relationships to one
another” (Burkitt, 1991, p. 166).  Like Shotter and Harré, Elias is aware that experiencing
oneself as an ‘I’ can only develop in conjunction with the recognition of the separateness
of others.
As Cromby (2005, p. 138) notes, “the management and embodied expression of
power within specific figurations” includes things like the way in which people greet
one another, the learning of the correct etiquette (e.g., ways of eating and behaving) for
various public situations. According to Cromby (Cromby, 2005, p. 1388), “these bodily
expressions accompany and exemplify channelised forms of feeling and thinking, modes
which reflect and enact social forms and are ‘embodiments of a . . . mental and
emotional structure’” (Elias, 1978b, p. 56, cited in Cromby, 2005).
For Elias (1982), as Cromby (2005, p. 138) points out, embodiment includes not
only the management of posture, gesture and expression, but also has a
phenomenological dimension; “modes of subjectivity, individual repertoires of thinking
and feeling . . . [are] simultaneously societally induced through enculturation”.  Thus
people’s status, location, and their “specific trajectories within particular matrices of
figurations” will, according to Cromby (2005, p. 138), “generate distinct and different
modes of being – but these differences are themselves societal products”.
Elias’s (1982) work suggests that there is no such thing as an unchanging
‘human nature’. Rather, as Burkitt (1991, p. 174) points out, “what Elias wants us to
contemplate is the entire restructuring of the personality and the psychic economy in the
process of historical change”.  The personality is formed within the social process, or
what Elias (using a term common to Bourdieu) refers to as the ‘social habitus’.  For Elias
(in Goudsblom & Mennell, 1998, p. 73, cited in Cromby, 2005, p. 139) the whole structure
of someone’s personality “both conscious and unconscious is a product of interweaving
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formed in a continuous interplay of relationships to other people and that the individual
form of the adult is a society-specific form”.
The other theorist whose work Cromby (2005) suggests may helpful for
theorising embodied subjectivity within a social constructionist framework is French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977).  For Bourdieu our ‘dispositions’ or ‘lasting ways of
being’ “are organised into structured and structuring systems” he calls the habitus (a
term used in common with Elias to designate a similar phenomenon).  Habitus is
defined by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 16, cited in Sampson, 1998) as “a set of
historical relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in the form of mental and
corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and action”.
As Burkitt (1991, p. 133) points out, different groups and classes within a society
will have a different habitus and this will predispose them “towards specific types of
practices and the development of particular life styles”. Sampson (1998, p. 25), a social
constructionist who, like Cromby (2005), utilises Bourdieu’s theorising to ‘re-embody’
social constructionism, defines habitus as
that aspect of our cultural learning that is deeply carved within our bodies, so deeply in
fact, that it generates a kind of ‘feel for the game’ that describes a practical rather than a
purely theoretical kind of knowledge.
Burkitt (1991) notes that as a child’s capacities and skills are being developed
within the kind of interactions with adults discussed in Section 3.3 above, we can also
see the beginnings of the formation of the ‘social habitus’ – the basic dispositions
fundamental to individuals within a particular social group or class. As Burkitt (1991,
p.155) points out, this kind of learning begins before the child even develops language or
a sense of individuated self.
Dispositions and inclinations are formed in the earliest years through the child’s
interdependence with adults, which will later incline the person towards the
development of certain capacities, and will orientate them within social practice as a
whole. A repertoire of what Bourdieu calls ‘strategies’ will be passed on to the child
which will enable or limit their social activities in later years . . . many of the dispositions
and inclinations formed in the habitus from the earliest years of infancy may not be
dialogically articulated as part of discursive consciousness, and will continue to operate
within the personality as an unconscious force.
(Burkitt, 1991, p. 155)
As Sampson (1998, p. 26) points out, the habitus “does not describe a
transcendent entity outside either culture or history. Our bodies are rather fully
socialized”. Habitus/embodied discourse is essentially “those learnings and knowledges
placed in our bodies by virtue of where and when we dwell” (Sampson, 1998, p. 26).   As
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Cromby (2005, p. 140) points out, “dispositions are related to individuals’ location
within dimensions such as gender and social class, and like Elias (1982), Bourdieu
emphasises the role of early experience in their acquisition”.
Ruling ideologies and subcultural norms are not just discursive constructions.
Systems of dispositions inculcated by the habitus, according to Bourdieu (1977, p. 94) are
“political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into . . . a durable manner of standing,
speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking”.  As Cromby (2005, p. 140) points out, the
habitus “instils within individuals patterns of dispositions which structure their
embodied experience (in turn inciting them to reproduce its own structure), setting
effective boundaries on the lived socio-cultural world”. Thus, the habitus particular to
the time, place and social class within which you are born becomes quite literally
embodied as an array of likes and dislikes, which feel entirely personal to you.
As Cromby (2005) further notes, because they are embodied rather than
consciously learned, such dispositions “ are not readily amenable to transformation”. As
Bourdieu (1977, p. 94) puts it
The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and
hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, can’t even be made
explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and,
therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transformation
achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole
cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as
insignificant as ‘stand up straight’ or ‘don’t hold your knife in your left hand’.
Cromby (2005, p. 141) points out that for both Elias and Bourdieu “our
embodiment is societally produced, reflecting both the culture we inhabit and our
location within it”.   Although such a position can be read as deterministic  
these theorists are not describing behavioural certainties but modal tendencies . . . each
highlights what we can call somatic repertoires that are typically, but not exclusively or
deterministically associated with gender identities or class locations.
(Cromby, 2005, p. 142, italics in original)
As Cromby (2005) notes, while the notion that feelings guide and shape our
actions is embedded in our folk psychology it is rarely acknowledged by social
constructionist / discursive psychologists. One theorist who does make this guidance
via feelings central, however, is John Shotter (1993b), who in his later theorizing
describes it as ‘knowing of the third kind’. It is to Shotter’s (1993b) work that Cromby
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(2005) turns in order to further explore the possibilities of integrating the realities of our
embodiment into a social constructionist account of human psychology.
For Shotter (1993b, pp. 40-41) feelings supply an “embodied form of practical-
moral knowledge in terms of which people are able to influence each other in their
being, rather than just their intellects”.  In this view the responses people have to an
interaction or a relationship communicate themselves not just discursively but also
within the embodied feelings we experience within that situation.  Shotter (1993b, pp.
40-41) describes this knowledge as an ‘affective attitude’, a “transmuted version of a
social relationship” lending our words and verbalised thoughts their “particular motives
and valencies”. These feelings include the emotions we can easily recognise such as love,
anger and fear, but they also include other feelings which are more difficult to pin down.
Shotter (1993b), drawing on the work of Vygotsky, locates the origins of this
‘knowing of the third kind’ in the ‘instructional’ social relations which occur during the
period of psychological symbiosis (discussed in Section 3.2.1 above).  As Cromby (2005,
p. 142) notes, for Shotter (Shotter, 1993b) this ‘knowing of the third kind’ appears
phenomenologically as feelings which are “called out within streams of activity and
[are] functional within them, supplying sensuous practical-moral guidance and ‘rooting’
our actions synchronously with others”.  Shotter’s ‘knowing of the third kind’ meshes
well with the notion of the habitus explicated by both Elias (1982) and Bourdieu (1977)
which, as already noted above, refers to the aspect of our cultural learning which is
literally ‘em-bodied’, generating a kind of ‘feel for the game’ as Shotter (1993b) refers to
it, which reflects a primarily practical, rather than theoretical, knowledge.
For Shotter, as Cromby (2004c) points out, our subjectivity (essentially our
‘personal being’) is the outcome of the dynamic interaction between this ‘knowing of the
third kind’ and a primarily discursive process he calls ‘joint action’.  For Shotter ‘joint
action’ refers to the ways we use discourse to negotiate our interactions with each other
(Cromby, 2004c).  Shotter emphasises the open-ended nature of joint action, noting that
it often produces outcomes unforeseen by its participants.
Thus, as Cromby (2004c) points out, for Shotter subjectivity, our sense of who
and what we are, is made up of thoughts and feelings which arise from within our
networks of social relationships. The responses of others, through talk and through
extra-discursive means such as gestures, posture, tone of voice and facial expression,
together with our own talk and our own gestures, posture, etc., continually create and
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re-create the situations ‘into which’ we must act and through which our ‘selves’ are
continuously formed and re-formed.
The implications of this for people living within societies where profound
inequalities and injustices exist and occur, as Williams (1999, cited in Cromby (2004b))
notes, is that such inequalities become
deeply embedded in our personal identities. Therefore, we should not be surprised when
we find them difficult to speak about, and hard to change.
3.3.4. The primacy of the ‘feeling body’ in the social construction of
the ‘self
In several other papers Cromby (2004b; 2004c; 2006b), drawing on insights
gained from the work of the theorists discussed above, explicates his own view of the
centrality of this embodied subjectivity to our experience of being human. Utilising the
work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby, 2004b), Cromby notes
that “in neural terms, our experience of self is first and foremost the experience of being
a body in a situation” (Cromby, 2004b, p. 16), an insight which accords with Harré’s
(1998, p. 4) point that a fundamental aspect of our sense of self, which he calls ‘Self 1’ is
to have a sense of one’s location as a person, in each of several arrays of other beings,
relevant to personhood. It is to have a sense of one’s point of view . . . a location in space
from which one perceives and acts upon the world. . .  including the part that lies within
one’s own skin.
According to Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby, 2004b, p. 2) our ‘core
consciousness’, “the fleeting point of awareness that constitutes our very being as
engaged, aware and active beings, is consciousness of our embodied state”.  Such ‘core
consciousness’ is, suggests Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby, 2004b, p. 2) “generated or
renewed in ‘pulses’ . . . whenever something new impinges upon us and, however
minimally, changes the state of the body-brain system”.  Such state-changes can also
come from our own bodily processes. Thus, notes (Cromby, 2004b, p. 3), while we are
awake
core consciousness is continually renewed by the incessant flow of changes in our bodies
and brains. Core consciousness is fleeting, transient, and ephemeral. Its content is of a
body in a situation right now, seeing, hearing or feeling something – but the full meaning
of these things only emerges (very shortly) afterwards.
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Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby, 2004b, 2004c) suggests that each time something
impinges on our core consciousness this activates other areas of the cortex which then
almost immediately provide us with the tools33 required to attribute meaning to it.  For
example, a negative feeling state may be named as ‘loneliness’, due to us having learned,
via our discursive interactions with others in our social world, to use the word
‘loneliness’ to name that feeling, and it may be understood as being due to the recent
end of an important relationship. Damasio (1999, cited in Cromby 2004b) calls this “web
of meanings and interpretations that we then create ‘extended consciousness’” (Cromby,
2004b, p 16). Our ability to use language then “allows us to narrate richly-detailed
meanings within our lives” (Cromby, 2004b, p. 16).
This ‘narration’ essentially comprises those aspects of the self Harré (1998)
characterises as Self 2 (encompassing the “ephemeral flows of activity, both private and
public, in which that person engages, producing thoughts and actions sometimes but not
always displaying repeated structures and forms” (Harré, 1998, p. 135) and Self 3 – “the
impression of a person’s personal characteristics that one person makes on another”
(Harré, 1998, p. 4), both intentionally and unintentionally.
As Cromby (2004b) points out, Damasio (1994, cited in Cromby, 2004b), echoing
the theorising of Elias and Bourdieu discussed above, also proposes that “how we feel,
our experience of our bodies, is not simply a matter of biology: our feelings themselves
are also . . . socialised, structured by experience” (Cromby, 2004b, p. 16). As Cromby
(2004b, p. 16) notes, “memories . . . do not only take the form of images, sounds or tastes;
they also take the form of feeling, body state profiles”. Thus, when we experience
something, for example, being let down by someone, feelings that in the past were
associated with similar experiences are “called out by feedback loops between brain and
body” (Cromby, 2004c, p. 3).  Such feelings tag future experiences with positive or
negative valences.
Damasio (1994, cited in Cromby, 2004c) calls such re-constituted feelings ‘somatic
markers’ and, as Cromby (2004c) points out, his “work with brain injured people
suggests they play a vital role in decision-making, especially in social settings”. These
‘somatic markers’ influence the way we make decisions by rendering some options more
attractive, or by directing our attention away from other, less favourable options. These
‘somatic markers’ “may introduce patterns of bias and apparent irrationality into our
                                                 
33 This corresponds to Harre’s (1999; 2002) ‘tools/tasks’ analogy as outlined in Chapter Five, Section 5.2.2.
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actions, patterns which we ourselves might only notice retrospectively”, if we notice
them at all (Cromby, 2004c, p. 4).
These  ‘somatic markers’ may have their origins in our pasts, “but their influence
stretches forwards into the future because they structure the viable possibilities we
perceive, and so influence the choices we make” (Cromby, 2004c, p. 4). Such ‘somatic
markers’ are the literal embodiment of the ‘validations’ (Harré & Gillett, 1994) operating
within the discursive contexts within which people are enmeshed (see Section 3.2.1).
Thus, according to Cromby (2006b) the feelings which constitute our subjectivity
provide us with a constant ‘automatic’ sense of our bodies (whether we are comfortable
or uncomfortable, hot or cold, hungry or sated); they bias us toward goals depending on
our bodily states (e.g., we are tired, we want to sleep; we are hungry, we want to eat),
what has occurred to us previously (we are more likely to avoid a situation which ‘felt
bad’ in the past), and broad patterns of socialisation (people do things which ‘feel right’
according to cultural and sub-cultural norms).  This last is, of course, the effect of the
habitus as outlined by Bourdieu and Elias –  “those learnings and knowledges placed in
our bodies by virtue of where and when we dwell” (Sampson, 1998, p. 26) or, to put it in
Shotter’s (1993) terms, our ‘knowing of the third kind’.
Cromby (2006b) suggests that it is not language, in the form of inner speech,
which is the primary element of subjective experience. For Cromby (2006b) feelings are
not ‘cognitive’, rather they are “the pre-cognitive, unreflective ground upon which
information processing, ‘rational’ choosing and decision making occur”.  Feelings can be
taken into account and decisions made accordingly but, as Cromby (2006b, p. 14) points
out, “whether we recognise their influence or not, feelings are always present: shaping
our goals, biasing our evaluations, and guiding our attention”.
These embodied feelings are there from the very beginning, long before we
develop a facility with language, and they remain at the core of our experience
throughout our lives. It is such feelings, rather than language, which are central to the
“affective exchanges” (Shotter, 1984, p. 57) between a mother and a child in the very
early stages of their relationship.  As was pointed out in Section 3.2.1 above, “the sort of
perception involved in these exchanges – of the expression of feeling or affect – is very
primitive” (Shotter, 1984, p. 57), with the participants acting purely as natural agents or
‘biological individuals’.
This centrality of feelings to our subjective experience is evident, as Meares
(2000) points out, in our memories of our own past. While one may remember what
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schools one attended, and in what years, central to autobiographical memory is the
sense of a personally experienced past. As Meares (2000) points out, such remembering
is
made up of episodes of personal experience that have a sensory aliveness. The
stereotypic episode has onself at its centre and is made up of sights, sounds, smells and
the feeling of one’s body.
Cromby (2006b)points out, however, that claiming socialised embodied feelings
constitute the core of subjectivity does not deny the importance of inner speech (that
sense of our selves Meares (2000) calls ‘myself’ or ‘self as stream of consciousness’). The
point, suggests Cromby (2006b, p. 14) “is that inner speech typically comes afterwards,
and is not the primary force shaping our activity”.
Cromby (2006b) suggests that there is a considerable amount of evidence to
support this suggestion, and that drawing on this evidence “renegade cognitive
psychologists like Zajonc have argued for versions of affective primacy, as have most
psychodynamic theorists” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 14).  Cromby (2006b) further notes that
studies of people’s discourse (Edwards & Potter, 1992) have also suggested that inner
speech is secondary to our socialised embodied feelings by showing “that what people
say is situated and occasioned in orientation to their current social sitution rather then
being the simple expression of an ‘inner’ decision-making process” (Cromby, 2006b, p.
14).
Cromby (2006, p. 14, author’s italics) notes that such evidence suggests that
there is a kind of primacy to feelings, and that inner speech functions to make sense of
them, relate them to things that are going on: to fix them, if you will, such that we can
represent them to ourselves and know, in a thoroughly human sense, what our feelings
mean.
As Cromby (2006b) points out we use our inner speech to make sense of our
feelings and because what we tend to remember of situations is our interpretation of
them this gives a sense of primacy to inner speech. As was noted above, it is the primacy
accorded to ‘inner speech’ which helps to create the impression that our motivations
arise from ‘within’ us, rather than being the outcome of activity, our own and that of
others with whom we interact both directly and indirectly.
The sense that inner speech is primary, argues Cromby (2006b, p. 14), is illusory
because “inner speech functions to complete feelings, which always come first”. This, of
course, does not mean that inner speech has no influence. Our inner speech constitutes
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an almost constant dialogue we hold with ‘ourselves’ and we use it to facilitate our
decision-making (will I have that extra slice of chocolate cake?), help us to understand
and deal with difficult situations (he seemed angry at me, but perhaps he was just tired),
help us decide what to do/say (should I stay and be honest with him, or should I go and
stay quiet?), etc..
As Cromby (2006b) points out, however, when inner speech guides our actions in
these ways “it does so by calling out further, alternate states of feeling”.  Essentially,
things happen which evoke feelings and we name these feelings with inner speech. This
inner speech can then evoke more feelings, which in turn will lead to further
commentary, and more feelings, and so it goes on. Thus, “there is a constant iteration
between socialised feelings and socially derived inner speech, a dialectical relationship, a
ceaseless flux of fluid movment from one to the other” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 14). Because
language is primarily representational, however, our thoughts and our memories tend to
emphasise the words which are relevant to how we are feeling/acting rather than the
nameless feelings that preceded them (Cromby, 2006b).
Cromby (2006) points out that it is the ability of words to create or ‘call out’
feelings and to guide or channel feelings so that we then act upon them, or relate to them
in a particular way, that makes it easy to imagine it is language which makes us do what
we do. Despite the huge significance of language in our experience of being a person,
however, “the real primacy lies with feelings” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 15).
feelings are how our primordial being-in-the-world is disclosed: both as habitual
embodied intentional stances (which psychologists usually refer to using such constructs
as ‘beliefs’), and also momentarily, in the here-and-now, in our immediate pre-cognitive
responses to things that happen, the events that occur and the situations we encounter.
(Cromby, 2006b, p. 15)
This is not to say that our socialised feelings locate us simply and
unproblematically in our worlds because “our fully human sense of our selves only
emerges from their dialectical interaction with language (relationally and as inner
speech)” ( Cromby, 2006b, p. 15), as was outlined in Section 3.2 above. As Cromby
(2006b) points out, feelings can sometimes be extremely difficult to put into words due
to their fundamentally non-verbal character and even if we could verbalise feelings
successfully often we are completely unaware of their sources. If we fail to notice what
prompted a feeling we may interpret it incorrectly. Also, we often have good reasons not
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to acknowledge our feelings, for to do so may open up possibilities which we may find
difficult to contemplate.
Cromby (2006b, p 15) suggests that this means that the view from the “fleeting
point of ‘rational’ reflection that is ‘I’ is always somewhat limited”.  There are too many
influences which go together to create our present for us to be aware of them all. Some
of these influences will be there in our immediate situation, others will result from the
general social structure within which we are living our lives, and others will be
chronologically distant or “subtended by neural mechanisms that operate out of
conscious awareness” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 15), as will be discussed in Chapter Four.
As Cromby (2006b, p. 15, author’s italics) points out, in agreement with the
general social constructionist / discursive position explicated above
we are, in fact, making our selves up as we go along, spinning out narrative constructions
to fix our experiences, to render them coherent, sensible, morally acceptable, and
rationally accountable to ourselves and others, according to prevailing subcultural
norms.
For Cromby (2006b), however, as for Shotter (Shotter, 1993b), our selves are not
only constructed through our emeshment in the social world, they are, as Cromby (2006,
p. 15, author’s italics) puts it, also constructed
in the embodied, material, socially situated flow of our being in the world. In this way,
we are being made up by the experiences our narratives strive to fix, and this making up
is more important and powerful than the retrospective ordering that  narrative provides.
Because of this reality our selfhood is inevitably a somewhat fragile achievement
and those whose early years did not provide them with sufficient protection from the
blows that life inevitably deals to most of us know this “to the very core of their being”
(Cromby, pp. 15-16). The implications of this for our conceptualisations of, and the way
we respond to, the various types of psychological suffering we call ‘mental illness’ will
be discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
3.4. CONCLUSION
As noted in Section 3.1 above, if our complex, unique and privatised ‘inner lives’
(what Harré calls our ‘personal being’) are produced from our participation in the
‘conversation’ (in the extended sense) around us it is likely that the kinds of suffering
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conceptualised as ‘mental illness’ emerge, at least in part, from the same source.  It was
suggested that if we could understand the genesis, and ongoing development, of our
‘personal being’ we may be able to come closer to some understanding of why the
various problems we call ‘mental illness’ occur and begin to move towards a different
way of conceptualising and ‘managing’ such suffering.
The approach to psychology advocated by the theorists whose work formed the
primary focus of this chapter is the notion that to be human is “to be a growing system
which can, in interaction with other growing systems, increasingly localize within itself
the power of responsible action” (Shotter, 1984, p. 48). As Vygotsky’s (1962) work makes
very clear, “people can only gain their personal powers from ‘nature’, from the social
ecology within which they are embedded” (Shotter, 1984, p 48).
Through the actions of other people, the things infants can at first only do
spontaneously in response to circumstances are transformed, through another person’s
agency, into things they can do later of their own volition. Thus, as Shotter (1984, p. 71)
notes, “the human child does not develop psychologically according to the ‘laws of
nature’, but in an intentional manner”. This means that “the concepts in terms of which
we interact with our children play an important part in determining the form of their
psychological development”.
It is suggested that the picture of human beings sketched out in this chapter is
more likely to provide the foundations of a theoretically coherent and practically useful
account of psychologial suffering than the assumptions which, it has been argued,
underlie the Dysfunctional Mind Account, as outlined in the Introduction.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HUMAN BEINGS AS BIOLOGICAL
ORGANISMS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Three it was suggested that in order to overcome the limitations of
the Dysfunctional Mind Account it was necessary to provide an account that
acknowledged the fundamental enmeshment of people within their social worlds. It was
suggested the social constructionist / discursive view of human psychology may
provide the foundations of a more theoretically coherent and practically useful account
of psychological suffering and a social constructionist / discursive analysis of the
emergence of selves, drawing on the work of John Shotter, Rom Harré and John Cromby
was offered as a possible starting point for such an account.
The emergence of persons and their psychological suffering cannot be
understood, however, by looking only at sociocultural/ discursive factors because
persons are both socioculturally and biologically co-constituted. What is required, then,
is an analysis of our biological development that would facilitate a clearer articulation of
the ways in which this co-constitutional process occurs. It is suggested that such an
analysis can be found in the work of developmental biologist Steven Rose (1997) who, in
his book Lifelines: Biology, Freedom, Determinism acknowledges the complex interrelations
between our bodies and the environments within which those bodies exist. In the
following section a brief outline will be given of Rose’s approach to biology in order to
provide a framework for ‘embodying’ the social constructionist account of persons
which will form the basis for the account of psychological suffering to be presented in
this thesis by incorporating into it insights from biological research.
It should be noted at this point that in this section I will be primarily drawing on
research from the biological sciences and in order to present this material as clearly and
as straight-forwardly as possible I will present it in the same language in which it is
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presented by the biologists and neuroscientists who carried out the research. This
research, for all its often unjustified and unspoken assumptions about the kinds of
creatures human beings are, leaves little room for doubt that what happens to us over
the course of our lives profoundly shapes both our biology and our personal being.  It is
only by acknowledging this that any real understanding of psychological suffering can
be reached.
4.2. LIFELINES: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION OF
LIVING SYSTEMS
Steven Rose’s (1997) work offers a view of biology that echoes many of the key
motifs of Harré’s social constructionist account of human psychology. Both approaches
see human beings as products of the constant coactions1 occurring between the organism
and its physical/social world and argue there can be no real understanding of human
beings if they are considered in isolation from their environment. Both approaches also
stress the uniqueness of each individual and the non-determinate nature of their
unfolding through development.  As Rose (1997, p. 157) points out, “each of our
presents is shaped by and can only be understood by our pasts, our personal, unique,
developmental history as an organism”.
While Harré and his fellow social constructionists focus on analysing the ways in
which human psychological phenomenon such as ‘minds’ and ‘selves’ emerge from the
coactions between a human being and their social world, Rose focuses on exploring how
unique human beings emerge from the coactions between the biological organism and
its environment (physical and social).
4.2.1. Organisms and their environments
As Rose (1997, p. 136) points out, “at the heart of modern biology lies the issue of
the nature of individual living units – organisms”. While Rose (1997) acknowledges
                                                 
1 A word used by Gottlieb (2002) to refer to the reciprocal interactions between various components of a
dynamic system. These ‘coactions’ can be horizontal (.e., they occur at the same level – gene-gene, cell-cell,
tissue-tissue, organism-organism) or vertical (i.e., they occur between different levels (gene-cytoplasm, cell-
tissue, personal/psychological-nervous system).
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there are a number of ambiguities inherent in our sense of the borders between
ourselves and the external world, he notes, in agreement with Harré (1998), that “for
most of the time we all have a sense of our own existence as a coherent whole, and we
recognize such coherence and unity in others” (Rose, 1997, p. 136).
Rose (1997, p. 136) notes that organisms differ considerably in size but every
organism “exists as a three-dimensional object occupying a defined volume within its
environment, and each possesses recognizable structures, internal features and
organization”.  As Rose (1997, p. 137) further notes, however, organisms extend in time
as well as in space.
Life persists not in three but in four dimensions – persistence which depends above all on
the maintenance of order: order within the cell, order within the organism, order in the
relationship of the organism to the world outside it.
Rose (1997) is also at pains to point out that genes and genomes do not contain
the future of the organism. They are not, he insists, “like architects’ blueprints or
information theorists’ code-bearers”. Rather, “they are no more and no less than an
essential part of the toolkit2 with and by which organisms construct their own futures”
(Rose, 1997, p. 137).
Rose (1997, p. 137) stresses that “neither cells nor organisms can be considered in
isolation from their own external environments”, just as Harré and his fellow social
constructionists stress that psychological phenomena such as ‘minds’ and ‘selves’ cannot
be usefully analysed in isolation from the social environment. As Rose (1997, pp. 137-
138) points out,
[a]ll cells are surrounded by membranes, constructed of complex arrays of lipid and
protein molecules, which act as both barrier and interface with the world outside them.
Across this semipermeable barrier there is a constant traffic with the cell’s surroundings.
To survive, let alone to act upon the external world or replicate, requires the continual
expenditure of energy, energy derived from food in the form of pre-existing molecules
such as sugars or fats . . . All these molecules must be carried into the cell across its
membrane and waste metabolites ejected through it into the environment.
Rose (1997) further notes that for single-celled organisms the environment of the
cell is, of course, also that of the organism. This environment is constantly changing.
There may be plenty of food, or there may be very little. It may be too hot, too cold, too
dry, too wet, or too acid. When faced with less than optimal conditions many single-
celled organisms attempt to find more favourable environments. But, as Rose (1997)
                                                 
2 Rose’s use of the word ‘toolkit’ in this context corresponds to Harré’s notion of molecular and organismic
tools being used for person-level tasks, as discussed in Chapter Five.
137
points out, their power to choose a better environment is inevitably limited by the range
of environments immediately accessible to them, and to their ability to adapt to certain
environments.
Rose (1997) then goes on to describe how, in difficult environments, cells can
‘switch on’ the DNA sequences which produce a new enzyme required to metabolize a
food source they didn’t previously need. As Rose (1997, p. 139) points out, this
illustrates how “it is the organism in interaction with the environment . . . that
determines which of its available genes are to be active at any one time”.
The interactions between cells and their environments are, however,
considerably more complex for multi-celled organisms. Individual cells are now
surrounded by their own microenvironment, external to them but internal to the
organism. It is the organism, rather than the cell, that must respond to environmental
changes so as to optimise its chances of survival. Cells within organisms are buffered
from external extremes and do not have to be searching for food in an uncertain
environment. Thus their genes do not have to be ready to make the switch from one
kind of food to another and they do not have to maintain a repertoire of DNA to enable
them to make such a switch.
Thus the word ‘environment’ is very complex and multi-layered. The
environment for individual gene-sized sequences of DNA is the rest of the genome and
the cellular machinery in which it is embedded. For the cell the environment is the extra-
cellular fluid within which it floats. For the organism the environment is the external
physical and social world.  No environment remains the same, notes Rose (1997, p. 140)
– “change is virtually the only constancy. Stasis is death”.
Rose (1997, p. 140) suggests there are two lessons to be learned from such
descriptions. The first is that “boundaries between organism and environment are not
fixed”. Organisms absorb parts of their environment as food, and are constantly
modifying their surroundings by excreting waste products into them or by modifying
aspects of their world to suit their needs. As Rose (1997, p. 140) notes,
[o]rganisms – any organism, even the seemingly simplest = and the environment – all
relevant aspects of it – interpenetrate. Abstracting an organism from its environment,
ignoring this dialectic of interpenetration, is a reductionist step which methodology may
demand but which will always mislead.
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The second lesson, according to Rose (1997, pp. 140-141), is that “organisms are
not passive responders to their environments. They actively choose to change them, and
work to that end . . . Organisms . . . are active players in their own futures”.
4.2.2. Development: A process of being and becoming
As Rose (1997, p. 141) points out, the developmental process is quite different to
the process involved in constructing artefacts. Rose (1997) gives the example of building
a car – raw materials come onto the assembly line and piece by piece the car is built up.
But it is only at the very end that a fully formed and fully functional car appears. The
car, at its halfway stage, does not function ‘in miniature’; indeed it does not function at
all. Living organisms, however, from very early on in their development, “have to be
capable simultaneously of quasi-independent existence, and of growing further toward
maturity. Moreover, the attributes that enable them at any one moment to maintain their
existence are not always merely ‘miniature’ forms of those they will need in adulthood”
(Rose, 1997, p. 141).
This is particularly obvious in the case of organisms like frogs and butterflies but
it is also true, in more subtle ways, for organisms that seem to have linear
developmental trajectories devoid of radical breaks, such as human beings.  As Rose
(1997, p. 142, author’s italics) notes
when a newborn baby suckles at its mother’s breast, the suckling reflex is not simply an
undeveloped form of the chewing technique that will be needed when the child switches
to solid food; quit different neural and mechanical processes are involved. Life demands
of all of its form the ability simultaneously to be and to become.
Rose (1997, p. 142) suggests that the prevailing way of thinking about
development always seeks to partition –
first splitting ‘nature’ from ‘nurture’, and then adding them together again. So both being
and becoming are regarded as the products of the additive effects of genes – nature – and
‘environment’ – nurture.
Rose (1997, p. 142, author’s italics) suggests this dichotomy is spurious. Rather,
“the unrolling processes of development are best understood in terms of a different
dichotomy, that between specificity and plasticity”.
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These terms refer to the degree to which an ontogenetic process is modifiable by
experience. Rose (1997) uses the human visual system as a way of illustrating these
concepts in action. Humans, he notes, are born with their eyes open, they are able to
focus them reasonably well and can see and perceive colours, shapes and movements.
This suggests, notes Rose (1997), that the pattern of connections via which the light-
sensitive cells of the retina connect to the brain must already be well established at birth.
But even in the visual system it is possible for the pattern of connections to be
modified during certain critical developmental periods. The famous study by Blakemore
and van Sluyters (1974, cited in Rose, 1997) in which cats were reared in environments of
horizontal or vertical stripes, or with only one eye open, showed that such abnormal
environments resulted in lasting changes in the patterns of synaptic connectivity. This,
notes Rose (1997, p. 143), “is the measure of plasticity . . . which can be imposed upon
developmental specificity”. Both specificity and plasticity3 are, however, embedded
properties of the organism – “both are completely made possible by the genes, and
completely made possible by the environment. They cannot be partitioned” (Rose, 1997,
p. 143).
During development all the cells in the body must cooperate with each other if
stability is to be maintained and each depends on the others to create and preserve “the
dynamic pattern of connections which maps the world onto the sense organs, the sense
organs onto the brain, and then, via the brain and the musculature, imposes new
patterns on the world beyond” (Rose, 1997, pp 152-153).  For Rose (1997, p. 153),
development is “a constructivist process; the developing organism, in its being and
becoming, in its specificity and its plasticity, constructs its own future”.
As Rose (1997, p. 153) points out, however, even the constructivist model he
maps out implies a degree of determinism, “albeit in this case a richer concept than the
unidimensional gene”.  Rose (1997, p. 153) insists that if we are to understand
development we need to go beyond this in “emphasising the role of chance, of
contingency, at all levels of analysis of living systems”.  Rose (1997, p. 154) gives the
example of identical twins who share identical DNA
from the moment of conception and cell division the relative locations of the two
embryos to the placenta and the environment of the uterus affect their development in
                                                 
3 It should be noted at this point that recent research has shown the human brain to be vastly more
responsive to environmental input than was previously thought – this malleability of the brain is referred to
as ‘neural plasticity’ (Huttenlocher, 2002, p. 9).
140
chance ways. Developmental divergence increases with every cell division, and after
birth with every random experience of each twin.
This is an insight that many studies attempting to determine whether ‘mental
illness’ is ‘caused’ by ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’ (twin studies being an obvious example) fail
to take account of.  In the rush to credit the gene with all the determining power over
how people develop, such studies often suggest that the ‘environment’ within which
their subjects are being reared is essentially ‘the same’ (or ‘different’) thus completely
missing subtle differences (or similarities) which may have as much power, perhaps
even more, over developmental outcomes, as genes.
As the research to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter will make clear,
genes do not play the lead role in development, rather they are ‘designed’ to work
within an environment and to be ‘used’ by that environment. Genes are turned on and
off by micro-environmental cues and these cues, in turn, are influenced by the
experience of the individual.  The implications of this insight for developing alternative
understandings of psychological suffering will be discussed in more depth in Chapters
Five and Six.
4.2.3. Living systems are dynamic systems
Rose (1997) argues that while homeostasis4 has become one of the organising
themes of physiology we must move beyond the concept of homeostasis to that of
homeodynamics if we are to truly understand the lifelines of living organisms. As Rose
(1997, p. 157) points out
[t]he set points around which the moment-by-moment fluctuations in an individual’s
biochemistry oscillate on the microscale themselves change during the trajectory of a
lifetime. Our body temperature, steroid hormone levels and neurotransmitter levels
maintain diurnal rhythms.
Women of childbearing age experience monthly hormonal cycles that have
been shown to significantly affect their patterns of life (Rose, 1997). Men may also show
comparable changes, though as Rose (1997) notes, researchers have not thus far been
particularly interested in pursuing this line of study. Lifelines, notes Rose (1997, p. 157)
                                                 
4 Homeostasis is the ability of a living organism to regulate its internal environment so as to maintain a
stable, constant condition in the face of environmental fluctuations.
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are inherently homeodynamic. The present instant of ours or any organism’s life, is
simply inexplicable biologically if considered merely as a frozen moment of time, the
mere sum, at that moment, of the differential expression of a hundred thousand genes.
Each of our presents is shaped by and can only be understood by our pasts, our personal,
unique, developmental history as an organism.
As Rose (1997) goes on to point out, even the moment-to-moment stability of an
organism is maintained dynamically rather than statically. It is now known that life
cycles are not a period of growth from conception to adulthood, then a long period of
relative stasis and then finally a decline into old age and death.  Each cell in the adult
body has its own life cycle from mitosis to death within a few days, weeks or months.
Even brain cells, which used to be considered permanently amitotic (i.e., they did not
divide), can replace themselves when they die, although research is suggesting that they
will only do this under certain conditions (Gould, 1997; Gould, Beylin, Tanapat, Reeves,
& Shors, 1999).
Further, the life and death of any cell continues relatively independently of the
life and death of the molecules of which it is composed. The complex macromolecules
(proteins, nucleic acids, polysaccharides, lipids) that make up a cell have life cycles of
their own, constantly being broken down and replaced by other cells. The average
lifetime of a protein molecule in a mammal is around two weeks. So “why this ceaseless
flux?” asks Rose (1997, p. 158).
The answer is simple . . . living systems need to be dynamic if they are to survive,
able to adjust themselves to the fluctuations which, even in the best-buffered internal
milieu, their cooperative existence as part of the greater unity of the organism demands.
Thus, Rose (1997, p. 159) argues, it is
to this irreducible dynamism as the generator of stable order that we must now turn in
order to understand how, having constructed itself through the processes of
development, the organism is able to preserve its integrity and act upon the external
world.
As Rose (1997, p. 161) notes, the reductionist approach to biology disassembles
cells into the various molecules that comprise them and “follow each enzyme reaction
through which they are transformed in terms of both its chemistry and its energetics”.
Chemistry has dealt with the energetics of such reactions within the framework of
thermodynamics; a science “concerned with equilibria, the final balance points between
energy-yielding and energy providing reactions, and the mathematics and physics of
such equilibria [are] well understood” (Rose, 1997, p. 161).
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 “Simplistically, the net effect of all the energy-utilizing and energy generating
reactions should be that the cell is in thermodynamic and catalytic balance, and should
equate to the life-process itself” (Rose, 1997, p. 161-162). Indeed, during the 1920s and
the 1930s scientists devised various complex experiments on living organisms kept in
closed metabolic chambers to prove that this was indeed the case (Rose, 1997).
As Rose (1997, p. 162) points out, however, if we are to truly understand the
complexity of the processes which occur within living systems “we have to take them
out of their closed metabolic cages”.  Living systems, argues Rose (1997, p. 162) are not
sealed off from the world, “they are open . . . and in constant interchange with their
environment . . . Life is not characterized by the static balance of completed reactions but
by dynamic equilibrium”.  In the case of humans, of course, a crucially important aspect
of ‘the environment’ is other humans, the social world, within which we are enmeshed
and upon which we depend, and the meanings we assign to the actions of ourselves and
others within that world.
Rose (1997) suggests that the thousands of chemical reactions taking place at
any moment within a cell constitute a complex interacting web. The reductionist, having
studied each of these reactions individually, would then attempt to build them up into
sequential chains, “recognizing that the products of one enzyme-catalysed reaction will
immediately serve as the substrates for another” (Rose, 1997, p. 162).  Such an approach
is, argues Rose (1997), far too simplistic. One cannot abstract from the “metabolic dance
of the molecules” any single reaction pathway. The various substances involved in this
‘dance’ participate not just in one “but in many interacting pathways, and the factors
which may influence the rate of any individual enzyme reaction then multiply
dramatically” (Rose, 1997, p. 164).
Once this metabolic web becomes sufficiently complex it becomes strong, stable
and able to resist change. But the stability does not reside in the individual components;
rather it resides within the whole of the web itself. As Rose (1997, p. 166) goes on to note
the metabolic web has a further advantage over one made of mere fabric. Unlike living
systems, human artefacts such as fabric cannot compensate for the loss of any individual
thread. The cellular web, however, has a degree of flexibility which permits it to
reorganize itself in response to injury or damage.
These properties of stability and self-organization are, argues Rose (1997, p.
166) “the key to appreciating the fundamental irreducibility of living cells”. The
metabolic organization of each cell is not just the sum of their parts, and one cannot
predict this metabolic organization simply by “summing every enzyme reaction and
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substrate concentration that we can measure. For us to understand them we have to be
able to understand the functioning of the entire ensemble” (Rose, 1997, p. 166).  Stability
and self-organization also explain why the equilibrium achieved by the cell is a dynamic
rather than a static one, notes Rose (1997). “The essence of the stability of the whole is
that the individual components are in constant flux” (Rose, 1997, p. 166).
But homeodynamic order within the cell is not maintained just through the self-
stabilizing properties of metabolic webs, it is also maintained “through internal
structural constraints set by semipermeable lipid membranes in which are embedded
proteins that recognize and regulate the entry and exit of key metabolites” (pp 168-169).
As Rose (1997, p. 169) notes, “[t]he internal components of the cell are in constant
motion . . . the traffic and interaction of dynamic order”.
Further, as Rose (1997) points out, these internal structures are created via a
complex series of interactions between genes and the environment. Without the genes
the amino acid chains that constitute the proteins could not be synthesised. How these
chains fold is, however, affected by the microenvironment of the cell. The folding
patterns and the shapes which result are not predictable from the DNA sequences, they
depend on the environment as well. Thus Rose (1997) argues
[l]ifelines . . . are not embedded in genes; their existence implies homeodynamics. Their
four dimensions are autopoietically constructed through the interplay of physical forces,
the intrinsic chemistry of lipids and proteins, the self-organizing and stabilizing
properties of complex metabolic webs, and the specificity of genes which permit the
plasticity of ontogeny. The organism is both the weaver and the pattern it weaves, the
choreographer and the dance that is danced.
4.2.4. Summary and Implications
Within the dynamic systems5 view of biological development taken by Rose
(1997), the lifeline of an organism is constructed via its enmeshment in its environment,
and cannot be understood without taking that environment into account – an insight
which mirrors the social constructionist position that a person cannot be understood
separately from the social world within which s/he is enmeshed.
As Rose (1997) further notes living systems “are in constant interchange with
their environment [and thus] life is not characterized by the static balance of completed
                                                 
5 The dynamic systems approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five (Section 5.2.1).
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reactions but by dynamic equilibrium” (Rose, 1997, p. 162). As noted above, in the case
of humans a crucially important aspect of ‘the environment’ is other humans, the social
world, within which we are enmeshed and upon which we depend, and the meanings
we assign to the actions of ourselves and others within that world.
The social constructionist analysis presented in Chapter Three makes the same
point about our personal being. As Shotter (1993b, p. 7) points out, while our personal
being, central to which is our sense of ‘self’, emerges from the “contingent flow of
continuous communicative interaction between human beings” it is never, at some
point, entirely complete.   Rather, at all times in a person’s life their personal being is
partially ‘constructed’ and, also, open to further construction, re-construction or even
‘de-construction’.
Again reflecting the social constructionist account presented in Chapter Three,
Rose (1997, p. 153) also stresses that “the present instant of ours or any organism’s life, is
simply inexplicable biologically if considered merely as a frozen moment of time” and
that “each of our presents is shaped by and can only be understood by our pasts, our
personal, unique, developmental history as an organism”. If neither our biological being
nor our personal being can be understood outside the context of the lifeline of the
organism/person then neither can our psychological suffering.
Hence, this account will be a ‘developmental6’ one, though, in line with Rose’s
(1997) analysis, development will be conceptualised as a “constructivist process”
whereby the organism, via its enmeshment with its environment, essentially “constructs
its own future” (p 153), rather than naturally unfolding according to a pre-determined
‘blueprint’. Such a view, as Rose (1997, p. 153) notes, emphasises “the role of chance and
of contingency, at all levels of analysis of living systems” (Rose, 1997, p. 153) and the
radical indeterminacy of all our life trajectories.
In line with Rose’s analysis, developmental psychologist Gilbert Gottlieb (1991)
suggests that the outcomes of development (behavioural, organic or neural) are a
consequence of at least two, and in many cases more, specific components of the system
interacting (or, to use Gottlieb’s term, ‘coacting’). Some examples of such ‘coactions’
include, person-person, organism-organism, organism-environment, cell-cell, nucleus-
cytoplasm, sensory stimulation -sensory system, and activity-motor behaviour.
As Gottlieb (1991) further notes, it is the relationship of the two components, not
the components themselves, which drives development. Thus, “genes in themselves
                                                 
6 See Chapter Six for further discussion on ‘developmentalism’.
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cannot cause development any more than stimulation in itself can cause development”
(Gottlieb, 1991, pp 7-8). Gottlieb (1991) suggests such coactions need to be at the heart of
developmental analysis.  As Gottlieb (1991, p. 8) points out, “the concept used most
frequently to designate coactions at the organismic level of functioning is experience.
Experience is thus a relational term”. Thus, human beings (like all other organisms) are,
as Eisenberg (1998) puts it, jointly moulded by nature and nurture.
In the next section I will discuss research concerning the foundational role of
early social experiences, specifically those between an infant and their first caregiver, for
the future socio-emotional functioning of that infant. Such research illustrates the central
insight of Rose’s approach to biology, that organisms cannot be understood separately
from their environment and that their experiences in those environments are
fundamental to the trajectory of their lifelines.
4.3. THE FOUNDATIONAL NATURE OF THE
MOTHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
4.3.1. Introduction
There is now a considerable body of evidence to suggest that the basic functional
building blocks for much of the mammalian infant’s social development are formed
early in life, mainly through the interaction of the infant and the mother (Schore, 2001b,
2001c). Indeed, as Hofer (2001, p. 822) points out “interactions with a caretaker appear to
play the same role for an infant’s affective and communicative development as early
visual input [does] for its ability to see”. As the opening of the Romanian orphanages
has made clear, the basic physical requirements of infants may be met but if they are not
involved in a ‘love relationship’ with another human being who is committed to their
care and well-being then their ability to feel and express emotions and to communicate
with others will not develop (Gunnar, 2001; Perry, 1997; Small, 1998; Taylor, 2002).
As Hofer (2001, p. 823) notes, “the general term used for the processes by which
the infant’s first social relationship is formed, regulated and expressed is ‘attachment7’
                                                 
7 For Hofer (2005, p. 291) the term ‘attachment’ “remains useful as a concept, like hunger, that describes the
operation of subprocesses that work together within the frame of a vital biological function”. It should be
noted that I will, at various points, draw on research findings from the ‘attachment’ literature which provide
general support for the analysis being developed in this thesis. This does not imply a wholesale acceptance
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or, colloquially, ‘bonding’”.  As summarised by Hofer (2001, p. 823), attachment theory,
developed by John Bowlby (1969, cited in Hofer, 2001, p. 823), suggests that
the early responses of newborns consist primarily of species-typical reflex acts. These are
thought to become slowly organized into a behavioural system that maintains proximity
to the mother. Through repeated use and maturation, Bowlby theorized, this simple
system gradually develops into a full-fledged attachment system (at about 7 to 8 months
in the human) as it becomes imbued with affect and organized around an ‘internal
working model’ (mental representation), specified by the infant’s particular experiences
with its mother up to that point in time. The mother goes through a similar process,
strongly influenced by (unconscious) traces of her own experiences with her mother. The
affective ‘bond’ thus formed is expressed in the infant’s early positive emotional states of
joy, comfort, security in the presence of the mother and the negative states of protest,
anxiety, anger and despair elicited by separation from her.
As Hofer (2001) notes, however, there are unresolved questions inherent in this
formulation. First, there is no clear articulation of how attachment is actually initiated.
“Bowlby’s (1969) primary definition of attachment is the infant’s ability to seek
proximity to a specific caregiver” but he never specified how an ‘attached’ state
develops from an ‘preattached’ state (Pipp & Harmon, 1987, p. 648).  Second, the theory
has difficulty in
explaining the slower-developing physiological and behavioural effects of early maternal
separation and falls prey to circular reasoning in that the best evidence for the existence
of attachment is the immediate (protest) response to separation, and yet attachment is
then used as an explanation for the very protest response from which it was inferred.
(Hofer, 2001, p 823)
Hofer (2001) notes that mounting neuroscience evidence for activity-dependent
developmental brain processes has set the stage for a new view of attachment as
deriving from specifiable regulatory processes recently found to be embedded in the
interactions between infant and mother (Hofer, 1995, cited in Hofer, 2001). In this
Section I will discuss research which has attempted to elucidate the developmental
processes underlying the ‘attachment’ process, focusing on the work of Myron Hofer
and his colleagues (Hofer, 1987, 2001, 2005, 2006; Hofer & Sullivan, 2001; Polan & Hofer,
1998, 1999a, 1999b) whose findings, as Pipp and Harmon (1987) have pointed out, have
altered “the traditional perspective on human attachment in important ways”.
Because experimental manipulations of the mother-infant interaction in humans
are not possible, and because long-term observational studies from infancy to adulthood
                                                                                                                                                  
of the concept of ‘attachment’ as articulated by Bowlby (1969, cited in Hofer, 2001). While some aspects of
attachment theory sit relatively comfortably with the analysis being developed herein, others do not, such
as, for example, the mentalistic notion of the infant developing an ‘internal working model’ of its
relationship with its mother.
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are very difficult and take so long, the research discussed in this section has been carried
out with rapidly developing laboratory species such as the rat. While one must be
careful about generalizing across species such studies nevertheless provide us with
some insight into the socio-biological processes that may be involved in the relationship
between human caregivers and their infants.
4.3.2. Early post-natal learning
Although research has shown that predispositions towards the mother may be
acquired prenatally (Hepper, 1987, Smotheram & Robinson, 1992, Robinson &
Smotheram, 1995, cited in Hofer, 2001; Polan & Hofer, 1999a), after birth “the newborn
enters a new world where contingent events, so important for more advanced forms of
learning, are now occurring with greater frequency” (Hofer, 2001, p. 827). As Hofer
(2001) points out, when developmental psychobiologists first began studying the
development of rat pups they were not expecting to find the capacity for any kind of
learning in the neonatal rat. Since then, however, a considerable amount of research has
shown “that the basic laws of adult learning also apply to infant rats and that learning
occurs naturally within the nest” (see Hofer, 2001, 918).
Indeed, Hofer (2001; 2001) reports a number of studies indicating that the kind of
rapid learning process occurring in young rats resembles imprinting in birds. For
example Sullivan et al. (cited in Hofer, 2001) found that associating a new smell with
simulated licking of the pup resulted, after only a few repetitions, in the pup being able
to select, approach and remain close to that odour. Interestingly it was not just pleasant
forms of stimulation that resulted in this kind of learning. Even tail pinches and mild
electric shocks paired with an odour during the first week of life, resulted in preferences
for that odour.
As Hofer (2001, 917) points out, however, such aversive tactile stimulation, if
delivered after the first week of life, stopped inducing preferences, suggesting “a
sensitive period for the formation of positive associations reinforced by intense tactile
stimulation” (Hofer, 2001, 917, p. 827).  Hofer (2001, p. 827) suggests that this finding
may help explain “the clinical observation that strong attachments can occur in children
of abusive parents”.  As Hofer (2001, p. 827) points out
[c]ues learned in this way can be highly specific to an identifying maternal feature, they
acquire the capacity to elicit states of increased arousal and operate, at a distance, as
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incentive cues in a motivational system that ensures close proximity of the infant to the
mother.
As Hofer (2001, 918, p. 603) notes, research has shown that “a surprisingly broad
spectrum of stimuli can function as reinforcers to produce an odor preference in rat
pups” while they are in the nest, but that it “becomes more selective at a time in
development when pups begin leaving the nest and encountering novel odors not
associated with the mother”. 
4.3.3. The mother’s regulation of infant systems
As the research discussed above makes clear, attachment begins soon after birth.
Prenatally acquired perceptual biases, and motor programmes, and some very basic
associative learning  smooth the transition between the womb and the outside world,
helping the infant to orient towards the mother and locate the source of milk. Once
outside the womb stimulus-guided tactile responses and associative learning take over
creating “a powerful behavioural control system through which the infant maintains
close proximity to its mother” (Hofer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 607).
There is, however, another important attribute of attachment, the attribute from
which the emotional tie of the infant to its mother has been inferred: the response to
separation. As Hofer (2001, p. 607) points out, “this has been supposed to be an integral
part of the proximity-maintenance system, one that represents the affective expression of
its motivational nature”.  It has long been thought that the strength of an attachment is
responsible for the intensity of the response to separation and “the separation response
itself is taken to represent a full expression of attachment behaviours in the absence of
their ‘goal object’” (Hofer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 607).
The responses of infant rats, and of primates, to separation from the mother
“involve a complex pattern of changes in a number of different behavioural and
physiologic systems” (Hofer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 607).  Hofer (1987) provides a summary
of infant responses to separation from their mother across several animal species,
including human beings, and notes “the broad outline and even some of the details are
surprisingly similar for different species” (Hofer, 1987, p. 638).  During the first, or
‘protest’ phase of separation there is an increase in agitation, vocalisation and searching
activities. There is also an increase in heart rate, and in cortisol and catecholamine levels.
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If the separation lasts for a longer period of time this response “merges into the
slow-developing changes of the so-called despair phase” (Hofer, 1987, p. 638).  Some of
the behavioural signs of this phase are decreased social interaction and play, mouthing
and rocking, hypo- or hyper-responsiveness, decreased or variable food intake and
postures or facial expressions indicative of sadness. Physiological signs include a
decrease in weight, sleep disturbances, a decrease in core temperature, oxygen
consumption, heart rate, and growth hormone levels (Hofer, 1987).
As Hofer points out, it has been assumed that the protest and despair phases
were both part of the same process, with Bowlby (1969, cited in Hofer, 1987) proposing
that both phases are ‘strategies’ selected by evolution because of their adaptive value.
The arousal of the protest stage was thought to be useful in helping the mother to locate
the lost infant and the inhibition of the despair phase was thought to help the infant hide
safely from predators and conserve its energy until the return of its mother.
Experiments carried out by Hofer and his team (see Hofer, 1987 for a summary
of these), however, caused them to question this ‘tidy view’ (Hofer, 1987).  Hofer and his
colleagues found, to their surprise, that the “slow-developing changes in the rat
continued to occur, even when the acute protest phase was completely prevented by the
presence of effective surrogates” (Hofer, 1987, p. 638).  As Hofer (1987, pp 638-39) notes,
“we were forced to conclude that the slow-developing changes were independent of the
acute isolation distress and that the two phases might be caused by different processes”.
In a series of experiments Hofer and his team (reported in Hofer, 1987) found
that a single aspect of the mother-infant relationship could prevent one of the
physiologic changes characteristic of the ‘despair’ phase without affecting any of the
others. Hofer and his team found that when separated from their mother “each of the
individual systems of the infant rat responded to the absence of one or another of the
components of the infant’s previous interaction with its mother” (Hofer & Sullivan,
2001, p. 607). Thus, if one of these components was provided to a separated pup, for
example maternal warmth, this would maintain the level of brain biogenic amine
function underlying the pups’ general activity level but it had no effect on other systems,
for example the pups’ heart rate.  Heart rate, however, was found to be regulated by
“maternal provision of milk to neural receptors in the lining of the pup’s stomach”
(Hofer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 607).
Other systems, such as those controlling sleep-wake states, activity level,
sucking pattern, vocalization and blood pressure were also found to be regulated by
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specific components of the infant’s interaction with its mother (see Hofer & Sullivan,
2001, p. 607). This led Hofer (1987, p. 639) to conclude that
[t]he pattern of slow-developing changes was in reality a composite or assemblage of
separate independent processes, each operating over a different pathway. The only
reason that all of these changes occurred as a pattern in the separated infant was because
all of the individual processes were activated at once by the withdrawal of all active
aspects of the mother-infant relationship simultaneously.
This loss will either decrease or increase levels of function across the infant’s
various biological systems, depending on whether that system had been up- or down-
regulated by the mother-infant interaction. Hofer (1987; 2001) calls these regulatory
functions performed by the interactions between mother and infant ‘hidden regulators’
because they are not evident by just observing the interaction between the mother and
the infant.
Hofer (1987, p. 639) points out that “each of these regulators within the normal
mother-infant interaction has its own dynamics and its own transduction mechanisms”.
Some interactions with the mother, for example, act to maintain relatively high levels of
function within their system under normal conditions (e.g., heart rate and oxygen
consumption). Other interactions act to down-regulate their systems (e.g., those
underlying behavioural reactivity, arousals during sleep and sucking) under normal
conditions.
These studies suggest “that the infant’s homeostatic system appears to be
relatively ‘open’” and that regulation of the infant’s biological functions is delegated, at
least in part, to the mother (Hofer, 1987, p. 639). Such research reveals “how differences
created in the nature and quality of behavioural interaction within the dyad can have
marked effects on the infant’s response after separation and suggest the presence of
regulators within the interaction that determine the form of the response after
withdrawal by separation” (Hofer, 1987, p. 641).
As Hofer (2001) points out, other investigators have discovered additional
maternal regulatory systems that further support his thesis. For example, a study by
Schanberg and Field (1987, p. 1442) found that when 10-day-old rat pups are separated
from their mothers for only 1-hour ornithine decarboxylase8 (ODC) was “markedly
diminished in the vital organs of rat pups”. Further, the author’s noted that this decrease
was
                                                 
8 An enzyme that is involved in protein synthesis and “a sensitive index of tissue growth and
differentiation” (Schanberg & Field, 1987, p. 1442).
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triggered specifically by the loss of tactile stimulation from the mother, as opposed to the
absence of sensory cues from littermates, passive stimuli from the mother, or nutritional
deprivation.
Separating rat pups from their mother also resulted in a decrease in growth
hormone (GH) secretion and also a “loss of tissue sensitivity to exogenous growth
hormone” (Schanberg & Field, 1987, p. 1442).  Furthermore, Schanberg & Field (1987, p.
1442) found that “only a specific type and pattern of tactile stimulation (brush strokes
mimicking their mother’s licking pattern) reinstated normal functioning of these
processes”.   
As Wexler (2006, p. 90) points out, a number of “persistent abnormalities in
multiple neurotransmitter systems” are also found in animals separated from their
mothers during infancy. Some examples of altered neurotransmitter systems in infant
rats who have been separated from their mothers for varying periods of time include:
expression of the dopamine transporter gene and dopamine-mediated stress responses
(Meaney, Brake & Gratton, 2002, cited in Wexler, 2006), expression of serotonin receptor
mRNA (Siburg, Oitzl, Workel, de Kloet, 2001, cited in Wexler, 2006), expression of
benzodiazepine receptors (Caldji, Francis, Shasrma et al., 2000, cited in Wexler, 2006),
sensitivity of glucocortocoid receptors related to stress response (Francis, Diorio, Plotsky
et al., 2002, cited in Wexler, 2006), and sensitivity to morphine (Kalinachev, Easterling &
Holtzman, 2002, cited in Wexler, 2006).
In addition to altering the functioning of the brain, early separations from the
mother also seem to result in alterations to the structure of the brain (Wexler, 2006). Rat
pups separated from their mothers for 24 hours showed a twofold increase in the death
rate of neurons and glial cells in the cerebral and cerebellar cortices, and in the white
matter tracts that link different brain regions (Zahn, Levine, Dent et al., 2002, cited in
Wexler). Monkeys who were repeatedly separated from their mothers for 5-hour periods
between the ages of 13 and 21 weeks had abnormally large right frontal brain regions as
adults. Although the time at which this subsequent abnormality developed is unclear, it
is thought to probably result from an abnormal decrease in the cell pruning that usually
takes place around the time of sexual maturation (Lyons, Afariana, Schatzberg et al.,
2002, cited in Wexler).
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4.3.4. Long-term effects of mother-infant interactions
As Hofer (2001, p. 830) points out, the maternal regulators inherent in the
interaction between mother and infant exert their effects on the biology and behaviour
of infants “throughout the preweaning period and even beyond”.  Hofer (2001) notes
that this is illustrated by the discovery of a major role for the mother-infant interaction in
the development of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) – a major part of the
neuroendocrine system that controls reactions to stress and is thought to regulate many
processes, including digestion, the immune system9, mood and emotions, and sexuality.
In mid-infancy (postnatal days 4 o 14) the HPA response of the rat pups to
isolation and to mild stressors is less intense than in the newborn or weaning periods – a
species-typical developmental stage known as the ‘stress-hyporesponsive period’.   It
was recently found, however, that rather than being the product of an intrinsic
developmental programme as initially thought, it was actually the result of hidden
regulators within the ongoing mother-infant interaction (see Hofer, 2001).
By analysing the activity of rat pups’ neuromodulators in response to various
experimental manipulations while separated from their mothers a group of researchers
(Stanton, Gutierrez, & Levine, 1988; Suchecki, Rosenfeld, & Levine, 1993; van Oers et al.,
1998, cited in Hofer, 2001) have “discovered that maternal licking and milk delivery
during suckling exerted an unexpected and prolonged attenuating effect on the
responsiveness of the HPA” (Hofer, 2001, p. 831).  This regulatory effect continues
throughout most of the time the pups are nursing and finally declines as weaning
occurs. As Hofer (2001, p. 831) points out,
[t]hese regulatory interactions achieve this effect by increasing the inhibitory feedback
from hippocampal glucocorticoid receptors and by decreasing the hypothalamic
stimulation of CRF and ACTH output. These regulatory effects on the pup’s brain can be
rapidly reversed by maternal separation.
A study by Liu, Diorio, Tannenbaum, Caldji, Francis, Freedman et al. (1997)
suggests that the effects on the infant of the quality of interactions it has with its mother
can be even longer lasting.  Liu et al. (1997) were interested in finding out why different
maternal behaviour of rat dams towards their pups resulted in differing HPA responses
to stress in their offspring. It has long been known that separating pups from their
mothers for three to fifteen minutes every day leads to decreases in fearfulness, stress
                                                 
9 Research suggests that early separations from the mother may result in a compromised immune system,
with experimentally induced autoimmune encephalitis being more severe in adult rats who have been
separated from their mothers in infancy, (Stephan, Straub, Brivik et al., 2002, cited in Wexler, 2006).
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reactivity, steroid release from the adrenal glands during stress, and hippocampal aging
as adults (Wexler, 2006). As Liu et al. (1997) point out; these effects were found to be due
not to separation from the mother per se, but to handling of the pups during separation
by human beings. Liu et al. (1997, p. 1659) further note that a number of authors have
proposed that “handling the pups altered the behavior of the mother and that these
differences in mother-pup interactions then mediate the effect of handling on the
development of endocrine and behavioral responses to stress”.
Liu et al. (1997) examined the behaviour of mothers of handled or non-handled
litters over the first ten days (known to be a critical period for the ‘handling effect’ on
HPA development) of their life. Mothers of pups who were handled showed increased
levels of licking and grooming of pups and arched-back nursing (LG-ABN) compared
with mothers of non-handled pups. To determine whether the increased maternal
licking and grooming affects the development of the HPA responses to stress, Liu et al.
(1997, p. 1659) then examined the relation between naturally occurring individual
differences in maternal care and HPA development.
To do this, the researchers selected a group of dams that showed higher licking
and grooming behaviours (also highly correlated with high arch-backed nursing) and
then assessed the HPA responsivity of their offspring. They found that, as adults, the
offspring of the high LG-ABN mothers “showed significantly reduced plasma ACTH
and corticosterone responses to restraint stress compared with the offspring of low-LG-
ABN mothers”, but that there were no differences in basal hormone levels (Liu et al.,
1997, p. 1660). The authors noted that these findings parallel those observed in handled
versus non-handled rats, which also differ in stress-induced, but not in basal HPA
activity.
Liu et al. (1997) also found “increased hippocampal glucocorticoid receptor
messenger RNA expression, enhanced glucocorticoid feedback sensitivity, and
decreased levels of hypothalamic corticotropin-releasing hormone messenger RNA
expression” in the adult offspring of high-LG-ABN mothers. These findings also parallel
those observed in handled versus non-handled rats. Liu et al. (1997) note that these
findings suggest that “maternal behavior serves to ‘program’ hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal responses to stress in the offspring” (Liu et al., 1997, p. 1659).
In line with these findings, research by Maestripieri and his colleagues
(Maestripieri, Higley et al., 2006; Maestripieri, McCormack, Lindell, Higley, & Sanchez,
2006) showed that rhesus monkey infants who were exposed to higher levels of maternal
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rejection in their first 6 months of life exhibited significantly lower CSF concentrations of
serotonin and dopamine metabolites in their 1st, 2nd and 3rd years of life than did
infants exposed to lower levels of maternal rejection.
Wexler (2006) also points to a number of studies with monkeys which
demonstrate the effects of compromised mother-infant relationships on more complex
aspects of adult social behaviour, some of which my have direct parallels in human
beings. As Wexler (2006) notes, studies comparing infants separated from their mothers
at birth and raised in small peer groups and infants raised by their mothers “are most
informative since both groups have ample social and physical contact with members of
their own species” (Wexler, 2006, p. 93).
A review by Kraemer (1997) outlines how peer-reared and mother-reared
monkeys show many behavioural differences as infants and juveniles and as adults.
Peer-reared monkeys are consistently rated as being more timid, fearful and emotionally
labile than mother-reared monkeys and as infants and juveniles they spend more time
sucking their fingers and toes, and clinging to their peers. The interactions amongst
these monkeys seem chaotic “with individuals being either inordinately separated from
group activity or intensely engaged, with rapid fluctuations between the two” (Kraemer,
1997, p. 407).
Peer-reared monkeys are consistently rated as being “in a chronically higher
‘tension’ or ‘stress’ state than groups of mother-reared monkeys” (Kraemer, 1997, p. 407)
and they are also more likely to “have a severe response to separation from there [sic]
cagemates than are mother-reared monkeys living in peer groups as juveniles”
(Kraemer, 1997, p. 407).  Aggressive behaviour is less common in peer-reared monkeys,
but when it does occur it is more likely to lead to injury. Peer-reared juveniles show
more signs of stress when separated from their cage-mates and trained observers rate
them as more tense, timid and emotionally labile.
Peer-reared monkeys also show different baseline and stress-related levels of
brain neurotransmitters and circulating hormones with the peer-reared monkeys
showing blunted responses in some and exaggerated responses in others. As Wexler
(2006, p. 94) notes “these observations indicate deficient biobehavioral self-regulation in
the peer-reared monkeys”. Monkeys reared in total or partial isolation show additional
deficiencies in self-regulation including altered temperature regulation, abnormal eating
patterns and impaired regulation of body weight (29, cited in Wexler, 2006). These
findings are not surprising in the light of Hofer’s (1987, 2001) finding that the mother
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plays a key role in regulating the infant’s biological functions. As Kraemer (1997, p. 404)
notes, “being mothered . . .  is the most important thing for the psychobiological
development of the infant”.
Kraemer (1997) notes that there seems to be evidence of decreased
neurobiological structure or organization in peer-reared monkeys. Mother-reared
monkeys show significant correlations among the activity of different brain
neurotransmitter systems, among different measures of behaviour, and between
neurotransmitter and behavioural measures. Most of these correlations are significantly
reduced or absent in peer-reared monkeys.  Kraemer (1997, p. 411) notes that this
finding suggests,
first that the correlations among measures that are observed in socially reared monkeys
are not attributable to necessarily interlocked neurochemical or transport mechanisms,
and second, that important aspects of neurobiological organization are attributable to
mother-infant attachment and do not occur if the monkey has no mother.
There have been a number of studies which have attempted to make more
ecologically natural interventions in mother-infant interactions by requiring the mothers
to spend more, or less, time foraging for food (Variable Foraging Demand paradigm).
Coplan, Pauncia, & Rosenblum (2004), in a review of this literature, noted that such
studies suggested that
[t]he psychosocial stress induced by the VFD (variable foraging demand) paradigm has a
clear impact on the ability of primate mothers to provide consistent and adequate
parenting towards their infants . . . [and] the extensive data on the neuropsychobiology
of the offspring demonstrates the powerful influence unpredictable rearing wields over
the future development of the primate CNS.
As Wexler (2006, p. 96) points out, “it is problematic for environmentally
dependent organisms when the environment (in this case maternal presence and
behaviours) changes so that it no longer matches the expectations and internal
neuropsychological structures generated by the previous environmental conditions”.
This is perhaps particularly so for human beings who are not only highly
environmentally dependent in terms of our development, but who are also living in a
world which is changing extremely rapidly and which, with each generation, is
becoming less and less similar to the environment within which we, as organisms,
evolved (Keverne, 2004).
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4.4. THE HUMAN MOTHER-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP AS A REGULATOR OF
INFANT SYSTEMS
The research outlined above describes a number of behavioural systems that act
together to encourage the infant to seek, and maintain, close proximity to the mother
and which cause “a complex patterned response to prolonged maternal separation”
(Polan & Hofer, 1999, p. 177). As Polan and Hofer (1999b, p. 177) note, these systems
indicate that an ‘enduring social bond’ (to use Bowlby’s term) has been formed, but we
can now understand the bond in terms of separate processes that can be delineated as
they work independently, serially, or in parallel to produce the familiar behavioural
signs of ‘attachment’.
This research has shown how the early relationship between a mother and her
infant shapes the developing physiology and the behaviour of the infant and, as Polan
and Hofer (1999, p. 177) point out, how “behavioral adaptations to environmental
change occurring in the life of the mother can thus lead to biological changes in the
offspring – a novel evolutionary mechanism”.
As Polan and Hofer (1999, p. 177) further note, their research findings have
moved them “conceptually . . . from using a hierarchical goal-corrected control system
as [their] model, to using a self-organizing regulatory system composed of mother and
infant as a unit”.  The role of ‘attachment behaviour’ can thus be seen in a new light: “It
provides the ‘glue’ that holds mother and infant together and allows the whole mutual
regulatory system to be formed and maintained” (Polan & Hofer, 1999b, p. 178).
While one must be cautious about generalizing between species, as has been
noted above, because the essential phenomena associated with infant attachment –
seeking proximity to the mother and the distress response to separation from the mother
– occur in most mammals, “the basic underlying mechanisms (from genes to
neurobehavioural systems) are likely to be similar in all mammals” (Polan & Hofer,
1999b). Thus, the research discussed above provides us with insights into the socio-
biological processes that may be involved in the relationship between human caregivers
and their infants.
Indeed, the plasticity of human brain structures and functions (Huttenlocher,
2002), and the fact that infancy and childhood lasts much longer in humans than in other
mammals (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999; Small, 1998), suggests that the physiological regulatory
157
effects of our early social interactions will have a commensurately greater effect on our
development than it does for other animals. As McKenna and McDade (2005, p. 138)
point out, the human being is born with only 25 percent of its brain volume and is thus
“neurologically the most immature infant primate of all, the slowest developing and the
most reliant on its mother for the longest period of time for physiological regulation and
support”. Indeed, these authors suggest that “nothing that a human infant can or cannot
do makes sense except in the light of the mother’s body” (McKenna & McDade, 2005, p.
138).
While there is comparatively little biologically oriented research concerning
humans what there is suggests that the interactions between human mothers and their
infants fulfil the same functions, and have the same fundamental importance, as those
between mothers and infants in other species.  Human babies, in common with newborn
rats (Polan & Hofer, 1999b), for example, arrive in the world equipped with a number of
orienting and approach behaviours that, as Polan and Hofer (1999b, p. 169) point out,
“serve as building blocks from which a filial attachment system can be constructed”.
As Hofer (2001) notes, recent research with humans has shown that newborns
are capable of slowly moving across the bare surface of their mother’s stomach and
locating a breast scented with amniotic fluid in preference to one which was unscented
(Verendi et al., cited in Hofer, 2001). This suggests that human newborns are not as
helpless as previously thought and “possess approach and orienting behaviours that
anticipate the recognized onset of maternal attachment at 6 to 8 months” (Hofer, 2001, p.
826)
As Wexler (2006, p. 97) points out, the dependence of the developing infant on
social-sensory stimulation from the outside world, and the intensity of pre- and
postnatal social-sensory experience means that the human mother and her infant are
rapidly linked in
mutually regulating dyadic systems. The resulting synchronization and mutual
contingency of infant-adult behaviors are evident in sleep and electroencephalogram
patterns . . .  direction of gaze . . .  facial expressions . . .  vocalization . . .  and cardiac and
behavioral rhythms.
As Wexler (2006) goes on to note, the behaviour of the adults who are linked
with the infants in this way thus exerts a profound effect on the infant’s general
physiological state and its orientation to sensory input. If an agitated baby is rocked or
walked around with this helps soothe them and ease their transition into sleep (e.g., Ter
Vrugt & Pederson, 1973, cited in Wexler, 2006). Slow, deep vocalization also soothes
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agitated babies, while an increased pitch and timbre can rouse a baby from light sleep to
alert awareness. An increased tempo and a staccato rhythm (such as would be
experienced if an adult was angry or excited) can over-arouse an infant so much they
start crying (Brazelton, 1982, cited in Wexler, 2006). Infants have even been shown to
move in synchrony with the adults who are interacting with them (Condon & Sander,
1974, cited in Wexler, 2006).
Small (1998) cites a study by Yogman, Lester & Hoffman (1983, cited in Small,
1998) which illustrates how biologically entrained babies are with adults with whom
they have a close physical and emotional relationship.  In this study a baby girl was
brought into a laboratory and placed in a seat that was curtained off from all other
distractions.  The baby was then approached by her mother, then her father, and then a
stranger. Chest monitors attached to the baby and to the adult participants in the study
showed that “the baby synchronized her heart rate to that of the mother or father when
they approached, but she did not synchronize her heart rate to the strangers”.
McKenna and McDade (2005) note that responses to separation from the mother
in humans are consistent across and within cultures. For example, newborns can lose up
to one degree of temperature when removed from their mothers’ ventrums following
birth, even when they are placed in incubators where the ambient temperature matches
that of the mother’s body (Fardig, 1980, cited in McKenna and McDade, 2005). Research
has also shown that 11-16 week old infants who are sleeping alone have lower axillary
skin temperatures compared with infants who are sharing a bed with their mothers
(Tuffnell, Peterson & Wailoo, cited in McKenna and McDade, 2005).
As McKenna, Thoman, Anders, Sadeh, Schectman & Glotzbach (1993) point out
infant thermoregulation, in common with other immature central nervous system (CNS)
homeostatic subsystems, may not be as efficient when the infant is alone as it is in the
evolutionarily ‘expectable’ social environment of being physically close to the mother.
Furthermore, a study by Feldman, Weller, Sirota and Eidelman (2002) suggests
that skin-to-skin contact or ‘kangaroo care’ increases the ability of premature infants to
regulate their physiological processes (e.g., sleep patterns, temperature and oxygen
consumption). Research into infant sleep has also suggested that having a parent in close
proximity (‘co-sleeping’) may help the infant’s immature nervous system learn to self-
regulate during sleep (for a review see McKenna et al., 1993).
McKenna’s research (McKenna, Mosko, Richard et al., 1994; Mosko, Richard &
McKenna, 1997, cited in McKenna & McDade, 2005) suggests that co-sleeping may help
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protect against SIDs by preventing the infant from entering sleep states that are too deep
for it to arouse itself from and that the sound and the feel of parents breathing may help
the infant to ‘remember’ to breathe. McKenna et al. (1993) also point out that research
has shown that ‘rooming-in’ newborns spend more time in quiet sleep than those infants
who were away from their mothers in the hospital nursery.
Maternal behaviour also exerts an influence on the regulatory processes of the
sympathetic nervous system, which is involved in affect regulation. As Calkins and Hill
(2007, p. 240) note, “during homeostasis the PNS enhances restorative and growth
processes” but during a challenging or ‘stressful’ situation the PNS influences the
regulation of cardiac output via the vagal nerve pathways.  Calkins and Hill (2007, p.
240) cite research that suggests that caregiver behaviour may affect this physiological
system. For example, a number of studies have shown that
mother-infant coregulated communication patterns and more responsive parenting are
positively related to good vagal regulation, and maternal intrusiveness and restrictive
parenting are negatively related to such regulation.
The above-mentioned research suggests that the mother-infant interaction
performs the same regulatory function for humans as it does with rats, with behaviours
such as cuddling (tactile stimulation/body warmth), rocking and walking, various sorts
of vocalisations, provision of milk, etc., acting as maternal regulators of immature
human biological and neurobiological systems. This research also suggests some of the
infant systems which may be regulated in this way – control of sleep-wake states and
self-regulation during sleep, thermoregulation, vagal regulation and possibly even
regulation of breathing.
Research by Schanberg and Field (1987) suggests that the mother-infant
interaction may also regulate the levels of growth hormone secretion in the human
infant. As already noted above, a study by Schanberg and Field (1987)) established that
separating rat pups from their mother resulted in a decrease in growth hormone (GH)
secretion and a “loss of tissue sensitivity to exogenous growth hormone” (Schanberg &
Field, 1987, p. 1442). As also noted above, Schanberg and Field (1987) also found that
only a specific kind of tactile stimulation (brush strokes which mimicked their mother’s
licking pattern) reinstated normal functioning of growth hormone secretion and tissue
sensitivity to exogenous growth hormone in the infant rat.
Schanberg and Field (1987) went on to explore the possible application of their
animal model to preterm human newborns and found that a combination of stroking
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and limb movement, given for 15 minutes three times a day throughout a two-week
period of hospitalization resulted in gains in weight and head circumference and in
better behaviour development test scores than a randomly chosen control group. These
beneficial effects were still discernible many months later. These results suggest that
somato-sensory stimulation from the mother may act as a ‘maternal regulator’ of the
human infant’s secretion of growth hormone.
Schanberg and Field (1987) make the link between their research and clinical
findings of “impaired growth hormone secretion and tissue responsivity to growth
hormone in nonorganic ‘psychosocial dwarfism’ children” (Schanberg & Field, 1987, p.
1442). As Schanberg and Field (1987) point out, even when these children are well fed
they fail to secrete growth hormone normally and the only thing that helps such
children to return to normal is being provided with adequate somato-sensory
stimulation.
As Schore (2001b) notes, the experiences necessary for experience-dependent
brain maturation are created within the context of the relationship between a child and
his/her primary caregiver.  If the mother-child relationship fails, for some reason, to
adequately regulate the child’s developing neurobiological systems and buffer the child
against stress then the consequences for the child’s ongoing neurodevelopment will be
adverse (Tiecher et al., 2003, p. 33). Given the regulatory functions provided by the
mother-child relationship, and the physiological stress which inevitably ensues if these
functions are not adequately regulated, it is not surprising that research has found that a
number of neurobiological systems seem to be ‘dysregulated’ by early relational
problems.
As Tiecher, Andersen, Polcari, Anderson, Navalta and Kim (2003, p. 33) note,
“early severe stress and maltreatment produces a cascade of neurobiological events that
have the potential to cause enduring changes in brain development”.  These authors
point out that such changes occur on multiple levels, from neurohumoral (especially the
hypthothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis), to structural and functional.
For example, the results of a study by Wismer-Fries, Ziegler, Kurian, Jacoris
and Pollak (2005) suggest “a failure to receive species-typical care disrupts the normal
development of the OT (oxytocin) and AVP (arginine vasopressin) neurohypophyseal
peptide systems in young children”.  These systems are “an integral part of mammalian
emotional circuitry” (Wismer-Fries, 2005, p. 17,237) and are associated with the
“emergence of social bonding, parental care, stress regulation, social communication,
161
and emotional reactivity” (Wismer-Fries, 2005, p. 17,237).  OT and AVP levels increase
during socially pleasant experiences, such as comforting touch and smells.
Wismer-Fries et al. (2005, p. 17,239) suggest that “perturbations in this system
may interfere with the calming and comforting effects that typically emerge between
young children and familiar adults who provide care and protection” and provides
further illustration of the effect of social deprivation on the neurobiological mechanisms
that subserve the regulation of emotional behaviour.
A number of authors also point out that there is evidence that chronic stress
and persistent glucocorticoid elevation may be particularly toxic to the hippocampus.
Mirescu, Peters and Gould (2004), for example, note that in rats maternal deprivation
produces persistent abnormalities in behavioural and neuroendocrine functions
associated with the hippocampus. These authors suggest that this indicates “that early
adverse experience inhibits structural plasticity via hypersensitivity to glucocorticoids
and diminishes the ability of the hippocampus to respond to stress in adulthood”
(Mirescu et al., 2004, p. 841).
Clinical studies of people with a history of abuse, which implicate dysfunction
of the hippocampal system, suggest that adverse experiences may have the same effect
on this part of the brain for human beings (Bremner & Vermetten, 2001; Bremner et al.,
2003). This conclusion is also supported by studies that have found “interrelationships
among stress, cortisol function, hippocampal volume, and hippocampus-dependent
cognition in stress-related disorders” (Corcoran et al., 2003).
Early ongoing relational problems, then, place the organism under chronic
physiological stress. The effects of that stress then reverberate through the brain
resulting in the eventual ‘dysregulation’ of a number of neural systems.  As Schwarz &
Perry (1994, p. 311) state, “the tenacious effects of trauma are rooted in the well-
characterized total initial body freeze, fight or flight, alarm or stress response to life
threat”. This complex set of processes includes “activation of the centrally-controlled
peripheral autonomic nervous system tone, the immune system, the hypothalamic-
pituitary axis . . . and of other neurochemical systems in the central nervous system”.
As Schwarz and Perry (1994, p. 312) further note, evidence is accumulating that
the “cascade of cellular and molecular processes” which occur when an organism is
under stress
alter brain structure and function to create an adaptive record of survival-related
information. Intense danger activates the neurosensory apparatus and alters the pattern
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and quantity of neurotransmitter release throughout neuronal systems responsible for
sensation, perception and processing of survival information. Neurotransmitter
receptor/effector activation then alters intracellular chemical constituents . . . Changes in
these messengers alter the micro-environmental milieu of the nucleus.
Echoing Rose’s (1997) point that genes do not play the lead role in development,
rather they are ‘designed’ to work within an environment, these authors note that such
micro-environmental alterations can result in changes in gene transcription and
expression of proteins, “including sensitization of receptors to similar future
neurotransmitter stimulation in all synaptically connected neurons” (Schwarz & Perry,
1994, p. 312). Thus, as Rose (1997) points out, genes are turned on and off by micro-
environmental cues and these cues, in turn, are influenced by the experience of the
individual.
The main neural systems involved in the human stress response are the
norepinephrine-sympathetic adrenomedullary (NE-SAM) system and the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) system10.  The HPA axis regulates the slower acting
responses to stress, while the NE-SAM system regulates acute stress responses (Yates,
2007).  As Yates (2007) points out, the central nucleus of the amygdala activates both the
L-HPA and the NE-SAM systems, via connections with the hypothalamus and
brainstem, respectively, in response to anything perceived as threatening.
These two networks operate at various places throughout the central and the
peripheral nervous systems and modulate the various aspects (behavioral, emotional,
cognitive, metabolic, immunological, autonomic, and endocrine) of the mammalian
stress response” (Yates, 2007). As De Bellis (2005, p. 155) points out, “arousal, stress
response, behavioral, and emotional regulation are all dependent on these systems” and
that, “importantly, neurodevelopment is also dependent on these systems”.
In the following discussion I will focus in particular on the impact of inadequate
and abusive care-giving on the HPA system, an aspect of human neurobiology which is
particularly open to the effects of experience during development because of its extreme
and lengthy post-natal plasticity (Perry, 2000; Pollak, 2005; Wismer Fries et al., 2005;
Yates, 2007), the repercussions of problems in this system on other brain systems, and its
centrality to the neurobiological and subjective aspects of psychological suffering
(Walker & Diforio, 1997; Davidson, 2002). Further, as Gunnar and Cheatham (Gunnar &
Cheatham, 2003) point out, the HPA axis has been widely studied in children because its
                                                 
10 Also known as the limbic-hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (L-HPA) axis.
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end product, cortisone, can be measured simply through obtaining samples of saliva.
The HPA axis is also, as Gold (2005, p. 319) points out “among the most frequently
studied mediators in all of psychiatric research”.
As Tarullo and Gunnar (2006, p. 632) note, the HPA axis (consisting of the
hypothalamus, the anterior pituitary gland and the adrenal cortices) “constitutes one of
the principal pathways of the mammalian stress response, in which a cascade of events
leads to elevations in glucocorticoid hormones”.  When a mammal is faced with a
stressor the hypothalamus increases the amount of corticotropin releasing hormone
(CRH) and arginine vasopressin (AVP) that it releases into the anterior pituitary gland.
This gland responds by releasing adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH, which
stimulates the adrenal gland to produce cortisol, a steroid hormone principally targeted
at the brain.  As Tarullo and Gunnar (2006, p. 632) note, cortisol is necessary for survival
“but when it is chronically elevated or poorly regulated, it can have deleterious impacts
on health”.
Because the HPA system is not fully mature at birth, experiences play a
fundamental role in shaping its basal rhythms and its reactivity. As Yates (2007) notes,
the HPA axis is essential for effectively responding to stressful stimuli in the short-term
but if these systems are repeatedly activated without recovery, as occurs when a young
child is exposed to very high levels of unbuffered stress, the HPA axis becomes
overactivated. As a result, this regulatory system “becomes more limited in its ability to
manage new sources of stress, and other linked regulatory systems (e.g., the growth
system, the immune system) do not function optimally” (Bugental & Grusec, 2006, p.
413).
As Yates (2007) points out, any alteration to these systems has the potential to
negatively influence aspects of neurodevelopment such as synaptic pruning, dendritic
branching, and neuronal death. Ultimately, the continuous activation of the HPA axis
(and associated changes in the functioning of other aspects of the central nervous
system) may lead to problems “not only in brain development but also in the social-
emotional and cognitive functioning and the health and growth of the child” (Bugental
& Grusec, 2006, p. 413).
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the HPA axis has been shown to be very
sensitive to adverse experiences with a primary caregiver (see, for e.g., Wismer Fries et
al., 2005). As Read, Perry, Moskowitz & Connolly (2001, p. 327) point out,
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[s]elf-regulatory systems, such as the HPA axis, seek to return the brain to prestress
levels of sensitivity to stress. However, repeated stressors can sensitize neurobiological
process so that the homeostasis returned to is at a higher level of responsivity.
As Read et al. (2001) and Perry (2001) note, research has identified two
interacting patterns of response to extreme stress in childhood. The first is the
hyperarousal (the fight or flight) response where the brain stem and mid-brain
neurotransmitter systems are sensitized, resulting in the child being
easily moved from being mildly anxious to feeling threatened to being terrorised. In the
long run, what is observed in these children is a set of maladaptive emotional,
behavioral, and cognitive problems, which are rooted in the original adaptive response to
a traumatic event.
(Perry, Pollard, Blakely, et al., 1995, p. 277, cited in Read et al., 2001, p. 327)
The second response to traumatic events in childhood is ‘dissociation’ which
involves decreases in blood pressure, and heart rate and “dissociative ‘freeze’ or
‘surrender’ responses. As Read et al. (2001) point out, while these responses may well be
adaptive for the immediate situation this hypoarousal pattern cause difficulties for the
child later on.  As Perry (2001, p. 5) points out, “the predominant response patterns and
combinations of these primary ‘styles’ appear to shift from dissociative (common in
babies and young children) to hyperarousal during development. As Perry (2001, p. 8)
further notes, “the child and adult response to trauma is an admixture of these two
primary adaptive patterns, arousal and dissociation”.
The impact of disrupted or problematic early relationships on neurodevelopment
is vividly illustrated in children who have been the victims of neglect11 or
maltreatment12. A review by Cichetti (2003) notes that maltreatment of children in their
early years results in marked changes to neurobiological and neurodevelopmental
processes mediated by the L-HPA and NE-SAM systems.  As Cichetti (2003) points out,
these processes may be hypo or hyper activated due to these children’s experiences and
while the reasons for these variations are not yet fully understood, as has already been
noted above, “both hypo and hyper stress reactivity have negative implications for
development and adaptation” (Yates, 2007, p. 11).
                                                 
11 Defined as consistent failure to meet physical needs (e.g., warmth, food, shelter, physical closeness, etc.)
and/or relational needs (attention, respect, emotional warmth, boundaries, etc.).
12 Defined as any consistent parental behaviour or control tactic that causes the child to experience stress (in
both the psychological sense of fear and anxiety and the physiological sense of heightened cortisol levels,
heart rates, etc.).
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The results of a recent study by Wismer-Fries et al. (Wismer Fries, Shirtcliff, &
Pollak, 2008, p. 596) shows that neglect has a similarly negative effect to trauma on the
HPA system. As Wismer-Fries et al. (2008, p. 589) point out, “early social and emotional
neglect is associated with disruption in the normal activity of the HPA system”.  These
authors suggest that “failure to receive this type of external ‘scaffolding’ from adults
may have long-term effects on the physiological systems underlying children’s
emotional regulation” (Wismer Fries et al., 2008, p. 589), particularly the HPA axis.
Such findings support Hofer’s (1987) conclusion that the mother-child interaction
helps to regulate developing biological systems.  If the relationship fails to do this then
the various systems the mother-child interaction is either directly or indirectly involved
in regulating, including the stress response systems, will end up becoming
‘dysregulated’.
As Perry (2000, p. 15) points out, “the organizing brain requires patterns of
sensory experience to create patterns of neural activity that, in turn, play a role in
guiding the various neurodevelopmental processes involved in healthy development”.
Research conducted by Perry and his team (Perry, 2000, p. 15) suggests that if a child’s
experience of life is chaotic and the sensory inputs are not consistent or predictable then
“the organizing systems in the brain reflect this chaos and, typically, organize in ways
that result in dysregulation”. This finding is also supported by animal studies which
indicate deficient biobehavioural self-regulation in rats and monkeys who have been
separated for long periods of time, or permanently, from their mothers (Kraemer, 1997;
Schanberg & Field, 1987, p. 1442).
While the majority of research has focused on children exposed to particularly
traumatic stressors or global neglect there is growing evidence that “more subtle
variations in the quality of early caregiving have salient effects on the organization of
stress response systems” (Yates, 2007, pp 10-11). This suggestion is supported by
research which shows that the cortisol levels of infants who are in ‘secure attachment
relationships’, which are believed to develop through a history of sensitive care-giving,
do not elevate, even when they are upset, whereas infants in insecure attachment
relationships do (Gunnar, Broderson, Nachmias, Buss, & Rigatuso, 1996; Hertsgaard,
Gunnar, Farrell Erikson, & Nachmias, 1995).
The results of a study by Gunnar, Brodersen, Nachmias, Buss and Rigatuso
(Gunnar et al., 1996, p. 191), for example “confirmed and extended evidence that secure
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attachment relationships protect or buffer infants from elevations in cortisol” with the
authors noting that
these protective effects have now been demonstrated to a wide variety of potentially
threatening stimuli: inoculations, maternal separation, novel or strange people, and
strange events.
The results of a study by Hertsgaard, Gunnar, Farrell Erikson and Nachmias
(1995), on the other hand, found that the stress responses of children who have
disorganised/disoriented attachment relationships (associated with care-giving which is
unpredictable, inconsistent and/or severely missattuned) deviate markedly from
normative stress responses. And as Pollak (2005), has shown, even simply interacting
with ‘sensitive caregivers’ (as opposed to ‘insensitive caregivers’) with whom no
‘attachment’ has necessarily been formed, has been shown to prevent elevations in
cortisol in situations that nonetheless cause distress or wariness in the child (Pollak,
2005).
Providing more support for the contention that children’s stress response
systems are affected by quality of care, a study by Dettling, Gunnar and Donzella (1999)
found that the normal circadian HPA activity (staying much the same for younger
children and decreasing as the day progresses in older children) was disrupted in
children in full-day, out-of-home childcare settings. While the children were in care
there was a slight rise in cortisol over the day, while samples taken at home on non-
childcare days showed the normal daily pattern.  As Gunnar and Cheatham (2003, p.
204) point out, perhaps not surprisingly, other studies have shown that daily CORT
levels are strongly affected by the quality of care children receive in these institutions
with children who “receive a lot of focused attention and stimulation from the
careprovider . . . less likely to show this CORT rise” and more likely to show the same
pattern of daytime CORT production that they do at home.  These results suggest that it
is not necessarily being away from the home that is stressful; rather it is the lack of
focused attention and stimulation from someone who seems to care for them.
A study by Bugental, Martorell and Barrazza (2003, p. 237) found that even
“subtle forms of maltreatment during infancy (below 1 year of age) have potential
consequences for the functioning of the child’s adrenocortical response system”.  For
example, infants who received corporal punishment frequently showed “high hormonal
reactivity to stress” (Bugental et al., 2003, p. 237). And infants who “experienced
frequent emotional withdrawal from the mother (either as a result of maternal
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depression, or mother’s strategic use of withdrawal as a control tactic) showed elevated
baseline levels of cortisol” (Bugental et al., 2003, p. 237).
Bugental et al. (2003) suggest “there are hormonal ‘costs’ when mothers show
response patterns (intentionally or unintentionally) that limit their utility as a means of
buffering the child against stress” (Bugental et al., 2003, p. 237).  The authors further
suggest that the
hormonal responses shown by infants may alter the functioning of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in ways that, if continued, may foster risk for immune
disorders, sensitization to later stress, cognitive deficits, and social-emotional problems.
(Bugental et al., 2003, p. 237)
This is in line with findings on the effects of maternal depression on children.  A
depressed mother is essentially emotionally unavailable to her child and is often unable
to be responsive to their socio-emotional, and sometimes even their basic physical needs
(Moehler, Brunner, Wiebel, Reck, & Resch, 2001; Murray, Fiori-Cowley, & Hooper,
1996). Depressed mothers, as well as mothers subject to panic disorder, are less
responsive to infant distress than are nondepressed mothers and thus are less likely to
buffer the young against stressful experiences (Bugental et al., 2003). Not surprisingly,
children of such mothers are dysregulated in their production of cortisol (e.g., Bugental
et al., 2003; Dawson & Ashman, 2000; Essex, Klein, Cho & Kalin, 2002; Field, 1994;
Newport, Stowe, & Nemeroff, 2002). As Bugental et al. (2003, p. 238) point out,  “when a
mother is clinically depressed over a period of time, children may show physiological
changes (e.g., changes in cortisol levels), accompanied by disruption of their social and
emotional regulation capacities”.
Such findings suggest that social relationships can buffer the stress reactions of
the HPA and NE-SAM systems (Pollak, 2005). As Liu et al. (1997, p. 1659) point out, this
suggestion is further supported by animal studies showing that “naturally occurring
variations in maternal care in early postnatal life are associated with the development of
individual differences in behavioural and HPA responses to stress in the rat” (e.g.,
Francis, Caldji, Champagne, Plotsky, & Meaney, 1999; Francis, Caldji, Champagne,
Plotsky, & Meaney, 1999).
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4.5. CONCLUSION
It is suggested that the developmental systems account of biology provided by
Steven Rose and outlined in Section 4.2 begins the process of building a bridge between
our bodies and our social/ psychological experiences in the world by providing an
analysis of our biological development that acknowledges the complex interrelations
between our bodies and the environments within which they exist. The research
discussed in Section 4.3 illustrates and supports Rose’s central point, that organisms
cannot be understood separately from their environment and that we are all “the
products of the constant dialectic between ‘the biological’ and ‘the social’ through which
humans have evolved, history has been made and we as individuals have developed”
(Rose, 1997, p. 6).
One of the key messages emerging from the research cited above, animal and
human, is that early experiences with care-givers shape the infant’s ability to regulate
their responses to the world, and to stress in particular. 13 Indeed, researchers in the area
of developmental psychopathology suggest that alterations in the HPA and/or NE-SAM
systems may be one of the main ways in which early adverse life events impact on
neurodevelopment thus leaving the person vulnerable to later psychological suffering
(Korte, 2001; Pollak, 2005; Yates, 2007). The implications of this will be discussed in more
detail in Chapters Five and Six.
                                                 
13 It must be acknowledged at this point, however, that much of the neurodevelopmental research cited in
this chapter is, at this stage, still speculative and because we do not know the ‘norms of reaction’ – the
points beyond which ‘normal’ development breaks down – human beings may be more ‘plastic’ and thus
more resilient, than the very early specificity often implied by these accounts.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARDS A PERSON-BASED ACCOUNT
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Without an understanding of the developmental processes, the procedures and methods
by which competent adults are produced from our newborns . . . the disturbances people
suffer in their being would seem to be impossible to understand also.
(Shotter, 1984, p. 191)
In Chapter Three an approach to human psychology was presented which
suggested that our personal being – those aspects of humans considered to be ‘mental’
or psychological – are essentially constituted out of the social interactions within which
we are enmeshed during our early lives. In this view, “the human child does not
develop psychologically according to the ‘laws of nature’, but in an intentional manner”
(Shotter, 1984, p. 71).  It was suggested that the picture of human beings sketched out in
Chapter Three is more likely to provide the foundations of a theoretically coherent and
practically useful account of psychologial suffering than the assumptions which, it has
been argued, underlie the Dysfunctional Mind Account, as outlined in the Introduction.
As was pointed out in Chapter Four, however, the emergence of persons and
their psychological suffering cannot be understood by looking only at sociocultural and
discursive factors because persons are both socioculturally and biologically co-
constituted. In order to facilitate a clearer articulation of the ways in which this co-
constitutional process occurs a brief outline of the developmental approach to biology
taken by Steven Rose (1997) was provided before discussing some recent research from
the biological sciences which illustrates Rose’s (1997) central contention – that the lifeline
of an organism is constructed via its enmeshment in its environment, and thus cannot be
understood without taking that environment into account – an insight which mirrors the
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social constructionist position that a person cannot be understood separately from the
social world within which s/he is enmeshed.
In this chapter I will sketch a very general outline of how such a biologically and
socioculturally coconstitutive process may occur during development, and how
vulnerabilities for psychological suffering may emerge from such processes. This outline
will serve as a general template for more detailed analyses, to be presented in Chapter
Six, of how, depending on the vagaries of each person’s particular life trajectory,
different kinds of psychological suffering – I will look specifically at how the two major
‘mental disorders’ of ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ – may emerge.  The resulting
analysis will, it is hoped, frame psychological suffering not as ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’
but, rather, as behaviours and experiences (many of which could more usefully be seen
as adaptive strategies for dealing with the otherwise unbearable) which emerge from the
living of human lives in a complex and sometimes inhuman world.   
It should be noted that in the account presented here I will not be speculating
about the role that genes may play in the genesis of psychological suffering.  While it is
acknowledged that it is possible, although this has by no means been proven beyond a
doubt, that certain genetic profiles may make a person more vulnerable to suffering
psychologically in certain environments, the position taken in this thesis is that it is the
environment within which those genes are expressed, and within which a person lives
out his or her life, that makes the crucial and decisive difference between a person
experiencing suffering or not experiencing suffering. The same point applies vis a vis
various other biological factors which have been the subject of much speculation from
researchers attempting to find the ‘causes’ of ‘mental illness’ – for example, viruses, birth
defects, birth trauma, etc..
Thus the focus of this analysis will not be upon a person’s genetic make-up, or on
any other biological ‘vulnerabilities’ which may increase a person’s likelihood of
suffering psychologically, within a certain environment, rather it will be upon the
processes that do, and do not, occur within their social environment, and the effect of
these on the development of a person’s neurobiology and their emerging personal being.
Indeed, even if it were to be found, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that people who were
diagnosed with certain ‘mental disorders’ had particular genes or birth defects or
viruses, or any other biological factor this still does not “warrant the adoption of an
exclusively organic approach . . . What matters is how a person lives out their physical
condition” (Ingleby, 1980, p. 39).
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Thus, in this analysis, in agreement with a number of authors whose work I draw
upon in this thesis (e.g., Ingleby, 1980 and Bentall, 2004), I am turning on its head the
common approach to attempting to understand psychological suffering which sees
biological abnormalities as creating the necessary conditions for such suffering and
environmental factors merely increasing the risk that such suffering will eventuate.
What I am suggesting is that environmental factors create the necessary conditions for
such suffering although, as is acknowledged in this and the following chapter, that does
not mean that those factors are sufficient, in and of themselves, for the kinds of suffering
we conceptualise as ‘mental disorder’ to emerge.  Rather, such suffering will depend for
its emergence on the compounding effects of complex coactions between various aspects
of a person’s being in the world – molecular, organismic and personal1 – and the social
world within which they are enmeshed.
Because, as has been noted a number of times in this thesis, it is the ‘person’,
rather than their biology, who lies at the centre of both the genesis and the experience of
psychological suffering the focus of this account will be an analysis of the emergence of
our ‘personal being’ (central to which are our ‘senses of self’) from our early social
interactions, particularly those with our primary care-giver. This analysis will draw
primarily on the work of Rom Harré, John Shotter, John Cromby and Russell Meares,
theorists whose approach to human psychology was introduced in Chapter Three.
It should be acknowleged at this point that this analysis is essentially a
‘developmentalist’ one, a perspective which has been subjected to considerable criticism
by a number of authors (e.g., Burman, 1994; Morss, 1996). Before proceeding any further
I will briefly discuss some of the criticisms directed at ‘developmentalism’, and outline
why, while many aspects of traditional developmental accounts will be rejected, the
account to be presented in this thesis will nevertheless be a ‘developmental’ one.
Morss (1996, p. 49), in his evaluation of the critical psychology of development,
defines ‘developmentalism’ as involving “the assumption of natural change”.  This
change may be posited to occur in a series of stages through which the individual
progresses or it may involve more general statements “concerning directional change
during the human lifetime: for example, the proposal that adults are more rational or
complex in their thinking than children”(Morss, 1996, p. 49).  Developmentalism can
also take the even more general form of ‘Children are like X’, ‘Adults are like Y’. A
                                                 
1 I will discuss the different ‘grammars’ associated with these different aspects of our being in the world in
Section 5.2.2.
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developmental explanation, suggests Morss (1996, p. 51) “ is always made for a purpose.
Those purposes, and their moral contexts, are as varied as human social life allows”.
As Morss (1996, p. 48) points out, it is necessary to establish a critical distance
from all developmental explanations by acknowledging them as discourses – “coherent
systems of meanings that are historically located and that reproduce power relations”.
A developmental statement – such as ‘Peter is just coming into adolescence, that’s why
he’s acting this way’ or ‘All adolescents act this way’ can never, argues Morss (1996, p.
48) be seen “as a neutral ‘reading-off”. Rather, “[d]evelopmental change must always be
treated as ‘produced’, so any naturalistic account of development has to be rejected”
(Morss, 1996, p. 48).
Morss (1996) suggests that the social constructionist theorising of writers like
Harré and Shotter has gone some way towards remedying some of the problems
inherent in a traditional ‘developmental’ approach.  Morss (1996, p. 47) notes, however,
that such theorising has not gone far because while “there is little appeal to biological
forms of adaptation [in their work] . . . a naturalistic argument is still to be found”.
Morss (1996, p. 47) suggests that for social constructionists,
people’s experience of their own and of others’ lives can take place only through social
interaction. Developmental change is refracted through interpersonal negotiation. Such
social processes are treated as generically human ones. The image, perhaps, is of small
communities in which much interaction is face-to-face and on equal terms. Such direct
interaction is taken to guarantee equality and authenticity of communication.
It is acknowledged that Shotter and Harré may perhaps be interpreted as
presenting, at times, an idealised picture of human social life wherein people socially
construct their identities linking themselves, semiotically both to each other and to their
surroundings (Shotter, 1984) as if each individual in this ‘dance’ were equal and the
environment within which it was occurring was essentially benign.  As the quote from
Morss (1996) cited above implies (and, it should be noted, with which Shotter and Harré
would not disagree), in other circumstances another dance would be danced and thus
the kinds of social processes outlined by these theorists cannot be said to be ‘generically
human’.
There is no doubt that much of the criticism directed against ‘developmentalism’
provides a necessary check to the essentially absolutist claims made by traditional
developmental psychology. There is a sense, however, that in their attempts to highlight
the problems with the developmental approach, critics are throwing the developing
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baby out with the developmentalist bathwater and arguing against the idea that
anything at all can be described as ‘naturally’ or universally human.
Thus, while the particular set of social processes identified by Shotter and Harré,
and outlined in this thesis, may not be ‘generically human’, in the sense that other,
perhaps entirely different, social processes may occur in other situations, what is
generically human is that social processes of some sort or another will always be
constitutional of human ‘being’ and experience. As Small (1998, p. 14) points out
our taxonomic order, the primates, is distinguished from other mammals by its intense
sociality at all levels and especially by the necessary long-term affiliative relationship
between parents and offspring.
And, as Taylor (2002) points out, of all the primates, humans are the most social
of all.  Our ‘big brain’, Taylor (2002, p. 36) suggests, is
fundamentally a social brain. We live by our ability to coordinate our needs with those of
the people around us . . . Our success as a species has come entirely from our gregarious
nature. We live and work together, having found safety in numbers across the many
thousands of years of our evolution.
While such a position is certainly ‘universalist’, in that it makes the assumption
that all people share a fundamental property, it is not absolutist.  It is not claiming that
all people are all social in exactly the same way. As Colm Hogan (2000, p. xvii) points
out, “there is a tendency to think of universalism as vacuous . . .  as a matter of bare
subjectivity [but] in fact, humans share many specific structures and properties, as the
array of linguistic universals illustrates”.
The position taken in this thesis is that Shotter and Harré’s analysis has identified
a number of important social processes a child (in this case, specifically, a modern,
Western child) must be involved in for that child to learn the ‘ontological skills’
necessary to the achievement of what Harré defines as ‘personal being2’. This is not to
say, as will be discussed in more detail below, that these particular social processes
happen, or should happen in every society at every time in history, or that they are
better than any other social processes which may have occurred at any other time or
place – a point which is fully acknowledged by both Shotter and Harré. Nor is it to say
                                                 
2 As noted in Chapter Three, ‘personal being’ encompasses (a) one’s sense of oneself as a singular being with
a continuous and unique history (b) one’s capacity for self-reference (‘self’ consciousness), and (c) one’s
sense of oneself as an agent – “a being in possession of an ultimate power of decision and action” (Harré,
1984a, p. 29).
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that the kind of ‘personal being’ achieved in the West is the only, or even the best, way
of being available to humans.
If, within the context of a modern Western society, however, all, or even some, of
the processes outlined in Chapter Three do not occur then this will, it is suggested,
compromise a person’s ability to fully, or in some cases even partially, participate in the
social and material life of that society. This is not to pathologise those who find
themselves in this position. Indeed one of the main aims of this thesis is to argue that
such outcomes are not the result of ‘disorder’ or ‘dysfunction’ but are simply emergent
from particular sets of coactions3 between the organism/person and their social and
physical environment. There is little doubt, however, that a failure of these basic social
processes, in the absence of any remedial action4, will often result in pathologisation of
that person by the society within which they are living their life.
While the kind of interactions outlined by Shotter and Harré are, to a certain
extent, particular to this time and place; what is not particular to this time and place, as
has already been noted above, is the fact that a child, as a profoundly social animal
(Blaffer Hrdy, 1999; Taylor, 2002; Small, 1998), must be involved, right from the start, in
social processes of one sort or another, including, particularly in the early years, intense
one-on-one interactions with a person (or, in the case of more ‘traditional’ societies, a
number of people) who cares about them.
Indeed, the neurobiological research outlined in Chapter Four suggests that in
early infancy a physically and emotionally close relationship between a child and at least
one committed care-giver (usually the child’s biological mother) must be established if
the child is to develop in such a way as to enable them to participate in the social and
material life of any society. As Kraemer (1997, p. 404) points out, such research suggests
that “being mothered . . . is the most important thing for the psychobiological
development of the infant”.
While the symbiotic relationship between a child and his/her mother identified
by Harré and Shotter may not occur in the same way in every situation, and indeed may
be thwarted in many, Shotter and Harré‘s analysis provides us with a general outline of
what needs to be present for the establishment of such a relationship, and what
                                                 
3 And it is never going to be possible to specify exactly what these were for each individual.  It may be
possible, however, to distinguish patterns and trends that may be, at least partially predictive, amongst
groups of people.
4 And I am not referring here only to ‘professional’ intervention. ‘Remedial action’ can be, and is, taken by
family and friends and can, particularly if such action is early enough in a child’s developmental trajectory,
lead to more positive outcomes for the child than would otherwise have been the case (Masten & Obradovic,
2006).
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processes will, ideally, occur within that relationship at a particular time in history and
within a particular sociocultural context. This analysis provides us with a starting point
for the task of understanding how we come to experience ourselves as ‘persons’. Such
understanding must, it is suggested, precede any understanding of how we come to
suffer in the ways that we do.
Thus, while rejecting many aspects of traditional developmental accounts the
account to be outlined here will still be a ‘developmental’ one. It will begin from the
assumption that humans are, first and foremost, social animals and that social processes
of one sort or another, initially those involving the infant and his/her first care-givers
and later involving other people and institutions within the person’s social world, are
fundamentally formative, in the developmental sense, of their experience of being in the
world – whatever that experience may be. Indeed, it is suggested that one cannot hope
to understand the genesis or the maintenance of the kinds of experiences listed in the
DSM as ‘mental disorders’ without taking a developmental perspective and how ‘what
came before’ conditions the possibilities for ‘what happened next’.
Furthermore, as signalled above, while this account focuses on the emergence of
our personal being from our early relationships with other humans this does not mean
that the reality of our embodiment, and the organismic and sub-organismic processes
which occur within those bodies, can be left out of the story.  While these processes may
seem entirely unrelated to the social world from within which our personal being
emerges they are, as was discussed in some detail in Chapter Four, as profoundly
shaped by the social world as our personal being. Further, as I will attempt to illustrate
in the current chapter, the functioning of these organismic and sub-organismic processes
subserve, and thus affect and shape, our subjective experience and our ability to fully
participate in the material and social life of the society into which we are born.
5.2. INTEGRATING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF
PERSONS INTO ONE ACCOUNT:
OVERCOMING SOME CHALLENGES
To develop the kind of account of psychological suffering being attempted here,
however, throws up some considerable challenges, in particular the difficulties inherent
in attempting to integrate two fundamentally different approaches to the study of
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human beings – the social sciences (which study the sociocultural and psychological
aspects of being human) and the biological sciences – both of which have their own
separate ontologies and grammars.  As Williams (2001, p. 23) notes, we have to “rethink
the relationship between biology and society, and associated terms such as mind and
body, without slipping into former reductionist or conflationary traps of the past”. It is
suggested that one useful way of attempting to do this is to view the biological
organism/person as a ‘dynamic system’, as advocated by developmental biologist
Stephen Rose whose views were presented at the beginning of Chapter Four.
A dynamic systems viewpoint offers not only the possibility of integrating the
biological and the ‘psychological’ or ‘personal’ aspects of human beings into one
coherent account, but it also offers the potential for reaching an understanding of those
phenomena we think of as being ‘psychological’ – our sense of ‘self’, our beliefs, our
thoughts, our motivations, our very ‘minds’ – as emergent from recursive coactions
between a variety of components.
5.2.1. Persons as dynamic systems
A dynamic system essentially comprises a number of interacting components, all
of which can potentially influence each other.  These interactions may be physical, or
they may involve an exchange of information. The interactions between systems
components are mathematically non-linear and asymmetrical (Cilliers, 1998, cited in
Horn, 2002; Lasser & Bathory, 1997) which means, as Horn (2002, p. 27) notes,
a change in A might not effect a proportional change in B. In addition, A and B may have
different-sized effects on each other. These aspects of complexity mean that very small
changes can have large effects on the future functioning of a system. Conversely, what
appear to be large changes within a system may actually only have small effects on the
overall system.
As Lasser and Bathory (1997, p. 149) point out, an understanding of such
psychological phenomena as individual differences is profoundly affected by whether
you apply the logic of linear or non-linear mathematics.
In terms of linear mathematics, large differences in adult characteristics, whether in terms
of cognition or personality, can be assumed to result from large differences in childhood
characteristics, whether genetic or environmental. In nonlinear mathematics no such
assumption can be made. Two children may appear to be very similar and to come from
similar environmental backgrounds, but they may end up being radically different from
each other as adults.
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The interactions between the various components of a system then feed back
upon themselves either directly (a change in A causes a change in B which then changes
A, etc.) or indirectly through a network of interactions.  Feedback may be positive
(which increases the effect of a change) or negative (decreasing the original signal).
Positive feedback does not necessarily lead to results which are positive for the system.
This feedback process can result in the emergence of patterns within a system which can
prove very resistant to change. Paradoxically, the feedback mechanisms within a
dynamic system can also mean that systems may change quite suddenly and, seemingly,
unpredictably.  In hindsight, however, it is possible to see a series of changes which led
the system into a state of ‘self-organised criticality’ (Horn, 2002).
A particularly important aspect of a dynamic system is that novel forms emerge
from the interactions of the various components within the system through the
processes of positive feedback.  These novel forms then affect interactions within the
sytem, and may then become parts of the system themselves.  As Granic and Hollenstein
(2003, p. 644) note
This process is known as self-organization and refers to the spontaneously generated (i.e.,
emergent) order in complex, adaptive systems.
Lewis (2000, p. 36) points out that self organization
accounts for growth and novelty throughout the natural world, from organisms to
societies to ecosystems to the biosphere itself. According to principles of self-
organization, these entities achieve their patterned structure without prespecification by
internal rules or determination by their environments, and human development is just
one exemplar of a universal tendency toward higher-order coherence.
Dynamic systems are also open to influences from the wider environment
(outside the system) and can adapt to changes which occur in this wider environment.
Despite their highly adaptable nature, however, Cilliers (1998, cited in Horn, 2002) notes
that large changes across the system may occur as conditions outside the system change.
How a system adapts to change depends on what state the system is in when new
information arrives from outside. As Granic and Hollenstein (2000, p. 644) note  “the
context or ecology in which the system is embedded is critical for understanding a DS5
behavior”.
According to Lewis (2000) there are a number of reasons for why the principles
of self-organisation offer the promise of providing a coherent understanding of human
                                                 
5 Dynamic systems
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development.  First, self-organizing systems permit true novelty;  “new forms
spontaneously appear with time, entraining the interactions of the elements that gave
rise to them” (Lewis, 2000, p. 39). Second, self-organizing systems become more complex
over time.  The increasing orderliness of dynamic systems results in the maintenance of
more and more sophisticated arrangements of coordinated processes.  This is done
spontaneously in the service of adaptive functions.
Third, “global reorganizations occur at phase transitions, points of instability and
turbulence where old patterns break down and new ones occur” (Lewis, 2000, p. 39).
Phase transitions occur abruptly across the whole system, meaning that new
configurations require the cooperation of all system components.  As Lewis (2000) notes,
this idea has two ramifications: (1) new levels of complexity appear discontinuously, as
exemplified by developmental stages and (2) development is strongly influenced by
small effects at phase transition points so that “new forms are not determined by their
precursors” (Lewis, 2000, p. 39, author’s italics).
Lewis (2000, p. 39) illustrates this point by giving the example of ‘personality’
transitions during early adolescence or early adulthood when “emotionally loaded life
events can trigger massive reorganizations of personality and identity”.  As Lewis (2000)
points out, a dynamic systems approach allows the “progressive, discrete, idiosyncratic,
and unpredictable” nature of developmental change to be accounted for within one
coherent explanatory framework.
Finally, self-organizing systems are both intrinsically sensitive and intrinsically
stable. As Lewis (2000, p. 39) notes “they are exquisitely sensitive to aspects of their
environments because of their propensity for feedback and coupling with other
systems”.  Lewis (2000, p. 39) goes on to note that despite this sensitivity, developing
systems are nevertheless
actively self-perpetuating, partly because recurrent patterns of coordination increase the
likelihood of their own recurrence. This is true of course in learning to walk, but it can
also be seen in the resilience of individual coping strategies despite environmental
impediments and novel challenges.
As Lewis (2000, p. 39) points out, viewing human development through a
dynamic systems lens
accounts for the creation of order from intrinsic processes, the increase in complexity
over time, the emergence of true novelty within developing systems, transition points
that permit both structural advances and individual diversification, and the capacity for
self-correcting stability as well as sensitive adaptation to the environment.
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As Fogel (2000, p. xi) points out, however,
all the other disciplines that partake of dynamic systems thinking deal with concrete and
measurable entities . . . [which] . . .  can be counted, quantified and reduced to numbers . .
. and are substantiated in actual entities of flesh and stone.  The psyche – the complexity
of human experience – is none of that, neither commensurate nor substantial. Psyche
coexists with matter, lives in bodies and ecosystems, but it is fundamentally nonmaterial.
Psyche is emergent at the very core of its ontology whether we have dynamic systems
ideas about it or not.
Lewis (2000, p. 41) also makes this point, noting that most developmental
research “falls between the muscles and the brain”, and asks
Can the psychological system be said to self-organize, literally, as well? Can a framework
invented for the study of matter be borrowed for the study of mind?
If we dispense with the unnecessary and confusing notion of ‘mind’ as it is
commonly understood (immaterial, but nevertheless an object-like entity to be studied),
however, as do the social constructionist theorists whose analysis forms the basis of the
account to be presented in this thesis, the notion of self organization appears well suited
to describe the emergence of those aspects of being human which are understood as
being ‘of the mind’.  Lewis (2000) calls these aspects ‘psychological forms’, while Martin,
Sugarman and Thompson (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003, p. 103) refer to them
as ‘psychological kinds’, described in general terms as
human subjectivity, understanding, actions, and experiences, the agentic reality . . .  we
regard as not reducible to sociocultural, biological, or physical levels of reality.
As Lewis (2000, p. 41) notes
Self-organization . . . appears well tailored to describe the emergence of psychological
forms, which are macroscopic and highly ordered which both emerge from and constrain
interactions among their constituents.
These ‘psychological kinds’ or ‘psychological forms’ essentially comprise our
‘personal being’, as articulated by Harré (1984).
While I will not be attempting to build a formal dynamic systems model of
psychological suffering, it is suggested that such a dynamic systems conceptualisation of
persons provides a useful heuristic device with which to integrate the various ‘aspects’
of our being in the world – biological and social – thus better arming us to embark on
the quest to understand how psychological suffering may emerge from the complex
coactions which occur between these various aspects.
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While such a heuristic device goes some way towards ameliorating many of the
problems inherent in attempting to integrate two fundamentally different approaches to
the study of human beings there are still, however, some challenges to overcome.   As
Harré (2002) notes, because social scientists and neurobiologists use completely separate
ontologies and grammars when they are talking about human processes and behaviours,
it is important to pay very careful attention to the way in which language is used when
discussing the various aspects of human being in the world.
5.2.2. Persons, organisms and molecules: Different ‘grammars’ for
different aspects of being
If psychology is to achieve its aim of understanding people, Harré (2002)
suggests it would make use of three different ‘grammars’6 – a P (persons) grammar, an
O (organisms) grammar and an M (molecules) grammar to refer to the three different
aspects of human beings it focuses on. The titles of each of these grammars would
“reflect the ontological presuppositions each embodies . . . Persons, Organisms and
Molecules are basic . . . sources of activity in these [three] ways of describing human
life” (Harré, 2002, p. 138).  In this way, suggests Harré (2002), psychology could
encompass our neurophysiological grounding, our embodiment as sentient organisms in
a physical world and our meaningful, agentic activity within a social world.
As Harré (1999, pp 100-101) notes,
choice of grammar makes a difference to which aspects of the world stand out for us.
Choosing a grammar is rather like choosing a particular dye to stain a bacterium. With
one dye one set of microstructures becomes visible, with a different dye another stands
out. Each is there in the bacterium, but is available to a human observer only when
stained.
Similarly, if we use a person-based grammar certain aspects of human existence
stand out, while if we used a molecular grammar other aspects would stand out. Thus,
when we use P grammar the aspect that stands out is persons acting and interacting in
their social worlds. This grammar is person-centred and focuses on people’s capacities,
skills, and actions. This grammar also includes those aspects of our lives we often refer
to as ‘psychological’ or ‘mental’ – for example, emotions, thoughts, dreams, decisions,
                                                 
6 Harré uses the word ‘grammar’ in the Wittgensteinian sense as “systems and clusters of rules ordering
human activity” (Cromby, 2004a, p. 801).
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beliefs etc.. In this grammar, Harré (1999, p. 102) suggests, a human being would be seen
in terms of his or her standing “in relation to the networks of positions that constitute
the local moral order”. In the O and M grammars, however, the human being is an
organism consisting of clusters of molecules and “in relation to material things and other
organisms would be seen in causal relations”.
When talking about the various aspects of our biological reality, however, M and
O grammar are the appropriate grammars to use. As already noted above, our biological
reality can be broken down into a number of ‘aspects’  (e.g., genes, cells, organ systems,
organs and organisms).  O grammar would be used when talking about the actions of
organisms in the world. This grammar is organism-centred and focuses on the coactions
of biological organisms with their environment.  M grammar would be used when
talking about sub-organismic processes, processes which go on ‘under the skin’ of the
organism.
This means that not only must anyone wishing to understand psychological
suffering acknowledge the multi-levelled, multi-directional complexity of the
relationships between our physical bodies and the material and social world within
which they exist, they must also acknowledge that the various phenomena involved
have grammars appropriate to them and attempt, insofar as is possible, to ensure that
there is no ‘slippage’ or confusion between these grammars. Such slippage often results
in the kind of assertions, commonly made within the neurosciences, and within
biological psychiatry, which conflate brain and ‘mind’ and imply that all the information
we need about human beings and their suffering will be found by looking in more and
more detail at the brain.
One way Harré  (2002) suggests that the relationship between persons, organisms
and molecules could be usefully explored by psychologists, and such ‘slippage’ avoided,
or at least minimised, is through a task/tool metaphor “by which tasks defined in the
terms of the P discourses are accomplished by the use of tools described in terms of the
O and M discourses”. Tasks, notes Harré (1999), “are defined in a goal-setting or means-
end discourse” while “bodies and their organs are tools” via which tasks are achieved.
Harré (2002, p. 163) suggests this ‘tool/task typology’ is well suited to “bridge the
distinction between bodily organs as structured molecular clusters and people”.  As
Harré (2002, p. 163) puts it “[h]uman beings in the molecular ontology are machines
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with no moral attributes. Brains in the person ontology are tools for use in tasks7 set
discursively”.
As Harré (1999, p. 106) points out, “tasks are not reducible to tools, in the sense
that there is no way that the task to be performed . . . could be deduced from knowledge
of the tool. The fit is too loose, the boundaries of possible employments too broad”.
Indeed, as Rose (2000, p. 251) points out, while “all aspects of our existence . . . are made
possible by the framing limitations of physical and chemical processes . . . this does not
entitle one to say, for any observed behaviour, that it is caused by such processes; rather,
they have made it possible – along with many alternative possibilities”.  Attempting to
suggest that the tools determine or cause the tasks is to mistake enablement for
causation.
Thus, it is suggested that when talking about psychological suffering, which is an
intensely person-based experience, one must primarily utilise a person-based ontology,
and the grammar appropriate to it. This does not mean that organismic and sub-
organismic processes cannot be included in the analysis but they must be discussed as
tools necessary to the tasks involved in achieving personal being, rather than as
representative of its essence. Thus not only can some forms of social constructionist
psychology be compatible with the biological sciences (including neuroscience), but, for
Harré (2002), as for Cromby (2004a; 2007), both approaches are necessary to
understanding human psychology because
[h]uman beings are present to the world and to each other in three forms: as persons, as
organisms and as complex clusters of molecules. None of the grammars grounded in
these ontologies can be dispensed with, and none can be extended to comprehend the
others without incoherence.
(Harré, 2002, p. 167)
There are two further points to make concerning the relationship between the
various aspects of our being in the world and the language we use to talk about them.
Firstly, the three grammars outlined by Harré  (2002) are not just three different ways of
saying the same thing.  When one is talking, using P grammar, about a person who is
feeling very anxious before going into an unfamiliar social situation this is not the same
as talking, using O grammar, or M grammar, about the organismic (sweating palms,
elevated heart rate, dilated pupils) and sub-organismic (enervation of the amygdala
                                                 
7 ‘Tasks’, in this sense, are essentially anything we do in the world at a ‘person-level’, from saying ‘hello’ to
giving a speech at the UN, from eating an apple to participating in a four-course banquet. The fulfilment of
such ‘tasks’ requires the learning of the various ‘ontological skills’ necessary to the achievement of
personhood, as noted in Chapter Four (Section 4.3.4).
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leading to the secretion of CRH into the HPA resulting in the release of CORT into the
bloodstream) processes which are occurring during this experience.
As Martin, Sugarman and Thompson (2003) point out, while person-based
phenomena are just as ‘real’ as organismic and molecular phenomena they are entirely
different. They cannot be talked about in O and M grammars and still remain person-
based phenomena. This does not mean that an understanding of the phenomena which
require the use of O and M grammars is not important to the understanding of person-
based phenomena, it just means that one cannot hope to gain a complete understanding
of person-based phenomena if one attempts to reduce them to organismic or sub-
organismic processes.
This is essentially because our ‘personhood’, or what Harré (1984) refers to as our
‘personal being’, is an emergent phenomenon arising, as Chapter Three made clear, from
the immersion of the biological human organism in the physical and, most importantly,
social world into which it is born.  Our personal being, including our psychological
suffering, is more than the sum of its parts, and thus cannot be understood by reducing
it to those parts.
Secondly, it should also be noted that none of the various aspects of our being in
the world (the molecular, the organismic and the person-based) are more ‘fundamental’
than the others in the sense that one can always begin the causal chain at that level and
work ‘upwards’. While the biological aspects of our reality may seem to be more ‘basic’,
indeed it would be impossible to feel anxiety if one was not an embodied sentient
organism, or if one’s amygdala did not become enervated in response to environmental
stimuli, anxiety before going into an unfamiliar social setting is not ‘caused’ by these
things.
While one can talk in a linear causal way about certain aspects of our biological
reality8 this approach cannot be applied to person-based phenomena such as
psychological suffering.  Thus, one may be able to say, within a molecular ontology and
utilising M grammar that enervation of the amygdala causes the neurons in the
paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus (PVN) to secrete corticotropin-releasing
hormone (CRH) into the system that connects the hypothalamus to the pituitary gland,
etc.).  One may also be able to say, within the organismic ontology using O grammar,
that stressful stimuli cause sweating palms.  Both of these causal statements, while
                                                 
8 Although as Rose (1997) has made clear, a linear-causal approach is not necessarily always the most
appropriate approach even when dealing with biological phenomena.
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obviously radically simplified, can still provide useful information and understanding
about the phenomena under study.
As already noted above, however, one cannot say that enervation of the
amygdala, or any other biological event for that matter, causes social anxiety. As was
argued in some detail in Chapter Two, this kind of assumption is one of the major errors
in biological psychiatry where it is commonly claimed that various biological events
(e.g., low serotonin levels) cause various ‘mental disorders’ (e.g., depression).
Neither, however, can one say, within a person-based ontology and utilising P
grammar that a person’s anxiety is caused in any straightforward way by particular
aspects of their sociocultural or psychological reality.  In other words, one cannot say
that a person’s anxiety before entering a strange social situation is caused by the
particular social setting, or that it is caused by the person’s mother having been overly
critical of them during their childhood, or that it is caused by the person suffering from a
‘social phobia’.
As will hopefully be made clear in the discussion to follow, the coactions
between human beings and their physical and social worlds impact in different ways on
the various aspects of our being (the molecular, the organismic and the person-based)
which then themselves ‘coact’ with each other. These coactions, out of which persons,
and the psychological suffering of those persons, emerge, are too complex and multi-
levelled to make simple A leads to B linear-causal statements. This complexity is one of
the main reasons why studies which have attempted to challenge biological psychiatry’s
hegemony by showing that ‘mental disorders’ have ‘social causes’ often fail to provide
the kinds of unequivocal results for which their authors may have hoped.
As Harré & Gillett (1994, p. 122) point out, “there are effects or forces that may be
discerned in the activity of an agent and are attributable to social structures . . . but these
effects and forces are misconceived if they are represented as being similar to those at
work in Newtonian mechanics”.  As Harré & Gillett (1994, p. 122) further note,
the relation of symbol to brain function and brain function to behavior is more subtle
than a simple causal production. Conceptual structure, arising in discourse, both
constrains and makes available ways of using information that equip an individual to
take genuine initiatives in their life contexts.
This is not to say, however, that we cannot reach an understanding of some of
the complex coactions that may have contributed to the person’s psychological and
physical state before entering the room full of strangers.  Indeed, the primary aim of this
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thesis is to begin the process of building the kind of conceptual framework concerning
persons and their development that would enable just this kind of understanding.
Before proceeding with the task of sketching a preliminary outline of how
vulnerabilities to the kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’ may arise
from within the early social interactions which forge our personal being, however, I will
set the scene for this analysis by discussing some of the contextual factors which impact
upon and fundamentally shape these interactions.
5.3. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING
While the main focus of the analysis being presented here will be upon the
child’s early interactions with their first care-giver, the wider socio-cultural milieu
within which these interactions occur profoundly influences, and at times constrains and
disrupts, the way in which parents parent. In this section I will briefly discuss some of
the factors which impact adversely upon the way in which children are ‘brought up’
within Anglo-American cultures, both distal (the ‘privatised self’ and the ‘privatisation
of parenting’) and proximal (adverse situations such as poverty, marital discord, ill
health, psychological suffering, etc.), and which thus play an important foundational
role in creating a vulnerability to psychological suffering.
5.3.1. The private, autonomous, separate ‘self’
As was discussed in Chapter Three, from the very beginning of their lives
children are immersed, firstly indirectly through their parents and, later, more directly,
in the wider socio-cultural discourses of their society, and these discourses
fundamentally shape their personal being. Perhaps one of the most central of these is the
notion we have in the West that we are in possession of a ‘self’ which is private, inner,
autonomous and essentially separate from others (Schumaker, 2001; Shweder & Bourne,
1984). As Crowley Jack (1991, p. 7) points out, this ‘private’ self “dovetails neatly with
dominant ideologies in the United States – individualism and its fraternal twin,
capitalism.” Capitalism is of course, an economic system that requires, for its optimum
functioning, that people function autonomously and make economic decisions in their
own self-interest.
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As Shweder (1984, p. 194) notes, this ‘egocentric individualist’ conceptualisation
of the ‘self’ is very different from the ‘sociocentric organic’ ‘self’ of more traditional
cultures. Generally speaking, in such traditional cultures people are
linked to each other in an interdependent system, members of organic cultures take an
active interest in one another’s affairs, and feel at ease in regulating and being regulated.
Indeed, others are the means to one’s functioning, and vice versa.
Rosaldo (1984, p. 146) points out, for example, that among the Ilongot9, in
common with many tribal cultures, there is no such thing as a ‘private’ or ‘inner’ self
that is conceptualised as standing
behind or underneath a public world where personhood is both affirmed and challenged.
As numerous ethnographies suggest, our notions of a constant ‘I’ – alluded to by the
experiences that make a lengthy dossier – are not found in tribal cultures in which
kinship and identity are forever things to be negotiated in diverse contexts . . . Personal
names may change when one contracts disease, moves to a new locale, makes friends, or
marries. And character is seen less as a product of one’s nature or experience in life than
of the situations in which the actor currently is found.
Shweder (1984, pp 194-195) suggests that there are potential costs to be paid for
valuing such a separate and autonomous notion of the ‘self’ because in doing so we are
“cutting the self off from the interdependent whole” and making us more vulnerable to
being isolated and/or lonely. This view of ‘self’ also makes it much less likely that
people will be able to locate the source of their problems, or indeed of their very
motivations and intentions (as was discussed in Chapter Three), outside of their ‘selves’.
This, in turn, makes it more likely that they will blame themselves for their
problems. Indeed, there are a number of discourses in the West around ‘personal
responsibility’ that overtly encourage this, thus providing fertile soil for the ‘negative
attributions’, ‘low self-esteem’, and feelings of guilt which are so central to many ‘mental
disorders’ in the West (Schumaker, 2001). If something goes wrong, or our life is not
working out as we planned, we have no one to blame but ourselves.
Shweder (1984, pp 195) suggests that because we have no larger framework
within which to locate our ‘self’
Many in our culture lack a meaningful orientation to the past. We come from nowhere,
the product of a random genetic accident. Many lack a meaningful orientation to the
future. We are going nowhere – at best we view ourselves as ‘machines’ that will one day
run down. The social order we view as the product of our making – an ‘association’
based on contract and individual consent. In our view, society is dependent on us . . . Cut
                                                 
9 A tribe that inhabits the east side of Luzon Island in the Philippines.
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adrift from any larger whole, the self has become the measure of all things, clutching to a
faith that some ‘invisible hand’ will by sleight of hand right things in the end.
Not everyone will end up feeling like this, of course, but such an orientation
establishes a vulnerability to such ‘existential penalties’, and these ‘penalties’, in turn,
leave us more vulnerable to the kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’.
That is not to say that people with more ‘relational’ conceptualisations of the ‘self’
would not feel sad, that they would not feel guilty, that they would not feel hopeless,
that they would not have delusions, or hallucinations, etc..  Anthropological research
suggests, however, that without the insular, privatised, autonomous and essentially
separate Western ‘self’, these sufferings would be interpreted quite differently
(Kleinman, 1988; Shweder, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1984).
For example, Kleinman and Good (1985, p. 3) note that
“dysphoria” – sadness, hopelessness, unhappiness, lack of pleasure with the things of the
world and with social relationships – has dramatically different meaning and form of
expression in different societies. For Buddhists, taking pleasure from things in the world
and social relationships is the basis of all suffering; a wilful dysphoria is thus the first
step on the road to salvation. For Shi’ite Muslims in Iran, grief is a religious experience,
associated with recognition of the tragic consequences of living justly in an unjust world;
the ability to experience dysphoria fully is thus a marker of depth of person and
understanding . . . Describing how it feels to be grieved or melancholy in another society
leads straightaway into analysis of different ways of being a person in radically different
worlds.
Furthermore, such experiences would also be conceptualised very differently by
those around the person who was suffering, thus leading them to respond differently to
them, which in turn would affect the trajectory that their experiences would take. This is
illustrated by the oft-repeated finding that the ‘prognosis’ of ‘schizophrenia’, which is
often a chronic and debilitating ‘illness’ in the West, is much better in developing
countries (Warner, 1985).  Indeed, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six,
such findings raise questions about whether the cluster of experiences conceptualised as
‘schizophrenia’ in developing countries may differ quite considerably from those
experienced in Western countries. The same point can also be made regarding the
cluster of sufferings conceptualised as ‘depression’.
For a Westerner the kinds of suffering which comprise the various ‘mental
disorders’ are considerably more likely to give rise to intense anxiety as they may
potentially be seen as a fundamental threat to our sense of ‘self’ as a coherent, valuable,
valued, and autonomous unity. They may also be seen as a threat to the potential
autonomy and the ‘success’ of that self, particularly in light of the knowledge that,
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ultimately, our life is our own business and if we ‘fail’ we must reap the consequences of
that failure. As Schumaker (2001, p. 63) notes, the sociocentric or ‘unindividuated’ self
found in non-Western cultures is “better able to locate problems at a less personal level”
and thus is able to
avoid the emotional brunt of these problems by coding stressful life events in external
terms, or in the wider context of a collective identity. In a sense, the collective is able to
absorb much of the emotional fallout.
This is not to romanticise the more ‘relational’ or ‘sociocentric organic’ self of
non-Western cultures; as Shweder (1984) points out, there are often severe costs to be
borne for having a more sociocentric self. This is particularly the case within contexts
where serious power imbalances exist.  What must be acknowledged, however, is that
humans are, as has already been noted several times, profoundly social creatures. As
Chapters Three and Four made clear we need contact with our fellow human beings at
every level – molecular, organismic and personal – and if we do not receive that contact
the consequences will be adverse.  This means that the ideal of the autonomous, private
and separate self which lies at the heart of our culture is essentially not a realisable one;
we can never, as the highly social animals that we are, really be that ‘self’.
But while very few people will actually have a sense of ‘self’ which matches the
Western cultural ideal10, the notion of such a ‘self’ nevertheless remains central to our
culture and is reflected in the ways in which we are ‘enculturated’ by our families, and
by our societies.  As Shweder (1984, p. 194) notes
our sense of personal inviolability is a violable social gift, the product of what others are
willing to respect and protect us from, the product of the way we are handled and
reacted to, the product of the rights and privileges we are granted by others in numerous
‘territories of the self’.
Our right to ‘privacy’, for example, is just one of the ways in which our culture
“asserts the sacredness of the person” (Simmel, 1968, p. 482, cited in Shweder & Bourne,
1984, p. 194) and these assertions are reiterated
in the respect shown by a parent for a child’s ‘security blanket’. It’s there as well when an
adult asks of a three-year-old ‘What do you want to eat for dinner?’ and again in the
knock on the door before entering the child’s personal space, his private bedroom,
another replica of the assertion.
As Shweder (1984, p. 194) points out, our view of our ‘self’
                                                 
10 And, as Crowley Jack (1991) points out, seeing oneself as not possessing such a ‘self’ can, in and of itself,
be a source of considerable suffering.
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is the product of the collective imagination. In the West, the messages implicit in many of
our child handling practices may well socialize deep intuitions about the ‘indecency’ of
outside (external) intrusions, regulations, or invasions of our imagined inviolatable self.
Practices cultivate intuitions, intuitions about what’s decent, which then support such
Western notions as ‘free to choose’, ‘autonomy in decision-making’, ‘sanctuary’ and ‘my
own business’.
One of the major institutions for the enculturation of this sense of a private and
personal self is, of course, the nuclear family, a child-rearing context that is, in common
with the self it helps constitute, insular, private and conceptualised as ‘nobody else’s
business’. I will now go on to discuss some of the implications of raising children within
such a context.
5.3.2. The privatisation of child-rearing
The analysis to be sketched out in this chapter, and to be discussed in more detail
in Chapter Six, suggests that intensive one-on-one interactions with the adults in their
social world fulfil necessary developmental functions for a child on two ‘levels’11 of
being – the biological and the psychological.  At the biological level such relationships
are essential to the regulation of an infant’s basic biological functions and facilitates the
eventual achievement of self-regulation of these functions (Hofer, 1987, 2001).  At the
psychological level such relationships facilitate a child’s motivated intentions, providing
the child with the skills to engage with the world of people and things (Cirulli, Berry, &
Alleva, 2003), a process which allows for the emergence of personal being (which in the
West essentially comprises our ‘senses of self’ as outlined in Chapter Three).
While the fulfilment of these functions at both levels is essential, no matter what
sort of society a child is born into – whether it be a foraging society like the Efé Pygmy
or a late-capitalist, technologically advanced society such as New Zealand – providing
the level of care that will meet the needs of a human infant requires a considerable
investment of time and effort.  Indeed, the level of intensive and long-term care
necessary to raise a human child exceeds that of any other animal on earth.
Because, however, the Western child is, to a very large extent, the responsibility
of his or her biological parents, with the bulk of that responsibility being carried by the
mother (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999; Lawler, 2000; Small, 1998), this places Western mothers in a
                                                 
11 The use of the word ‘levels’ is used interchangeably with the word ‘aspects’ and is not meant to imply that
any level is any more fundamental than another.
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very difficult position. As evolutionary anthropologist Blaffer Hrdy (1999) points out,
Bowlby’s (1969, cited in Blaffer Hrdy, 1999, p. 205) basic observations “that primate
infants, including humans, are born immobile and vulnerable” and that “they respond
very poorly to being left alone, or otherwise being made to feel insecure” cannot be
disputed, and yet many Western mothers, for a complex mix of reasons, both socio-
cultural and economic, cannot avoid leaving their babies alone, and/or without the
opportunity for close contact and interaction with another human being, at least some of
the time. Indeed they are often encouraged to do so by medical and childcare experts
(Small, 1998).
In many traditional societies, past and present, however, the responsibility for
the next generation was/is shared by a greater number of people (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999;
Small, 1998). Such shared responsibility ensures a certain degree of autonomy for the
mother, she can go out and work, as women have always done for the vast bulk of our
evolutionary history, and it also ensures that babies and children are very rarely left
alone (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999; Small, 1998). As Small (1998, p. 25) notes, cross-cultural
studies show that the assumption, common in modern Western societies, that the
“monotropic bond – that is, one parent at a time connected to one baby at a time”
provides the best environment for a developing child, is, quite simply, wrong.
Studies by Tronick and his colleagues (e.g., Tronick, Morelli, & Ivey, 1992) have
shown that an Efé pygmy infant spends 50 percent of its time with an adult who is not
its mother during the first four months of its life, and also that the infant will interact
with five or more adults per hour. Women other than their mothers also often nurse Efé
pygmy babies. While the baby clearly knows who its biological parents are it has a wide
circle of concerned adults to depend upon.  As Small (1998) points out, “this
multifaceted bond produces a tight network of social relationships – babies are attached
to several adults and adults are attached to several babies”.
While the Efé are particularly communal in their approach to child-rearing
humans are, by ‘nature’, cooperative breeders and, up until relatively recently, the
survival of our infants has depended on the mother being assisted by others – the father
and/or various individuals (usually kin and, in humans, most commonly older, post-
reproductive women) other than the parents – alloparents12” (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999, p. 90). In
many primate societies the assistance of alloparents allows the females to breed much
faster than they would otherwise be able to and “among humans living in foraging
                                                 
12 Edward O. Wilson’s term for those individuals who help others rear their young: allo (from the Greek for
‘other than’) plus parent (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999).
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societies, a helpful mate and/or alloparents were usually essential for a mother to rear
any infant at all” (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999, p. 91). Research consistently shows that human
beings require extensive socio-emotional support in the raising of their children and that
if this support is not available the consequences for the child-care-giver relationship and
the child’s subsequent socio-emotional and physical development are likely to be
adverse as will be discussed further below.
Indeed it is this reality that is often left out of the heated debates over what
children ‘need’ and what mothers ‘should’ provide for their children. One side of this
debate claims that a woman is a ‘bad mother’ if her whole life is not bound up in the
needs of her child (e.g., Winnicott, 1964, cited in Lawler, 2000) while the other groups
suggests that infants and children are, as Blaffer Hrdy (1999, p. 492) puts it
innately flexible and resilient ready-formed personalities waiting to emerge, for whom
‘good enough’ care suffices in a world where it is considered crass to ask anyone to
define what ‘good enough’ means.
Such polarised positions are almost inevitable in a world which is full of
“conflicting self-interests – between parents and offspring, between mothers and fathers,
within families, between families” (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999, p. 493) but they do not negate the
ultimate reality that the “needs of human infants are enormous and largely non-
negotiable” (Blaffer Hrdy, 1999, p. 493).  What is negotiable, of course, is who will fulfil
those needs and at this present point in history, conflict notwithstanding, it is still the
mother who is ultimately positioned as the one who bears the most responsibility for
this.
This means, of course, that women are also positioned as the ones to be blamed if
something goes wrong. Indeed it has been this perceived ‘mother-blaming’ which lies at
the heart of the conflict described above and it is not surprising, as Blaffer Hrdy (1999, p.
494) notes, that if infants’ needs are presented as ultimately having to be met by mothers
that some women may feel “compelled to downplay infant needs”.  It is also not
surprising, given this context, that biological explanations for psychological suffering
have eclipsed earlier explanations that were perceived to be ‘mother-blaming’.
While the analysis being presented in this thesis could be construed by some as
‘mother-blaming’ there is no way around the fact that children’s needs are indeed
‘enormous’ and they must be met to at least some degree or there will be adverse
outcomes, as will be discussed in some detail below. I am focusing on the mother child
relationship because, within the modern Western context, this relationship is the
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primary location where such needs are almost always met (or not met) during the early
years of a child’s life.
This is not to say that mothers should necessarily be the ones to meet all of those
needs. Indeed, it is suggested that such a requirement, in light of the kind of animals
humans are, is entirely unreasonable and indicates there are major problems with the
way in which, society-wide, we approach the raising of the next generation. Such
problems are outside the purview of this thesis, but they are central to reaching any kind
of understanding concerning why the problems between mothers and their children
discussed below actually occur. Further, it is suggested that these problems must be
acknowledged and addressed before any real progress can be made in preventing the
occurrence of such ‘failures’ and the vulnerabilities to psychological suffering they
confer.
Thus, because of the privatisation of child rearing in Western societies, with
most of the responsibility being borne by the mother, there are often very few other
people who are able to step into the breach if things go wrong. This means that a
‘breakdown’ in the mother-child relationship is likely to have particularly adverse
consequences for the child, as will be outlined in more detail in Section 5.4. This is
because such a breakdown leaves the child with little or no chance of learning the
ontological skills required to engage with their social world.
A failure to learn such skills will almost inevitably create difficulties learning to
negotiate their way around that world and may slow or even stop the process of
acquiring the ‘senses of self’ that comprise our ‘personal being’ in Western societies. In
addition, neurobiological research suggests that difficulties in the mother-child
relationship will be very likely to alter the developmental path of the ‘tools’ that
subserve this process in ways that leave these ‘tools’ less able to assist the child to
regulate their emotions and their responses to stressful13 events, as will be outlined in
more detail below14.
                                                 
13 In this thesis the word the word ‘stress’ is used to refer to both physiological stress and the person-level
experiences of, and responses to, that stress.  Thus, for example, the phrase “an event which places a person
under stress”, essentially means any event which initiates the physiological stress response and the
associated person-level or psychological experiences such as anxiety and/or fear, constricted attention,
irritability/anger and etc.
14 It should be added, however, this does not mean these ‘tools’ should be conceptualised as ‘dysfunctional’,
at least in the sense that word is used within the DMA. A person’s neurobiological ‘tools’ are shaped by the
environment within which they spend their formative years and are often highly ‘functional’ within that
particular environment having ‘adapted’ to help the child survive within it. As the person moves out into
the wider world, however, their neurobiological tools may no longer be suited to the tasks they need to fulfil
to become a participating member of their society. It is suggested that the neurobiological ‘tools’ of children
growing up in an environment where they are exposed to events which cause them chronically high levels
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In addition to increasing a child’s likelihood of being adversely affected by a
breakdown in their relationship with their parents, and, in particular, their mother, the
privatisation of parenting also results in children spending more time either alone, or
out of physical contact with another human being. As the research outlined in Chapter
Four made clear, such contact is essential to optimal biological and psychological
functioning and it is possible that such basic and essentially society-wide deprivation
may contribute towards a generalised vulnerability to the ever-increasing list of ‘mental
disorders’ endemic to, and rapidly increasing in, Western and Westernising societies
(Good & Kleinman, 1985; Schumaker, 2001; Seligman, 1990).
As Small (1998, p. 223-224) points out
human infants are evolutionarily – that is biologically over generations – designed to be
part of an intimate physical dyad with an adult. Cross-cultural studies, observations of
non-human primates and historical fact all combine to paint a portrait of a human infant
entwined with a parent.
As Small (1998) further notes, perhaps one of the most important points about
life within the kind of hunter-gatherer bands that shaped our modern ‘humanity’, and,
importantly, the ‘expectations’ of our infants, is that in such societies babies are usually
in constant contact with either their mother or some other human being.  They are never
left alone. The babies of the !Kung San of the Kalahari, for example, are with their
mothers almost constantly, sitting in a special sling within the large animal-skin
garment, the kaross, which women wear.
Indeed, Small (1998, p. 81) reports that anthropologist Melvin Konner “found
that San infants have more than twice the amount of passive contact with their mothers
than do babies in industrialized societies”.   Perhaps not surprisingly !Kung San babies
rarely cry, and if they do it is not for long. As Small (1998, p. 81) notes, research shows
that “more than 90 percent of their total crying events during the first nine months last
less than thirty seconds”.
Likewise, in the subsistence agriculturalist Gusii tribe of Western Kenya infants
are always carried about during their first year, either by their mother, an older sibling
or a ‘child nurse’; usually a young female relative.  Gusii babies, like the babies of the
!Kung are never left alone and, as Small (1998, p. 95) points out “Gusii mothers cannot
imagine leaving a baby in a room by itself, or leaving it alone to cry”.  Like !Kung San
                                                                                                                                                  
of stress will not serve them well in the wider social world particularly, and perhaps ironically, if they are
exposed to stress.
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babies, Gusii babies “are in physical contact with someone at least twice as much as
white middle-class American babies” (Small, 1998, p. 105).
Thus, while human babies have evolved to require and to ‘expect’ intensive
physical contact with one or more other human beings during their infancy, in modern
Western contexts our infants are often left either entirely alone or with very little
physical contact (while confined in buggies, car-seats, play-pens and high-chairs) with
another human being for considerable periods of time (Small, 1998).  Western infants
even sleep alone whereas “in almost all cultures around the globe today, babies sleep
with an adult and children sleep with parents or other siblings” (Small, 1998, p. 112).
Indeed, as Small (1998, p. 112) points out this privatisation of sleep is “one of the major
ways in which the West stands out from the rest of humanity in the treatment of
children”.
Of course the privatisation of child rearing, and the comparative
physical/social isolation of our infants and children, does not mean that every one in the
West will suffer in ways which would lead to them being diagnosed with a ‘mental
illness’.  Many of us have parents who have managed, one way or another, to provide us
with enough physical and emotional contact to enable us to make our way through life
without coming to the attention of mental health professionals. Their interactions with
us have facilitated our acquisition of the necessary ontological skills, enabling us to
engage adequately with the world of people and things. The stability of their physical
and emotional presence and their reactions to us have buffered us against stress and
fostered resilience against future stress. Others, while their parents may not have been
able to do this, may have had a grandmother, or an uncle, or an older sister who filled
the gap, providing the interactions, the stability, and the love that the parents could not
deliver.
What the privatisation of child-rearing does mean, however, is that modern
Westerners are more vulnerable to failing to experience some, or many, of those crucial
early interactions with significant others in our social world than those whose childhood
is spent within more traditional hunter-gatherer or subsistence agricultural communities
because if their biological parents are not ‘up to the job’ there is often no-one else who is
able to compensate for them.
Thus, while most Western children will get by with considerably less physical
contact during their early years than they are evolutionarily ‘designed’ for, those
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children unlucky enough to receive parenting which is compromised in some way (often
due to stress factors such as those discussed in Section 5.3.3 below) or those children
who spend most of their time in out-of-home care situations where there is a high child
to adult ratio and a low quality of care will be particularly adversely affected.  Such
children will not only receive even less physical contact than other Western children, but
they will also receive less ‘supportive’ parenting in general, with many being subject to
neglect and/or abuse.
In the following section I will discuss several more proximal factors that may
impact upon parenting, leading, potentially, to the relational problems discussed in
Section 5.4, which in turn, affect the developmental trajectory of the child.
5.3.3. Parenting under stress
As Francis et al. (1999, p. 1161) note, “human clinical research suggests that the
social, emotional, and economic context are overriding determinants of the quality of the
relationship between parent and child”. As these authors go on to note, parental care is
severely compromised if the parent is under chronic stress, and the “conditions that
most commonly characterize abusive and neglectful homes involve economic hardship,
marital strife, and a lack of social and emotional support” (Francis et al., 1999, p. 1161).
Parental care is also severely compromised if the parent is suffering psychologically.
There are, of course, a number of other stresses which impact upon parents in modern
Western societies and may compromise their ability to meet the needs of their children15
but space dictates limiting this discussion to a few particularly stressful situations.
Economic hardship
For a number of reasons one of the major stressors for a large number of people
in the modern West is economic hardship and poverty16. Using longitudinal data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Infant Health and Development Program,
                                                 
15 For example, the necessity for (or desire on the part of) both parents to work at paid jobs, the pressures
associated with work (e.g., demands to work longer hours, take work home, etc.), constant time pressure,
parenting in urban environments where infants and children must be constantly under parental
supervision, constant exposure to advertising and other inducements to buy goods and services, commercial
and media influence upon children, etc.
16 Poverty, of course, is not unique to the West; relatively speaking people are far poorer in the ‘developing’
world, although the context within which most non-Westerners experience poverty is considerably
different. (Wilkinson, 1996)
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Duncan, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov (1994, p. 312-313) report that “[f]amily income and
poverty status are powerful determinants of the cognitive development and behavior of
children” even after other differences – in particular family structure and maternal
schooling – between high and low-income families are taken into account.  The authors
also report that “the effects of persistent poverty were 60%-80% higher than the effects
of transient poverty”, suggesting that “the effects of poverty are cumulative” (Duncan et
al., pp 312-13).
These authors suggest that “economic disadvantage not only has a tangible effect
on children through the provision of educational resources available to them, but
through the detrimental psychological effect it exerts on their parents” (Duncan et al.,
1994, p. 315). As McLoyd & Wilson (1991, p. 107) point out, economic hardship has been
shown to correlate with more punitive, and less supportive, parenting styles. Children
who have been parented in ‘non-supportive’17 ways are consistently shown to have
lower self-esteem, more antisocial aggression and behavioural problems, and higher
rates of  ‘psychological disorders’ than children who have been parented in more
‘supportive’ ways. Some of the possible reasons for such outcomes will be discussed in
more detail in Section 5.4.
As McLoyd & Wilson (1991) further note, the fact that the kind of child-rearing
practices more prevalent among economically disadvantaged parents (e.g., harsh
discipline, nonsupportiveness) are predictive of a range of socio-emotional problems
“strongly suggests that at least some of the psychological and behavioral problems of
poor children are mediated by negative parenting precipitated by economic hardship”
(McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 112).
In support of this contention McLoyd and Wilson (1991) cite, Elder’s (Elder, 1979,
Elder Liker & Cross, 1984, Elder et al, 1985) studies of families during the Great
Depression which indicated that
fathers who sustained heavy financial losses became more irritable, tense and explosive,
which, in turn, increased their tendency to be punitive and inconsistent in the discipline
of their children. These fathering behaviors in turn predicted temper tantrums,
irritability, and negativism in young children especially boys, and moodiness and
hypersensitivity, feelings of inadequacy and lowered aspirations in adolescent girls
(McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 112)
                                                 
17 ‘Non-supportive behaviour’ is defined by McLoyd and Wilson (McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 111) “as low
levels of behavior that make the child feel comfortable in the presence of the parent and communicate to the
child that he or she is basically accepted and approved”.
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More recent studies of contemporary children in families experiencing economic
loss report findings consistent with Elder’s mediational model (Galambox & Silbereisen,
1987; Lempers, Clark-Lempers & Simon, 1989, Silbereisen, Walper & Albrecht, 1990,
cited in McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 112). As   McLoyd and Wilson (1991, p. 111, authors’
italics) note, observations of mothers and children interacting over the course of several
days
indicated that day-to-day fluctuations in the mother’s tendency to initiate and continue
aversive exchanges with their children were systematically related to the daily frequency
of hassles or crises that the mothers experienced.
As these authors point out, this strongly suggests that the ongoing stress of
living, and attempting to raise children, in poverty, is a major reason why poor mothers
“are less nurturant, less supportive, and less inductive in their parenting than middle-
class mothers” (McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 111). Further, as McLoyd and Wilson (1991)
note, poor mothers are often fully aware of how their negative feelings towards life are
affecting their parenting behaviour. As the respondents in a study by Longfellow et al.
(1982, cited in McLoyd & Wilson, 1991) reported, it is difficult to behave in the ways
required to be a good parent – nurturant, patient and involved – when you are feeling
depressed and are under a lot of stress. Further, poor mothers were also fully aware that
their ‘parenting strategies’ were ineffective and needed to be changed.
Perhaps not surprisingly, another factor that impacts on the way poor women
parent is that they are considerably more likely to experience ‘mental health problems’
than their economically more well off counterparts (McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 108).
Studies indicate that prevalence of maternal depression among women living in
poverty, for example, is twice that of women who are not under economic stress
(McLoyd & Wilson, 1991). Such problems, as will be discussed in more detail below,
have been consistently linked with difficulties with the relationship between the mother
and the child and adverse outcomes for the child.
McLoyd and Wilson (1991, p. 108) suggest that “poverty, in addition to exposing
the individual to more acute and chronic stressors, weakens the individual’s ability to
cope with new problems and difficulties, which, consequently, have more debilitating
effects” (McLoyd & Wilson, 1991, p. 108). It should also be noted that poor mothers are
also very likely to have been brought up in ‘unsupportive’ environments themselves,
thus, as will be outlined below, making them particularly vulnerable to later
psychological suffering.
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Thus, as McLoyd and Wilson (1991, p. 128) stress, while they emphasize the role
of mothers as a mediator of the impact of poverty on children’s mental health, they
do not blame mothers for the mental health of their children. Rather, both mothers and
their children are seen as victims of economic and social inequality. Ultimately, it is
poverty itself that creates suboptimal conditions for maternal psychological functioning,
child rearing and child development.
Lack of social support
As has already been noted above, human beings are ‘cooperative breeders’
(Blaffer Hrdy, 1999) and require assistance from other human beings to rear their
children. Research suggests, perhaps not surprisingly in the light of the privatisation of
child-rearing noted above, that one of the most important sources of social support for
parents in the West are their spouses or partners (Belsky, 1984, p. 88; Crnic, Greenberg,
& Slough, 1986. p. 29; Gjerdingen, Froberg, & Fontaine, 1991). Indeed, Belsky (1984, p.
88) suggests that “the marital relationship serves as the principal support system for
parents”, a position borne out by the results of a study by Crnic, Greenberg and Slough
(1986. p. 29) who found that of all the sources of social support the intimate support
provided by a spouse or partner was the most powerful predictor of both mother and
infant functioning18 at both 8 and 12 months.
In line with this, research consistently indicates that growing up without two
parents is associated with a host of adverse outcomes for children (Duncan et al., 1994;
McLoyd & Wilson, 1991; Musick & Meier, 2008). Such outcomes strongly suggest that
two people are able to do a lot better than one when it comes to raising the next
generation.  Not only can they offer each other social and emotional support, they can
also share parenting duties, thus ensuring that neither one of them has to bear the entire
responsibility for the well-being of their children alone.
Further, if the load is spread between two people then this can buffer the effects
of any problems that may arise with one of the parents. For example it has been found
that “involved, psychologically healthy, and supportive fathers can buffer children from
the detrimental effects of maternal depression, whereas absent or psychologically
unhealthy fathers can amplify the effects”  (Goodman & Gotlib, 1999, cited in Shonkoff
and Phillips, 2000, p. 254).
                                                 
18 As measured by mothers’ responses to the Satisfaction with Parenting Scale and the General Life
Satisfaction Index, ratings of mother-child dyadic synchrony, infant compliance and non-compliance with
mothers’ requests.  Infant ‘attachment’ was classified using Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall’s (cited in
Crnic et al., 1986) categories of ‘avoidant’, ‘ambivalent’ and ‘secure’ and infant ‘competence’ was measured
with the Bayley Scales (Bayley, 1969, cited in Crnic et al., 1986).
199
The advantages of being brought up by two parents are removed, however, if
there is marital conflict. Such conflict, of course, means that neither partner will be of
any support to the other in raising the children, indeed their relationship will be a source
of stress rather than support. Research suggests that children whose parents are together
but often argue fare just as badly as those who are being brought up by just one parent
with research suggesting that parental conflict is associated with negative schooling
outcomes, behaviour problems, early and nonmarital family formation, lower quality
adult relationships, and lower psychological well-being (Musick & Meier, 2008; Peterson
& Zill, 1986; Reid & Crisafulli, 1990). Outcomes are, not surprisingly, even more adverse
for those children whose parents’ relationship involves violence of any sort (Jouriles,
Murphy, & O'Leary, 1989; Holden, 1991).
The adverse outcomes for children often associated with single-parent families
are particularly illustrative of the difficulties involved in attempting to bring up children
without any social support. As Eisenberg (1990, p. 11) points out, “single mothers of
whatever age, beset by poverty as well as by lack of emotional support from a husband,
have difficulty meeting the needs of their children”.  As Musick and Meier (2008, p. 2)
note, “growing up without both parents is associated with a host of poor child
outcomes”.
Children from single parent and stepparent families, for example, tend to end up
with lower levels of educational and occupational attainment than children who grow
up with both their parents and they also “report greater substance use and risk-taking
behaviour, such as smoking, drinking, and drug use (Musick & Meier, 2008). As McLoyd
and Wilson (1991) point out, if you add poverty to the equation outcomes are even
worse. In comparison to children living in non-poor, two-parent households, for
example, children in poor female-headed households have an admission rate to
psychiatric outpatient services that is two to four times higher (Belle, 1980, cited in
McLoyd & Wilson, 1991).
Single motherhood is also a risk factor for psychological distress in the mother,
which, as will be discussed below, correlates highly with adverse outcomes for children.
Anxiety, depression, and health problems are more prevalent among single mothers
than they are among other marital status groups, and single mothers’ risk of physical
and psychological problems is intensified if they are poor and live alone with their
children” (McLoyd & Wilson, p. 108). This further supports the contention that
attempting to bring up children with very little social support is highly stressful.
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Sources of social support outside the nuclear family include grandmothers,
friends, neighbours, mother-child groups (often formed through child-birth education or
early post-natal education classes), and the various ‘experts’ whom they consult
concerning parenting, including GPs and Plunket nurses. A number of studies suggest
that being able to draw on such sources of support is beneficial for both the mothers and
their children. Grandmothers, for example, can provide an “important source of child
care during the earliest months and years of life” (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 234).
Furthermore, research also suggests that grandmothers are not only important
‘attachment figures’ in and of themselves, but that their support of the mother facilitates
more secure infant attachment19.
Sources of support outside the extended family can also improve the relationship
between a mother and her child. A study by Jacobson and Frye (1991), for example,
suggested that maternal support positively influences infant security with infants whose
mothers had the home visits being rated as more ‘securely attached’ than infants in the
control group.
A study by Crnic, Greenberg and Slough (1986. p. 29) of mothers with high-risk
infants also found a relationship between social support and infant attachment, with the
infants of “mothers who reported satisfactory intimate, friendship and community
support during early infancy” being judged to be more ‘securely attached’.  Crnic et al.
(1986) also found that “professional support was associated positively with the quality
of home environment at 8 months” and also with greater maternal satisfaction with
parenting. These results suggest that mothers perceived such sources of support to be
helpful to their parenting.
A study by Hashima and Amato (1994, p. 400) illustrated the particular
importance of social support for parents in poverty by showing that “poor parents who
reported few sources of assistance to draw upon in a crisis were especially likely to
report that they yelled at or slapped their children ‘very often’”. These authors noted
that a number of studies have shown that “economic deprivation combined with a lack
of social support creates an especially dangerous situation for children” and that “social
                                                 
19 As was noted in Chapter Four (Footnote 7), while I will be drawing on research findings from the
‘attachment’ literature, this does not imply a wholesale acceptance of attachment theory as articulated by
Bowlby (1969, cited in Hofer, 2001). Nor does it imply an acceptance that an infant’s relationship with its
mother can necessarily be neatly categorised into the various kinds of ‘attachment relationships’ that will be
described in more detail below. Nevertheless, the findings from attachment research consistently show that
certain sorts of behaviours on the part of the mother tend to be correlated with certain sorts of relationships
between those mothers and their infants, and that the quality of those relationships then goes on to correlate
highly with certain outcomes in later life. In this respect the findings from attachment research are useful in
helping to support the analysis I am developing in this thesis.
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support may play a special role in buffering poor parents from the stressful conditions
of poverty and in decreasing the incidence of problematic parental behaviour” (Hashima
& Amato, 1994, p. 400).
Research indicating that social support protects women from post-natal (also
referred to as post-partum) depression also highlights the importance of such support,
particularly in the first few years of a child’s life.  Indeed, it has been suggested that
post-natal depression may be linked to, or even caused by, a lack of social support and
recognition for the motherhood role.  While epidemiological studies in the West suggest
that approximately 10% of women develop post-natal depression, Stern and Kruckman
(1983, p. 1033) note that “a review of the ethnographic literature on childbirth shows
remarkably little evidence for post-partum depression in non-Western settings”. From
their own observations, and from an examination of the cross-cultural literature these
authors suggest that there are a number of common elements in the social structuring of
the post-partum period that protect women from the experience of post-partum
depression.
These elements include:  (1) cultural patterning of a distinct post-partum period;
(2) protective measures designed to reflect the vulnerability of the new mother; (3) social
seclusion; (4) mandated rest; (5) assistance in tasks from relatives and/or midwife; (6)
social recognition of new social status through rituals, gifts or other means. These
authors further suggest that “a relationship exists between the strategies typically
employed cross-culturally in the post-partum period, which serve to mobilize social
support to the new mother, and post-partum mental health” (Stern & Kruckman, 1983,
p. 1036). The experience of ‘depression’ in the US (and other Western cultures) may,
Stern and Kruckman (1983, p. 1039, authors’ italics) suggest,
result from the relative lack of: (1) social structuring of the post-partum events; (2)
instrumental support and aid for the new mother; and (3) social recognition of the role
transition for the new mother.
A study by Harkness (1987) supports this suggestion, with the author noting that
there seems to be no evidence that Kipsigis women in the rural Kenyan province of
Kokwet suffer from post-natal depression, in contrast to high prevalence rates for
women in the West. As Harkness (1987, p. 200) points out, the “cultural structuring of
the postpartum period in Kokwet exemplified to a high degree of the components of
social support described by Stern and Kruckman (Stern & Kruckman, 1983) as typical of
many non-Western societies. Stern and Kruckman have suggested that social support
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systems such as those in Kokwet serve to buffer against or prevent the experience of
postpartum depression.
 Distressed mothers
A number of children are being raised by mothers who are experiencing
considerable psychological distress, often to the point of being diagnosable as ‘mentally
ill’. Perhaps not surprisingly, research suggests such mothers feel considerably less
positive towards their children and act towards them accordingly.
As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, there is a large body of evidence
suggesting that parental, and in particular maternal, depression is correlated with
unsupportive parenting styles and adverse outcomes for children (Beardslee, Versage, &
Gladstone, 1998; Downey & Coyne, 1990; Gelfand & Teti, 1990; Reck et al., 2004; Murray
et al., 1996). Gelfand and Teti (1990, p. 331), in a review of the literature, note that
depressed mothers have been found to be “often preoccupied and inattentive to their
children”.  Furthermore, “dyadic exchanges between the depressed mother and her
child have been observed to lack the sensitive reciprocity, synchronicity, and
expressions of pleasure in each other’s company often found in nondepressed mother-
child pairs” (Gelfand & Teti, 1990, pp 331-332).
As Reck, Hunt, and Fuchs et al. (2004) note, “the behavior of depressed mothers
is characterized by a lack of responsiveness, passivity or intrusiveness, less positive
affect, more negative affect, and a less expressive mimetic behavior”.  Overall depressed
mothers are reported to “lack empathy and emotional availability”, and to have “a
reduced ability to perceive the child’s signals and interpret them correctly, and to react
appropriately and promptly”. This maternal unavailability and unresponsiveness is
suggested to lead to difficulties in the mother-child relationship (Beardslee et al., 1998;
Downey & Coyne, 1990; Murray et al., 1996) and to long-term socio-emotional
difficulties for the child (Downey & Coyne, 1990; Moehler et al., 2001).
A review by Kaitz and Maytal (2005, p. 573) suggests that maternal ‘anxiety
disorders’ are associated with potentially adverse outcomes for children.  Kaitz and
Maytal (2005, p. 573) conclude that the interactions between anxious mothers and their
infants are “mutually dysregulating in the short- and long-term” and are a potential
long-term “source of risk and distress” for the mother and the infant. Thus, mirroring
the findings from animal research reported in Chapter Four, more fearful, anxious
mothers, like the low licking, grooming and arched-back nursing mother rats, appear to
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be less able to respond to their infant in ways which are conducive to the child’s well-
being.
While there is not a lot of research on the effects of other ‘mental disorders’ on
parenting behaviours and attitudes, as Downey and Coyne (1990, p. 56) point out, if a
parent is suffering psychologically, however that suffering may manifest itself, this
exerts a detrimental effect on their parenting, and thus on their children. For example, “a
number of studies suggest the children of medically or nondepressed psychiatrically ill
parents were indistinguishable from children with a depressed parent” (Downey &
Coyne, 1990, p. 56).
Downey and Coyne (1990) also found, in a meta-analysis of studies looking at
the effects on children of parental depression or schizophrenia, that “despite
inconsistencies across measures and samples, the school-aged children of affectively
disturbed and schizophrenic parents showed similar deficits in comparison with
matched or random control children” (Downey & Coyne, 1990, p. 53). Once again, some
of the possible reasons for such outcomes will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.
It is also important to note that many women, while not necessarily suffering in a
way that would result in them being diagnosed with a ‘mental illness’ are nevertheless
suffering considerable distress due to personal and socio-economic problems. As was
noted above in the discussions concerning economic hardship and lack of social support,
such distress, not surprisingly, interferes with a woman’s ability to devote the amount of
emotional and physical energy required to provide the kind of care ‘expected’ by a
human infant.  Such compromised abilities to care, in a context where the mother bears
the main responsibility for that care, is likely to lead to adverse outcomes for the child.
5.4. PATHWAYS TO VULNERABILITY
While there is obviously a fair degree of latitude regarding exactly how very
early interactions between a child and their first care-giver(s) proceed, research strongly
suggests that if there is no-one in the infant’s environment who is able to be fully
engaged with that infant in the kind of synchronous and symbiotic relationship outlined
in Chapter Three then this constitutes a “violation of expectation” (Brazelton et al., 1975,
cited in Small, 1998) and the stress response will ensue (Hofer, 1987).
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While the details of these interactions may be different across different cultures
(Richman, Miller, & LeVine, 1992) the human infant nevertheless has some basic
expectations of care, that our mother will remain close by and provide us with warmth,
food and tactile, visual, auditory and kinaesthetic stimulation, which must be met.
Within Western cultures such needs are met within the context of a psychologically
symbiotic relationship with a primary caregiver, which quickly becomes highly verbal in
nature, while within other cultures they are met within a relationship wherein physical
contact is more central (Richman et al., 1992).
As was noted in Section 5.3.2 most of the responsibility for providing such
interactions for human infants in modern Western societies tends to rest with the
biological parents, primarily the mother. Because of this it is suggested that the modern
Western infant is more vulnerable to missing out on important aspects of such
stimulation because it is more difficult for one, or even two, people to be in the kind of
close and consistent physical and social contact with a child that human infants have
evolved to need and to ‘expect’.
Indeed, research consistently indicates that Western infants have considerably
less contact with their mothers and other care-givers than infants from more ‘traditional’
hunter-gatherer or subsistence agricultural societies – the kind of societies for which
humans have evolved to be particularly suited (Small, 1998).  As Shotter (1984, p. 57)
notes, human babies are essentially “adapted to a complete dependence upon an adult
human being” and for things to proceed well during early infancy a relationship is
required within which each member pays total attention to the other while they are
together.20
In the following it will be argued that when a child does not receive the kind of
physical and emotional interactions they are evolutionarily evolved to ‘expect’ then
developmental processes will be initiated which re likely to confer upon the developing
child, at both a biological and a personal level, a general vulnerability to the kinds of
suffering currently conceptualised as ‘mental illness’. It must be stressed at this point
that there does not need to be gross neglect or physical or sexual abuse for such damage
to occur, there just needs to be a ‘failure of care’21 to the extent that the child’s basic
biological and person-level needs and ‘expectations’ are not being met. In Chapter Six I
                                                 
20 As was noted in Chapter Three research suggests that such preoccupation with the infant is very common,
for both mothers and fathers during the very early weeks of parenthood, although mothers are generally
much more preoccupied than fathers.
21 This phrase ‘failure of care’ is not being used to imply that the mother is a failure; it is simply a useful
shorthand to encompass the wide range of problems that can occur within mother-child relationships.
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will discuss some of the possible ways in which such general vulnerability, depending
on what happens to the person over the trajectory of their ‘lifeline’, may result in the
kinds of experiences that are thought to be ‘symptomatic’ of two of psychiatry’s most
high-profile ‘mental disorders’ – ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’.
It is important to note at this point that this general vulnerability does not
necessarily mean psychological suffering is inevitable. Because human beings are
essentially dynamic systems a very small event occurring at a pivotal time in someone’s
life may radically affect the trajectory of that life.  And, as will be discussed in more
detail below, it is not just the experiences themselves but the timing, the context and the
meaning assigned to those experiences that will make the difference between someone
suffering or not suffering.
5.4.1. In the beginning
Human babies are born with a range of orienting, approach and expressive
behaviours that allow them to immediately ‘join the conversation’ around them.  Some
of these behaviours are ‘innate’, while others, as Polan and Hofer (1999a) have shown
are learned before birth. Such behaviours then serve as the building blocks from which
the kind of psychologically symbiotic relationship described in Chapter Three can be
constructed. As Taylor (2002) points out, less than an hour after they are born babies
draw back their head to look into the face of the person who is holding them and within
the first few hours they will turn their heads in response to their mother’s voice. After
only a few hours human infants can imitate an adult’s facial expression and very soon
thereafter they can accurately reflect back another person’s emotions. And from the first
day of their life infants will move their body in synchrony with adult speech (Small,
1998, p. 36). The human baby, as Taylor (2002, p. 39) notes, “begins life primed to be
social”.
These behaviours and abilities allow for a rapid increase in responsiveness on the
part of the infant towards its mother in the first few weeks (Meares, 2000) of its life. This
growing responsiveness results in a qualitative change in the interactions between the
mother and the infant over these first few weeks so long, of course, as the mother is
adequately responsive towards the child (Shotter, 1984). Thus, as Small (1998, p. 37)
points out,
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when babies and adults interact, they are partners in an interactive social dance in which
they jointly regulate each other, and this dance is essential for the baby’s social and
psychological development.
While the participants in this ‘dance’ may be acting more as ‘biological
individuals’ than as ‘persons’ at this stage, the infant nevertheless requires, at every
‘level’ of its being (molecular, organismic and personal-psychological), a physically and
emotionally close relationship with someone who cares for them and who is able to
devote a considerable amount of time to meeting their needs. At the molecular and the
organismic level, as was outlined in Chapter Four, research suggests that the various
primarily physical interactions (cuddling, rocking, eye contact, vocalisations, provision
of milk, etc.) occurring within the mother-child relationship act as regulators of
immature biological systems in humans such as control of sleep-wake states and self-
regulation during sleep, thermoregulation, regulation of growth hormone levels,
regulation of stress response systems, and possibly even regulation of breathing (Hofer,
2001; McKenna & McDade, 2005; Perry, 2000; Schanberg & Field, 1987; Yogman, Lester
& Hoffman, 1983, cited in Small, 1998; Wexler, 2006).
If things are going ‘well’ within the mother-child relationship such ‘biological
symbiosis’ would occur ‘naturally’. The mother would, because of her positive feelings
towards her baby want to cuddle, stroke, smile at, make eye contact with, rock, talk to
and generally be with her baby, and would thus provide, without much conscious
thought on her part, the kind of tactile, visual, auditory and kinaesthetic stimulation
required by a human infant. Research has shown that touch is particularly important for
an infant’s developing regulatory systems.  For example, a study by Feldman, Weller,
Sirota and Eidelman (Feldman et al., 2002) suggests that skin-to-skin contact or
‘kangaroo care’ increases the ability of premature infants to regulate their physiological
processes (e.g., sleep patterns, temperature and oxygen consumption) and has been
associated with better ‘attachment’ relationships later in life.
Research with non-premature infants has also shown that touch is “an important
feature of early care and normative development” (Calkins & Hill, 2007, p. 239). Jahromi,
Putnam and Stifter (2004) found, for example, that while mothers touched their babies
less and were less affectionate with at 6 months than they were at 2 months, and the use
of distraction and vocalising increased, holding and/or rocking the baby while
vocalising reduced distress in infants at both ages. Other research has shown that 3
month-old infants do not respond to a still face interaction, normally a stressful
situation, unless the mother was able to touch them prior to such interaction periods
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suggesting that touch reduced the levels of stress experienced by the child (Gusella,
Muir, & Tronick, 1988).
Within the context of these very early interactions mothers will also be preparing
the ground for the development of a more ‘psychologically’ or ‘personally’ symbiotic
relationship between their infants and themselves by reacting towards their infants as
“potential human beings . . . with human qualities and sensitivities” (Newson, 1979, p.
210). As was pointed out in Chapter Three, this assumption “is integral to  [the initiation
of] psychologically symbiotic exchanges” (Harré, personal communication, 1997, cited in
Tissaw, 2000) because in acting as if her child is an intentional being whose actions have
meaning she essentially scaffolds the emergence of just such a being.
For a significant number of children, however, their mothers are unable to
initiate or maintain even the very early stages, this kind of stable, reliable and physically
and emotionally close relationship (Fleming & Corter, 1988; Downey & Coyne, 1990;
Mayes et al., 2005; Teti, Gelfand, Messinger, & Isabella, 1995). As was noted above, this
can occur for a number of reasons, including the socio-cultural and socio-economic
factors outlined in Section 5.3, the complex subjectivities of human beings, and the fact
that our parenting behaviours are learned rather than ‘instinctive’.
As research within the field of attachment theory has consistently shown, babies
who are mothered in ways which are ‘unsupportive22’ often end up exhibiting
behaviours which suggest high levels of anxiety, insecurity and ambivalence. Utilising
an experimental procedure called the ‘Strange Situation Paradigm23’ Ainsworth (cited in
Teti et al., 1995) (Ainsworth, 1985) identified three basic infant attachment patterns –
‘secure’ (Type B) ‘insecure-avoidant’ (Type A), and ‘insecure-ambivalent’ (Type C)
which have been conceptualised by Main and Solomon (cited in Teti et al., 1995) as
“coherent, organized strategies used by infants to access their attachment figures in
times of stress” (Teti et al., 1995, p. 365).
                                                 
22 Ainsworth (1985, p. 777) describes unsupportive mothers as “generally less sensitively responsive to
infant signals and communications across all contexts throughout the first year”. She further notes that such
mothers were “especially conspicuous [for] their delay in responding to crying and their relative lack of
tender, careful or affectionate behavior when holding the baby”.  It should be noted that I will often use the
phrase ‘Unsupportive parenting’ in this thesis as a shorthand way of referring to behaviours that fail to meet
the basic relational needs of the human infant as outlined in Chapters Three and Four. Such relational needs
include the need for affectionate physical contact (hugging, stroking, rocking, holding etc.) and the need for
the caregiver to be “responsive to infant signals and communications across all contexts” (Ainsworth, 1985,
p. 777). ‘Unsupportive parenting’ also encompasses behaviour that is emotionally or physically abusive –
from regular corporal punishment through to physical and sexual abuse. In most cases, however, the phrase
will be used to refer to failures to meet relational needs rather than overtly abusive behaviours.
23 A 21-24 minute procedure during which young children’s behaviour is observed during separations from
and reunions with their mothers.
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Main and Solomon (1990, cited in Teti et al., 1995) added a fourth category that
they called ‘disorganized-disorientated’ (Type D).  As Teti et al. (1995, p. 365) point out,
Type B attachment patterns have been shown to relate to “empathic, sensitive
parenting” and Type A and Type C attachments to “insensitive, unresponsive
parenting”.  Type D attachments have been found to be particularly common among
infants from ‘high-risk’ environments “characterized, for example, by very low income,
child maltreatment, or parental alcoholic consumption”.
Such research suggests that the babies of such ‘unsupportive’ mothers tended, in
comparison to babies whose mothers were more ‘supportive’, to cry a lot more, to
respond less positively to being held by their mothers and yet to protest more when they
were put down by, or separated from, them. Such babies were also “less responsive in
face-to-face situations and less responsive to maternal commands” (Ainsworth, 1985, p.
776). They were also judged to be a lot angrier and more irritable.
This kind of ‘unsupportive’ mothering, in addition to being stressful for the
infant in and of itself, also interferes with the child’s ability to regulate its own emotional
reactions, to ‘self-soothe’. While babies begin to regulate their emotional responses very
soon after birth by engaging in behaviours such as suckling to sooth themselves
(Campos, 1988, cited in Repetti et al., 2002), a study by Van den Boom (1994, cited in
Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002) showed that “parental nurturing appears to facilitate
the development of these primitive coping behaviors”. In this study an intervention
which improved “maternal responsiveness, attentiveness and control . . . resulted in an
increase in infant self-soothing behaviors” (Repetti et al., 2002, p. 345). Further, infants
whose mothers did not take part in this ‘intervention’ showed a slight decrease in self-
soothing behaviours between 6 and 9 months and were rated as being less securely
attached to their mothers.
The ‘quality’ of the mother-child relationship, as well as generating differing
behavioural and emotional person-level responses in the child, has also, as was outlined
in Chapter Four, been shown to generate different responses at the biological level. For
example, the cortisol levels of infants who are in ‘secure attachment relationships’ do not
elevate, even when they are upset, whereas the cortisol levels of infants in insecure
attachment relationships do (Gunnar et al., 1996). Furthermore, research has also shown
that children who have ‘disorganised/disoriented’ attachment relationships (associated
with care-giving which is unpredictable, inconsistent and/or severely missattuned)
deviate markedly from normative stress responses (Hertsgaard et al., 1995).
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Such findings are not at all surprising in the light of Hofer’s research (Hofer,
1987), which showed that the mother-infant relationship essentially acts as a regulator of
the infant’s immature biological systems. As was noted in Chapter Four, an infant only
needs to be left alone, or even just without physical contact, for a short period of time
before the changes characteristic of the 1st or ‘protest phase’ of the ‘separation response’
as described by Hofer (Hofer, 1987) are initiated.
Such changes include, at the organismic-behavioural level, an increase in
agitation and in vocalisation (crying) and at the organismic-molecular level an increase
in heart rate, and also in cortisol and catecholamine levels, and a lowering of body
temperature. Indeed, animal research has suggested that even relatively brief periods of
separation, within the range of what could naturally be expected to occur, still had
detectable effects on the development and the behaviour of the offspring (Coplan, Trost
& Owens et al., 1998, cited in Yates, 2007).
Furthermore, as Hofer’s (1987) research made clear, if the ‘separation’ from the
mother continues for a long enough period of time the first phase of the ‘separation
response’ “merges into the slow-developing changes of the so-called despair phase”
(Hofer, 1987, p. 638) [also called the dissociation phase]. Hofer’s (Hofer, 1987) research
indicates that some of the behavioural signs of this phase are decreased social interaction
and play, mouthing and rocking, hypo- or hyper-responsiveness, decreased or variable
food intake and postures or facial expressions indicative of sadness. Physiological signs
include a decrease in weight, sleep disturbances, a decrease in core temperature, oxygen
consumption, heart rate, and growth hormone levels. While most children will receive
some sort of attention before they move into this ‘despair phase’, some children may
spend considerable periods of time in this state.
 A child who is left alone long enough for the ‘despair’ phase to begin is placed
under extreme physiological stress due to the complete and ongoing withdrawal of the
multiple regulators inherent within the relationship between them and their primary
care-giver (Hofer, 1987) and the impact of such stress, particularly if it occurs frequently,
will be extremely adverse for their developing neurobiology. As was detailed in Chapter
Four, in animals such separations result in a number of persistent abnormalities in
multiple neurotransmitter systems and also seem to alter the structure of the brain
(Wexler, 2006).
While the ‘separations’ engineered by researchers between animal mothers and
their infants in no way capture the complexities involved in a human-mother child
210
relationship, research has confirmed that human infants find separations from their
mother as aversive as any other infant mammal, whether those separations be actual (as
in the mother not being there at all) or socio-emotional (the mother being there
physically, but behaving in an unresponsive or hostile manner).24
Research has also confirmed that such ‘separations’ affect various aspects of the
infant’s developing neurophysiology (and, indeed, their physiology in general), in
particular their stress response systems.  It is also of interest to note that the same
neurotransmitter systems affected by mother-infant separations in animal research have
also been implicated in the genesis of psychological suffering by researchers looking for
the biological ‘causes’ of ‘mental illness’.  These same systems are also involved in
addiction to various drugs (Keverne, 2004).
Further, Hofer’s research suggests that if a baby remains alone and uncomforted
long enough for the ‘despair’ or ‘dissociation’ phase to begin this would exert effects not
just on the baby’s developing neurobiology but also on the development of their
personal being, central to which is their sense of ‘self’. While at this early stage there is
no psychological or personal sense of ‘self’ which can feel ‘rejected’ or ‘abandoned’, it is
suggested that those human infants whose caregivers are unresponsive or neglectful
will, due to the frequent, and often lengthy, withdrawal of the various regulators
inherent in the mother-child relationship, be placed in a state of disequilibrium which
will be experienced, even if only at a very basic level, as emotionally aversive.
While the child may not ‘remember’ such feelings, or the experiences that gave
rise to them, in such a way as to enable them to narratively reconstruct them, these
feelings and experiences would nevertheless exert an ongoing effect, particularly if they
occurred frequently. Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter Three, such experiences are,
like all our experiences, quite literally, embodied (Damasio, 1994; Perry, 2001; Schwarz
& Perry, 1994) in ways that exert their effect throughout every level of our being.
Because these ‘memories’ are embodied rather than discursively created, they
can be formed from the very beginning of a child’s life outside the womb. Indeed, it is
possible such ‘memories’ may even be formed prior to birth. It follows that if a child’s
experiences during their early years are particularly aversive (due to ongoing
                                                 
24 It could be argued that human infants find any maternal behaviour that interferes with the meeting of
their basic physical and relational needs aversive. For example, mothers who consciously make a ‘project’
out of being a ‘perfect’ mother are, in their own way, being ‘unresponsive’ to their infant’s needs if their
interactions are imposed upon the child and are, in essence, motivated more by their own needs than by
those of the infant.
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‘unsupportive’ parenting) or traumatic (due to ongoing abuse for example) then the
reactivation of their early memories would be particularly stressful at both the biological
and the personal level.
Thus, as was pointed out in Chapter Three, this very early stage of the mother-
child relationship, even before it becomes truly ‘psychologically symbiotic’, is a crucial
one and if there are difficulties within the relationship then the consequences for the
child are likely, at every level, to be adverse. It is suggested that if the relationship
cannot be ‘mended’ in some way then such difficulties not only compromise the
‘quality’ of the mother-child relationship into the future but also lay the foundations for
the kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental illness’.
5.4.2. Psychological symbiosis
As Shotter (1974b) and Tissaw (2000) point out, the relationship between a
mother and her child becomes ‘psychologically symbiotic’ when behaviours such as
smiling and reaching for specific objects “result in attempts on the part of the mother to
interpret and/or complete what appear to be intentional or other actions that may be
described through use of psychological predicates” (Tissaw, 2000, p. 856). As has
already been noted, for a mother to do this, she must be able to orient towards her infant
as if the infant was a ‘person’.
Such an orientation, would be considerably more difficult to achieve if the
mother was experiencing psychological distress of any kind.  This suggestion is
supported by the results of a study by Feldman (1999) indicating that depressed mothers
were less likely to make attempts to build a personal relationship with their child. Such
mothers were a lot less likely than ‘healthy’ mothers to use a nickname for their child, to
idealise the child, to see resemblances between the child and other family members, to
interact with the child in a special way or to imagine their child’s future.
It is further suggested that a distressed mother would be less likely to be able to
fully engage in the kind of ‘proto-conversational’ interactions outlined in Chapter Three.
This suggestion is supported by the results of a study by Lundy (2003) which suggest
that the frequency of ‘interactional synchrony’ the “extent to which an interaction
appears to be reciprocal and mutually rewarding” (Isabella, Belsky & von Eye, 1989, p.
13, cited in Lundy, 2003), significantly predicts infant-mother and infant-father
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‘attachment security’. The results of this study also suggest that “individual differences
in the frequency of such synchrony may be associated with differences in general
perspective-taking skills” (Lundy, 2003, p. 201).  Such ‘perspective-taking skills’ are
conceptualised by Lundy (2003) as reflecting the ability of parents to be perceptive of
their infants’ ‘mental processes’. Such ‘perspective-taking-skills’ could also be
conceptualised, in less mentalistic terms, as the ability of parents to see their infant as a
‘person’.
As was pointed out in Chapter Three, when things are going well between a
mother and an infant they rapidly “come to coordinate their emotions and expressions
within a split second of one another” (Taylor, 2002, p. 40). Such interactions, while
appearing simple, consist “of a fluid and complex stream of behaviours which are
interwoven and extremely difficult to code” (Meares, 2000, p. 6). As Meares (2000, p. 6)
notes, if there is a break in the patterning in these proto-conversational interchanges, “a
failure of attunement is quickly perceived by the baby, whose rapidly changing
expressions are surprisingly subtle”. When this happens the pleasure inherent in the
‘conversation’ for both partners is lost. Meares (2000, p. 16) suggests that the experience
could be referred to as ‘disjunctional anxiety’ and notes that such observations suggest
“the proto-conversation is not mere to and fro. The resonance between the ‘conversing
partners has a transformational effect”.
This contention is supported by research in the field of ‘emotion regulation’
which suggests that children learn to regulate their emotional responses “through
specific patterns in which the matching of affective states and reparation of interactive
and affective ‘mismatches’ . . . have fundamental importance” (Reck et al., 2004).  As
Reck et al. (2004, p. 274) note, “typically, early interactions . .  are characterized by good
attunement or synchronicity of behavioral and physiological rhythms and thus attain
reciprocal optimal stimulation and arousal modulation”.
During ‘stressful’ interactions, however, such ‘optimal stimulation and arousal
modulation’ as Reck et al. (2004) refer to it, does not occur and the child becomes
distressed. Tronick and his colleagues (Tronick, Als, Admson, Wise & Brazelton, 1978,
cited in Tronick, 1998) showed how this can happen with their ‘Face-to-Face Still-Face
Paradigm25’ where they instructed mothers not to engage in their normal interactive
                                                 
25 This experimental procedure was developed by Tronick et al. (1978, cited in Tronick, 1998) and consists of
a mother holding a still-face and remaining unresponsive to her infant even as it tries to engage her
attention.
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behaviour but rather to face their infant but remain unresponsive. As Tronick (1998, p.
292) notes
[t]he effect on the infant is dramatic. Infants almost immediately detect the change and
attempt to solicit the mother’s attention. Failing to elicit her response, most infants turn
away only to look back at her again. This solicitation cycle may be repeated many times.
But when the attempts fail, infants withdraw, lose postural control and self-comfort in
response to their failure to repair the interaction.
As Tronick (1998) further notes, the disengagement is profound even with this
short break in the mother-child interactions. Tronick (1998) suggests that the response of
the infants is reminiscent of the withdrawal of infants in institutions such as those in
Romania and highlights the absolute necessity of the mother-child interactions to a
child’s emotional well being.
Trevarthen and Aitken (2001, p. 9) suggest that such findings indicate the
human infant has
expectations of the emotional quality of the engagement [with their ‘conversational’
partner] and the normal contingencies of a sympathetic adult response, and that these
emotions change in ways that affect the adult, regulating positively towards a happy
encounter, and defending against failure of contact, by appealing with negative
emotional expressions for appropriate remedial action to repair communication.
Trevarthen (2001, p. 851) further suggests that such research findings show “how
sensitive a young infant is to affectionate parenting and they explain how failure of
caregiver support is potentially harmful”.
As was noted in Chapter Three, it is from within these very early, pre-linguistic,
symbiotic interactions between the mother and the child, that the two aspects of our
personal being which comprise ‘Self 1’ begin to emerge; (a) a sense of one’s embodied
self as the centred structure of our own perceptual field (Harré, 1998) and (b) the sense,
and eventual discursive presentation, of oneself as an agent.
At the same time, these symbiotic interactions are also scaffolding and facilitating
the eventual emergence of those aspects of our experience conceptualised by Harré
(1998) as being part of our ‘Self 2’; the “ephemeral flows of activity, both private and
public, in which that person engages, producing thoughts and actions sometimes but
not always displaying repeated structures and forms” (1998, p. 135). Self 2 is essentially
“the totality of attributes both ephemeral and enduring of the person I am” (Harré, 1998,
p. 148) and also includes beliefs about those attributes.  As was noted in Chapter Three,
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the ‘quality’ of these interactions also affect the ‘value’ which the child learns to
associate with their sense of ‘self’.
Thus, at the person level, it is suggested that if there are early relational problems
of one sort or another this will interfere with the processes involved in acquiring the
‘ontological skills’ necessary to developing these various ‘senses of self’. In other words,
if the primary care-giver does not ‘afford’ the child the opportunity to express the
various behaviours which form the foundations of the socio-emotional and practical
skills and abilities essential to being a person in their world then, unless someone else
steps into the breach and does so, the child will be unlikely to gain those skills and
abilities. I will discuss the ways in which unsupportive parenting may compromise the
emergence of the various aspects of the ‘self’, and thus confer vulnerability to
psychological suffering, in some detail in Chapter Six.
It should be noted at this point that this is not to say that such early experiences
will result in the complete absence of a ‘sense of self’, indeed such a complete absence
would be possible only in the event of a child being raised with absolutely no human
contact at all. What it does mean, however, is that early relational problems of the kind
described herein will inevitably affect the emerging senses of self in ways which make
life considerably more difficult, as will be discussed in some detail below. It is in this
sense that I refer in this and following chapters to ‘damaged’ or ‘compromised’ senses of
self.
At the organismic and neurobiological level, as already mentioned in Section
5.4.1, research suggests that the stress response systems of children whose mothers show
a “high level of emotional unavailability – either as an intentional tactic or as a side
effect of her own depressed state” (Bugental et al., 2003, p. 241) may be adversely
affected. A study by Bugental, Martorell and Barraza (2003) for example, found that
children of depressed and/or unresponsive mothers had higher baseline levels of
cortisol than ‘normal’ controls and the authors suggest that such “elevated baseline
levels of cortisol may be thought of as reflecting children’s characteristic levels of HPA
activity” (Bugental et al., 2003, p. 241).
Bugental et al. (2003) go on to note that the mother’s ‘emotional unavailability’
may limit her utility as a means of buffering her child against stress – at both the
neurobiological ‘tool’ level and the personal level.  Such ‘hypercortisolism’ while it may
be a useful short-term ‘strategy’ for coping with unbuffered stress, tends to be associated
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at later ages with ‘internalising problems’ (e.g., anxiety and depression) (Bugental et al.,
2003).
Bugental et al. (2003) also found that the very early use of corporal punishment
heightened children’s reactivity to stress. Bugental et al. (2003, p. 244) note that such
hormonal reactivity may be seen as reflecting the child’s “vulnerability to unexpected,
challenging, or novel life events” and suggest that
when mothers make use of physically punitive tactics at an age when children are as yet
unable to regulate their behavior effectively children appear to become more susceptible
to the effects of stressful events.
As was noted in Chapter Four the physiological reactions to stress shown by
infants whose mothers are either ‘emotionally unavailable’, or who use harsh control
tactics leads to maladaptive changes in stress response systems such as the HPA axis
and
may alter the functioning of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in ways that,
if continued, may foster risk for immune disorders, sensitization to later stress, cognitive
deficits, and social-emotional problems.
(Bugental et al., 2003, p. 237)
Further, research suggests that such stress sensitization would then, in turn,
impact at the person level as either what psychologists would call ‘emotional reactivity’
(quick to cry, irritable, prone to temper tantrums) or, in some cases, ‘emotional
hyporeactivity’ (socially withdrawn, emotionally flat, etc.).  As Perry (2001, p. 8) points
out, the way in which a child responds, both at the neurobiological/organismic and the
personal level, to adverse experiences depends on “the nature, frequency, pattern and
intensity” of the experience, “the adaptive style of the child” and the presence of
mitigating factors such as the presence of a supportive person in their lives.
These ‘difficult’ behaviours, particularly if they were towards the reactive end of
the spectrum, would then affect the mother who, if already under stress and unable to
meet her child’s relational needs, would be very unlikely to respond to the child’s
behaviour positively. If the mother did respond to her already highly ‘stressed’ child
negatively this would, of course, be felt at every level of the child’s being – molecular,
organismic, and personal, as ‘stressful’ and aversive, and on the vicious circle would
turn.
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Indeed, many children from home environments characterised as risky (i.e.,
marked by recurrent episodes of anger or aggression and/or by interactions which are
cold, unsupportive and neglectful) (Perry, 2002; Repetti et al., 2002, p. 345; Wismer Fries,
2004) have been reported to experience numerous problems which may reflect the
cascade of person-level and organismic/neurobiological level factors described above
(Perry, 2002; Repetti et al., 2002; Wismer Fries & Pollak, 2004). Such problems include
‘developmental delays’ of perceptual and motor skills as well as socio-emotional
problems including hyperactivity, emotional over-reactivity and under-reactivity and
social withdrawal. The ways in which such problems compound to the point where a
person suffers the kinds of experiences conceptualised to be symptomatic of
‘schizophrenia’ or ‘depression’ will be discussed in Chapter Six.
Essentially, then, a socially stable and structured environment during the
period of psychological symbiosis, the most important aspect of which is a stable and
loving mother-child relationship, enables the child to develop, at both the
neurobiological level, and at the psychological or ‘personal’ level, in a way which suits
that child to life in his or her socio-cultural niche. Interactions within this environment
essentially scaffold the emergence of the senses of ‘self’, as outlined by Harré (1998),
which comprise our personal being and enable the emergence, within the active
relationship between the child and significant others within their early environment, of
‘personal’ needs and desires26 (Burkitt, 1991).
These early social interactions essentially provide a means by which children
orientate themselves in the world and the foundations upon which the successful
learning of language can occur. In addition, and fundamentally linked to this, a socially
stable and structured environment also enables the child’s neurobiological tools to
develop in ways adaptive to living a life as an active and engaged member of their
society.
It follows that if such a socially stable and structured environment is not
available to the child then this compromises their development at the neurobiological
and the personal/psychological level.  If a mother consistently behaves in ways which
                                                 
26 As already noted in Chapter Three, this is not to say the child has no needs or desires before this process
starts but rather that their very basic needs and desires are transformed via the interactions they have with
their social world into more complex ‘socially constructed’ needs and desires.
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interfere with the meeting of a child’s basic physical and relational needs27 the child will
be put under stress (which, if prolonged, has adverse impacts on the development of the
child’s neurobiological tools) and also makes it less likely that they will absorb the social
meanings necessary to orientate themselves within the wider social world outside the
home.
Indeed, there may well be grounds to suggest that such 'disengagement' is not
an uncommon occurrence within modern Western families, given the intense pressure
placed on just one or two people within the isolated context of the nuclear family, to
provide for all a child's socio-emotional needs during their early years, especially if there
are any extra problems such as financial difficulties, work stress, family problems,
illness, separation and divorce or parental ‘mental illness’ of any kind.   
Further, if, in addition to maternal disengagement or inability to respond to the
child’s needs, the child also has to deal with an unstable and chaotic environment (e.g.,
constantly changing step-fathers, frequent shifts of house and school, violence, abuse28,
drug and alcohol abuse, or absent or grossly neglectful parents) they would, in the
absence of any mitigating factors, absorb unstable and chaotic patterns of behaviour and
would gear their expectations of life towards more of the same. Again this would put
them under considerable stress and the strategies (e.g., hyper-vigilance, avoidance, and,
in extreme cases, dissociation) they developed, at a personal level, to deal with the
situations they found themselves in would be unlikely to be adaptive in the world
outside of their home environment.
As has already been noted in Chapter Four, such chaotic environments also
severely compromise the child’s developing neurobiological tools because the
developing brain requires “patterns of sensory experience to create patterns of neural
activity that, in turn, play a role in guiding the various neurodevelopmental processes
involved in healthy development” (Perry, 2000, p. 15).  As has also been noted above,
research suggests that if a child’s experience of life is chaotic and the sensory inputs are
not consistent or predictable then “the organizing systems in the brain reflect this chaos
                                                 
27 Such maternal ‘unresponsiveness’ to a child’s needs may range from being chronically disengaged
through to being over-attentive to the point of intrusiveness and may also include behaviours which could
be referred to as ‘abusive’, either emotionally or physically.
28 It is important to note that while that others within the child’s environment may be abusive if the child is
buffered from the stress of that abuse by the person with which s/he has the most significant relationship
(usually, though not always, the child’s mother) then the consequences will not be as adverse (Finkelhor,
1990). If the abuser is the person with whom the child has the most significant relationship, however, then
this causes major problems – the extent of which are detailed in the literature on the neurodevelopmental
and socioemotional effects of abuse (see Finkelhor, 1990 for a review). The implications of this will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
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and, typically, organize in ways that result in dysregulation” (Perry, 2000, p. 15). While
such neurobiological organization may, in fact, be adaptive for the environment within
which the child finds him/herself, as has been noted at several points, as may any
personal/psychological strategies the child develops to cope with that situation, it
would be unlikely to serve them well outside that environment.
5.5. CONCLUSION
Essentially, the analysis presented in this thesis suggests that if a child’s basic
relational needs are not met by their care-giver(s) vulnerabilities will be conferred upon
the child at the molecular, the organismic and the person-level which may, in coaction
with later life circumstances, result in the emergence of psychological suffering.  This
contention is supported by research that suggests that ‘adverse’ or ‘unsupportive’
parenting is a risk factor for the occurrence of a number of ‘psychopathologies’
(Beardslee et al., 1998; Downey & Coyne, 1990; Enns, Cox, & Clara, 2002; Heider et al.,
2008).
At the person-level if the child’s primary care-giver fails to provide the kind of
care ‘expected’ and needed by the human child then this compromises the emergence of
the skills and abilities foundational to building the ‘senses of self’ which comprise our
personal being. At the organismic and molecular level such failures expose the child’s
stress response systems to chronic and unbuffered stress, stress that eventually results in
‘dysregulations’ of these systems and a lessened ability, at an organismic level, to
respond to stressors in an adaptive way. Such ‘dysregulations’ also, of course, exert an
effect at the person-level because such chronically dysregulated neurobiological ‘tools’
are less able to subserve the person-level tasks the person must perform during their
lives.
While it is being argued that early relational problems of one kind or another lie
at the root of most, if not all, of the various forms of psychological suffering
conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’, this is not to say that such early relational
problems will inevitably result in such suffering. No factor, not even one so fundamental
as the early relationship between a child and its primary caregiver, can ever entirely
determine an outcome in a dynamic system such as a human being.  There are a myriad
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of factors that may tip the scales in either direction – towards suffering, or towards
flourishing, at this very early point in a person’s lifeline.
For example, it is suggested that if the relationship between the infant and their
primary care-giver is ‘mended’ early enough, or replaced or supplemented by another
relationship(s) this may allow the child to acquire, albeit slightly later, those ‘ontological
skills’ central to the ‘senses of self’ as outlined by Harré (1998).  In addition, the now
positive interactions between the child and his or her care-giver would be very likely to
transform the valency of their early ‘feeling tone’ from negative to positive. This in turn
may have the potential to initiate a reassessment of the value they have assigned to their
‘self’ – from negative to positive.
Indeed, all through a person’s childhood, no matter how adverse it may seem to
be, there may arise situations with the potential for conferring resilience as well as
vulnerability (Masten & Obradovic, 2006). There may be, for example, a supportive aunt
or grandmother who acts as a buffer against the stress of the mother-child relationship
and any other chaos that might prevail in the child’s home and provides the child with
opportunities to build the skills and abilities required for a relatively stable, coherent
and valued sense of self.  Or there may be a teacher who takes a special interest in the
child, thus enabling them to begin to realise their capacities for learning and for
achievement, which in turn may precipitate a reassessment of the value they assign to
their ‘self’. Thus it may be that while the child will always carry with them the ‘scars’
(literally and metaphorically) of early relational problems, they may live out their life
without ever experiencing the kind of suffering which would bring them to the attention
of the mental health profession.
It is contended, however, that early relational problems of the kind described in
this thesis will make people more vulnerable to the effects of stressors and/or loss of or
lack of social support, and the earlier and the longer a person is exposed to such
problems the more vulnerable they will be. As they move through childhood and
adolescence and into adulthood these people, if subjected to enough ‘stress’, will break
down sooner and suffer more intensely, than people who are not as vulnerable and their
suffering will be much more likely to be formally diagnosed as a ‘mental illness’ of one
kind or another.
What is felt to be ‘stressful’ and what is not, is bound up in the feelings, and the
meanings, people have learned to associate with certain events. As has been noted
above, such feelings arise out of our reactions to what happens to us over the course of
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our development. As was discussed in Section 5.4.1, while a person may not ‘remember’
such feelings, or the experiences that gave rise to them, in such a way as to enable them
to narratively reconstruct them, these feelings and experiences will nevertheless exert an
ongoing effect. These embodied feelings are there from the very beginning, long before
we develop an overt facility with language, and they remain at the core of our
experience throughout our lives (Cromby, 2006b).
Because the early life of those who have received inadequate care of one kind or
another have been, at a person-level and an organismic/molecular-level, highly
stressful, as has been outlined above, many of the ‘embodied feelings’ of such people are
essentially of a negative nature.  As a number of theorists from both the biological and
social sciences have noted (Meares, 2000; Perry, 2002; Schwarz & Perry, 1994) such
feelings can then be ‘triggered’ or ‘called out’ by subsequent events in a person’s life
which ‘remind’ them of the original event(s). Thus, relatively minor relational ‘failures’ –
a certain ‘look’ from a loved one, getting turned down for a promotion, a friend’s
perceived slight – may ‘trigger’ or ‘call out’ highly negative embodied ‘memories’ of
separation and abandonment which then precipitate feelings and behaviours which, to
onlookers, may seem to be out of all proportion to the event.
At the organismic/molecular level the reactivation of such ‘memories’ would
initiate the body’s stress response systems (Schwarz, 1994), already sensitized due to
stress-induced vulnerability of limbic areas (Post, 1992; Post, Weiss & Leverich, 1994,
cited in Harkness & Tucker, 2000) resulting in either hypo- or hyper-arousal (Perry,
2001, p. 5).
At the person-level such ‘memories’ would be experienced as intensely negative
feelings (e.g., fear, anger, panic, hopelessness) accompanied by disturbing thoughts and
bodily sensations over which the person would feel little control (Schwarz, 1994).
Further, such feelings may then stimulate behaviour that may seem ‘hyperactive’ or
‘over-the-top’, or, conversely, behaviour that is suggestive of hesitance, avoidance or
numbness (Garmezy, 1974; Schwarz & Perry, 1994).  Perry (1991) suggests that such
‘malignant memories’ (Schwarz & Perry, 1994) are the basis for the characteristic
symptoms of post-traumatic-stress-syndrome (PTSD) and may also underlie, or
contribute towards, a number of other so-called ‘psychopathologies’.
Because of this, people with who have experienced the kind of ‘unsupportive
parenting’ experiences and adverse home environments discussed above are not only
more vulnerable to the effects of stressful events they are also likely to find more events
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stressful due to the the effects wrought by the reactivation of such embodied memories
from their early lives. Thus, in the manner of all dynamic systems the occurrence of
certain events during the course of a person’s lifeline may, due to their timing, their
intensity and/or the meanings they carry for the person involved, eventually result in
the kinds of experiences which are conceptualised as being due to a ‘mental
disorder’/‘dysfunctioning mind’.  I will discuss in more detail how early vulnerabilities
may, depending on the complexities of each person’s lifeline, result in the experiences
involved in two of psychiatry’s major ‘mental disorders’ – ‘schizophrenia’ and
‘depression’ – in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX
APPLYING THE PERSON-BASED ACCOUNT
TO ‘SCHIZOPHRENIA’ AND ‘DEPRESSION’
6.1. WAYS OF BEING, WAYS OF SUFFERING
Pain is in my neck. Sorrow is in my head and neck.  Anguish is in my shoulders. All
suffering is truly in me.
Anonymous (Bouricius, 1989)
I spent day after day crying, huddled up in bed where I felt safe and could do no harm to
myself.  I could not concentrate to read or even watch television, and I did nothing for
hours on end. My appetite disappeared, and I was constantly exhausted.
Kathryn (McNeil, 1993)
An indescribable anguish squeezed my heart , an anguish no resolve could allay. If I
refused to obey, I felt guilty and cowardly for not daring, and the anguish mounted.
Then the order became more insistent. If, finally to obey, I went to the fire and stretched
out my hand, an intense feeling of guilt overcame me as though I were doing something
wicked, and the anxiety waxed in proportion. I should say, however, that the latter
alternative provoked a greater disturbance, for I felt that if I obeyed the order, I should
commit an act irreparably damaging to my personality.
Marguerite (Sechehaye, 1964)
The mornings themselves were becoming bad now as I wandered about lethargic . . . but
afternoons were still the worst, when I’d feel the horror, like some poisonous fogbank,
roll in upon my mind, forcing me into bed. There I would lie for as long as six hours,
stuporous and virtually paralyzed, gazing at the ceiling and waiting for that moment of
evening when, mysteriously, the crucifixion would ease up just enough to allow me to
force down some food and then, like an automaton, seek an hour or two of sleep again.
William (Styron, 1990)
Voices, like the roar of a crowd came. I felt like Jesus; I was being crucified. It was dark. I
just continued to huddle under the blanket, feeling weak, laid bare and defenceless in a
cruel world I could no longer understand.
Stuart (Myers, 2001)
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The above quotations are from people who have been diagnosed with one or
other of the two ‘mental disorders’ that will be the focus of the analysis presented in this
chapter. What is most apparent reading through even such brief excerpts as these is that
central to the experience of such ‘disorders’ is intense suffering.  These people
experience emotional and physical pain, deep sorrow, fear, exhaustion, weakness, and
vulnerability. They feel confused, trapped, out of control and out of touch with the
world. They feel hopeless, numb, self-destructive and overwhelmed.  They use words
and phrases such as ‘chaos’, ‘dark’, ’black poisonous fogbank’, ‘crucifixion’, ‘treacherous
quagmire’ and ‘abyss’ in order to convey something of the anguish they experience in
order that we, who have not felt these things, might understand what it is like to be
them.
As was pointed out in Chapter Two the experience and the genesis and
maintenance of such suffering is still essentially mystifying to those who approach it as
the result of a ‘dysfunctioning’ mind (or brain) because the assumptions about human
beings which underlie this view are inherently faulty. If we take the view of human
beings espoused in this thesis, however  –  that individual experience does not arise
from ‘within’ the individual but rather is socio-culturally and biologically co-constituted
over the course of one’s lifeline – such experiences become more ‘understandable1’
The analysis sketched out in Chapter Five suggested that the kinds of suffering
exemplified by the two disorders which will be the focus of this chapter should not be
conceptualized as ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’ but, rather, as experiences and ‘ways of
being’ that emerge from the complex coactions between the biological, the personal and
the social aspects of our lives.  It was essentially argued that our personal being and the
neurobiological tools that subserve that personal being, develop within the context of
the psychologically and biologically symbiotic interactions occurring between a child
and significant others in their environment, usually, in the modern Western context, the
mother. Because of this, it was suggested, problems within this relationship can exert
potentially profound effects at the organismic, molecular and the personal level, effects
that confer upon the child vulnerabilities to the kinds of suffering conceptualised as
‘mental disorder’.
                                                 
1 As has already been noted in Chapter Two (see Footnote 25), Karl Jaspers, a German psychiatrist who
initiated the phenomenological movement in psychiatry noted in his General Psychopathology (1913, 1963,
cited in Sass, 2002) that some ‘mental disorders’ are ‘understandable’ and some are ‘un-understandable’ –
closed to psychological comprehension or understanding.
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What makes the difference between how such generalised vulnerabilities may
‘play out’ as particular kinds of suffering, however, is to be found in the complex
coactions between these organismic, molecular and person-level vulnerabilities
conferred by such unsupportive and/or abusive parenting and the ongoing events of
each individual life. Out of such coactions, it is suggested, emerge a ‘cluster of
sufferings’ unique to each person. That these ‘sufferings’ tend to cluster together and
seem, because of this, to suggest underlying ‘pathologies’ representative of various
discrete ‘disorders’ or ‘illnesses’, simply reflects the reality that many people have very
similar experiences. These experiences, due to us all being animals of a particular kind
who require particular environmental contingencies in order to flourish, play out in
broadly similar ways, though they can never, of course, be exactly the same.
In light of this observation it was decided that rather than approaching the task
of understanding such sufferings by looking at individual ‘symptoms’, which is an
approach commonly taken by those critical of the ‘disorder’ based approach to
psychological suffering, I would acknowledge the reality that such sufferings do indeed
cluster together and look at two of psychiatry’s major ‘clusters’ – conceptualised as
‘schizophrenia’ and ‘major depressive disorder’.
This does not mean, however, that I am endorsing the view that ‘schizophrenia’
and ‘major depression’, or any of the other ‘mental disorders’ for that matter, are
discrete ‘disorders’ or ‘illnesses’ which occur due to underlying ‘pathologies’ of the
‘mind’ or brain and which are easily distinguished from each other.2 Indeed, as has
already been discussed in Chapter Two, this is a highly contested notion, and one that
lacks strong theoretical or empirical support.
This also means that the analysis below is, necessarily, a general one that will
apply to some people who have been diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ or ‘depressive’, but
may not apply to others. Thus, the purpose of the analyses presented below is simply to
illustrate, by way of example, that there may be alternative routes to understanding the
genesis of the cluster of sufferings conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’.
While there is an emerging consensus that such ‘clusters of suffering’ emerge out
of the complex coactions between organismic, molecular and person-level factors,
particularly amongst those working in the field of ‘developmental psychopathology’
(e.g., Cicchetti, 1996; Sroufe & Rutter, 1984; Steinberg & Avenevoli, 2000), the vast
                                                 
2 It should be noted at this point that in order to avoid ponderous phrasing I may, at times, utilise these
diagnostic terms in ways that may seem to the reader to reify them. This is in no way the intention and it is
hoped that when such apparent reifications occur they will be understood as linguistic conveniences.
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majority of theorists, including most developmental psychopathologists, still tend to
give priority to organismic and molecular level factors in the genesis of such suffering.
While such organismic and molecular level factors may precipitate and exacerbate
psychological suffering it is suggested that it is person level factors, particularly those
which occur within, and emerge out of, our interactions with our primary care-giver,
which give particular shape to these ‘sufferings’ due to their effects on the early stages of
the emergence of the various ‘senses of self’ (as outlined in Chapter Three) which
comprise our personal being.
It must be stressed, however, that this focus on person-level factors in no way
negates the centrality of the organismic and molecular level factors in the genesis and
experience of psychological suffering. As I will attempt to sketch out below, the
emergence of such suffering depends on coactions between these factors, all of which
are necessary for the emergence of psychological suffering but none of which are
sufficient to it. What is being argued, however, is that it is to person-level factors that
one must look to understand the genesis of the particularities involved in the various
‘clusters of suffering’ conceptualised as ‘mental disorders’. Indeed, given the profoundly
personal nature of psychological suffering, the subjective experience of which is ‘located’
at the person level and talked about using P-grammar3, there is really no other place to
look for such understandings.
Indeed, it is because of this that I will not, as has already been noted in Chapter
Five, be speculating about the role various genes may play in the genesis of
‘schizophrenia’ or ‘depression’.  While it is acknowledged that it is possible, although this
has by no means been proven beyond a doubt, that certain genetic profiles may make a
person more vulnerable to suffering psychologically in certain environments the
position being taken here is that it is the environment within which those genes are
expressed, and within which a person lives out his or her life, that makes the difference
between a person experiencing suffering or not experiencing suffering. The same point
applies vis a vis various other biological factors which have been the subject of much
speculation from researchers attempting to find the ‘causes’ of ‘mental illness’ – for
example, viruses, birth defects, birth trauma, etc..
Indeed, as Read, Perry, Moskowitz and Connolly (2001) note, one of the rare
studies to evaluate the families who have adopted the ‘at-risk’ offspring of parents with
‘schizophrenia’ found that only 4% of those children raised by ‘healthy’ adoptive
                                                 
3 See Chapter Five for a discussion of the different ‘grammars’ which need to be utilised when discussing
different aspects of our being in the world.
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families were diagnosed as ‘severe and psychotic’ compared to 34% of the children
raised by ‘disturbed’ adoptive families. Tiernari et al. (1991, p. 463, cited in Read et al.,
2001, p. 325) concluded that “in healthy rearing families the adoptees have little serious
mental illness, whether or not their biological mothers were schizophrenic”.  Thus, notes
Read (Read et al., 2001, p. 325), “dysfunction of the family, and the maltreatment of the
child implied thereby had 7 times more explanatory power than genetic predisposition”.
Similarly, a study which found that a polymorphism in the 5-HTT gene occurs
more frequently in those who are depressed (although it should be noted that this is not
a consistently replicated finding4) also found that people with this gene only get
depressed if they are exposed to multiple stressful life events (Capsi, Sugden, Moffitt,
Taylor et al., 2003). Further, not all people who are depressed have this polymorphism.
Claiming, as a number of media reports have done, that such research has discovered
the ‘gene for depression’ is, quite simply, wrong. Indeed, it is akin to suggesting that
having two X chromosomes is involved in the genesis of depression because this
chromosomal pattern is found more frequently in people who are depressed.5
Thus the focus of this analysis will not be upon a person’s genetic make-up, or on
any other biological ‘vulnerabilities’ which may increase a person’s likelihood of
suffering psychologically, within a certain environment, rather it will be upon the
processes that do, and do not, occur within their social environment, and the possible
effects of these on the development of a person’s neurobiological tools and their
emerging personal being.
.
6.2. SCHIZOPHRENIA
He tended to lose the sense of whose thoughts originated in whom, and felt ‘as if’ his
interlocutor somehow ‘invaded him’, an experience that shattered his identity and was
intensely anxiety provoking. When walking on the street, he scrupulously avoided
glancing at his mirror image in the windowpanes of shops, because he felt uncertain on
which side he actually was.
(Parnas & Handest, 2003, pp. 129-130)
                                                 
4 See, for example, a review by Thapar, Harold, Rice, Langley & O’Donovan (2007).
5 As Gotlib and Hammen (1992, p. 18) note, “considerable evidence across a wide array of methods of
investigation suggests that women are about two times more likely to experience clinical depressions than
men”.
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. . . I wonder if I ever knew myself, or merely played the parts that were acceptable, just
so that I could fit in somewhere.
Mary (M. E. McGrath, 1984, p. 838)
Early on, I was aware that something was terribly wrong with me, that something was
‘odd within’, though I never could have put a name to it or expressed the experience in
words.
(Wagner, 1996, p. 400)
I am a lonely nothing, a being, but pass me by. Forever pass me by. Strangers, I don’t see
you. My afflictions fill the place that was meant for sharing love. I am crying in despair.
Anonymous (Bouricius, 1989, p. 202)
The latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual, the DSM-IV-TR
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) suggests that to be diagnosed as
‘schizophrenic’ three diagnostic criteria must be met. These are:
(1) Characteristic symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
speech, grossly disorganized behaviour (often characterised as ‘positive
symptoms’), negative symptoms – affective flattening (loss or decline in
emotional response), alogia (slowed speech), or avolition (lowered
motivational levels);
(2) Social/occupational dysfunction: Work, interpersonal relationships or self-
care must be markedly affected for a significant amount of time since the
onset of the disturbance;
(3) Duration: The disturbances must have been experienced for at least six
months.
The seemingly straight-forward nature of this list of criteria belies, however, the
wide range of experiences which are conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’. As MacDonald
and Schulz (2009, p. 495) point out in an article attempting to summarise the known
‘facts’ about ‘schizophrenia’, “schizophrenia has a heterogeneous presentation, with
disorganized, positive, and negative symptoms having different levels of prominence
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across time and across individuals”. Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Two,
’schizophrenia’ has been singled out for particularly intensive criticism even in
comparison to other so-called ‘mental disorders’, for its “weak diagnostic accuracy,
uncertain aetiology and dustbin-like character” (Miller, 1986, p23).
In an ongoing exploration of ‘anomalies of subjective experience’ in
schizophrenia Parnas and his colleagues (Parnas & Handest, 2003) (Parnas, Handest,
Jansson, & Saebye, 2005) (Parnas & Sass, 2002) (Sass, 2002) suggest that what
characterises the ‘schizophrenic’ experience more than anything else is “certain
alterations in the structure of consciousness”, alterations which not only generate
‘strange experiences’ but also “altered forms of subjectivity” (Cermolacce et al., 2007, p.
705, authors’ italics).  These authors suggest that particularly prominent among these
‘anomalies’ are ‘disturbances of self’.
Indeed, ever since its ‘discovery’ in the nineteenth century schizophrenia has
been characterised as “a brain disorder that is manifested as a disturbance of self” (Keefe
& David, 1998) with Lysaker and Lysaker (2002) noting that “there has been almost
uniform acceptance that a disruption in sense of self is a universal experience among
persons with schizophrenia”.  As Davidson and Strauss (1992) note, however,
while a distortion of self remains to this day an essential phenomenological characteristic
of schizophrenia . . . it has received considerably less attention in recent years with the
increasing support for ‘descriptive’ and biological approaches to severe mental illness.
According to Cermolacce et al. (2007) the most prominent feature of the
‘disturbances of self’ involved in schizophrenia is essentially something Blankenburg
(1971, cited in Cermolacce et al., 2007, p. 706) called a “’loss of natural self-evidence’, a
deficient pre-given obviousness and naturalness of the world and people”. Cermolacce
et al. (2007, p. 706), in presenting a case study to illustrate this, note that their patient,
Maria, “experiences a constant lack of immersion in the environing world, an
impossibility of full presence”.  Maria complains that due to an invisible barrier
preventing her full presence, she is never able to be fully spontaneous and immerse
herself in the world. She feels as if she is “living life in a fog” and notes that at times she
feels as if she is only “seventy percent conscious”.
While Maria acknowledges ownership of her thoughts she experiences them at a
distance, as if they do not come from her own self.  She feels as if she is not fully alive,
she is not “quite human” or “from this planet”, as if, suggest Cermolacce et al. (2007, p.
706)  “she were a thing, a physical object, rather than a subject”. Cermolacce et al. (2007)
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go on to note that such feelings may seem quite trivial or ordinary but on closer
examination they seem to “be related to a disturbed ability to grasp every day
significations of the world”.  For Maria, these feelings
appear as motivated by a profoundly disturbed, incomplete sense of instantaneous self-
identity which she first experienced in her early childhood. She was always insecure of
herself, “lacking a solid attitude”. Now, she has a difficulty in interacting with others; she
does not know what to say and what to mean. Looking at her own hands may surprise
her and she may stare in the mirror, sometimes for hours, inspecting her facial
appearance.
(Cermolacce et al., 2007, p. 706, authors’ italics)
According to Cermolacce et al. (2007, p. 706), Maria’s “clinical picture is a typical
example of premorbid experience and behaviour of schizophrenia”.  They suggest that
such thoughts and feelings are due to “a sense of personal insecurity (often associated
with a feeling of being profoundly different from others) and a lack of ‘common sense’ –
a term which they use to refer to a “tacit, fluid, context-sensitive and automatic pre-
understanding of and attunement to other people and situations” (Cermolacce et al.,
2007, p. 706).
Cermolacce et al. (1997, p. 706) note that the changes of awareness experienced in
the early ‘prodromal’ stages of schizophrenia comprise “a family of complaints about a
certain unclarity or opacity of consciousness and a diminished sense of inner aliveness”
(Cermolacce et al., 2007, p. 706, authors’ italics) that are very difficult for the person to
put into words and “even more difficult for the psychiatrist to enquire about”. Such
experiences, they suggest, indicate “a very fundamental disturbance of the self in
schizophrenic conditions”; a disturbance, essentially, of the first person perspective
which for most people is “an experience given to me as immediately mine” (Cermolacce et
al., 2007, p. 706, authors’ italics).
The sense of self which Cermolacce et al. (2007) suggest is disturbed in
schizophrenia is essentially the first aspect of ‘Self 1’, as described by Harré (1998, p. 4);
the
sense of one’s location as a person, in each of several arrays of other beings, relevant to
personhood . . . the sense of one’s point of view . . . a location in space from which one
perceives and acts upon the world, including the part that lies within one’s own skin.
This sense of self, as Cermolacce et al. (2007, p. 707, authors’ italics) go on to note,
does not belong to someone
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in the sense of a relation . . . of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being
me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the
sense of self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience
manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation of self-awareness of
experience is called ‘mineness’ or ipseity.
Central to this sense of self is the reality of our biophysical embodiment.   In
line with Harré’s (1998) analysis, Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) note that “conscious
experience is . . . never purely cognitive or spiritual but is closely intertwined with our
bodily existence and experience”. Because we are physically embodied creatures
“embodiment is a fundamental condition of selfhood”. As Parnas and Handest (2003)
further note,
The body has ambiguous experiential status: at the one extreme it is a ‘lived body’ . . . ,
i.e., subjective, animated body, identical with the self; at the other extreme it is
experienced as a physical, spatially extended object or thing . . . Incessant oscillation or
interplay between these experiential bodily modes constitute a tacit foundation of all
experiencing.
As was noted in Chapter Three, while our sense of experiencing ourselves as an
embodied perceiver in the world, and of seeing everything from that viewpoint, is the
most basic aspect of consciousness it is, nevertheless, not something which occurs solely
within the person. Consciousness, it was suggested, is relational, which makes our
ability to perceive an active process at every level. And because it is an active process it
requires action and, inevitably, interaction with other ‘things’ in the world, material and,
most importantly, social.
Thus, in line with the position held by Harré (1998) and Shotter (1984; 1993a),
Cermolacce et al. (2007, p. 705) describe such a sense of self as
a mutally constitutive relation between the organism and its Um-welt, the latter
composed of ‘domains of significance’ or affordances. In other words, the lived world, -
as it is patterned by and is patterning my first person perspective, always contains a
ubiquitously implicit sense of unique familiarity, and thus exerting a stabilizing influence
on the very structure of my (first-person) experience of the world.
 Also in line with Harré (1998) and Shotter (1984, 1993), Cermolacce et al. (2007, p.
705) suggest that because of this
one should not think of the first person perspective in a strictly internalistic manner as an
immanent formal cognitive structure, ‘void of personality’, as an attention-ray from an
abstract disengaged ego-pole. If the organism were not motivationally geared to its
encounter with the world or if the subject was not a being in the world, there would be
no articulation of such affordances.
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As has also already been noted in Chapter Three, Harré (1998, p. 104) suggests
that the origins of this sense of ‘self’ “lie in the manipulative practices with which . . . an
infant begins to appreciate its world as ordered, with respect to its own position as an
embodied being among other things and beings of that or similar sorts”. Because of the
initial helplessness of the human infant such manipulations must, as was discussed in
Chapters Three and Five, be scaffolded and thus enabled by other human beings in the
child’s world. In Western contexts it is mainly the child’s mother who fulfils this role
during early infancy. It is, suggests Shotter (1974a) via such enablings that children learn
to coordinate their actions with their perceptions, thus allowing them to gradually
incorporate the structure of their environment into their actions so that they learn to
meet their environment with the right response.
Given this analysis it is possible that while most attempts to understand the
schizophrenic experience blame such disturbances of self on ‘dysfunctioning’
neurobiology, such disturbances may arise, at least in part, because of disruptions
during early infancy in the processes involved in acquiring that basic sense of ‘mineness’
or ipseity central to the experience of being a ‘self’ in the world, the sense of self which
enables a feeling of “pre-given obviousness and naturalness of the world and people”
(Cermolacce et al., 2007, p. 706) .
Such disruptions may occur if the child is in a relationship with their primary
care-giver which does not provide the kind of ‘enablings’ referred to above. That is not,
of course, to say that the neurobiological tools which subserve the skills and abilities
required to develop this sense of self do not also play a role, indeed, as will be shown in
the analysis to follow, it is the coactions which occur between a person’s neurobiology,
their person-level reactions to the events occurring in their lives, and their disrupted or
incomplete senses of self which eventually result in the experience of ‘schizophrenia’.
The kind of relationship which did not provide such basic ‘enablings’ would, it is
speculated, be marked by a high level of disengagement on the part of the primary care-
giver, with any interactions that did occur being primarily of a negative nature – ranging
from emotional coldness and dismissiveness through to cruelty and physical and/or
sexual abuse. It must be stressed at this point that such disengagement may occur in the
context of so-called ‘good’ homes although it will, as was outlined in Chapter Five, be
much more likely to occur in ‘disadvantaged’ homes, as reflected in the epidemiological
studies showing higher rates of ‘schizophrenia’ among certain socially disadvantaged
groups (J. McGrath, Saha, Chant, & Welham, 2008; Reininghaus et al., 2008; Warner,
1985).
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In support of the contention that certain kinds of early relational problems may
be foundational for the experiences conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ a study of over
500 child guidance clinic attenders found that over 35% of those diagnosed
‘schizophrenic’ as adults had been removed from home because of neglect; double the
rate of any other diagnosis (Robins, 1996, cited in Read, van Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005).
And a study by Cannon, Caspi and Moffit (2002, cited in Read et al., 2005) EN102),
involving over 1000 people, found that those whose interactions with their mothers at
age three years were characterized by ‘harshness towards the child’ and ‘no effort to
help the child’ were, as adults, significantly more likely to be diagnosed with
schizophreniform disorder 6. Further, in a sample of adults diagnosed with
schizophrenia 85 percent had suffered some form of childhood abuse or neglect, with 50
percent having suffered childhood sexual abuse (Howlowka, King, Saheb et al., 2003,
cited in Read et al., 2005).
Indeed, a number of researchers are suggesting that childhood sexual abuse is
particularly common in the early lives of people who are later diagnosed with
‘schizophrenia’ (see Read et al., 2001 for a review). A study by Friedman, Smith & Fogel
(2002, cited in Read et al., 2005), for example, found that among a group of female
outpatients who were diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ 78 percent had been sexually abused
during their childhood, compared to 26 percent of people with ‘panic disorder’, 30
percent of those with ‘anxiety disorders’ and 42 percent of those with ‘major depression’.
Child abuse has been linked, in particular, to the development of the ‘symptoms’
characteristic of psychosis (Janssen et al., 2004; Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003). A
study by Ross, Anderson and Clark (1994, cited in Morrison et al., 2003) found, for
example, that patients who reported being sexually abused during their childhood were
more likely to report psychotic symptoms that patients who did not report being
sexually abused. This links with research indicating that experiencing trauma of any
kind is linked to a higher likelihood of becoming psychotic (Grimby, 1993, cited in
Morrison et al., 2003; Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2006).
Whitfield, Dube, Felitti and Anda (Whitfield, Dube, Felitti, & Anda, 2005, p. 797) also
found that there was a “statistically significant and graded relationship between
histories of childhood trauma and histories of hallucinations that was independent of a
                                                 
6 The ‘symptoms’ of ‘Schizophreniform disorder’ are very similar to ‘schizophrenia’ but the total duration of
the illness is shorter (at least one month but less than six months, whereas schizophrenia is at least six
months) and impaired social or occupational functioning is not a requirement though it may occur. About
half of those diagnosed with ‘schizophreniform disorder’ are later diagnosed with schizophrenia
(Strakowski, 1994)
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history of substance abuse”. Hallucinations are, of course, one of the central components
of the psychotic experience.
While research suggests that the incidence of childhood sexual abuse is
particularly high amongst those diagnosed with ‘schizophrenia’, however, it is also a
feature of the early lives of many of those diagnosed with various kinds of ‘mental
disorder’ – for example, childhood sexual abuse is prevalent amongst those diagnosed
with ‘panic disorder’, ‘anxiety disorder’, ‘bi-polar disorder’, ‘major depression’ and
‘borderline personality disorder’ (Beitchman et al., 1992; Leverich, Perez, Luckenbaugh,
& Post, 2002; Read, 1997; Weaver & Clum, 1993).  It is also the case that many people
experience childhood sexual abuse without developing the ‘symptoms’ of any major
‘mental disorder’ (Finkelhor, 1990; Kendall-Tackett, Williams, & Finkelhor, 1993),
although this does not, of course, necessarily mean that such people do not suffer from
having been abused in this way (Finkelhor, 1990).
As a number of authors (e.g., Alexander, 1992; Molnar, Buka, & Kessler, 2001)
point out, childhood sexual abuse usually occurs as part of a general cluster of family
adversities, including factors such as ‘maternal unavailability’, ‘absence of a biological
parent’ and a ‘poor relationship’ with parents (Alexander, 1992), all factors which may
result in the basic ‘disturbances of self’ suggested to underlie ‘schizophrenia’.  Peters
(1988, cited in Alexander, 1992) found that maternal warmth emerged as a stronger
predictor of adjustment in adulthood than did abuse variables (duration and severity of
abuse) and Alexander (1992, p. 185) cites a number of studies showing that the severity
of the long-term effects of childhood sexual abuse “appears to be mediated by the
support received from the non-abusive parent”.
Such findings suggest that childhood sexual abuse, in and of itself, may not
necessarily be foundational of the schizophrenic experience, though having experienced
such abuse would, in the light of the analysis being presented in this thesis, be expected
to exert an impact on the way in which ‘schizophrenia’ would be experienced.  If
childhood sexual abuse occurs within the context of an extremely disengaged and
emotionally cold child-care-giver relationship this relationship will be unable to buffer
the already damaged child against the further stress caused by the abuse, thus
increasing the probability that the abuse will cause even more ‘damage’ to the child at
every level – organismic, molecular and personal – thus being more likely, particularly
in the face of any intensification of the psychosocial demands placed on them, to
precipitate the symptoms characteristic of psychosis.  I will discuss the implications of
this in more detail below.
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I will now attempt to outline how damage to this basic sense of ‘self’ may impact
on all other aspects of a person’s being in the world and may lead to the constellation of
‘signs’ and ‘symptoms’ which are considered representative of the ‘disorder’
conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’. As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) note, a
disturbance of this most basic sense of self exerts
profound reverberations on the sense of personal identity: unstable ipseity and lack of
common sense7 create a vacuum at the very core of one’s subjectivity. This vacuum
deprives the patient of reliable dispositional attitudes that normally imbibe cognition and
emotion with a sense of typicality and familiar direction.
Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) suggest that such ‘disturbances of presence’
seem to “constitute a foundation of the more explicit and articulated anomalies of
selfhood” such as a sense of identity over time or demarcation from other people (both
aspects of Self 2). As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) point out
if a memory of a past event is to contribute to my sense of identity over time, it can only
do this job in so far as the past event is being remembered as having taken place in my
field of awareness, as something which was originally experienced from my first-person
perspective.
This contention is supported by a number of studies which strongly suggest that
autobiographical memory, a central ‘ontological skill’ involved in creating and
maintaining a sense of oneself as a continuous unity through time, is disturbed in
‘schizophrenia’ (Danion et al., 2005; Riutort, Cuervo, & Danion, 2003) with patients
recalling very few specific autobiographical memories (Riutort, Cuervo, Danion, Peretti
& Salamé, 2003, cited in Danion et al., 2005).
Interestingly, it has been found that people who experienced ‘emotional trauma’
during their early childhood have longer periods of infantile amnesia than those who
have not experienced such trauma (childhood amnesia has its offset at around 3.5 years
for the general population and 6.1 years for those with a history of early trauma) (R.
Joseph, 2003).  Given the dearth of autobiographical memories in people who are
diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’, such findings provide further support for the contention
being made in this thesis that early relational problems may be involved in the genesis
of the experiences conceptualised as ‘schizophrenic’.
                                                 
7 As in the sense of ‘sensus communis’ (Gadamer, 1989, cited in Cermolacce et al., p. 706) – a “tacit fluid,
context-sensitive and automatic pre-understanding of an attunement to other people and situations, the
latter being constantly remodelled by our own acting”. This is essentially what Shotter (1993) means when
he refers to ‘knowing of the third kind’ (see Chapter Three, Section 3.3).
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Parnas and Handest  (2003, p. 126) further note that such basic identity
disturbances are different from those seen in the ‘non-schizophrenia spectrum
personality disorders’ such as ‘borderline personality disorder’ or ‘narcissistic
personality disorder’. In these  ‘disorders’, suggest Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126)
“the identity disorder operates on the level of social self (self-image), with the sense of
ipseity and pre-reflective immersion remaining intact”. It is suggested in Section 6.3
below that this is also the case with ‘depression’.
As Parnas and Sass (2002, p. 111) point out, “pre-schizophrenics and schizotypal
patients frequently manifest behavioral abnormalities in early infancy and childhood”
which may be associated with the basic disturbance of self these authors suggest
underlie the schizophrenic experience.  For example, research suggests children who
later become ‘schizophrenic’ exhibit perceptual, cognitive and motor ‘abnormalities’ and
delayed development of motor skills, especially walking, during the first two years of
their life (e.g., Walker & Lewine, 1990). Socially, children who later become
schizophrenic also seem to find it much more difficult interacting with other people than
‘normal’ controls, for example, a study by Jones et al. (1994, cited in D. A. Lewis &
Levitt, 2002) observed that at age 4 years such children were observed to be more likely
to play alone.
While such ‘abnormalities’ are often suggested to be purely due to
‘dysfunctioning’ neurobiology, it is possible that they may also be due, at least in part, to
a constant sense of ‘unmineness’ of experience which by destabilising the very structure
of their (first-person) experience of the world compromises their attempts to negotiate
their way around that world both physically and socially.
The kind of ‘abnormalities’ outlined above may also impact adversely on already
problematic relations between the child and their primary care-giver potentially leading
the care-giver to be even more unresponsive or abusive and less able to interact with the
child in ways conducive to scaffolding the emergence of the other ‘senses of self’ central
to personal being. In addition, as already noted above, the emergence of these other
‘senses of self’ would already be compromised by the basic instability of the first aspect
of Self 1, the basic sense of the ‘mineness’ of experience.
The compounding difficulties outlined above will then have repercussions for
the person as they move beyond infancy and into childhood leaving them less equipped
to deal with the new and increasingly challenging socio-emotional and cognitive
demands of formal education. Indeed there are a number of studies which report that
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children who later become schizophrenic experience numerous problems during this
stage of childhood which may reflect the cascade of person-level and organismic/
neurobiological level factors suggested to contribute towards the eventual emergence of
the cluster of experiences conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’.
For example, Cannon, Walsh, Hollis, Kargin and Taylor et al. (2001, p. 424) found
that children who later become schizophrenic were ‘abnormally suspicious and
sensitive’ and showed difficulty in relating to other people. Done, Crow, Johnstone &
Sacker (1994) also noted children who later developed ‘schizophrenia’ were rated by
their teachers as being more socially ‘maladjusted’ than controls. Reflecting the
underlying physiological-level ‘hyper’ and ‘hypoactivity’ described above, even at the
age of seven pre-schizophrenic boys were more likely to be rated as over-reactive than
controls and tended to be described as being ‘anxious for acceptance’ and also as
‘hostile’ to other children and to adults.
When assessed again at 11 years boys showed a similar ‘over-reactive’ behaviour
profile. Pre-schizophrenic girls were also judged to be more socially ‘maladjusted’ than
‘normal’ controls, but while the girls were rated as ‘over-reactive’ at age seven (though
not as over-reactive as boys), by age 11 they were rated as under-reactive, being seen as
withdrawn, unforthcoming and depressed. This divergence between the genders is in
line with the consistent finding reported in the depression research literature that upon
entering adolescence the sex difference patterns that typify adult depression begin to
emerge. As Gotlib and Hammen (1992, p. 40, authors’ italics) note “while studies of
preadolescent samples typically find either no sex differences or elevations in boys’ rates
of depression, teenage girls are diagnosed and report symptoms of depression two or
three times the rate of boys”.
It is suggested that such difficulties negotiating their way around the social
world may be due, in part, to the lack of “natural self-evidence”, the deficient sense of
the “pre-given obviousness and naturalness of the world and people” arising from
fundamental difficulties with their basic sense of being in the world.  As Cermolacce et
al. (2007) note, such a “sentiment of perplexity” leads to excessive ruminations on
everyday matters that would not concern ‘normal’ people, thus interfering with “normal
interactions with the world”.  Such perplexity would be exacerbated by the impact of
these early disturbances on the acquisition of the other ‘senses of self’ outlined by Harre
(1998) – the sense of oneself as an agent in the world, and the sense of oneself as a
unique human being with one’s own attributes and a past, present and future which can
be narrated both to the self and others.
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Indeed, research suggests that people who are eventually diagnosed as
‘schizophrenic’ may experience ‘disturbances of self’ from very early in their lives. For
example, “one follow-back study using objective information . . . [revealed] fluidity of
self-demarcation, lack of a coherent narrative-historical self-identity, and other self-
disturbances to be prominent features of the pre-schizophrenic states at school age”
(Hartman, Millofsky, Vaillant et al., 1984, cited in Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. ??).
Parnas and Handest (2003) also cite the work carried out by Huber, Klosterkotter
and their colleagues (Gross, Kluber, Klosterkötter et al., cited in Parnas & Handest, 2003)
in Germany which have “identified subtle (nonpsychotic) affective, cognitive,
perceptual, motor, and bodily disturbances” which they suggest may precede the onset
of schizophrenia. As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 123) note, “several of these
disturbances reflect anomalies in self experience (e.g., varieties of depersonalization,
disturbances of consciousness and action, distorted bodily experiences)”.
This suggests that people who eventually become ‘schizophrenic’ may never feel
completely ‘present’ in the world, they may always, in other words, feel a lack of “the
sense of ‘mineness’ of experience” (Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 125) central to the first
aspect of ‘Self 1’. Indeed Cermolacce et al. (2007, p. 705) point out that such feelings of
oddness “typically arise [a] long time before the onset of the first psychotic phase of the
illness” with many sufferers noting that they have felt such perplexity and ‘disturbances
of self’ since early childhood.
For example, Parnas and Handest (2003) discuss the case of Thomas who
“reported that he felt . . . quite different from other people since his very early
childhood”, while Elizabeth (Herrig, 1995, p. 339), in a First Person Account published in
Schizophrenia Bulletin, reported that at school she felt “different and alone” and that she
“wanted to blend in in the classroom as though I were a desk. I never spoke”. Rosemary
(Traynor, 1997, p. 167) reports that  “[a]s a child I was actually never really happy. I
could sense there was something wrong” while Mary (M. E. McGrath, 1984, p. 838) notes
. . . I wonder if I ever knew myself, or merely played the parts that were acceptable, just
so that I could fit in somewhere.
Similarly, Pamela (Wagner, 1996, p. 400) also suggests early feelings of oddness
‘within’:
Early on, I was aware that something was terribly wrong with me, that something was
‘odd within’, though I never could have put a name to it or expressed the experience in
words.
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While, once again, such ‘disturbances of self’, when they are noticed at all by
psychiatrists operating within the standard paradigm, are often thought to be due to
‘dysfunctioning’ neurobiology, support for the contention that such ‘disturbances of self’
may arise, at least in part, from early relational problems is provided by research from
the field of ‘attachment theory8’. For example, insecurely attached children, although
intellectually equal to securely attached children at the age of 2 years, “are less persistent
and enthusiastic when solving problems”  (Meins, 1997, cited in Bentall, 2004, p. 468)
suggesting problems with conceptualising themselves as someone who can make things
happen in the world. Furthermore, at the age of 11 years insecurely attached children are
“less able to recall specific incidents from earlier in life, and are less able to reflect on
their own mental processes” (Bentall, 2004, p. 468), suggesting problems concerning
autobiographical memory, an ontological skill central to ‘Self 2’.  This is in line with the
findings already noted above that people diagnosed with ‘schizophrenia’ have
difficulties recalling autobiographical memories.
Furthermore, a study by Fonagy and Meins (1997, cited in Bentall, 2004) has
shown that insecurely attached children between four and six years of age “perform less
well than securely attached children on a test designed to measure their ability to
understand the mental states of other people” (Bentall, 2004, p. 468). This also suggests
problems with the acquisition of ‘Self 2’ because one of the central aspects of being a
‘self’ in that sense is also being able to conceptualise others as ‘selves’, similar to though
not identical to you. Indeed, as was outlined in Chapter Three, it is via our interactions
with other ‘selves’ that we learn to become ourselves.  As Parnas and Handest (2003, p.
126) note, this ability to ‘understand the mental states of others’ is often compromised in
people with schizophrenia as illustrated by a comment they quote from a woman called
Anne:  “it is not the question of knowledge; it is prior to knowledge (. . . ); it is so small,
so trivial; every child has it!”.
Indeed, as Bentall (2004, p. 469) points out, a number of studies suggest that
people who become ‘schizophrenic’ show, or report insecure ‘attachment styles’,
particularly those characterised as ‘anxious-avoidant’ and ‘anxious-ambivalent’.  As
Bentall (2004, p. 470) points out, people with the ‘avoidant’ attachment style tend to
“devalue the importance of attachments” and that they often cannot remember specific
details about their relationship with their parents during their childhood. Again, this
links to problems reported with autobiographical memory discussed above. A study by
                                                 
8 See Footnote 15 in Chapter Five regarding the way in which ‘attachment theory’, and the research which
flows from it, is viewed and utilised in this thesis
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Dozier, Stevenson, Lee and Velligan (1991, cited in Bentall, 2004) found that people with
a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’, in comparison with those who were diagnosed with
‘affective disorders’ tended to have an ‘avoidant’ attachment style9 and that such
patients tended to be deluded, hallucinatory and suspicious.
Another study in which a large sample of people were administered
questionnaires measuring attachments to others found that people with ‘schizophrenia’
as defined by the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria, tended to
have “an insecure and especially dismissing attachment style”, while adolescents who
showed high levels of psychoticism and paranoia were likely to have an attachment
style that was either anxious-avoidant or anxious-ambivalent .  As Bentall (2004, p. 470)
notes people with an anxious-ambivalent attachment style “desperately want to have
relationships, but feel in their hearts that no one will ever want to get close to them”.
As Bentall (2004, p. 486) notes, while it might be pointed out that a sizeable
minority of the population are ‘insecurely attached’ but only around one percent of the
population is diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ “we must consider the importance of
interactions between different risk factors for psychosis”. Bentall (2004, p. 486) points
out that a person who is securely attached might cope well with a violent or sexual
assault, whereas someone who has grown up in a stressful and threatening environment
and has an avoidant or ambivalent attachment style may respond by developing
psychotic ‘symptoms’. Indeed the same point has already been made above with respect
to the studies showing the high rates of childhood sexual abuse in people who are
diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’.
While the focus up to this point has been on the centrality of ‘disturbances of
self’ due to early relational problems in the genesis of the experiences conceptualised as
‘schizophrenic’, these ‘disturbances of self’ alone are not enough to generate such
experiences.  As well as impacting on a child’s senses of self, early relational problems
have also been shown to exert disruptive effects on brain development, with changes
occurring on multiple levels, from neurohumoral to structural and functional. As was
noted in Chapter Four, Wismer-Fries, Ziegler, Kurian, Jacoris and Pollak (2005) suggest
that “a failure to receive species-typical care disrupts the normal development of the OT
(oxytocin) and AVP (arginine vasopressin) neurohypophyseal peptide systems in young
                                                 
9 Although it should be noted that this was reported by the patient rather than independently assessed.
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children”, systems which are “an integral part of mammalian emotional circuitry”
(Wismer-Fries, 2005, p. 17,237).
These systems are suggested to be associated with the “emergence of social
bonding, parental care, stress regulation, social communication, and emotional
reactivity” (Wismer-Fries, 2005, p. 17,237).  OT and AVP levels increase during socially
pleasant experiences, such as comforting touch and smells which children who are being
parented in an emotionally unresponsive, cold or harsh way would receive infrequently.
As will be discussed below, stress regulation, social communication and emotional
reactivity are all typically compromised in people who are diagnosed with
‘schizophrenia’.
A number of studies also suggest that chronic stress and persistent
glucocorticoid elevation may be particularly toxic to the hippocampus (Lim, Chong, &
Keefe, 2009; Mirescu et al., 2004). A study by Mirescu, Peters and Gould (2004), suggests
“that early adverse experience inhibits structural plasticity via hypersensitivity to
glucocorticoids and diminishes the ability of the hippocampus to respond to stress in
adulthood” (Mirescu et al., 2004, p. 841), a conclusion supported by clinical studies of
people with a history of abuse who show evidence of a dysregulated10 hippocampal
system (Bremner & Vermetten, 2001) (Bremner et al., 2003).
Because, as Walker and DiForio (1997, p. 674) point out, “the hippocampus
plays a pivotal role in the modulation of the HPA axis, structural abnormalities in this
region would be expected to be linked with HPA dysfunction”. Furthermore, as Lim,
Chong and Keefe (2009, p. 405) point out, the hippocampus “is involved in crucial
‘working memory’ functions throughout childhood until the “prefrontal cortex reaches
functional maturity and takes over this function”.
As was outlined in some detail in Chapter Four, early adverse experience has a
particularly toxic effect on the HPA axis, an aspect of human neurobiology which is
particularly open to the effects of experience during development because of its extreme
and lengthy post-natal plasticity (Perry, 2000; Pollak, 2005; Wismer Fries et al., 2005;
Yates, 2007, pp. 10-11). As Yates (2007) points out, any alteration to these systems may
negatively influence aspects of neuro-development such as synaptic pruning, dendritic
branching, and neuronal death. Ultimately, the continuous activation of the HPA axis
                                                 
10 I will utilise this word to indicate differences in the ways in which the various neural systems of people
who have been under chronic stress respond because it is very commonly used by researchers in the field.
This does not imply an acceptance that the neural systems of people who have been under chronic stress are
‘dysfunctional’, they are simply functioning differently because of the different environmental contingencies
to which they must respond.
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(and associated changes in the functioning of other aspects of the central nervous
system) may lead to deficits not only in brain development but also in social-emotional
and cognitive functioning and the health and growth of the child.
Further illustrating the effect of relational damage on the stress response
systems is research that shows that the cortisol levels of infants in insecure attachment
relationships tend to elevate when they are upset (Gunnar et al., 1996) whereas those of
children in ‘secure’ relationships do not. Research has also shown that the children of
mothers who are ‘emotionally unavailable’ (either due to maternal depression or as a
control tactic) also have higher baseline levels of cortisol (Bugental et al., 2003). As
Bugental et al. (2003) note these elevated baseline levels of cortisol may be seen as
reflecting levels of HPA activity which are characteristic of these children.
Furthermore, research also shows that the physiological stress responses of
children who have ‘disorganised/ disoriented’ attachment relationships (associated with
care-giving which is unpredictable, inconsistent and/or severely missattuned) deviate
markedly from normative stress responses (Hertsgaard et al., 1995). This is in line with
research by Bugental et al. (2003) suggesting that the children of mothers who use
punitive control tactics (e.g., corporal punishment) at very young ages heightened
children’s reactivity to stressful situations. This suggests that when mothers become a
source of stress rather than of support “at an age when children are as yet unable to
regulate their behavior effectively children appear to become more susceptible to the
effects of stressful events” (Bugental & Grusec, 2006, p. 244).
In light of this research, the well-replicated finding that people who are
diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ also have dysregulated stress response systems suggests
that such ‘dysregulations11’ could possibly have their genesis within a child’s
relationship with their first care-giver. For example, a study by Silber (1966, cited in
Garmezy, 1974, p 71) showed, children considered to be at ‘high risk’ for developing
schizophrenia were “highly labile autonomically, reacting to stress with rapid latencies
and abnormal amplitudes” and that “their reactions were overgeneralized” which
broadened the range of situations which were capable of stimulating their already
sensitised stress response systems (Garmezy, 1974, p 71).
Further, in a review of the research on the relationship between stress and
schizophrenia, Walker and DiForio (1997) stated that schizophrenia patients have been
                                                 
11 See Footnote 8.
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found to show higher baseline levels of plasma cortisol and saliva cortisol than normal
controls. In addition, when given the dexamethasone suppression test (DST)
schizophrenic patients, unlike the vast majority of ‘normal’ controls, fail to suppress
cortisol release, a finding which suggests a dysregulation of the HPA axis.
Interestingly such dysregulation of the stress response system12 is also
consistently reported in those diagnosed with affective disorders.  As Davidson (2002, p.
478) notes, elevated activity of the HPA axis “is one of the most replicated biological
findings in major depression”. This is in line with the suggestion that a general
vulnerability to psychological suffering is conferred via early relational problems which
causes ‘damage’ not only to a child’s emerging personal being, but also to their
developing neurobiological tools. How that damage ‘plays out’ will depend on the
particular nature of the damage (as discussed above) and what happens to the child as
they move through their lifeline.
Thus, as was noted in Chapter Five the compounding difficulties at both the
personal and molecular/organismic levels will, at all times during the child’s
development, ‘feed back’ on each other in the recursive manner characteristic of all
dynamic systems.  As was also noted in Chapter Five, the interactions between various
components in a dynamic system may feed back upon themselves directly (a change in
A causes a change in B which then changes A, etc.) or indirectly through a network of
interactions.
This means that the effects exerted on each ‘level’ – the molecular, the
organismic, and the personal-psychological – will also affect all the other levels, creating
‘feedback loops’ which can result in the emergence of patterns within a person that can
prove particularly resistant to change. These feedback mechanisms can also mean that,
paradoxically, systems may change quite suddenly and, seemingly, unpredictably.  In
hindsight, however, it is possible to see a series of changes which led the system into a
state of ‘self-organised criticality’ (Horn, 2002).
As was noted in Chapter Five, such ‘global reorganizations’ occur at phase
transitions; “points of instability and turbulence where old patterns break down and new
ones occur” (M. D. Lewis, 2000, p. 39).  Adolescence – the time between childhood and
early adulthood, a time of life widely acknowledged to be a period of particular stress
(Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; Bentall, 2004) even for people who have not experienced early
                                                 
12 This phrase encompasses not just the HPA axis but also related systems such as the NE-SAM
(norepinephrine-sympathetic adrenomedullary) system, which are involved in the physiological stress
response.
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relational problems – is illustrative of just such a ‘phase transition’.  It is perhaps not
surprising then that it is often either during adolescence or early adulthood that people
become officially ‘ill’ with ‘schizophrenia’13.
As one of the major retrospective studies of the onset of schizophrenia, the
Mannheim Age, Beginning, Course (ABC) study (Hafner et al., 1998) noted, the
distribution of the age of onset (from the occurrence of the first ‘sign’ or ‘symptom’)
showed an early and steep increase for men, with a pronounced peak between 15 and 25
years and a decrease in later years. For women the increase was less steep, with the peak
lower and later, between 15 and 30 years of age.
While biological psychiatrists tend to focus on the changes occurring in the
adolescent brain (see Strauch, 2003 for an overview of this research), as an explanation
for why adolescence is a high-risk period for the first appearance of ‘schizophrenia’
there are also person-level factors that are just as, and quite possibly more, important.
As Bentall (2004, p. 490) notes, adolescence
clearly involves a number of developmental tasks, each of which may be seen as a hurdle
at which the weak or ill-prepared may fall. In the ten years after puberty, the emerging
adult must remodel her relationship with her parents, begin to explore sexual and
emotional relationships with potential partners, and decide on a career path.
Overarching these tasks, there is a need to establish an identity, a process that
developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst Erik Erikson portrayed as the central
problem of adolescence.
Bentall (2004, p. 490) further notes that research has shown that these challenges
seem to provoke in adolescents traits that are reminiscent of characteristics often seen in
psychotic patients: marked shifts of mood coupled with equally dramatic shifts in self-
esteem; self-consciousness, egocentricity and grandiosity; magical thinking and a
preoccupation with powerful role models and the fable of one’s own life.
It should also be noted that the demands and challenges of life may actually be
experienced as more stressful by people who become ‘schizophrenic’ than they are by
other people. For example, research has shown that people who later develop
‘schizophrenia’ report greater subjective stress even though they do not appear to
experience any more stressful events than ‘normal’ controls (Norman & Malla, 1993;
Walker & Diforio, 1997, cited in Corcoran, Walker, Huot, Mittal, Tessner, Kestler et al.,
2003).  ‘Schizophrenic’ patients are also reported to “respond with more negative
                                                 
13 As will be discussed further in Section 6.3., adolescence is also a time when rates of depression begin to
rapidly increase (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992).
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emotions to everyday stressors than do controls” (Myin-Germeys et al., 2001, cited in
Corcoran et al., 2003, p. 676).
This may be due to a complex mix of compounding person-level and
organismic/molecular-level factors. For example, as was noted in Chapter Five, social
challenges and relational difficulties (e.g., failing a test, being turned down for a job,
being turned down for a date, etc.) may reactivate ‘somatic markers’ or embodied
memories of childhood experiences that involved abandonment, rejection and
humiliation. For children who were subjected to abuse, of physical and personal trauma
such memories would be particularly ‘malignant’ (Schwarz, 1994).
At the organismic/molecular level the reactivation of such ‘malignant memories’
would initiate the body’s stress response systems (Schwarz, 1994), already sensitized
due to stress-induced vulnerability of limbic areas (Post, 1992; Post, Weiss & Leverich,
1994, cited in Harkness & Tucker, 2000) resulting in either hypo- or hyper-arousal
(Perry, 2001, p. 5).
Schwarz (1994) suggests that such memories, and the physiological stress they
aroused, would be experienced at the ‘person-level’ as intensely negative feelings (fear,
anger, panic, etc.) accompanied by disturbing thoughts and bodily sensations over
which the person would feel little control.  As was noted in Chapter Five, such feelings
may then stimulate behaviour that may seem ‘hyperactive’ or ‘over-the-top’, or,
conversely, behaviour that is suggestive of hesitance, avoidance or numbness (Garmezy,
1974; Schwarz & Perry, 1994).
If people who later become schizophrenic do, due to relational difficulties with
their first care-giver, experience events as more ‘stressful’ than ‘normal’ people do, then
this suggests that any intensification in the demands placed on them, such as happens,
for example, during adolescence, will be even more likely to precipitate the kind of
changes representative of the ‘signs and symptoms’ of what psychiatrists refer to as the
‘initial prodrome’ of ‘schizophrenia’.  This would also suggest that the more
dysregulated their stress response systems the more severe these ‘symptoms’ would be.
While there is not a lot of research on the underlying neurobiology of the
prodromal symptoms, research concerning ‘negative symptoms’ which, as noted above,
are similar, if not identical, to the prodromal ‘symptoms’, suggests there is an
association between cortisol release and the severity of these symptoms (Walker &
Diforio, 1997, p. 672). This indicates that symptom severity may be related to the severity
of the dysregulations in the HPA system.
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As White, Anjum and Schulz (2006, p. 377) note, “operationally, the prodrome is
defined by duration of time, starting with the onset of decline in the baseline level of
functioning and ending at the time when the criteria for a schizophrenia spectrum
diagnosis are met”. As these authors further note, this time period can be considered as a
continuum, “with the level of risk increasing as the symptoms emerge or evolve during
the prodrome” (White et al. 2006, p. 377). The Mannheim ABC study (Hafner et al., 1998)
suggests that the prodromal phase lasts, on average, for five years and is followed by a
pre-psychotic phase of around one year in duration during which positive symptoms
(hallucinations, delusions, ‘disordered’ thoughts) first appeared and escalated.
While talk of an ‘initial prodrome’ suggests that when the person enters it they
have moved from being ‘normal’ to being in the early stages of a ‘disease process’, the
research cited above, and people’s subjective accounts of their schizophrenic experience,
do not support such a view.  As has already been noted above, many of those who are
later diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ have felt a sense of perplexity and/or oddness about
their relationship with the social and material world since early childhood.  Indeed, as
has already been noted above, the so-called ‘prodrome’ could be seen as just another
point in the developmental trajectory of persons trying to deal with the continuing
repercussions of early relational difficulties, difficulties which profoundly disrupted
their most basic sense of being in the world and the neurobiological systems which
subserve it.
 As Yung and McGorry (1996, p. 358) note, research suggests that the signs and
symptoms of the ‘initial prodrome’ may include:
(1) changes in affect – e.g., anxiety, depression, irritability, anhedonia, suicidal ideas and
guilt; (2) ‘changes in volition’ – e.g., loss of motivation, loss of interest, loss of energy; (3)
‘cognitive changes’ – disturbance of attention, daydreaming, thought blocking; (4)
physical symptoms – somatic complaints, loss of weight, poor appetite, sleep
disturbance; (5) ‘Other symptoms’ – obsessive-compulsive phenomena, dissociative
phenomena, change in sense of self, others, or the world, speech abnormalities,
perceptual abnormalities, and suspiciousness.
As Romans and Seeman (2005, p. 125) note “non-specific symptoms and negative
symptoms usually emerge first, followed by attenuated positive symptoms”.
These changes will be experienced by the child/adolescent at a person-level as
intensified suffering and an increasingly fragile and fragmented ‘sense of self’.  This
sense of the self ‘shattering’ or ‘disintegrating’ occurs as the person progressively loses
(due to the compounding effects of problems arising from their early relational
difficulties coacting with current life-stress and reactivated ‘malignant memories)
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whatever tenuous hold they may have had during childhood on the ‘mineness’ of their
experience (Self 1), their sense of ‘self as agents’ (the second and related aspect of Self 1),
and their ability to conceptualise themselves, and present themselves, as a coherent
unity of experience (Self 2).
This suggestion is supported by the work of Parnas and his colleagues (Parnas &
Handest, 2003) (Parnas et al., 2005) (Parnas & Sass, 2002; Sass, 2002) (Cermolacce et al.,
2007) who note that ‘disturbances of self’ essentially underlie the ‘signs and symptoms’
of the so-called ‘initial prodrome’.  For example, Sass and Parnas (2003) cite the results of
a Norwegian early intervention project (Moller and Husby, 2000) that carried out in-
depth interviews with 20 first onset schizophrenic patients and found that
all patients had profound and alarming changes of experience of self; nearly all patients
complained of the near-ineffability of their self-alteration; and the great majority reported
preoccupation with metaphysical, supernatural, or philosophical issues.
In addition, such basic disturbances of self are “specific to the schizophrenia
spectrum conditions” and are not found in other ‘mental disorders’ (Sass & Parnas, 2003,
p. 437)’.
As Sass and Parnas (2003, p. 437) point out, “it is important to realize that the
nature of the self-disorders in the prodromal or pre-psychotic phases may not be
immediately obvious”.  As these authors go on to note
typically, the patient complains that a profound change is afflicting him or her yet cannot
pinpoint what exactly is changing because it is not a something which can be easily
expressed in propositional terms.
(Sass & Parnas, 2003, p. 437)
Often it is expressed by complaints of anxiety, lowered initiative and motivation,
and depressed mood and may range from a seemingly innocuous “I don’t feel myself”
or “I am not myself” through to “I am losing contact with myself” or “Something inside
me has turned inhuman” (Sass & Parnas, 2003, p. 437).  Sass and Parnas (2003, p. 438) go
on to note that patients may complain of being “occupied by, and scrutinizing, my own
inner world” or of “excessive brooding [and] analyzing and defining myself and my
thoughts”.
As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 125) point out, people in the early stages of
schizophrenia will often “sense a sort of ‘inner void’ or a ‘lack of inner nucleus’, which is
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normally constitutive of his field of awareness and crucial to its very subsistence”.  Some
patients say things like “My consciousness is not as whole as it should be”, “My I-feeling
is diminished”, “My I is disappearing for me”, “It is a continual universal blocking”.
These authors further note that this sense of losing oneself is “frequently associated with
diminished affectability or reactivity of the self” (Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 125); a
feeling which may underlie prodromal ‘symptoms’ such as depressed mood, anhedonia,
and loss of motivation, interest and energy.
Other anomalies of self experienced by people in the early stages of
schizophrenia include a feeling that their body no longer belongs to them (a disturbance
of a fundamental aspect of Self 1), an alteration in the ‘stream of consciousness’ (a central
aspect of Self 2) and problems with discriminating self from ‘not-self’ (once again the
ability to this is part of Self 2). For example, Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) note that
many patients describe “a variety of dissociations of the bodily experiential modes” with
a “striking tendency to experience one’s body predominantly as an object” illustrating
“an increasing experiential distance between subjectivity and corporeality” a sense, in
other words of ‘disembodiment’.  Patients complain that they are no longer in their body
or note that while they can sense their body it is “far away, some other place” (Parnas &
Handest, 2003, p. 126).
A common early change, according to Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 127) is “a
sense of being detached, disconnected from one’s body, which feels somehow alien or
not ‘fitting’ the subject”.  Other people may feel a “loss of bodily coherence” where their
body parts are felt to be disconnected from each other. Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 127)
point out that “this experience may take on an alarming intensity” when the previously
taken-for-granted unity of body and ‘self’ disintegrates creating “a sense of
fragmentation accompanied by a (pre)-psychotic panic of literal dissolution (‘going to
pieces’)”.
As Parnas and Handest (2003) note, such ‘disturbances’ may also affect motor
performance. People may ‘involuntarily’ speak or act in ways which interfere with what
they were meaning to do although at this stage such speech or action is still regarded as
their own rather than being imposed by some external agency. Indeed Parnas and
Handest (2003) describe how a patient of theirs reported such involuntary speakings
years before the onset of schizophrenia, indicating, as I have suggested above, that such
disturbances may be present, albeit in a much less noticeable way, from very early on in
a child’s development.
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The other aspect of ‘self’ which Parnas and Handest (2003) suggest is disrupted
or disturbed during the upheavals of the ‘prodromal’ period is the ‘stream of
consciousness’ – which was suggested, in Chapter Three, to be a central aspect of ‘Self 2’
as outlined by Harré (1998).   Drawing on Meares (2000, p. 10) this ‘stream of
consciousness’ was described as “a constantly changing fabric of inner experience, a
kind of gossamer or ‘shimmer’ . . . which might vanish, leaving us with nothing”.
Parnas and Handest (2003), somewhat more prosaically, describe the ‘stream of
consciousness’ as “a sense of consciousness as a temporal flux.” As these authors go on
to note,
the self permeates this whole as its first personal perspective: there is no distance between
my thoughts and myself. Apart from certain reflective acts, my thinking is at ‘zero point of
orientation’
(Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 127, author’s italics)
That aspect of ‘Self 1’ which is “the sense of existing as a self-possessed subject of
awareness or activity” (Sass, 2002, p. 253), then, is absolutely central to experiencing the
‘stream of consciousness’ as fully one’s own – with no gap or fissure between “the self
and its contents” (Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 128).  During the ‘prodromal’ phase of
‘schizophrenia, however, just such fissure does, in fact, seem to develop, suggesting,
once again, that a fundamental disturbance of ‘Self 1’ may be central to the
schizophrenic experience. As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 128) note,
mental contents became quasi-autonomous, bereft of their natural ipseity dimension.
Thoughts may appear as if from nowhere, are felt somehow ego-less, decentered or at a
distance from the self. They may interfere with the ongoing stream of thoughts (thought
interference), and are often described by the patient through specific private designations
such as ‘automatic’, ‘acute’ thoughts, ‘thought-tics’, etc.
Parnas and Handest (2003) suggest that this sense of an “experiential fissure
between the self and its contents” is very similar to the fissure which occurs between the
‘self and its body’ as described above.  And in the same way that people still sense their
body as their own, despite a growing sense of disconnection with it, the person, at this
early stage, still essentially sees these ‘thought-tics’ as their own “and there is no sense
of ongoing inner resistance or mental struggle (as in the case of obsession)” (Parnas &
Handest, 2003, p. 128).
At this point people often report what Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 126) refer to
as a “hyper-reflexive form of introspective experience”. ‘Hyper-reflexivity’ is basically
an “exaggerated self-consciousness in which a subject takes itself as its own object”.
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Sass (2002), drawing on Blankenberg (1971, 1991, cited in Sass, 2002, p. 260) suggests,
that such ‘hyper-reflexivity’ is essentially “a consequence of the loss of natural self-
evidence, of the normal sense of embeddedness in a framework” so that the person
“must devote energy and a kind of active, conscious effort and control to processes that
would normally take place automatically” (Sass, 2002, p. 260). Sass (2002) goes on to
suggest that this need for effort may account, at least in part, for the lowered energy and
general fatigue so common in schizophrenia.
For example, Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 128) quote a patient who “if a thought
passed through his brain ( . . . ), he was forced to direct back his attention and scrutinize
his mind in order to know exactly what he had been thinking”. This patient, then, was
not only experiencing a gap between his ‘stream of consciousness’ and his ‘self’, he also
felt forced to examine the ‘contents’ of that stream of consciousness in the same way he
might examine any other phenomenon in the world which he found ‘perplexing’.
As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 128) note, this
tends to objectify the introspective experience: the content of experience is less lived and
appears more like an inspected object. For example, inner speech becomes transformed
from a medium of thinking into an object-like entity with quasi-perceptual
characteristics.
This ‘fissure’ between the ‘self and its contents’ and the preoccupation with
examining those ‘contents’ tends to rob the person of the sense of subjective mastery
over their ‘stream of consciousness’ and it is experienced as increasingly alien or other
(Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 128).  Patients report that they become increasingly obsessed
with seemingly trivial matters that they themselves identify as trivial and yet they
cannot stop thinking about them. Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 129) suggest that this
state may intensify into a ‘thought pressure’ “where the patient is overwhelmed by a
myriad of unconnected thoughts” or the person may experience a ‘thought block’ where
thoughts suddenly disappear or fade away. Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 129, authors’
italics) further suggest that such hyper-reflexivity may lead to “a peculiar and pervasive
splitting or a doubling of the self into an observing and observed ego, none providing a
reliable sense of ipseity.” which “may intensify prior to a frank psychotic episode”, as
will be discussed below.
Another, and closely related, aspect of the prodromal experience of
schizophrenia is the growing “inability to discriminate self from not-self”, described by
Bleuler (1911, cited in Parnas and Handest, 2003) as transitivism. Again, Parnas and
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Handest (2003) suggest that such transitivism arises because of an increasingly deficient
sense of the ‘mineness of experience’.  Parnas and Handest (2003) point out that in the
prodromal phases of schizophrenia, or in so-called ‘schizotypal’ conditions, one may
observe very subtle instances of transitivism which are “purely experiential, i.e.,
unaccompanied by delusional elaborations” (Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 129).
These authors present as an example of this the case of a young man who, during
conversations, was unable to distinguish between himself and the person he was talking
to.
He tended to lose the sense of whose thoughts originated in whom, and felt ‘as if’ his
interlocutor somehow ‘invaded him’, an experience that shattered his identity and was
intensely anxiety provoking. When walking on the street, he scrupulously avoided
glancing at his mirror image in the windowpanes of shops, because he felt uncertain on
which side he actually was.
(Parnas & Handest, 2003, pp. 129-130)
As Parnas and Handest (2003, p. 130) point out, the various anomalies of
experience linked to the profound disturbance in the basic sense of ‘mineness’ of
experience shatters the experiential equilibrium and often results in people, during the
early stages of schizophrenia, embarking on a metaphysical quest which can lead to
existential reorientations. For these people ‘reality’ can start to seem somehow mind-
dependent, physical causality “loses its regulatory ontological role”, ‘other minds’
become either mysterious entities or “malevolent constructions”, the distinction between
self and others becomes blurred and normally unexamined ‘mental processes’ are
subjected to intense examination.
This can result in the later stages of the prodromal phase of schizophrenia, in a
solipsistic orientation being taken to the world, motivated by the now profoundly
altered self-experience and elaborated by the person “into a nexus of interests and
beliefs pointing to a new existential orientation” (Parnas & Handest, 2003, p. 130). Often
prominent in this new orientation is a sense of their own centrality as evidenced by one
of Parnas and Handest’s (2003, p. 130) patients noting that
When I hear a dog barking or a cat screaming far away, I instantly get the feeling that
they bark and scream at me. When I listen to the radio, I get this thought that one is trying
to let me understand something I know that it is pure rubbish.
It should be noted at this point that many of the ‘symptoms’ of the ‘prodrome’
(conceptualised by some psychiatrists as ‘negative symptoms’) remain even once the
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person has begun to experience the hallucinations, delusions, disordered thoughts and
‘disorganised’ behaviour, which are typically regarded as the manifestations of
psychosis (conceptualised as ‘positive symptoms’). Interestingly, as Parnas and Handest
(2003) point out, the ‘disturbances of self’ they suggest lie at the centre of the
schizophrenic experience correlate with both the negative and positive symptoms of
schizophrenia.
As has already been noted above, the end of the ‘prodromal’ phase is signalled
by the emergence of psychotic ‘symptoms’  – hallucinations, delusions, ‘disordered’
thoughts and ‘disorganised’ behaviours (the so-called ‘positive symptoms’). At the
person-level, Sass (2002) suggests that the various ‘anamolies of experience’ precipitated
by the very basic disturbance of self described above and the ‘hyperreflexivity’ these
‘anomalies’ create, are foundational for the emergence of psychotic ‘symptoms’. Sass
(2002) suggests that while the hyperreflexive ruminations engaged in by people in the
early stages of ‘schizophrenia’ are attempts to compensate for a more basic loss, they
will often have a counterproductive effect – further distancing the person “from any
sense of naturalness or capacity for spontaneous action, thereby increasing the patient’s
perplexity and making it more difficult to break out of what can easily become a kind of
self-propagating spiral” (Sass, 2002, p. 261).
Thus, the person who attempts “to reassert control and re-establish a sense of self
by means of introspective scrutiny may end up exacerbating his self-alienation and
fragmentation” (Sass, 2002, p 261).  It is suggested that the Western preoccupation with
achieving a bounded, coherent and unified self would make just such a tactic more
likely. As one of Sass’s (2002, p. 261) patients notes,  “My downfall was insight . . . Too
much insight can tear your mind apart”. Interestingly, introspectionist studies with
‘normal’ people show that such hyperreflection, even if it is produced voluntarily, can
bring on similar alterations of the sense of ‘self’ and the world that are “strikingly
reminiscent of what occurs in schizophrenia” (Hunt, 1985, 1995; Sass, 1994, cited in Sass,
2002, p. 262).
Sass (2002) suggests that there is also an even more basic kind of hyperreflexivity
which occurs in ‘schizophrenics’ where the person comes to reflect on themselves or
aspects of their functioning in a “host of other, more passive, automatic, or ‘pre-
reflective’ ways”. These kinds of hyperreflexivity include experiences in which the
“normally transparent field of experience can become increasingly disrupted by a kind
of automatic and passively experienced popping up of unusual sensations, feelings, or
thoughts that come to acquire object-like quality” (Sass, 2002, p. 262).
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In the early ‘pre-morbid’ stages of ‘schizophrenia’, patient reports suggest that
this kind of hyperreflexivity is experienced “as a largely passive process, more like an
affliction” (Sass, 2002, p. 262). It usually involves cenesthesias (a loss of the automaticity
of movement) and certain disturbances of thought and perception, which have been
designated with the term ‘basal irritation’. As Sass (2002, p. 262) points out, these
experiences “appear to involve hyperreflexive awareness of sensations and other
phenomena that would not normally be attended to in any sustained fashion”. While
such experiences very rarely occur in other ‘mental disorders’ they are very similar to
experiences reported by ‘normal’ people who voluntarily adopt “an abnormal kind of
detached, introspective stance toward their own bodily experiences” (Angyal, 1936;
Hunt, 1985, 1995; Sass, 1994, cited in Sass, 2002).
Such hyper-awareness of bodily sensations and other phenomena that would
usually not be attended to, in common with the hyperawareness of one’s own thoughts
and actions, is driven, then, by very basic disturbances in the sense of oneself as a “self-
possessed subject of awareness or activity” (Sass, 2002, p. 253). That hyper-awareness, or
‘hyperreflexivity’ then, in turn, creates more ‘anomalies of experience’, creating the
‘need’ for an ever-increasing degree of hyperreflexivity as the person struggles to
compensate for, and to understand, their increasingly fragmented experience of being in
the world.
Longitudinal studies of premorbid and prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia
cited by Sass (2002, p. 263), illustrate this struggle showing “a progressive shift from
‘basal irritation’ to full-blown first-rank symptoms through increasing objectification
and externalization of normally tacit inner phenomena”.  Such studies show, suggests
Sass (Sass, 2002, p. 263), that each of the first rank symptoms “are generally preceded by
subtle subjective experiences of alienation occurring in the same experiential domain”
(e.g., bodily sensation, thought, perception) which then become “externalized and
thematized in the form of first-rank symptoms affecting that realm”.
Sass (2002, p. 263) suggests that this essentially occurs because to have awareness
of what is usually tacit objectifies or alienates the phenomenon and “causes it to be
experienced as existing at some kind of remove from what Husserl (1989) called the
‘zero point’ of orientation of ongoing experiential selfhood”. Thus, in extreme instances
the person can “lose the sense of inhabiting his own actions, thoughts, or sensations and
may feel that these are under the control of some alien being or force”. At this point, as
Parnas and Sass (2003) note, the person loses any sense of autonomy they may have had
and feels ‘at the mercy of the world’.
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As has already been noted above, the hyperreflexivity driven by the original
‘disturbance of self’, also tends to lead to an obsession with existentialist philosophies
and/or religious themes. This obsession usually starts during the prodromal phase but
continues and intensifies as the person becomes increasingly more anxious (Parnas &
Handest, 2003). Very often it is these religious or existentialist ideas that provide the
‘themes’ for the hallucinations and delusions experienced by people with
‘schizophrenia’. Alongside, and often informed by, the religious and existential ideas the
person has begun to explore, the feelings of ‘centrality’ which first started to emerge
during the prodrome also intensify during the ‘psychotic’ phase resulting in ‘delusions
of grandeur’. During such delusions the person may identify him or herself as, for
example, Jesus Christ, the Buddha, the Virgin Mary or Satan.
As Parnas and Sass (2002, p. 131) point out, a number of authors have noted that
there is a “characteristic metaphysical colouring” of the contents of ‘schizophrenic’
delusions, a ‘colouring’ which “helps to distinguish them from non-schizophrenic
delusions”. Parnas and Sass (2002, p. 131) suggest that “the ‘metaphysical taint’ [of these
delusions] indicates something about the nature of the experienced self-relation: that is
to say, it points to a disturbance of self as the founding instance”.
It is suggested, however, that while the ‘anomalies of self’ identified by Parnas
and his colleagues are foundational for the experiences of both the ‘prodromal’ and
‘psychotic’ phases of ‘schizophrenia’ they are not, in and of themselves, enough to result
in a psychotic breakdown. There must also, it is suggested, be increasing levels of
personal stress (which may or may not be due to a proximal trauma) impacting on
already dysregulated stress response systems, the effects of which then reverberate
through every aspect of a person’s being – personal, organismic and molecular – and
coact with the person-level  ‘anomalies of self’ outlined above.
This suggestion is supported by research indicating that “[u]nusual stress
appears to be necessary for the fundamental development of psychosis” (McGlashan &
Johannessen, 1996, p. 204). For example, a study by Romme and Escher (1989, cited in
Morrison et al., 2003) found that 70% of voice hearers developed their hallucinations
following a traumatic event, and they suggested that hearing voices may be part of a
coping process. Furthermore, a study by Honig et al. (1998, cited in Morrison et al, 2003),
comparing the form and content of chronic auditory hallucinations in three cohorts
(patients with schizophrenia, patients with a dissociative disorder, and non-patient
voice-hearers), found that, in most patients, the onset of auditory hallucinations was
preceded by either a traumatic event or an event that activated the memory of earlier trauma,
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and that the disability incurred by hearing voices was associated with the reactivation of
previous trauma and abuse. It should also be noted here that the ‘disability’ incurred by
hearing voices would also have been associated with the fact that in the West
experiencing hallucinations of any kind is considered to be a signifier of ‘madness’,
which would, in and of itself, be extremely anxiety inducing. In a culture where hearing
voices was considered nothing out of the ordinary it is quite possible that ‘disability’
may not be incurred at all, as will be discussed further below.
These findings highlight the fact that the proximal source of stress does not
necessarily have to be, in and of itself, ‘traumatic’ in order to be experienced as stressful.
As already noted above, people who develop ‘schizophrenia’ report greater subjective
stress even though they do not appear to experience any more stressful events than
‘normal’ controls (Norman & Malla, 1993; Walker & Diforio, 1997, cited in Corcoran,
Walker, Huot, Mittal, Tessner, Kestler et al., 2003, p. 676). As has also been suggested
above, one of the reasons for this sensitivity to stress may be that later life stress
reactivates what Schwarz (1994) conceptualises as ‘malignant memories’ thus
precipitating a cascade of person-level and organismic/molecular level responses which
may precipitate a change in ‘state’, in dynamic systems terminology.
For those whose first care-givers failed to meet their basic relational needs – these
malignant memories would be extremely stressful, stressful enough on top of the
compounding effects of early damage, including the disturbances of self described
above and disturbances of the brain’s stress response systems, to precipitate psychosis.
For those who also experienced childhood sexual abuse, which, as already noted above,
is extremely prevalent amongst people diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’, the memories may
be almost as traumatic as the original abuse, thus leading to an even more extreme stress
response and generating even more florid psychotic experiences.
This suggestion is supported by the ‘dose-response’ relationship found by a large
number of studies (see, for e.g., Read et al., 2005) between florid psychotic symptoms –
in particular delusions and hallucinations (both auditory and visual) – and childhood
sexual abuse – “the more severe the abuse the stronger the relationship” (Read et al.,
2005, p. 339).
Furthermore, Bentall (2004, p. 491) notes that another source of proximal stress
prior to the psychotic breakdown may simply be the
mere inability to adapt to new demands, to cross hurdles which brothers, sisters, friends
and neighbours stride over with relative ease [which] may be sufficient to instil a sense of
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failure and personal inadequacy, magnify pre-existing social-cognitive peculiarities, and
provoke thoughts that are increasingly psychotic.
Thus, it is suggested, psychotic ‘symptoms’ arise, in the same manner as
‘prodromal symptoms’, out of the coactions between a person’s already disturbed
‘senses of self’, their already dysregulated stress response systems and intensifications in
proximal sources of stress. As with the ‘symptoms’ of the ‘prodrome’, studies have
found that there is an association between cortisol release and the severity of psychotic
‘symptoms’ in both medicated and non-medicated patients (Rybakowski, Linka,
Markowski & Kanarkowskit, 1991; Franzen, 1971, cited in Walker & DiForio, 1997).
Another study suggested that cortisol levels were significantly higher (250%)
immediately prior to psychotic episodes in comparison to periods of recovery (Sachar,
Kanter, Buie, Engle and Mehlman, 1970 cited in Walker & Diforio, 1997). When the
subjects were actually psychotic the cortisol levels fell to midway between pre-episode
and recovery levels. As Walker and DiForio (1997) point out, “this is consistent with the
assumption that elevated cortisol release precipitates symptom exacerbation, rather than
being solely a consequence of it”.
It should be noted at this point that psychotic disturbances are not particular to
‘schizophrenia’; they can also occur in ‘major depressive disorder’, ‘post-traumatic stress
disorder’, ‘borderline personality disorder’, ‘bi-polar disorder’, and in the ‘normal’
population (Bentall, 2004).  Such disturbances, for these people, are often precipitated
by, or associated with, trauma of one kind or another, as they are for those diagnosed
‘schizophrenic’.  Read, van Os, Morrison and Ross (2005) cited a study, for example,
which indicated that ‘bi-polar’ patients who had experienced childhood sexual abuse
also had high rates of auditory hallucinations. Indeed, only one of the severely abused
patients this study did not experience auditory hallucinations.
It should also be pointed out that studies have also shown that many of the
‘neuropathologies’ found in those diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ – all of which could be
explained by glucocorticoid-related neurotoxicity – are also found in a number of other
‘mental disorders’, including ‘major depression’, ‘bi-polar disorder, and ‘post-traumatic
stress disorder’ (Bentall, 2004; Walker & Diforio, 1997).  Both these bodies of research
provide support for the contention that not having their basic relational needs met
during infancy and early childhood may confer upon people a general vulnerability to
psychological suffering of all kinds.
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As was noted in the introduction, however, what makes the difference between
how such generalised vulnerabilities may ‘play out’ as particular kinds of suffering, is to
be found in the complex trajectories of each individual life out of which emerges their
own unique cluster of ‘sufferings’. What is being suggested, then, is that people who
experience early relational difficulties of a very particular sort – wherein the caregiver is
unresponsive, neglectful and emotionally cold and, possibly, physically harsh –  will be
more likely to experience the particular cluster of ‘sufferings’ thought to typify the
‘disorder’ called ‘schizophrenia’, as outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) and the self-reports of many of those so diagnosed.
The particularities of experience involved in this ‘cluster of sufferings’, it is
suggested, have their foundations not in disordered neurobiology (as has already been
noted, such disordered neurobiology is necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of
‘schizophrenia’), or in high levels of proximal stress (again, necessary but not sufficient),
but in their early social interactions; interactions which do not adequately enable the
emergence of the most basic ‘sense of self’, the sense of ‘mineness’ of experience or
‘ipseity’ as discussed in some detail above.
It must also, of course, be stressed, that this does not mean that such
‘disturbances of self’ are, in and of themselves, sufficient for the experiences
conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ to arise. ‘Schizophrenia’, like all other ‘mental
disorders’, does not have one underlying ‘cause’, rather it depends for its emergence on
increasingly complex coactions occurring over the course of a person’s lifeline between
person-level factors, neurobiological factors and proximal and distal life stresses.
It is suggested, however, that given the compounding nature of these coactions,
the more profound the early damage (the more unresponsive, neglectful, emotionally
cold and physically harsh the caregiver), particularly if it is accompanied by childhood
sexual abuse (which seems to intensify the psychotic symptoms thus making it more
likely the person would come to the attention of a mental health professional), the more
likely a person will end up with an official diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’.
If the early relational difficulties between a child and their first care-giver are less
profound then the person may well end up, depending on what happens to them during
their development, with another cluster of ‘sufferings’ some of which, for some of them,
may overlap with the ‘schizophrenic’ cluster, others of which will not. This contention is
supported by the fact that there are a number of people who have a mixture of
‘symptoms’ from a range of ‘mental disorders’, making it particularly difficult to decide
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which ‘mental disorder’ they really have. For example, Bentall (2004) notes that many
people have some of the symptoms of both ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘bi-polar disorder’,
making these two disorders particularly difficult to diagnose ‘correctly’.
The same point could be made concerning the overlap between the ‘symptoms’
of ‘schizophrenia’ and a number of other ‘mental disorders’ (e.g., ‘major depressive
disorder’, ‘borderline personality disorder’, ‘antisocial personality disorder’,
‘schizotypal personality disorder’, etc., etc.). As White (2006) notes, it is often difficult,
particularly during the early stages of schizophrenia, to decide whether the patient has
an ‘affective disorder’, ‘borderline personality disorder’ or ‘antisocial personality
disorder’.  This is because, essentially, each person has their own unique lifeline and
hence their own unique ‘cluster of sufferings’.
It should also be noted at this point that just because one has received the
diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ does not necessarily mean that one has experienced such
profound early damage. The diagnosis is often given to people whose ‘cluster of
sufferings’ would, in the context of the disorder-based system we currently use, sit more
comfortably under some other diagnostic category. Indeed, people often tend to get the
diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ if they exhibit any sort of psychotic symptoms, hence the
difficulty for psychiatrists in attempting to work out whether someone is ‘bi-polar’ or
‘schizophrenic’.
Indeed, such diagnostic gymnastics exemplify one of the many problems
inherent in any attempt classify someone as X or Y;  people who are experiencing their
own particular ‘cluster of sufferings’ will be boxed into the cluster listed in the DSM-IV-
TR depending on whether they have the symptom(s) their psychiatrist/psychologist
personally thinks are particularly representative of X. Another psychiatrist/psychologist
may think their symptoms are more representative of Y. And so it goes on. As Smail
(Smail, 1987, p. 12), himself a clinical psychologist, notes, he has several times
observed at first hand the label ‘schizophrenic’ being attached to someone on no better
grounds than that they accounted for their emotional unease in terms judged by their
psychiatrists to be ‘pseudo-philosophical’
As noted above, ‘psychotic’ experiences may be the endpoint of a number of
alternative developmental trajectories and do not require the kind of profound early
‘damage’ being suggested to contribute towards a vulnerability to the cluster of
sufferings conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ in order to manifest itself.  Indeed, as
Bentall (2004) notes, research suggests that the outcome for people with the same
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diagnosis is enormously variable, with some remaining ‘ill’ for the rest of their lives,
others completely ‘recovering’ and others having intermediate outcomes.  It is suggested
that the more profound the early damage to the ‘self’ the less likely a person is to move
beyond the ‘schizophrenic’ experience, particularly if they are treated as if they are
‘chronically mentally ill’ by those around them, and expected to remain so for the rest of
their lives.
6.3. DEPRESSION
According to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), a ‘major
depressive episode’ is characterised by the presence of five or more of the following
symptoms over the course of a two-week period, representing a change from a person’s
previous functioning:
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either
subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others
(e.g., appears tearful). (In children and adolescents, this may be characterized
as an irritable mood.)
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most
of the day, nearly every day.
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of
more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite
nearly every day.
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day.
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day.
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day.
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every
day.
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every
day.
259
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for
committing suicide.
A diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) can be made if a person meets
the criteria for experiencing a major depressive episode. MDD becomes recurrent,
according to DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), when a person
experiences two separate depressive episodes with a gap between episodes of at least
two months (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). MDD is very common with
studies suggesting that approximately 5 percent of the adults in the United States and
Canada meet the criteria for MDD at any given time, although rates of MDD do vary
between countries with 0.8% of Taiwanese meeting the criteria for MDD and 5.8%
meeting the criteria in New Zealand (see Richards & Perri, 2002).
As Bentall (2004, p. 243) points out, research into the ‘cognitions14’ of those
diagnosed with ‘depression’ has established that the thinking of people who are
depressed is “dominated by a negative view of the self, the world and the future” (Beck,
1976, cited in Bentall, p. 239).  Beck (1976, cited in Bentall, 2004) refers to this attitude as
‘the negative cognitive triad’ and suggests that such “automatic or unbidden thoughts . .
. are the immediate precursors of dysphoric mood” (Bentall, 2004, p. 239).  Another
group of cognitively oriented researchers, led by Abramson and Seligman (Abramson,
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978, cited in Bentall, 2000, p 239), have found that depressed
people “make excessively internal, global and stable attributions for negative events”
and research suggests that this ‘attributional style’ may precede the onset of ‘dysphoria’.
As Bentall (Bentall, 2004) further notes, while Abramson, Seligman and
colleagues (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978, cited in Bentall, 2000, p ) focused on
the last aspect of Beck’s (1976, cited in Bentall, 2004)  ‘cognitive triad’, arguing that
“excessively stable and global attributions for negative events lead to a sense of
hopelessness”, research suggests that negative ‘attributions’ about the first element in
Beck’s (1976, cited in Bentall, 2004) triad – the self – are even more fundamental to
‘depression’.
                                                 
14 Current research into the genesis of depression research tends to be dominated by two main strands of
theorising – (a) that the origins of depression lie in our ‘cognitive styles’, in other words we become
depressed because of problems with the way we think and (b) that the genesis of depression lies in our
neurobiology – we become depressed because of problems with our neurobiology.
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This suggestion is supported by the large number of studies which consistently
emphasise how negatively depressed people feel about themselves (e.g., Beck, 1967;
Pietromonaco, 1985, cited in Carnelly & Pietromonaco, 1994}, how they expect more
negative events to happen to them and less positive events (e.g., Pietromonaco &
Markus, 1985; Pietromonaco & Rook, 1987; Pyszczyniski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987, cited
in Carnelly & Peitromonaco, 1994), and that they recall more negative and less positive
information about themselves (e.g., Derry & Kuiper, 1981; MacDonald & Kuiper, 1984;
Teasdale, Taylor & Fogarty, 1980, cited Carnelly & Peitromonaco, 1994).
As William Styron (1990, p. 5) notes in his ‘memoir of madness’ Darkness Visible;
Of the many dreadful manifestations of the disease, both physical and psychological, a
sense of self-hatred – or, put less categorically, a failure of self-esteem – is one of the most
universally experienced symptoms, and I had suffered more and more from a general
feeing of worthlessness as the malady had progressed.
In line with these findings a study by Brown, Andrews, Harris, Adler and Bridge
(1986) found that low self-esteem was a statistically and clinically significant factor in
conferring vulnerability to ‘depression’.  Furthermore, a prospective study by Andrews
and Brown (1988, p. 99) found that “low self-esteem . . . was associated with a
considerably increased risk” of depression. As Strauman and Kolden (1997) note, the
research of Brown and his colleagues (G.W. Brown, Bifulco, Veiel, & Andrews, 1990)
(George W. Brown et al., 1986) suggests that “self-esteem is the most prominent
immediate causal locus for the indirect effects of vulnerability factors such as childhood
loss or abuse experiences, temperament, and socioeconomic influences” (Strauman &
Kolden, 1997m p 9).
As Strauman and Kolden (1997, p. 9) further note, “the findings of Brown et al.
(1986) are particularly important because they demonstrate that for many individuals,
low self-esteem preceded the onset of their initial depressive episode”. More recent
investigations using large community samples and sophisticated statistical modelling
lead to similar conclusions (Strauman & Kolden, 1997). Research also suggests that low
self-esteem and negative self-evaluation contribute significantly to the maintenance of
depressive episodes and to the likelihood of relapse and recurrence (Strauman &
Kolden, 1997).
The re-analysis of the results of a study of the gender differences in the levels of
‘rumination’ by Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson and Grayson (1999) also illustrates the
centrality of negative evaluations of the self to the cluster of sufferings conceptualised as
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‘depression’. As Treynor, Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003, p. 247) point out,
“rumination is a method of coping with negative mood that involves self-focused
attention . . . it is characterized by self-reflection . . . as well as a repetitive and passive
focus on one’s negative emotions”. As these authors further note, research has
consistently shown that rumination “predicts greater depressive symptoms . . . [and] . . .
predicts the onset of major depressive episodes” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 248).
After constructing a measure of rumination that was not confounded with
‘depression’ content, Treynor et al. (2003) found support for a two-factor model of
rumination. They called the first factor ‘reflection’ and the second factor ‘brooding’. The
items on the reflection factor suggest “a purposeful turning inward to engage in
cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms”, while those on the
brooding factor reflect “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with some
unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., p. 256).
Treynor et al. (2003) also found that although women scored higher than men
on both the reflection and brooding factors, suggesting women are generally more
contemplative than men, “only when this contemplation takes the form of brooding is it
associated with greater levels of depression in women compared to men”. Treynor et
al.’s (2003) re-analysis of the data of an earlier study by Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson &
Grayson (1999) suggested that it is a low sense of mastery, rather than the existence of
chronic stressors as suggested by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1999) that  “contributes
primarily to brooding – that is, to a passive contemplation of what’s wrong in your life
and how you wish it were better” (Treynor et al., p. 257).
The sense of ‘self’ which, it is suggested, is so ‘fragile’ or ‘insecure’ in those who
are vulnerable to ‘depression’ is that aspect of the ‘self’ Harré (1998) calls Self 2 – our
sense of ourselves as a continuous unity through time, with a set of unique skills and
attributes and a past, present and future which we can ‘narrate’ both to ourselves and to
others. This aspect of the self includes the sense of the ‘self as stream of consciousness’;
the almost continuous silent ‘chatter’ which we see as representative of our ‘mind’ or
our ‘inner self’. Again, as has already been noted several times in this thesis, this ‘sense
of self’ is conceptualised as particularly ‘inner’, private, and essentially separate from
other ‘selves’. It is also this sense of ‘self’ which is felt to be the ‘essence’ of the person
one feels oneself to be and which represents what is commonly thought of as the ‘self’.
Central to Self 2 is the ‘self-concept’, which essentially encompasses all the things
we believe about ourselves. These things may be reported to ourselves, or to others (Self
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3) and may change quite considerably over time.  Harré (1998) suggests that among the
more lasting, and consistent, contents of our self-concept are beliefs about our capacities
and powers, although even these change as we move through our lives. A crucial aspect
of a person’s self concept is the beliefs they have about the worth or value of their ‘self’.
This judgement of ‘self’ has generally been referred to within psychology as ‘self-
esteem’, an aspect of the self, as noted above, which is particularly central to the cluster
of sufferings conceptualised as ‘depression’.  The research outlined above seems to be
indicating that people who become depressed not only tend to accord a low value to
their ‘self’, but also that their self-concept is very fragile and prone to changing as
situations change.
As was outlined in Chapters Three and Five, the origins of our sense of who we
are and the value we assign to our ‘self’, emerge from within our early interactions with
our first caregiver. It is within the context of these interactions that we learn the
ontological skills necessary to ‘achieve’ such senses of self, and it is within the context of
those interactions that we absorb the ‘feeling tones’ which permeate our early lives and
which lay the foundations, according to Meares (2000), for the value we accord to our
‘self’. In light of the analysis being developed in this thesis, then, it is possible that the
roots of ‘depression’ may lie in caregivers being unable to establish and/or maintain the
kind of intense, emotionally and physically close relationship with their infants that is
essential to the emergence of a relatively stable15 and valued sense of ‘self’16.
As Meares (2000) points out, this kind of relationship requires the caregiver to
respond to their infant in a way that creates “a feeling of ‘fit’ with the immediate
experience of the baby”. Such attunement creates a pleasure, suggests Meares (2000),
which does not just arise from within the baby, rather it is “engendered by the
harmonious connectedness between the baby’s state” and the state of those with whom
s/he is interacting, at this stage usually the mother (Meares, 2000, p. 69). If the mother is
unable to do this then such ‘failures of attunement’ will severely compromise the
“particular form of pleasure upon which value [accorded to the self] depends” (Meares,
2000, p. 68).
                                                 
15This is not to suggest that anyone’s ‘sense of self’ is entirely stable. As Harre (1998) notes, our ideas and
feelings about ourselves can shift considerably over time. The word ‘stable’ as used here simply means that
one’s feelings about oneself do not shift very easily and quickly from situation to situation.
16 This suggestion is broadly in line with the position of the object-relations tradition within psychodynamic
psychology which postulates that relationships between infants and their caregivers can result in
problematic ‘representations’ of the ‘self’ or ‘self-with-significant-other’ which confer vulnerability to
depression  (see for e.g., Blatt & Homann, 1992).  As will become obvious as the analysis proceeds, however,
while there are some similarities between the approach being developed in this thesis and the object-
relations approach, there are also some significant differences.
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If such ‘fit’ is not achieved between the mother and the baby, Meares (2000)
suggests, then the pleasure inherent in the ‘conversation’ for both partners is lost and the
infant experiences ‘disjunctional anxiety’. Meares (2000) suggests that if such
‘misattunements’ are chronic this ‘disjunctional anxiety’ permeates the child’s
experience of life with a primarily negative ‘feeling tone’, and this feeling tone, via the
processes discussed in Chapter Three, becomes ‘embodied’. It becomes, in other words,
an aspect of one’s ‘personal being’ and as such is ‘woven into’ the ‘senses of self’ that
comprise that personal being. As was pointed out in Chapter Three, such embodied
feelings are thus there right from the beginning and they remain at the core of our
experience throughout our lives, and “whether we recognise their influence or not,
[these] feelings are always present: shaping our goals, biasing our evaluations, and
guiding our attention” (Cromby, 2006b, p. 14).
Thus, it is suggested that the ‘self’ that would arise out of such asynchronous
interactions would be a ‘self’ whose experience and reality has not been ‘re-cognised’, a
self who has not experienced the pleasure that arises as a consequence of such
recognition, a self who would find it very difficult to accord value to their ‘self without
outside ‘help’ (social relationships or roles which confer value upon the ‘self’), as will be
discussed further below, because they would not have embodied a sense of that ‘self’ as
being valued, and thus as being valuable, during the time that ‘self’ was being forged.
It should be noted before going any further that while it is the contention that
all instances of ‘depression’ are essentially precipitated by ‘threats to the self’ of one
form or another, a person does not have to have experienced the kind of early relational
problems which will be outlined in this chapter to become depressed in response to a
major life stressor. As was noted in Chapter Five, because of the centrality of the notion
of the autonomous, private and essentially separate ‘self’ to personal being in the West
we are all, to a certain extent, ‘vulnerable selves’.
As Shweder (1984) notes, Westerners have essentially “cut . . . the self off from
the interdependent whole” which not only makes us more vulnerable to feelings of
isolation and loneliness, but also makes it very likely we will locate the source of our
problems ‘inside our selves’, and thus blame ourselves. As Schumaker (2001) points out
there are a number of discourses in the West around ‘personal responsibility’ which
overtly encourage this, thus providing fertile soil for the ‘negative attributions’, ‘low
self-esteem’, and feelings of guilt which are so central to many of our ‘mental disorders’
in the West.
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The focus of the following analysis, however, will be on the genesis of
experiences that are towards the more severe end of the spectrum of sufferings
conceptualised as ‘depression’. These severe and chronic depressions have often been
theorised in the past to be ‘endogenous’ (‘of the body’) as opposed to ‘reactive’, partly
because they are often experienced by those who suffer them as having come ‘from out
of nowhere’.  Thus, while it is the contention that all ‘depressions’, even mild ones, are
precipitated by ‘threats to the self’ of one sort or another, in order to experience the kind
of severe depressions which are the focus of this discussion one must have been
involved in interactions with a primary care-giver which did not meet some of the basic
relational needs of the human infant, as outlined in Chapter Three, and which thus
‘damage’ the child at the molecular, organismic and the person level as will be further
discussed below.
Interestingly, and in line with the current analysis, the endogenous-reactive
distinction, though still utilised by practitioners, has not received a lot of empirical
support and is not considered a valid diagnostic distinction (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992).
For example, the results of studies by Frank, Anderson, Reynolds, Ritenour & Kupfer
(1994) and Brown, Harris & Hepworth (1994) suggest that the seeming disconnection
between severe life events and the onset of a depressive episode in ‘endogenous
depressions’ disappears when only first episodes of depressions characterised by the
endogenous symptom pattern are considered.
When this is done the rate of severely threatening life events and their proximity
to episode onset is quite comparable with the rate observed in patients with a ‘non-
endogenous’ symptom pattern. This suggests that the main difference between so-called
‘endogenous’ and ‘non-endogenous’ depression may lie in its severity, its chronicity
and, in most cases, the earliness of its onset.  This is in line with the finding that early
onset depression is associated with high recurrence risk (Kessler & Magee, 1994).
Furthermore, Harkness and Monroe (2002, p. 387) found that “severe physical
abuse, sexual abuse, antipathy, and neglect, as well as both high and lax levels of
supervision and discipline”, were significantly associated with the kind of depression
commonly conceptualised as ‘endogenous17’.  As Harkness and Monroe  (Harkness &
Monroe, 2002, p. 390) note, endogenous depression “has traditionally been associated
with a neurobiological etiology and it is compelling to find it here preceded by severe
environmental adversity”.
                                                 
17 Now more commonly known as ‘melancholic depression’ and long thought to be biological rather than
environmental in origin (Peselow, Sanfilipo, Difiglia, & Fieve, 1992).
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It is suggested that the ways in which depressed18 mothers interact with their
children may offer some valuable insights into what sort of relational difficulties may
confer upon people a particular vulnerability to the cluster of suffering conceptualised
as ‘depression’, and how this vulnerability might be conferred. As was outlined in
Chapter Five, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that parental, and in
particular maternal, depression is correlated with a number of adverse outcomes for
children (Downey & Coyne, 1990; Beardslee, Versage, & Gladstone, 1998; Gelfand &
Teti, 1990; Hammen & Brennan, 2003). One ‘adverse outcome’ which research suggests
is particularly likely for the offspring of depressed women is, perhaps not surprisingly,
‘depression’.
As a study by Hammen and Brennan (2003), using a large community sample,
noted, “children exposed to maternal depression prior to age 10 years (and before the
onset of a youth disorder) were twice as likely to have major depression or dysthymic
disorder [before the age of 15] as children of never-depressed mothers”. Furthermore,
research shows that maternal depression has a much greater impact on the later
development of depression in offspring than does paternal depression (Kessler, 1997;
Shiner & Marmorstein, 1998), a finding which suggests that the way in which depressed
mothers interact with their children may be the primary means of conferring this
vulnerability.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that the kinds of parenting
behaviours that are characteristic of depressed women are also found in women who are
distressed or under stress, but who would not necessarily be diagnosed as ‘clinically
depressed’. For example, as was pointed out in Chapter Five, women raising children
under the stresses of poverty are often found to be “are less nurturant, less supportive,
and less inductive in their parenting than middle-class mothers” (McLoyd & Wilson,
1991, p. 111).  Women attempting to raise children alone, particularly if they are also
economically disadvantaged, as Eisenberg (1990, p. 11) points out, can experience
increased “difficulty meeting the needs of their children”.
                                                 
18 It should be noted that while the research into the effects of maternal ‘depression’ on offspring accepts the
diagnostic category of ‘depression’ as a ‘mental illness’ uncritically this does not negate the importance of
the findings of such research to the argument being put forward in this thesis. While it is argued in this
thesis that there is no such thing as the ‘mental illness’ called ‘depression’, it is not being argued that people
do not experience the kinds of suffering which are conceptualised as ‘depression’ and the research
concerning maternal ‘depression’ very strongly suggests that such suffering exerts an impact on both the
way in which women ‘mother’ their children, and that the children of women who are, or who have been,
‘depressed’, are highly likely to suffer from ‘depression’ themselves.
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A number of studies, for example, have shown the quantity and the
expressiveness of infant-directed-speech or ‘motherese’ to be adversely affected in
women who are depressed (Teasdale, Fogarty & Williams, 1980; Scherer, 1986, cited in
Reck, Hunt, Fuchs, Weiss, Noon, Moehler, et al., 2004; Bettes, 1988). It is this kind of
speech which is commonly used in the ‘proto-conversational’ interactions suggested in
Chapters Three and Five to be central to the emergence of a unified, coherent and valued
‘Self 2’.
As Bettes (1988) points out, maternal vocalisations to infants are regularly spaced
and both the utterances and the pauses are very short, usually less than a second.
Motherese vocalisations are also “intonationally simplified and exaggerated in both
pitch range and duration” (Bettes, 1988, p. 1090). Bettes (1988) found, however, that
depressed mothers often failed to make adjustments in their vocalisations in response to
infant vocalisations, whereas non-depressed mothers made these adjustments
consistently. Depressed mothers were also found to be less able to impose structures on
their vocal behaviour – the average latency to respond to their infant for depressed
mothers was nearly 2 seconds, and the length of their pauses and their utterances was
highly variable. As Bettes (1988, p. 1095) points out, research suggests that the optimal
interstimulus interval for infant conditioning is 1 second, and that pauses of longer than
3 seconds “indicate ‘time-outs’ or periods of disengagement”.
In line with these findings, as Gelfand and Teti (1990, pp. 331-332) note, general
(vocal and non-vocal) interactions between depressed mothers and their infants “have
been observed to lack the sensitive reciprocity, synchronicity, and expressions of
pleasure in each other’s company often found in nondepressed mother-child pairs”. A
more recent study by Lundy (, 2002, cited in Lundy, 2003, p. 202) also shows that
depressive symptoms in mothers “have been found to predict reductions in the
frequency of parent-child synchrony”. 
Such ‘asynchrony’ also seems to continue beyond infancy into toddlerhood,
with depressed mothers being less likely to repair interrupted interactions between
themselves and their toddlers (Jameson, Gelfand, Kulesar & Teti, 1997, cited in Cicchetti
& Toth, 1998). This study also found that the toddlers of depressed mothers were less
likely to maintain interactions with their mothers and that depressed mothers and their
toddlers showed less interactive coordination than non-depressed mothers and their
toddlers.
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As a recent review by Reck et al. (2004, p. 276) notes, overall depressed mothers
are reported to “lack empathy and emotional availability”, and to have “a reduced
ability to perceive the child’s signals and interpret them correctly, and to react
appropriately and promptly”. Depressed mothers have also been observed to show “a
lesser degree of playful body contact as well as less loving interactions (kissing and
stroking) with their infant” (Reck et al., 2004, p. 276).19
It should be noted at this point that the behaviour of depressed mothers is not
homogenous with research identifying two main ‘negative’ interactional patterns
between depressed mothers and their children, as well as a ‘positive’ interactional
pattern, which is similar to the way in which non-depressed women interact with their
children (see Field et al., 2001). The two main ‘negative’ patterns have been described as
‘withdrawn, unavailable and understimulating’ and ‘hostile-intrusive and
overstimulating’. Furthermore, some depressed mothers show a mixture of the
‘withdrawn’ and ‘hostile’ behaviours (Field, Healey, Goldstein, & Guthertz, 1990).
In light of the analysis being developed in this thesis it is very likely that such
differing interactional styles may result in different clusters of suffering – some of which
may be conceptualized as ‘depression’, others of which may not. For example, if a
mother is profoundly withdrawn and disengaged this may interfere with the very basic
processes involved in establishing a secure sense of ‘mineness’ or ipseity, suggested
above to underlie the cluster of sufferings conceptualized as schizophrenia.
It should also be noted, however, that while depressed mothers can be
‘withdrawn, unavailable and understimulating’, the kind of profound disengagement
which, it was suggested in Section 6.2, may contribute to the ‘disturbances of self’ that
underlie ‘schizophrenia’ is not typical of depressed mothers20. Indeed, a wide-ranging
meta-analysis of research concerning the parenting behaviour of depressed mothers by
Lovejoy, Graczyk and O’Hare (Lovejoy, Graczyk, O'Hare, & Neuman, 2000, p. 583)
suggested that depression seemed to be
                                                 
19 It is acknowledged that the research concerning the interactions of depressed mothers with their children,
like any research, will, to a certain degree, reflect the presuppositions and the values of the researchers.
Nevertheless, the consistency of the findings (albeit couched in somewhat value-laden terms) and the
compatibility of these findings with research which indicates that the children of depressed mothers are
often later diagnosed as ‘depressed’ themselves, strongly suggests that the ways in which depressed
mothers interact with their children may play a significant role in the genesis of ‘depression’.
20 Interestingly, a study by Goodman and Brumley (Goodman & Brumley, 1990) found that the parenting of
‘depressed’ women generally fell between that of ‘schizophrenic’ women and ‘well’ women, and that
“depressed women’s functioning was more variable than that of either other group” (Goodman & Brumley,
1990, p. 37).  Furthermore, the results of this study suggested that the mother’s diagnosis had its effect
mainly via the ‘quality’ of her parenting and thus the model which emerged from these results “is that
diagnosis influences the quality of the parenting and quality of parenting influences outcome” (Goodman &
Brumley, 1990, p. 38)
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associated most strongly with irritability and hostility toward the child, to be associated
to a somewhat lesser degree with disengagement from the child, and to have a relatively
weak association with rates of play and other active and pleasant social interactions.
A review by Downey and Coyne (1990, p. 63) also highlights the high level of
irritability and hostility evident in the interactions between depressed mothers and their
children.  As these authors point out, ‘clinically depressed’ mothers from the UCLA
Family Stress Project were found to be “more irritable and critical and less positive and
task focused than other mothers during a conflict resolution task with their child”
(Downey & Coyne, 1990, p. 63) and that research also indicates that maternal depression
predicts hostility towards children in a non-clinical sample.
Essentially, then, the research discussed above suggests that the behaviours
characteristic of, though not confined to, depressed mothers, interfere with the ability of
these mothers to achieve an attunement or synchrony between themselves and their
infants. It has been suggested that such failures of attunement severely compromise the
“particular form of pleasure upon which value [accorded to the self] depends” (Meares,
2000, p. 68). In light of the current analysis, then, if “the face and voice of the mother is
where the baby’s existence as the ‘me’ resides” (Meares, 2000, p. 85), then the emerging
‘me’ of the infants of depressed women is very likely to be a less responsive, less
expressive, less happy ‘me’; a possibility which the research seems to support.
A study by Cicchetti, Rogosch, Toth and Spagnola (1997), for example, which
looked at children’s affect displays upon recognizing themselves in a mirror, suggested
that the children of depressed mothers begin to form negative feelings about their ‘self’
from very early in their lives.  As these authors note, the development of what is called
‘visual self-knowledge’ (the ability to recognize oneself in the mirror) during early
toddlerhood has been investigated empirically primarily through studies involving
applying rouge to the nose of children, placing them in front of the mirror, and seeing if
they then touch their own nose; if they do then this indicates that they can recognize
themselves.
Research with ‘low-risk’ samples indicates that this visual self-recognition
usually results in the display of ‘positive affect’ (e.g., Brookes-Gunn & Lewis, 1984 cited
in Cicchetti et al., 1997, p. 342). Research with ‘high risk’ samples, however, shows a
“higher level of neutral or negative affect accompanying self-recognition” {Schneider-
Rosen & Cicchetti, 1984, 1991; Spiker & Ricks, 1984, cited in Cicchetti, Rogosch, Toth &
Spagnola, 1997 , p. 341}.
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Cicchetti et al. (1997) compared toddlers of depressed and non-depressed
mothers and found that while there was no difference between the groups in the
percentage of toddlers who showed the ability to recognise themselves in the mirror
there were “striking affect differences” between the two groups of toddlers who had
attained self-recognition;  the self-recognizing toddlers of depressed mothers displayed
“significantly more nonpositive affect while examining themselves in the mirror post-
rouge application than did the toddlers who were self-recognizers in the nondepressed
group” (Cicchetti et al., 1997, p. 356).
As Cicchetti et al. (1997, p. 356) note,
what makes these data so compelling are that there were no differences between the two
groups of self-recognizing toddlers during pre-rouge mirror inspection. Thus, the
nonpositive affect exhibited during post-rouge application appears to have been
associated with a self-evaluation process that resulted in the disruption of a positive
affective display towards the self.
As Cicchetti, Rogosch, Toth and Spagnola (1997) also point out, research
consistently suggests that the attribution patterns of depressed mothers seem to affect
the types of self-attributions made by their children.  For example, a study by Radke-
Yarrow, Belmont, Nottelman and Bottomly (1990, cited in Cicchetti et al., 1997, p. 341)
showed depressed mothers “conveyed significantly more negative affect in their
attributions, particularly in regard to negative attributions about child emotions”.
Furthermore, among depressed mothers and their toddlers “there was a higher
correspondence in the affective tone of attributions and statements about the self”
(Cicchetti et al., 1997, p. 341).  As Cicchetti et al. (1997, p. 341) note, “this finding
suggests a heightened vulnerability among children of mood-disordered mothers for
negative self-attributions”.
Research also suggests that the infants of depressed mothers have problems with
what is conceptualised in the literature as ‘self-efficacy’. For example, the infants of
depressed mothers have been found to make fewer efforts to activate their mothers and
they “appear to lack initiative [and to] become withdrawn and querulous” (Papousek,
2001, cited in Reck, 2004). A study by Jennings and Abrew (2004) suggests that this lack
of ‘self-efficacy’ continues into the toddler years, the age when children first start to
develop a sense of themselves as a ‘self’, and to have ideas about the attributes of that
‘self (conceptualised as ‘self-concept’).  In this study the toddlers of depressed mothers
were less persistent, required more prompts and showed less pride and pleasure in their
achievements than the toddlers of nondepressed mothers.
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A study by Nolen-Hoeksema, Wolfson, Mumme and Guskin (1995) suggests that
such problems with ‘self-efficacy’ may continue beyond the toddler years and into early
and middle-childhood. The children of mothers “who were more negative and hostile
and less able to encourage mastery in their children” were more likely to exhibit more
helpless behaviours in a puzzle task and were “less likely to endorse active problem-
solving approaches to frustrating situations” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995, p. 377).
Furthermore, the teachers of these children rated them as “less competent and more
prone to helpless behaviors” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995, p. 377).
 ‘Self-efficacy’ is a crucial aspect of a person’s ‘self-concept’; if one does not feel
positive about one’s agentic powers then this will inevitably affect the overall value one
accords to one’s ‘self’. Of course our sense of ourselves as an agent in the world is, in
Harré’s (1998) schema, an aspect of ‘Self 1’, suggesting that the emergence of this aspect
of ‘self’ of children who experience the kinds of early relational problems discussed
above is also compromised. As was pointed out in Chapter Three, it is via our
immersion in the various discourses that comprise our social world that we learn the
various ‘rules of engagement’, and realise which rules are validated within which
discourses. According to this view, right from the beginning our “intentions are
structured by and emerge from the positions taken up in a social context and the
discourses that pervade and structure it” (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 122)
For Harré and Gillett (1994) the validations operating within discursive contexts
together with a person’s ‘self-location’ or ‘positioning’ within these contexts emerge as
the crucial factors influencing the attainment of a sense of control over one’s actions in
real-life situations. ‘Validations’ essentially provide people with options to look at a
situation in one way rather than another and they also recommend commitments to
certain positionings within a discourse. Thus, there will be certain ‘options’ within the
discourses that surround us that are validated and others which are not.
For people who experience early relational difficulties of the kind typified by, but
not confined to, the children of depressed women, it is suggested that the ‘validations’
operating within their discursive contexts would tend to constrain their options to look
at situations, and to look at their own ‘positioning’ or ‘efficacy’ regarding those
situations, in ways which would make the kind of ‘helpless’ behaviours outlined above
much more likely.  Furthermore, as was pointed out in Chapter Three (Section 3.3) such
validations become, quite literally, embodied, an essential, albeit largely
unacknowledged, aspect of one’s personal being.
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This does not necessarily mean that such a person would be ‘helpless’ in every
situation. Indeed, there may be many situations within which, due to immersion in
different ‘discourses’ as they grow up, they are able to exercise considerably more
initiative and ‘power’ over their environment. It is suggested, however, that if the fragile
‘self’ of such a person was, at any stage threatened then feelings of ‘helplessness’ may
well be re-activated. This is in line with the findings of the study by Treynor et al.
(Treynor et al., 2003), cited above, which suggest that it is feelings of ‘low-self mastery’
that are most central to the experience of ‘depression’.
Studies have also shown that the behaviour of infants of depressed mothers
tends to be characterised by behaviours which ‘mirror’ the depressed behaviour of the
mother such as “increased withdrawal and avoidance, avoidance of eye contact, a low
level of expression of positive affect” (Reck et al., 2004, p. 276), more self-comforting
behaviour (e.g., touching themselves or putting their fingers in their mouths) and less
vocal utterances (Beebe, Lachmann & Jaffe, 1997, cited in Reck, 2004).  And a study by
Cohn, Matias, Tronick, Connell and Lyons-Ruth (1986) reported that in comparison to
infants of nondepressed mothers, who are in ‘Play’ (during observed interactions with
mothers) an average of 15 percent of the time, only one infant in the depressed mother
group was in Play for this amount of time.
Furthermore, the results of a study by Field et al. (1988) suggests that the
children of depressed mothers interact with strangers in much the same way as they
interact with their mothers, although they did not look away from the strangers as
frequently as they looked away from their mothers (Field et al., 1988). Field et al. (1988)
suggest that gaze aversion may be ‘stimulus-specific’, in other words, it occurs as a
direct reaction to the mother’s unresponsiveness. Citing Tronic and Gianino (1986), Field
et al. (1988) suggest that head and gaze aversion may be an attempt to “reduce the
negative affect engendered by unresponsive maternal behavior” . . . [suggesting that]  . .
. the interactions with the stranger were not as stressful as those with their depressed
mothers” (Field et al., 1988, p. 1575).
As was noted in Chapter Five, this kind of ‘unsupportive’ mothering, in addition
to being stressful for the infant, also interferes with the child’s ability to regulate its own
emotional reactions, to ‘self-soothe’. While babies begin to regulate their emotional
responses very soon after birth by engaging in behaviours such as suckling to sooth
themselves (Campos, 1988, cited in Repetti et al., 2002), a study by Van den Boom (1994,
cited in Repetti et al., 2002, p. 345) showed that “parental nurturing appears to facilitate
the development of these primitive coping behaviors”. In this study an intervention
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which improved “maternal responsiveness, attentiveness and control . . . resulted in an
increase in infant self-soothing behaviors” (Repetti et al., 2002, p. 345). Further, infants
whose mothers did not take part in this ‘intervention’ showed a slight decrease in self-
soothing behaviours between 6 and 9 months and were rated as having “less secure
attachment to their mothers”.
The ‘difficult’ behaviours of the children of depressed women, including their
lowered ability to ‘self-soothe’ and thus regulate their own emotional responses, would
then, in turn, make it even more difficult for the already compromised mother-child
relationship to function in ways that would overcome the effects of such
‘dysregulations’. Within this ‘negative cycle’ the kinds of behaviours and feelings
commonly observed in the children of ‘depressed’ mothers (although not confined to
them) are likely to be experienced as aversive by the mother, further adding to her
‘stress load’ and potentially exacerbating her ‘depression’.  The mother’s increasing
depression would, in turn, lead to a progressive worsening of the already strained
mother-child relationship.  As Hammen, Burge and Stansbury (1990, p. 25) note,
research suggests that the “negative, conflictual interactions” which characterise the
interactions between depressed women and their children “are more likely to occur as
the child’s age increases”.
If nothing occurs to break this cycle these difficulties will compound as these
children grow older, leaving them less well equipped to deal with the challenges and
complexities of the interpersonal relationships they will encounter in the wider social
world. As Cicchetti and Toth (1998, p. 228) point out, for example, research has shown
preschool-aged children of parents with a mood disorder “characteristically engage in
uncontrolled and poorly regulated exchanges with peers” and that the boys of mothers
who are depressed “have been found to generate aggressive strategies to solve
hypothetical peer conflicts”.
Cicchetti and Toth (1998, p. 229) further note that research has shown that
younger children of depressed mothers tend to be ‘over-aroused’ to “hypothetical
situations of interpersonal conflict and distress. This finding suggests that social
difficulties may be more stressful to them than to children who have not experienced
such early relational problems.  Older children of depressed mothers, on the other hand,
“appeared to struggle against experiencing guilt” and were also prone to being
extremely sensitive, to the point of ‘overinvolvement’, to the problems of others
(Cicchetti & Toth, 1998, p. 229).
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Thus it is very likely a child who had experienced unsupportive parenting of the
kind outlined above would experience more social difficulties, which themselves would
be experienced as aversive and stressful at both the personal and the physiological
levels. This may result in such children withdrawing from social situations and
spending more time alone, thus lowering their chances of having positive social
experiences which may, through assisting them to confer value upon the ‘self’, serve as a
protection against ‘depression’. As Gotlib and Hammen (1992, p. 53) note, research
suggests that this might be the case, with studies which compared non-clinically
depressed and nondepressed children finding that “the relatively depressed children
rated others as less friendly in all social contexts, and indicated wanting to be alone
more often, especially in the family context”.
As was illustrated in Chapters Three and Five, a child’s relationship with their
first care-giver not only forges their person level feelings and their ways of being in the
world, it also shapes their responses to the world at the molecular-organismic level. As
the research outlined in Chapter Four made clear, if a child is involved in a relationship
with a care-giver which is highly stressful or which is unable to buffer the child from the
effects of other environmental stressors, this can adversely affect the reactivity of the
child’s HPA axis and leave the child less able to cope, at both the organismic-molecular
and the person level, with the effects of stress.
As Essex, Klein, Cho & Kalin (2002, p. 777) point out, “numerous retrospective
studies of adults and children suggest that increased reactivity of the HPA system is
associated with early trauma and severe deprivation”. Studies have also suggested less
severe stress, such as that experienced due to unsupportive behaviours such as those
shown by depressed mothers, is also positively associated with higher cortisol levels in
infants and toddlers (Bugental et al., 2003; see Essex et al., 2002).  Other studies with
preschoolers and older children suggest that “children’s cortisol levels are positively
correlated with numerous concurrent stresses ranging from maternal depression and
other social stresses to broader family characteristics known to be associated with higher
stress levels” (e.g., low socioeconomic status) (Essex et al., 2002, p. 777).
In support of the contention that the ways in which depressed mothers interact
with their children are stressful for the children, Field, Healy, Goldstein, Perry, Bendell,
Schanberg, Zimmerman and Kuhn (1988) point out that elevated heart rate in infants has
been noted in studies where the mother is asked to remain still-faced (Stoller & Field,
1982, cited in Field et al., 1988) or where the mother is ‘over-stimulating’ (Field, 1981,
cited in Field et al., 1988) – both behaviours characteristic of depressed women.
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Furthermore, Field et al.’s (1988, p. 1575) own study indicated that the infants of
depressed mothers “showed higher heart rate and lower vagal tone when interacting
with their mothers” in comparison to the infants of non-depressed mothers. The infants
of depressed mothers also “showed higher cortisol values than the infants of
nondepressed mothers” (Field et al., 1988, p. 1575).
Field et al. (1988) suggest that the infants’ elevated heart rate during interactions
with their depressed mothers may be due to the arousal of their sympathetic nervous
system. Furthermore, the lower vagal tone of the infants during these interactions
suggests a lowering of parasympathetic activity. As Field et al. (1988, p. 1577) point out,
higher sympathetic arousal and, conversely, lower parasympathetic activity generally
occur in stressful situations, suggesting that the infants of depressed mothers were
stressed during their interactions with their mothers.
Interestingly, the heart rate of these infants was not elevated during their
interactions with the stranger, despite their behaviour still remaining, with the exception
of the amount of gaze aversion, much the same.  This suggests that for these children
interacting with their own mothers was more stressful than interacting with a stranger.
The elevated levels of cortisol in these infants is also indicative of the arousal of
the sympathetic nervous system. As Field et al. (1988, p. 1577) point out,
given the delay in the effects of stress on cortisol levels, and given that baseline measures
of cortisol in infants are related to the levels of cortisol excreted under stress, it would
appear that these infants may be experiencing chronic stress.
As has already been noted in Section 6.2, such ‘dysregulations’ of the stress
response system are consistently reported in those diagnosed with ‘affective disorders’.
As Davidson (2002, p. 478) notes, elevated activity of the HPA axis “is one of the most
replicated biological findings in major depression”. This is in line with the suggestion
that a general vulnerability to psychological suffering is conferred via early relational
problems which causes ‘damage’ not only to a child’s emerging personal being, but also
to their developing neurobiological tools.
Thus, it is suggested that unsupportive parenting of the kind exemplified by, but
not confined to, depressed women, damages not only the emerging ‘self’, but also the
neurobiology that subserves that ‘self’, conferring upon the children of these women a
particular vulnerability to the cluster of sufferings conceptualised as ‘depression’.  In
order to experience an episode of ‘depression’, however, the person must also be placed
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under stress of a sort which re-activates the aversive feelings which permeated their
early life, stress which involves some sort of social loss, rejection or let-down.
In support of this contention, a wide-ranging review of the ‘antecedents,
concomitants and consequences’ of depression by Barnett and Gotlib (1988, p. 119)
concluded that depression is often preceded by the “disruption or loss of a central
source of self-worth among individuals who do not have satisfying alternative sources
of self-esteem” (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988, p. 119). This review suggests that “the disruption
of a primary relationship, such as the marital relationship, may lead to depression” and
that an “alienation within the individual’s intimate interpersonal system may precede,
and possibly precipitate, the onset of depressive symptoms” (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988, p.
120). As Barnett and Gotlib (1988, p. 119) note, such losses and alienations “most often
involve important interpersonal relationships or social roles, but disappointments in the
attainment of achievement related goals have also been recognized as precipitating
events” (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988, p. 119).
This suggestion is supported by the research of Brown and his colleagues (Brown
et al., 1986; Brown, Bifulco, & Andrews, 1990; Brown, Bifulco, Veiel et al., 1990) with the
results of a study by Brown, Bifulco, Viel and Andrews (1990) showing that the “the ill-
effects in terms of low self-esteem will on the whole not occur when the current
environment is reasonably supportive”. If the environment is unsupportive, however,
depression is very likely to occur. For example, a prospective study by Brown, Andrews,
Harris, Adler and Bridge (1986) found a very high rate of depression in women who
confided in and were ‘let-down’ by partners or other people close to them. Conversely,
for those who were not ‘let-down’, confiding in partners or other close sources of
support, was associated with a low risk for depression.
Furthermore, in support of the contention that ‘threats to self’ are particularly
likely to lead to ‘depression’ for people with a ‘vulnerable self’, studies carried out by
Brown, Andrews, Harris, Adler and Bridge (1986) suggest that social support and NES
(Negative Evaluation of Self) both contribute to the risk of depression. Furthermore, a
study by Brown, Andrews and Bifulco (cited in Brown, Bifulco, Veiel et al., 1990) found
that once a ‘severe event’ had occurred, NES “predicted an increased risk of depression
at a caseness level” (Brown, Bifulco, Veiel et al., 1990, p. 225). The results of a study by
Brown, Bifulco, Veiel and Andrews (1990) also made the link between NES and early
relational problems, noting that when “early inadequate parenting and a negative
current environment occur together, there is a potentiation of NES in a statistical sense
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. . . That is, their combined presence is associated with an increased risk of NES” (Brown,
Bifulco, Veiel et al., 1990, p. 231).
Further supporting the contention that events which constitute a ‘threat to self’
are very likely to trigger the feelings, and subsequently the thoughts, characteristic of
‘depression’, is the finding that many people experience their first episode of
‘depression’ during adolescence – a period of time marked by major role transitions and
new, and potentially threatening, social experiences. A number of studies have found
elevated rates of depressed moods in adolescence, as compared to adulthood (e.g.,
Allgood-Merten, Lewinsohn & Hops, 1990; Larsson & Melin, 1990, cited in Petersen,
Compas, Brooks-Gunn, Stemmler, Ey & Grant, 1993).  A general population study by
Radloff (1991, cited in Petersen et al., 1993, p. 157) looking at incidence of ‘depressed
mood’, for example, found “dramatic increases in depressed moods between the ages of
13 and 15 years, a peak at approximately 17-18 years, and a subsequent decline to adult
levels”.
Other studies have suggested that diagnoses of clinical depression also appear to
increase dramatically in adolescence compared to childhood (Fleming & Offord, 1990;
Rutter et al., 1976; Rutter, 1986, cited in Petersen et al., 1993). The period from late
adolescence to the mid-20s, known as the ‘transition to adulthood’ is also “marked by
high rates of major depression” (Reinherz, 2003, p. 2141).
The initial impact of a social exit or role loss which threatens the ‘self’, it is
suggested, will be to reactivate ‘somatic markers’ or embodied memories of highly
aversive childhood experiences – experiences, as already noted above, that are marked
by a profound sense of ‘misattunement’ with the world (experienced in early infancy as
the mother) and permeated with what Meares (2000) refers to as ‘disjunctional anxiety’.
At the organismic/molecular level, the reactivation of such ‘memories’ would initiate
the body’s stress response systems (Schwarz, 1994), already sensitized due to stress-
induced vulnerability of limbic areas (Post, 1992; Post, Weiss & Leverich, 1994, cited in
Harkness & Tucker (2000) resulting in either emotional hyperreactivity (quick to cry,
irritable, prone to tantrums), or emotional hyporeactivity (social withdrawal, emotional
flatness, apathy, disinterest in surroundings) (Schwarz & Perry, 1994).
Thus, the physiological stress induced by the social exit or role loss would
manifest itself as person-level feelings and behaviours such as tearfulness, anxiety,
irritability, insomnia (or hypersomnia) and agitation (or lethargy) – all of which are
‘symptoms’ of ‘depression’ according to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
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Association, 2000).  These behaviours and feelings, along with a profound sense of
‘misattunement’ or ‘asynchrony’ reactivated by the perceived threat to the self, would, it
is suggested, be very likely to be the first ‘signs’ that something was wrong with the
negative thoughts and feelings about the ‘self’ coming later, as people utilise their ‘inner
voice’ to respond to, and as an attempt to ‘make sense of’, these feelings (Cromby,
2006b).
While there is not a lot of research into people’s subjective experience of the early
stages of depression, a series of in-depth interviews with people who had suffered
recurrent episodes of ‘depression’ by Hagerty, Williams & Liken (1997) provides
research support for the suggestion that the feelings (rather than the thoughts) come
first.  As these authors point out, early ‘signs’ that depression was imminent for the
participants in this study tended to be a vague sense that ‘something wasn’t right’, often
experienced as ‘stress’ or ‘anxiety’ and often attributed to external causes such as work
stress or lack of sleep.
My acceptance of the illness followed several months of denial during which, at first, I
had ascribed the malaise and restlessness and sudden fits of anxiety to withdrawal from
alcohol; I had abruptly abandoned whisky and all other intoxicants in June.
William (Styron, 1990, p. 8)
The next stage of the ‘depressive prodrome’, these authors suggest, includes
alterations in sleep and appetite, lack of energy, changes in the way they are thinking,
withdrawal and isolation and general anxiety.
It was not really alarming at first, since the change was subtle, but I did notice that my
surroundings took on a different tone at certain times: the shadows of nightfall seemed
more sombre, my mornings were less buoyant, walks in the woods became less zestful,
and there was a moment during my working hours in the late afternoon when a kind of
panic and anxiety overtook me, just for a few minutes, accompanied by a visceral
queasiness – such a seizure was at least slightly alarming, after all.
William (Styron, 1990, p. 42)
Interestingly, and in line with the analysis being developed in this thesis,
Hagerty, Williams and Liken (1997, p. 310) suggest that these symptoms “were all linked
to one general outcome, the inability to experience congruence, harmony, or synchrony
with the environment”, a feeling of being ‘out of tune’ with other people, and with the
world in general. Such feelings, it is suggested, may be reactivated memories of the
profound sense of ‘misattunement’ or ‘asynchrony’ experienced by the person during
their very early interactions with their first care-giver.
278
These authors labelled this experience as ‘desynchrony’ and noted that it was
“disturbing to all participants” (Hagerty et al., 1997).
Everyone else seemed to be moving through their days peacefully, laughing and having
fun. I resented them because they were experiencing such an easy time of it. I felt utterly
cut off from them emotionally. I was angry because there was no way they could
understand what I was going through. Their very presence seemed to magnify my sense
of isolation.
David (Karp, 1996)
Oh, I was so alone. I played basketball. I was a member of a team. I had a roommate, but
I was so alone. I had a lot of friends, but I was completely isolated. And that’s what, like,
I believe depression is – a disease of isolation that tells you to withdraw, stay away, don’t
be a social person. Stay away from the people who are going to make you better. Yeah,
the need to be alone, to withdraw. That’s one symptom. But I was like, just so alone. I can
remember walking around, walking around in the rain one day, just like “What the hell?
What was wrong with me? What is wrong with me?”.
Male salesman (Karp, 1996, p. 37)
For the participants in Hagerty et al.’s (Hagerty et al., 1997) study such feelings
often led to avoidance of interpersonal interactions.
I cut myself off from the world and my friends. Two years of my life disappeared into a
black hole.
Kathryn (McNeil, 1993, p. 13)
I would just withdraw from people and places and things that were going on around me.
I would end up just sitting in front of a TV or sitting at home in bed . . . I just got to the
point where I just wanted to be alone and withdrawn from other people. All I can say is
that I would find myself uncomfortable being with other people
Male Office clerk, part-time (Karp, 1996, p. 36)
In my crise a quarante ans I shrank from all human relations, and this explained the image
Paul Rosenfeld happened upon in the fine essay he wrote about me. He spoke of a house
with the shades drawn and a man sitting within, a man who could not hear the knock
when life drove up to the door with her merry summons. How could Paul ever have
guessed what was happening in that house?
(Brooks, 1964, p. 84)
This disturbing experience of desynchrony and the social withdrawal it
precipitated, was then followed by the occurrence of the ‘symptoms’ which signalled the
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beginning of an acute episode of ‘depression’ to all participants, a point which Hagerty
et al. (1997) labelled as ‘the crash’. It was at this point, according to Hagerty (1997) that
the participants in his study started to notice changes in ‘cognition’, in other words
people start to ‘notice’ they are thinking differently and these ‘different thoughts’, as
research consistently indicates, are “dominated by a negative view of the self, the world
and the future” (Beck, 1976, cited in Bentall, 2004, p. 239). Beck (1976, cited in Bentall,
2004) notes that “automatic or unbidden thoughts that reflect these [negative] themes
are the immediate precursors of a dysphoric mood” (Bentall, 2004, p. 239).
As was noted above, such negative thoughts and feelings about the ‘self’ are
essentially people’s attempts to respond to, and to ‘make sense of’, the profoundly
aversive feelings which begin to permeate their experience of life following the ‘threat to
self’. Essentially, as Cromby (Cromby, 2006b, p. 14) sees it, things happen which evoke
feelings and we name these feelings with inner speech. This inner speech can then evoke
more feelings, which in turn will lead to further commentary, and more feelings, and so
it goes on. It should also be noted at this point that because the capacity for ‘inner
speech’ also emerges from people’s early experiences with their first care-givers, as was
outlined in Chapter Three , it is very like that the ‘inner voice’ of those who have
experienced early relational difficulties will find ‘negative ruminations’ particularly easy
and familiar.
As Cromby (2006b, p. 14) notes, “there is a constant iteration between socialised
feelings and socially derived inner speech, a dialectical relationship, a ceaseless flux of
fluid movment from one to the other”.  It is at this point that people are most likely to
articulate extremely negative feelings about the ‘self’, feelings of failure and shame at
their incompetence, as writer Van Wyck Brooks (1964, pp. 83-84) describes;
There came a time in the middle twenties when my own bubble burst, when the dome
under which I had lived crumbled into ruin, when I was consumed with a sense of
failure, a feeling that my work had all gone wrong and that I was mistaken in all I had
said or thought. What had I been doing? I had only ploughed the sea, as a certain great
man once remarked, and I thought of my writing “with rage and shame”, E.M. Forster’s
phrase for his own feeling about his early work.
Such ruminations can then, in turn, exacerbate the feelings and contribute to the
downward spiral so characteristic of ‘depression’.
. . .  after a while it takes on a life of its own. You don’t have any control [over] your
thinking or how despairing you feel or how morose you start feeling. It just takes off.
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And you need some intervention or some relief because you can’t deal with the pain
anymore
Unemployed, disabled female (Karp, 1996, p. 32)
What happens [is] my head, I feel kind of light-headed, and it just kind of shuts off. And
it can be very frustrating, especially if you’re working and trying to do something. The
whole head, it’s just  . . . awful. What happens [is] I can tell when I’m starting to get
depressed. When I begin to have some depression [I begin to have] dark thoughts,
something bad is going to happen . . . You’re going to die. It doesn’t matter how type of
thing, you know. Isn’t it sad that you’re going to, you know, take over, and then the
anxiety, light-headed, don’t feel like eating. These are all symptoms . . . But when those
initial thoughts start to come in regularly, they basically take over. Then it’s like life is
worthless, and why even bother to get out of bed.
 Male salesman (Karp, 1996, p. 31)
Thus, while it is being suggested that the vulnerable or devalued self lies at the
centre of the cluster of sufferings conceptualised as depression, and provides it with its
person-level particularities the subjective experience of this devalued or ‘non-self’
involves considerably more than just ‘negative cognitions about the self’ or ‘low self-
esteem’. Such assessments of the ‘self’, it is suggested, are ‘after the fact’. They are, as has
been pointed out above, simply the attempts of the person to ‘make sense of’, to ‘give
voice to’, the intensely negative feelings aroused in them, at every level of their being, by
events which re-awaken embodied memories of being profoundly ‘out of tune’ or ‘out of
step’ with their world (as originally represented by their primary care-giver), a sense of
being essentially ‘unre-cognised’, as Meares (2000) puts it. This sense often manifests
itself in particularly severe experiences of depression, in feelings of being a non-self, or
of not existing at all in relation to other people.
This is reflected in the comments of a woman with recurrent depressions who
had eventually sought ECT treatment as a last resort;
I use the words ‘my’ and ‘I’ as a convention, actually, whatever constitutes a self is
absent. Although everything is frightening, nothing matters – there is no ‘me’ for it to
matter to.
(Anonymous, 2006,  p. D1)
[Depression] is a black hole – a profound disconnection between the self and the life
force.
(Anonymous, 2006)
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Once caught in this ‘vortex’ of feelings and thoughts people begin to experience
the kind of anguish and despair that moves out of the realm of understandable and into
the realm of the ‘ununderstandable’.
I would say it kind of feels like somebody is holding a match that’s lit and just the flame
is really hot and you’re trying to stand it, and it’s just consuming you more and more and
then it just gets down to the end and there’s no more, and the consuming part is just
complete hopelessness. You start off as a whole person and then little by little things that
you care about start floating away and they’re not important any more and they get
harder to hold on to. They just become less and less important and harder to try and do
and the easiest thing to do is just to lie down and let it consume you.
Female nanny (Karp, 1996, p. 29)
I mean it’s doom, it’s hopelessness, down the water is death, and up is just a dark storm
that you want to get away from, but can’t . . . That’s why the sense of doom. And that
causes a paralysis, you know . . . The sense of doom actually paralyzes you . . . It
incapacitates you . . .
Male custodian (Karp, 1996)
There’s a real strong element of despair [to depression]. I mean it was like so
overwhelming that [despair] was all I felt. And . . . when I got myself admitted [to the
hospital] this last time I just had this incredible sense of despair [with] no end to it. You
know, just a constant ocean of it . . . Also, after a while it takes on a life of its own. You
don’t have any control [over] your thinking or how despairing you feel or how morose
you start feeling. It just takes off. And you need some intervention or some relief because
you can’t deal with the pain anymore
Unemployed, disabled female (Karp, 1996)
For some people their pain reaches a point where they feel, quite simply, unable
to go on and they begin to fantasise about death. These ‘fantasies’ are, in the same way
as the ‘ruminations’ discussed above, attempts on the part of the person to make sense
of, or to alleviate, their feelings.  Unfortunately such thoughts tend to result in an
exacerbation of the pain, creating a downward spiral that, for some people, can end in
suicide.
What I had begun to discover is that, mysteriously and in ways that are totally remote
from normal experience, the gray drizzle of horror induced by depression takes on the
quality of physical pain. But it is not an immediately identifiable pain, like that of a
broken limb. It may be more accurate to say that despair, owing to some evil trick played
upon the sick brain by the inhabiting psyche, comes to resemble the diabolical discomfort
of being imprisoned in a fiercely over-heated room. And because no breeze stirs this
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caldron, because there is no escape from this smothering confinement, it is entirely
natural that the victim begins to think ceaselessly of oblivion.
(Styron, 1990, p. 50)
I was possessed now with a fantasy of suicide that filled my mind as the full moon fills
the sky. It was a fixed idea. I could not expel this fantasy that shimmered in my brain and
I saw every knife as something with which to cut one’s throat and every high building as
something to jump from. A belt was a garrotte for me, a rope existed to hang oneself
with, the top of a door was merely a bracket for the rope, every rusty musket had its
predestined use for me and every tomb in a graveyard was a place to starve in.
Van Wyck (Brooks, 1964, p. 84)
Sometimes I fear for my own safety, and have frightening visions of hurting myself. I
have considered suicide, and planned how I would do it down to the last detail. I used to
have hideous nightmares that I was dead.
Kathryn (McNeil, 1993, p. 13)
Central to these quotations is the notion that such ‘fantasies’ occur ‘against one’s
will’. One’s ‘self’ is no longer in charge, it is in too much pain. There is a sense of
watching oneself moving inexorably, and almost unwillingly, towards destruction,
eloquently described in this quote from William Styron’s (1990, p. 50) Darkness Visible;
A phenomenon that a number of people have noted while in deep depression is the sense
of being accompanied by a second self – a wraithlike observer who, not sharing the
dementia of his double, is able to watch with dispassionate curiosity as his companion
struggles against the oncoming disaster, or decides to embrace it. There is a theatrical
quality about all this, and during the next several days, as I went about stolidly
preparing for extinction, I couldn’t shake off a sense of melodrama – a melodrama in
which I, the victim to be of self-murder, was both the solitary actor and lone member of
the audience. I had not yet chosen the mode of my departure, but I knew that that step
would come next, and soon, as inescapable as nightfall.
(Styron, 1990, pp. 64-65)
It is suggested that seriously contemplating, or actually committing, suicide
would be much more likely for those who experienced particularly severe early
relational difficulties, and whose sense of ‘self’ was, consequently, particularly
vulnerable. This is supported by the results of a study by Felitti (2002) whereby the
‘adverse events’ (e.g., parental violence, childhood sexual abuse, parental alcoholism) of
a person’s life were counted and they were given a score between 1 and 10.  An
individual with an ACE score of 4 or more was not only 460% more likely to be suffering
from ‘depression’, they were also 1,200% more likely to attempt suicide.  Indeed, Felitti
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(2002) suggests that about two-thirds to 80 percent of all attempted suicides could be
attributed to adverse childhood experiences.
It is suggested, however, as it was for ‘schizophrenia’, that extreme adversity
(such as childhood sexual or physical abuse) in and of itself is not foundational of the
particularities of the ‘depressive’ experience. If such abuse occurred within the context
of the kind of unsupportive parenting outlined above, and was perpetrated by someone
close to the child on a frequent basis, however, it would be very likely to exacerbate the
vulnerability of the emerging ‘self’ and thus would contribute to the severity and
chronicity of their eventual ‘depression’. This contention is supported by research which
shows that childhood adversities, including emotional abuse, physical abuse or sexual
abuse, are commonly found in people who are ‘clinically depressed’ (Felitti, 2002;
Molnar et al., 2001)  and that such adversity is associated with more severe
‘symptomatology’ (K. L. Harkness & Monroe, 2002) and with earlier onset (Young,
Abelson, Curtis, & Nesse, 1997).
For the vast majority of people, however, the ‘option’ of ending it all, while it
may be contemplated in some cases, is ultimately discarded.  Indeed, as Richards and
Perri (2002) point out, for adults, the typical episode of depression lasts between 12 and
20 weeks with about 80 percent of all depressed people ‘recovering’ within a year.  Such
‘recoveries’ are sometimes achieved with professional help, but are often achieved
without it (Richards & Perri, 2002). Such ‘recoveries’ are frequently accompanied by
positive changes in the person’s social environment, either serendipitous or purposely
arranged, and by active efforts on the part of the previously depressed person to reduce
the amount of stress they are under (Richards & Perri, 2002).
Nevertheless, these ‘recoveries’ are only temporary for most people, with 80-85
percent of formerly depressed people ‘relapsing’ several times over the course of their
life (Kessler & Magee, 1995, p. 197; Richards & Perri, 2002). This is not surprising in light
of the analysis being developed in this thesis. As has already been noted, the feelings
which arise as a consequence of the kind of early relational problems suggested to
underlie the ‘vulnerable self’ are an integral part of one’s personal being. They are there
from the beginning and they remain at the core of our experience throughout our lives.
If that ‘vulnerable self’ is threatened again then those feelings will be very likely
to be activated again, even if the person has already been ‘cured’ of a previous
depression. This is particularly likely due to the inability of most commonly utilised
therapies (e.g., cognitive-behavioural therapy and pharmacotherapy) to address the
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embodied feelings/memories that lie at the root of ‘depression’. Indeed, having already
experienced a ‘depression’ will make it all the more likely the person will experience
another one in reaction to a similar threat. As Hagerty et al. (1997) point out, clinicians
treat more patients for recurrent than first-time episodes and recurrence is also
associated with increased severity and increased duration of episodes, and shorter
periods of wellness between episodes (Hagerty et al., 1997). As with all other things we
‘do’ in our lives, if we have ‘done’ depression once, we will find it easier to ‘do’ it again.
Thus, for the person with the kind of early relational difficulties outlined in this
section, every threat to the vulnerable self, even if these threats seem quite minor to an
outsider, has the potential to reactivate the embodied feelings that permeated their
earliest interactions with their care-giver. These feelings would then suffuse their
current experience and impact on their being at every level, from the molecular to the
personal and the whole process would begin all over again.
6.4. CONCLUSION
The analyses presented in this chapter utilised the basic approach outlined in
Chapter Five to attempt to build an alternative understanding of how the clusters of
suffering conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ may emerge from within
the complex coactions between all the aspects of a child’s being– molecular, organismic
and personal – and their social world. The central focus of these analyses was on how
the particularities of the relationship between a child and their mother may shape the
emergence of differing ‘senses of self’ (Harré, 1998), and how these ‘senses of self’ in
turn, given certain environmental contingencies, shape the particularities of the
sufferings that the child later experiences.
Thus, the analysis presented in this thesis, in agreement with many authors
whose work I draw on, suggests that there is no one ‘cause’, in a straight-forward linear-
causal sense, for psychological suffering. As was noted in Chapter Five, no factor, not
even one so fundamental as the early relationship between a child and its primary care-
giver, can ever entirely determine an outcome in a dynamic system such as a human
being. Early relational problems may ‘plant the seeds’, but such suffering requires fertile
ground within which to grow.
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In this chapter some of the more proximal factors suggested to be necessary,
although not sufficient, to the emergence of the particular clusters of suffering
conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’, were discussed. In this final section I
will briefly outline some more distal factors that also contribute towards the
precipitation and maintenance of psychological suffering. While such factors have not
been the focus of the analysis developed in this thesis, as has already been indicated
several times it is impossible to reach any useful understanding of psychological
suffering without placing it within a wider socio-cultural context.
First, as was discussed in Chapter Five, it is very likely that, for a number of
complex reasons, the vast majority of humans in modern setting have experienced early
relational experiences that were not ideal for the kinds of animals we are, thus
contributing to a generalised vulnerability to the ever-increasing list of ‘mental
disorders’ endemic to, and rapidly increasing in, Western and Westernising societies 21
(Good & Kleinman, 1985; Schumaker, 2001; Seligman, 1990). The kind of damage
suggested to be necessary for the emergence of ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ may not
occur some cultures due to child-rearing being a more communal affair. In such societies
considerably less pressure is placed on the mother to be all things to her child, and
children are more likely to be enmeshed in a social network of people who are able to
care for them if their mother cannot.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the kinds of ‘social stressors’ and ‘threats to self’
necessary to the precipitation and maintenance of the kinds of sufferings conceptualised
as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ would be much more likely to occur within a
modern Western society than they would within a more sociocentric society. As
Schumaker (2001, p. 3) points out, Western modernity has “high degrees of structural-
functional differentiation, as well as unprecedented social mobilization that operates in
conjunction with liberal capitalism”. This results, suggests Schumaker (2001, p. 3) in
the subordination of social, economic, and political values to the logic of the market. The
values of personal autonomy have risen to ascendancy in an increasingly
hyperglobalized environment that ushers in a type of consciousness that diminishes
prospects for solidarity.
                                                 
21 It is suggested that because both the social constructionist analysis and the developmental approach to
biology outlined in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis imply the centrality of the coactions between the
organism/person and the wider world (both material and, most importantly, social) through their emphases
on openness of the constitutive processes, broadening the analysis to include more distal or macro-social
factors represents a ‘natural’ theoretical progression.
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This would not be a problem, of course, if humans were endlessly flexible beings,
essentially unhitched from their biological bodies and their basic and indisputable need
– at every level of their being – for social connections with other human beings (Blaffer
Hrdy, 1999; Schumaker, 2001; Small, 1998; S. E. Taylor, 2002) (Hofer, 1987; Hofer, 1984).
As Schumaker (2001, p. 7) points out, however,
[a]loneness and social alienation are intolerable states for the human being. We would
whither and die, both psychologically and physically, if deprived entirely of the
opportunity to relate meaningfully to other people.
The threat, and in many cases the reality, of such deprivation, however,
particularly during early development, is a common feature of the modern Western
existence. As Schumaker (2001, pp. 121-22, author’s italics) points out, “mental health
professionals now speak of the problem of existential isolation that affects many people
today”. Yalom (cited in Schumaker, 2001, p. 122) defines this as “a separation between
the individual and the world” and it is experienced as “deep loneliness and a vague all-
pervasive misgiving”. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that rates of ‘mental disorder’
are so high in the West, given that the factors that precipitate and maintain such distress
are particularly prevalent in comparison to less ‘modern’ societies.
This may, at least partially, explain the consistent finding that schizophrenia is
far more common in urban environments (Mortensen et al., 1999; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl,
& Vollebergh, 2001). Indeed, a study by Mortensen et al. (1999) suggested that urban
birth alone may account for 34.6% of the cases of schizophrenia on a population basis.
Furthermore, another study by the same team of researchers (Pedersen & Mortensen,
2001, cited in Bentall, 2004, p. 477) found a
dose-response relationship between exposure to an urban environment in childhood and
the development of psychosis in later life. It seems that the greater proportion of
childhood spent living in urban environments the greater the risk of madness, with those
who spend their entire childhood in cities being most at risk in later life.
While such findings are often interpreted to be due to increased exposure to
viruses or other biological factors, researcher Jim van Os (cited in Velasquez-Manoff,
2005) suggests that the risk factors posed by the urban environment must be social in
nature. As van Os (cited in Velasquez-Manoff, 2005, p. 2) points out, “studies of smaller
communities show a correlation between social fragmentation, isolation, inequality and
an increased risk of psychosis”.
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Furthermore, as has been noted in Chapter Five, the private, autonomous and
individualised ‘self’ that emerges out of the typical Western upbringing also makes it
more likely that a person will be vulnerable to experiencing such social isolation and
alienation (Shweder & Bourne, 1984). This may occur not only because of a person’s own
prioritisation of individualistic needs (e.g., success, money, pleasure) over relational
needs, but also because many others in the person’s social world will be prioritising their
individual needs also.
The Western view of ‘self’ also makes it much less likely that people will be able
to locate the source of our problems, or indeed of their very motivations and intentions,
outside of their ‘selves’.  This, in turn, makes it more likely that they will blame
themselves for their problems. Indeed, there are a number of discourses in the West
around ‘personal responsibility’ that overtly encourage this, thus providing fertile soil
for the ‘negative attributions’, ‘low self-esteem’, and feelings of guilt which are so central
to many ‘mental disorders’ in the West (Schumaker, 2001). If something goes wrong, or
our life is not working out as we planned, we have no-one to blame but ourselves.
As Schumaker (2001, pp. 62-63) notes,
the individuated self personalizes the inner states of emotion and is easily overwhelmed
by adversity and difficult life events. The results are self-blame, isolation, loneliness,
guilt, existential despair and other symptoms that manifest themselves in the Western
brand of depression.
Schumaker (2001, p. 63) suggests that the unindividuated self is “better able to
locate problems at a less personal level”, and thus avoids the emotional brunt of these
problems by being able to place stressful life events “within the wider context of a
collective identity”. This is in line with research which shows that “the ‘cognitive
symptoms [of depression] – especially guilt and low self-esteem – are less evident in
developing countries than in the West” (Bentall, 2004, p. 236).
As was also noted in Chapter Five, the Western conceptualisation of ‘self’
would also make many of the feelings/experiences involved in the cluster of sufferings
conceptualised as ‘depression’ and ‘schizophrenia’ much more threatening and thus
anxiety inducing, than people with a more ‘un-individuated’ (Shweder & Bourne, 1984)
self.  As was pointed out in Chapter Five, “‘dysphoria’ – sadness, hopelessness,
unhappiness, lack of pleasure with the things of the world and with social relationships
– has dramatically different meaning and form of expression in different societies”
(Kleinman & Good, 1985, p. 3). Indeed, in some cultures such experiences are viewed as
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being positive, rather than negative, healthy rather than pathological, making it very
unlikely that they would precipitate the particular ‘cluster of suffering’ conceptualised
as ‘depression’ in the West.
Furthermore, while for Westerners the sense that one’s ‘self’ is ‘dissolving’ or
‘fragmenting’ or that one is ‘losing oneself’ is profoundly threatening, it is possible it
would not be experienced as so threatening in the context of a more ‘sociocentric’
(Shweder & Bourne, 1984) culture. Indeed, it is possible that the conceptualisation of the
‘self’ in more sociocentric  cultures is so profoundly different to that of individualistic
societies, that there is no ‘self’22, in the Western sense, to ‘dissolve’ or ‘fragment’. If these
‘anomalies of experience’, as Parnas and colleagues call them, were not seen as
threatening then they would not induce the kind of anxiety they do in Western contexts,
and may, in some instances, be experienced as a state of being which was simply
‘different’, rather than profoundly distressing. The same point may be made about many
of the other ‘symptoms’ of ‘schizophrenia’ such has hallucinations, a sense of being
somehow separate from one’s body, unusual bodily sensations etc.
Finally, modern Western societies are also less likely to provide the kind of
environment within which ‘recovery’ from the kinds of psychological suffering
conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’ is optimised or even, in many cases, possible. The
consistent finding that the prognosis for ‘schizophrenia’ is considerably better in non-
Western, non-industrialised societies supports this suggestion. This may be due to a
number of factors, including the possibility that a less individuated ‘self’ may be
protective against the kinds of ‘disturbances of self’ thought to underlie ‘schizophrenia’,
that some of the experiences which are considered to be ‘symptomatic’ of
‘schizophrenia’ may not be considered to be problematic or pathological, and the fact
that many people who are diagnosed with ‘schizophrenia’ in the West become extremely
isolated from their fellow human beings.
As Warner (1985, p. 172) points out, being a ‘schizophrenic’ in a Western
industrial society is, for many people, “an unbelievably bitter experience”. As Warner
(Warner, 1985) points out, roughly half of New York City’s homeless are ‘mentally ill’ in
one way or another and between 6 to 8 percent of the inmates of local jails in the United
States are psychotic. Furthermore, Warner (1985, p. 186) notes that even if they are not
on ‘skid row’ or in jail, “Western schizophrenics lead lives of social isolation”.
Schizophrenics have been found to have close contacts with far fewer people than
                                                 
22 At least in the sense of ‘Self 2’ – one’s sense of oneself as a relatively coherent and unitary ‘self’ – and ‘Self
3’ (the presentation of that ‘self’ to others).
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‘normals’  and a third of those considered ‘chronically mentally ill’ have no friends at all
(Warner, 1985).
That isolation, like the anxiety discussed above, compounds the already existing
problem. We need other selves around us in order to be ourselves throughout our lives,
not just at the beginning. Even for a ‘normal’ person, maintaining the sense of oneself as
a coherent unity23 in the face of the kind of isolation endured by people who have been
diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’ in the West would be very difficult.  For someone with
‘schizophrenia’, who faces the task of not only maintaining but of actually attempting to
reconstruct some sort of semblance of ‘self’, such isolation would make this task all but
impossible.
                                                 
23 As noted above this is central aspect of the Western sense of ‘self’.
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CONCLUSION
TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING
It was suggested in the Introduction to this thesis that the lack of progress made
towards understanding and preventing, or, in many cases, even alleviating,
psychological suffering has been due, in large part, to the way in which such suffering is
conceptualised – as s ‘disorder’, ‘illness’ or ‘disease’ which is located, and is thus
potentially locatable, within the individual.   This conceptualisation of psychological
suffering was referred to as the ‘Dysfunctional Mind Account’ (DMA), and in Chapter
One it was argued that this conceptualisation underlies all accepted models or theories
of psychological suffering and is the dominant way of conceptualising such suffering for
both professionals and lay-people in Western cultures.
It was argued in Chapter Two that this conceptualisation is inherently flawed at
a theoretical level, and has very little empirical support.  It was further suggested that, at
a practical level, such a conceptualisation leads to the search for both causes and ‘cure’
being focused primarily ‘inside the skin’ of the individual; a partial approach which
leads to only partial and often misleading results. This approach not only compromises
our understanding of such suffering, but also compromises our efforts to prevent and to
‘cure’ and/or alleviate such suffering.   In the Concluding section of Chapter Two, it was
argued that the main reason the DMA is unable to assist us in understanding and
alleviating psychological suffering is because it is underpinned with assumptions about
human beings and their suffering which are inherently faulty.
These assumptions are as follows –
1) that certain activities or experiences of persons (those referred to as
‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ and which are seen as occurring ‘inside’ the
person, e.g., thoughts, beliefs, wishes, fears, hopes, etc.) are seen as
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representing or occurring in something called the ‘mind’, an entity
posited to contain, or comprise, these activities and experiences;
2) that this ‘mind’ can then be investigated by science, a position that has
made it easy to conflate the ‘mind’ with the brain;
3) that particular sorts of psychological suffering (and ideas about which
sorts can change according to the time and the place where such decisions
are being made) are indicative of a ‘dysfunctional mind’ (or brain)
4) that humans are autonomous individuals, essentially separate from each
other, and from ‘society’, and that society is simply a backdrop to human
life.
In the Introduction to Chapter Three an approach to understanding human
experience was presented which overturns these assumptions, and in so doing overturns
the notion of the “atomistic, bounded, coherent, rational psychological subject endorsed,
at least implicitly, by most mainstream approaches“ (Cromby, 2004a, p. 797).  As Handy
(1987, p. 163) points out, one of the most fundamental propositions of this approach,
which is referred to as ‘social constructionism’, is that
human subjectivity and action are so inextricably interwoven with the social context
which people inhabit that a theoretical separation between the individual and society is
conceptually inadequate.
Because of this the social constructionist approach necessitates
developing analyses which acknowledge firstly, that human subjectivity and actions are
constituted within and through social structures, and, secondly, that people are also the
producers of the social structures they inhabit.
(Handy, 1987, p 164)
The account presented in Chapter Three attempted to sketch out such an
analysis, drawing primarily on the theorising of Rom Harré, John Shotter and John
Cromby. The work of these theorists, it was suggested, was particularly useful for
seeking an alternative understanding of psychological suffering because of their focus
on the social construction of our subjectivity, our experience of being persons in the
world; our ‘personal being’ as Harré (1984a) refers to it.  It is at this person-in-the-world
level (rather than at the organismic or sub-organismic level) that the kinds of suffering
conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’ are primarily experienced, indeed it is this that sets
them apart as ‘mental’ and provides the justification for a separate (albeit medical)
speciality devoted to them. If they manifested themselves purely, or primarily, at a
physical level they would not be ‘mental disorders’.
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As was pointed out in Chapter Three, for Shotter and Harré our individual,
unique mental lives are essentially social productions. Indeed, Harré (1984) characterises
them as being the result of the acquisition of a theory rather than of biological
maturation and suggests that most of the things we take to be “metaphysically ultimate
in psychology are referents of theoretical concepts” (1984, p. 21).   As Harré (1984, p. 20)
notes,
[a] person is not natural object, but a cultural artefact. A person is a being who has
learned a theory, in terms of which his or her experience is ordered.
Both Harré (1984a; 1998) and Shotter (1974a; 1974b; 1984; 1997) suggest that this
‘theory learning’ process occurs within the context of an infants’ earliest social
relationships, and, in particular, their relationship with their mother.  As Harré (1984,
pp. 21-22) notes, from the very beginning “infants make demands upon their mothers
and other caretakers that provoke the very talk and action from the mother” that
facilitates the development of personal being – a being with a sense of oneself as a
singular being with a continuous and unique history with a capacity for self-reference
(‘self’ consciousness), and a sense of oneself as an agent – “a being in possession of an
ultimate power of decision and action” (Harré, 1984, p. 29).
It was suggested that if our ‘personal being’ emerges from our enmeshment with
our social world, then it is likely that the kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental
illness’ may also emerge, at least in part, from the particularities of that enmeshment.  It
was further suggested that if we could understand the processes involved in the
emergence of our ‘personal being’ it is possible we may be able to come closer to some
understanding of why the various problems we call ‘mental illness’ occur and begin to
move towards a way of conceptualising such suffering that does not frame such
experiences as ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’ but, rather, sees them as emerging from the
intricate coactions between the person and the social world within which they must live
their lives.
In Chapter Four, however, it was acknowledged that the emergence of persons
and their psychological suffering cannot be understood by looking only at sociocultural
and discursive factors because persons are both socioculturally and biologically co-
constituted. In order to facilitate a clearer articulation of the ways in which this co-
constitutional process occurs, a brief outline of the developmental approach to biology
taken by Steven Rose (1997) was provided before discussing some recent research from
the biological sciences which illustrates Rose’s (1997) central contention – that the lifeline
of an organism is constructed via its enmeshment in its environment, and thus cannot be
293
understood without taking that environment into account – an insight which mirrors the
social constructionist position that a person cannot be understood separately from the
social world within which s/he is enmeshed.
At this point the scene was set to embark upon the task, in Chapter Five, of
outlining how our personal being is biologically and socioculturally co-constituted and
how vulnerabilities for the kinds of psychological suffering conceptualised as ‘mental
disorder’ may emerge from such processes. This outline served as a general template for
more detailed analyses presented in Chapter Six, of how, depending on the vagaries of
each person’s particular life trajectory, different kinds of psychological suffering – those
clusters of suffering conceptualised as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘depression’ – may emerge.
It is acknowledged that there have been a number of attempts, particularly
within the field of developmental psychopathology, to generate alternative
understandings of psychological suffering wherein such suffering is conceptualised as
emerging from the coactions that occur between the various levels of our being in this
world and the environment within which we are enmeshed.  It is suggested, however,
that such accounts, while offering considerably more insight into psychological suffering
than accounts that do not acknowledge such complexity, are nevertheless still
underpinned by the same assumptions which underlie the Dysfunctional Mind Account.
As was pointed out in Chapter Two, ‘biopsychosocial’ accounts still see the
human being as being essentially a composite of parts that are separable by science; the
‘mind’ and the body, emotions and cognitions, rationality and irrationality, actions and
thoughts. Such accounts also see the human being as separable from the social and
material environment with the environment merely ‘impacting upon’ people in various
ways, or, in the case of ‘mental disorders’,  ‘triggering’ vulnerabilities that are internal to
the person.
Furthermore, such accounts still view the ‘psychological’ aspect of human beings
as being contained in, or represented by, an entity referred to as the ‘mind’ (which may
or may not be conflated with the brain, depending on the account), and this ‘mind’ (or
brain) generates various ‘mental’ or psychological phenomena such as thoughts, desires,
obsessions, hallucinations, etc. It is this ‘mind’ which ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘causes’ the
person to feel/think/act in ways which are considered to be ‘ununderstandable1’, in
                                                 
1 As was noted in Chapter One, this is a term coined by Karl Jaspers (1963, cited in Sass, 2002) a German
phenomenological psychiatrist, to describe the kinds of ‘psychopathologies’ that were “closed to
psychological comprehension” (Sass, 2002, p 251).  Such suffering, in other words, was so bizarre it could
only be caused by aberrations in the brain.
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which case they are said to be suffering from a ‘mental disorder’, a concept which the
majority of such accounts still accept without question.
In the account presented in this thesis it was suggested that the feelings/
thoughts/actions which are ‘symptomatic’ of the various ‘mental disorders’ listed in the
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) are, in fact, completely
understandable if they are seen as being emergent from our continual personal and
embodied enmeshment within our social world, rather than as arising out of the various
processes occurring within us (whether that be our neurochemistry or our ‘mental
mechanisms’ or an ‘interaction’ between them).
This means that while organismic and molecular level factors will, due the fact
we are biophysically embodied, be inevitably involved in the genesis and the experience
of psychological suffering, they are not, in and of themselves, the cause of such suffering.
Furthermore, it has been argued in this thesis that it is person level factors, particularly
those which occur within, and emerge out of, our interactions with our primary care-
giver, which give particular shape to our ‘sufferings’ due to their effects on the early
stages of the emergence of the various ‘senses of self’ (as outlined in Chapter Three)
which comprise our personal being.
This means that the feelings/thoughts/behaviours which are conceptualised as
‘mental disorder’ are as much part of our personal being as any other aspect of us; they
are not ‘other’, they are not ‘disease’, ‘illness’ or ‘dysfunction’.  Indeed, as was illustrated
in Chapters Five and Six, such feelings/thoughts/behaviours almost always represent
an adaptive response, at every level of our being, to the environmental contingencies
people are faced with. Thus, when understood in its full context, the suffering
conceptualised as ‘mental illness’/‘mental disorder’ can be seen as the very
understandable responses of the embodied person to what is happening to them, rather
than ‘ununderstandable’ dysfunctions, aberrations and pathological processes of the
‘mind’ (or brain).
Thus this analysis places the kind of psychological suffering conceptualised as
‘mental disorder’ on a continuum with all other human experiences and means that the
‘symptoms’ of psychiatry’s various ‘mental disorders’ are meaningful expressions of
distress rather than meaningless ‘noise’ from dysfunctional brains or minds.
Obviously such an analysis has major implications for the ways in which those
who are considered to be ‘mentally ill’ are treated, both by society and by ‘mental health
professionals’, most of whom are still viewing such suffering through a ‘Dysfunctional
Mind Account’ lens. The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that the kind of
suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’ should not be seen as representing a
295
dysfunctioning ‘mind’ or brain and thus should not be seen as a problem that should be
dealt with from within a scientific-medical paradigm. Indeed, it is suggested that such a
paradigm, with its determinedly individualistic focus, is entirely the wrong one to turn
to if one is interested in preventing, alleviating, or simply helping people to understand
and live more comfortably with, the experiences conceptualised as symptomatic of
‘mental disorder’.
As was noted in Chapter Six, while the analysis presented in this thesis focused
primarily on the role of early relational problems in the genesis of psychological
suffering, such relational problems do not occur because of ‘dysfunctional’ processes
‘within’ the individuals involved, but because of socio-cultural and economic factors
which are forcing human beings to live in an increasingly socially fragmented world
which is profoundly at odds with our ‘nature’ (Schumaker, 2001; Smail, 1987; Small,
1998; Taylor, 2002).
As a number of theorists are increasingly arguing, it is essentially this
fragmentation and isolation, at every point in a person’s lifeline – from the very earliest
interactions with their first care-giver onwards – which generates and maintains the
kinds of suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’ (e.g., Bentall, 2004; Eckersley,
2004; Perry, 2001; Smail, 1987, 1993; Schumaker, 2001; Seligman, 1990). It is suggested
that these more distal or macro-social factors must be acknowledged and changed before
any progress can be made towards preventing, or even alleviating, the kinds of
psychological suffering conceptualised as ‘mental disorder’.
As was discussed in Chapter Six, social and economic factors in modern Western
societies have structured child-rearing so that most, if not all, of the responsibility for
bringing up the next generation rests with the biological parents, and, in many cases,
with the mother.  This isolates parents from the rest of the social group who would have,
in more traditional societies, shared the child-rearing responsibilities, and leaves them,
essentially, to parent alone.
This ‘privatisation’ of child-rearing, as was discussed in Chapter Six, particularly
in conjunction with other social and financial pressures, can result in less than optimal
early relational experiences for offspring which, it was suggested, contribute to a
generalised vulnerability to the kinds of psychological suffering endemic to, and rapidly
increasing in, Western and Westernising societies (Good & Kleinman, 1985; Schumaker,
2001; Seligman, 1990).
It was also suggested in Chapter Six that social and economic forces which
structure modern Western societies not only create vulnerabilities to psychological
suffering, but it also provide fertile ground, due to the increased likelihood of loneliness
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and social isolation, for the precipitation and the maintenance of such suffering. As has
been noted a number of times in this thesis, human beings are profoundly social
creatures, and they find aloneness and social alienation intolerable at every level of their
being – molecular, organismic and personal.
As Schumaker (2001, p 7) points out,
All functional cultures take heed of our inherently social nature. They operate in
conjunction with this aspect of human nature and provide pathways whereby members
can become united in satisfying ways.
While psychological suffering is undeniably a personal experience, we must
ultimately look beyond the personal, to the social and material environment out of
which all of our ‘personhoods’ emerge, if we truly wish to understand, alleviate and
perhaps even prevent such suffering.
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